TEODORA TOLEVA

THE INFLUENCE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE ON THE CREATION OF THE ALBANIAN NATION

1896–1908

FILIP VIŠNJIĆ

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE ON THE CREATION OF THE ALBANIAN NATION,
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The book by Dr. Teodora Toleva, The Influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the Creation of the Albanian Nation 1896-1908, was written based on research in the Imperial and Royal Archive in Vienna (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv). It is her doctoral dissertation, titled
La Influenda del Imperio Austro-hungaro en la construccion nacional albanesa, 1896-1908 (University of Barcelona, Department of Contemporary History, 2008, 719 pages), written in Spanish, which was defended in 2008 at the Department of Contemporary History, University of Barcelona. The dissertation was later published in Bulgarian, under the title
Влиянието на Австро-Унгария за създаването на албанската нация 1896-1908 (Sofia: Siela 2012, 576 pages), and then in German, under the title Der Einfluss Österreich-Ungarns auf die Bildung der albanischen Nation 1896-1908 (Klagenfurt: Mohorjeva Hermagoras Verlag 2013, 574 pages).
Thus, the Serbian language is – after Spanish, Bulgarian, and German – the fourth language in which the extensive research and conclusions of Teodora Toleva on Austro-Hungarian plans for the creation of the Albanian nation are presented, and to a significant extent, as an anti-nation to the Serbs. This edition of Teodora Toleva's book in Serbian represents the third book edition in any language, after the Bulgarian and

German editions, which were previously published in Bulgaria and Austria. Her research is presented in a positivist manner, and the author emphasizes that she is aware of this. Unfortunately, the severe illness and premature death of Teodora Toleva (1968-2011) prevented her from preparing her doctoral dissertation, in the form of a book, with more of her personal touch.

Toleva says that, after her research, she intends to break historiographical stereotypes, as well as previously communicated research and conclusions about the existence of the Albanian nation in the 19th century, and even before that. In this regard, the author notes that she begins her study of the topic from scratch because, as she emphasizes, she cannot rely on previous achievements in historiography which, when it comes to this issue, prove to be unreliable. She specifically mentions as such the Albanian-American historian Stavro Skendi, the French historian Georges Castellan, as well as the German historians Hans Dieter Schanderl and Peter Bartl.

The starting point of Teodora Toleva is the secret consultations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary at the end of 1896, followed by extensive archival material that tracks the activities of Austro-Hungarian diplomatic planners in Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople, Austro-Hungarian consuls in the "Albanian regions," connections with the Roman Catholic Church, spy networks, bribery – all in order to shape the Albanian nation and create the Albanian state – which would primarily stand in opposition to the intentions of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Italy to establish control over the eastern Adriatic after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Simultaneously with Austro-Hungarian activities, a parallel process of creating the Albanian nation by the Italians was underway, whose goal was for this area to be gradually annexed to Italy and for Serbia to be distanced from the Adriatic Sea. Toleva ends her research with the Young Turk Revolution (1908), when the previous context in which Austro-Hungarian policy was making plans changed.

The first questions posed were how to make a unified nation, a common script, and a literary language, and then a state, from a completely heterogeneous Albanian element, with very scarce mutual communication, which was divided into two large ethno-linguistic groups – Ghegs and Tosks, into three religions – Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Orthodox, and into Sunnis and Bektashis. At secret consultations of Austro-Hungarian ministers and diplomats, it was explicitly emphasized that at the end of the 19th century, the Albanian nation did not exist. In this sense, the intentions of the Albanian League (1878), which was backed by the Turks, are not taken into account, since Austro-Hungarian reports, in the program of that organization which met in Prizren, recorded the presence of pan-Islamic ideology and the absence of the Albanian national idea. Among Albanians at that time, regional and religious identity dominated. From a larger number of Austro-Hungarian documents used by Toleva, an explicit position of ministers and diplomats can be seen that the Albanian nation could not be formed without the support of official Vienna.

In order to determine the facts about inter-Albanian similarities and divisions, it was necessary to enable the work of Austro-Hungarian consulates in the "Albanian regions" of the Ottoman Empire (Shkodra, Durrës, Vlora,
Bitola,
Skopje, Prizren). Their goal was to operate in depth

1 Slavenko Terzić, Old Serbia (19th-20th Century): The Drama of a Civilization, Novi Sad – Belgrade 2012, 118-119.
...and the breadth of the population, the infiltration of the entire area with spy, informant, and collaborator networks, determining the character of the tribes and prominent families, a thorough understanding of morals, customs, and behavior in accordance with these, from which there should be no deviation
According to the research of Teodora Toleva, Vienna did not trust the Albanian elite, nor those who came from the ranks of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, nor the prominent figures among Muslims. Vienna would not have full trust even in bishops who originated from the Albanian people, so it considered that these positions could be taken by Croats from Dalmatia and Istria or Germans from South Tyrol. Much effort was put into making Franciscans and Jesuits the spearhead of Austro-Hungary in the areas inhabited by ethnic Albanians. The role of the Franciscans in Bosnia and Herzegovina was praised, and it was considered that the violent Austro-Hungarian model of creating a "Bosnian nation" could simply be transferred among the Albanians of the three faiths.
Vienna allocated significant funds for "rewarding" the most prominent Albanians, but it noticed that the Albanian nature was fickle and that full trust could not be given even to those who verbally, nor those who in practice, expressed explicit loyalty. According to some opinions of Austro-Hungarian diplomats, Albanian leaders—regardless of whether they belonged to the ranks of Muslims or Roman Catholics—mainly looked after their personal financial interests and every other kind of benefit behind which supposedly common intentions for creating the Albanian nation could be hidden. If someone else appeared with new offers, even among the Albanians most loyal to Austro-Hungary, there were those who reconsidered. In Vienna, this was understood as a bad character trait of the Albanian people.
4 Robert Elsie, Albanian Literature: A Short History, London-New York 2005, 118-119.
Despite the fact that major anomalies in such relations were noticed, Austro-Hungarian diplomats continued to bribe and grant privileges to influential Albanians—whether they were Muslim beys or influential Roman Catholic priests—even when it became clear that they had not fulfilled the requirements dictated by Vienna, and when it was certain that the recipients of privileges had betrayed the interests of Austro-Hungary, and in some cases—even when Vienna was deceived. This shows how important it was for Austro-Hungarian strategists to shape and establish the Albanian nation, so for the sake of "higher goals" it was sometimes necessary to swallow the bitter fruits of failure.
The borders of "Greater Albania"—which the Ottomans demarcated through the "four Albanian vilayets" via the Albanian League (1878), or the borders drawn by Austro-Hungarian planners in the observed period (1896-1908), in order to especially drive a wedge into the Serbian ethnic and state fabric in the future—were truly embodied through "Greater Albania," a quasi-state under Nazi-Fascist patronage (1941-1945) and the "Little Albania" attached to it within occupied Serbia (1941-1944). The plans for "Greater Albania" have their consequences in our time, reflected in the NATO aggression against the FR Yugoslavia (1999), the entry of NATO forces into Kosovo and Metohija, and the unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo-Metohija Albanian administration (2008), by which the Albanian ethnic-administrative framework was expanded from the Republic of Albania to the quasi-state "Kosovo."

Western imperial policy, whether it is Austro-Hungary, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or today's Euro-Atlantic structures led by the United States of America—although these are completely different ideologies—continuously threatens Orthodox and Slavic unity in the Balkan Peninsula through the Albanian factor as a landmine. Even in our time, as it was in the time described by Teodora Toleva, we witness the mass evocation of memories of Muslim Albanians about their Roman Catholic ancestors. We also witness an interesting but dangerous eruption of memories among Sandžak Muslims in Old Raška, especially in Novi Pazar, about Albanian origin, which already happened during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro (1916-1918) and the Nazi occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in southwestern Serbia (1941-1944). The idea of Greater Albania is very much alive, and its supporters are not lacking from the imperial West to the pan-Islamic Orient.

In the end, Teodora Toleva views some issues from Bulgarian positions. For example, she considers Macedonia a historical Bulgarian land, and even interprets Pomoravlje in a similar way. Of course, we do not agree with this. Furthermore, regarding the observed period, Toleva writes about "Serbs and Montenegrins," which cannot be considered accurate, because the Principality of Montenegro at that time was a national and mother state of the Serbian people just as much as the Kingdom of Serbia. The census in Montenegro in 1909 determined that 95% of the population were Serbs, and 5% were other citizens, mostly Albanians. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1945 proclaimed the existence of the Montenegrin nation as "different Serbs from all Serbs," and Montenegrin nationality was recorded in Yugoslav statistical data in the 1948 census.

This last point, of course, does not affect at all the research findings and conclusions of Teodora Toleva about the creation of the Albanian nation, which she presented in the book The Influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the Creation of the Albanian Nation 1896-1908, and which can be summarized in her words: "Therefore, the Albanian nation at the beginning of the 20th century does not exist, and the so-called 'Albanian national movement,' whose activity is quite insignificant, is nothing but a small group that operates without a 'national context.'"

Aleksandar Raković

5 Aleksandar Raković, Serbs and Religious Interventionism 1991-2015: Political Aspects of Religious Challenges to the Serbian State and Church after the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Belgrade 2015, 165-195.

11 In memoriam patris mei ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The text that follows could not have come into being without the fortunate encounter with Dr. Agustí Colominas, who, despite his numerous obligations—both public and media-related, as well as those in publishing and teaching—accepted me as his student and took on the mentorship of my work.

I owe him immense gratitude for his accessibility and dedication, for his always accurate and precise professional advice; for his endless patience with inexperienced doctoral students and the incredible generosity he shows toward them; for never tiring of correcting numerous mistakes in my work, never discouraging the student in the process; for his humanity and friendship; for the fact that he took on the difficult task of being a firm support and infallible judge in the most challenging moments of writing the text. Thanks to his professionalism and vast research experience, as well as the

authentic cosmopolitanism he possesses, and thus his intolerance toward any kind of prejudice, the initial idea for this work could be realized as a concrete text.
For all these reasons, my sincerest gratitude is first and foremost addressed to my mentor.
The text would also not have been possible without the impeccable professionalism of the staff at the Imperial and Royal Archive in Vienna (German: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien), for which I am deeply grateful to them.
I would also like to thank Belén Moreno, Vicente Hernán Servera Bijudés, Igor Seke, and Jordi Teixidó for significant technical assistance, as well as Juan Carlos Gutiérrez for editing and stylistic improvement of the text.
Roberto Bravo de la Varga, Roswitha and Christian Menzl, and Pilar Gómez translated several cited or thoroughly paraphrased texts, and I am very grateful to them for that contribution.

The Balkans have always represented one of the crisis areas, which from a political aspect are constantly current and potentially explosive. If we look back at the events of the last two decades, we cannot help but notice the similarity with the situation that existed at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, which gives the impression that the troubles of that time are once again on the agenda. Therefore, we can expect that the current situation in the Balkans will direct the attention of researchers to the study of Balkan politics of the great powers. For Austria-Hungary, the Balkans were the last remaining region where it could use its status as a great power, and its policy toward Albania, which is ultimately the subject of various debates, should fundamentally be considered precisely from this point of view.
The book before us is yet another example of such research interest and as such represents a continuation of the works of Hans-Dieter Schanderl, Engelbert Deutsch, and Nathalie Clayer, which are connected and supplemented by material from the Vienna archives, primarily the Viennese dynastic, court, and state archives, which in this work served as an important base of historical sources. Teodora Toleva focuses her attention on the efforts of Viennese statesmen who, at the turn of the two centuries, were directed toward Albania, with the aim of preventing Serbia or Italy from establishing themselves on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea and thus becoming a threat to the southern edge of the Danube monarchy. Unlike Schanderl or Stavro Skendi, who accept the existence of the Albanian nation even before that, Toleva sees in these efforts of Vienna’s policy the decisive stimulus for the creation of the nation and the influence on the development of the Albanian written language. The task of experts and their future research will be to determine how well-founded this author’s thesis is. In any case, it gives reason for reflection and represents a significant contribution to the topic of the genesis of nations, which is extremely relevant today.
Teodora Toleva has to a great extent experienced what the French historian Arlette Farge calls “the taste of the archives” (French: gout de l’archive). She was fascinated by the diversity of sources preserved in the archive and the possibilities they offer. When, during 1999, she first visited the Viennese dynastic, court, and state archive with the aim of researching for the then still planned work on the Macedonian question before the First World War, she accidentally came across unpublished secret documents on the Albanian question, which would permanently capture her attention. This motivated

the shaping of the dissertation topic, which was written in Spanish, and with its defense in 2008, Toleva earned her doctorate. Not long after, the author's insidious illness appeared, against which even doctors were powerless, and it became an obstacle to the planned additional work on this topic. The book before you is actually a translation of the author's dissertation from Spanish and serves as a reminder of her, so that the memory of Teodora Toleva and her passion for historical science will be preserved forever.

Vienna, Summer 2012

Leopold Auer

Former Director of the Viennese Dynastic, Court, and State Archive, Member of the Institute for Austrian History Research

18 PREFACE TO THE BULGARIAN EDITION

During the 19th century, ethnic nations fought against empires to create their own states, while in the 20th century, states created political nations. The debate over which nation is ethnic (natural) and which is political (artificial) does not cease, especially when considering the additional question—how much is a nation historical and "state-building"? In the Balkans, at least four nations are political—Albanian, Turkish, Macedonian, and Bosniak, which proves the stability of the historical process. Of these, the last three have their "father of the nation"—Kemal Atatürk and Josip Broz Tito, although not everyone recognizes them as "legitimate." It is natural that colleagues in Tirana, as well as most Albanologists, when it comes to the formation of the Albanian nation, return even to the famous hero Skanderbeg, but this conscientiously written book by Toleva contains a substantial contribution precisely because it is entirely based on a rich documentary foundation. In this case, talent is overshadowed by the emergence of character, because quite a few researchers prefer to preserve the basic generally accepted thesis, even if existing evidence suggests otherwise. The official historiography of a state strives not only for knowledge and pointing to facts, but also for encouraging national self-confidence.

The dissertation of Dr. Teodora Toleva, defended in 2008 at the University of Barcelona, impresses as a "model of late positivism," which, as the author herself notes, has been neglected by many younger colleagues in the last two decades. Before approaching academic generalizations, a scholar during years of research should write a number of works on specific topics. Of course, this requires persistent "toiling" in archives and a cross-section of at least several sources for a single conclusion, so that the author can approach historical truth. Otherwise, the work takes the form of a bad historical novel or, more generally, unscientific fiction, which today floods bookstore shelves. The correct approach is applied already in the first chapter of the book, where the organization of the foreign policy of the dual Habsburg monarchy is presented. The structure is primarily reduced to the Central Administration in Vienna, but also to its diplomatic missions and consulates in foreign territories. The author highlights the particularities in the operation of Ballhausplatz and its direct subordination to the will of the emperor and the court camarilla. Austria-Hungary is the patron of Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, and by the end of the 19th century already has experience with Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The secret consultations during 1896 are understandably explained and are linked to the upcoming Eastern Crisis, leading to the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire is

doomed to collapse, while its rich legacy in the Balkans will be contested from all sides. Dr. Toleva deeply analyzes the considered and accepted Memorandum on the necessity of uniting the quarreling Albanian tribes, which are further divided by religious differences—three-quarters are Muslims, and the rest are Catholics and Orthodox. The dual monarchy is in geopolitical conflict with Russia, which, as the protector of Orthodox peoples in the Balkans, supports the claims of Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, and Greeks to Albanian lands. Austria-Hungary needs secure access across the Adriatic to the Mediterranean Sea, which could be achieved by creating the Albanian Principality as a direct protectorate, but first an Albanian nation had to be created. Dr. Toleva goes beyond Balkan frameworks when considering the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy, which also seeks to establish control over the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea (and is under the patronage of the Vatican). The complexity of mutual relations in the Triple Alliance requires avoiding sharp opposition, which is why Vienna places much emphasis on the church and schools, which should awaken the national consciousness of Albanians. Economic domination also joins the struggle to achieve long-term strategic goals. A valuable source on the ethnic composition of the Scutari, Kosovo, Bitola, Janina, and Thessaloniki vilayets are the precisely cited statistical data, which do not reveal a single “Macedonian.”

The traditional struggle against the “danger of Pan-Slavism” forces the Habsburg monarchy to limit its influence in foreign policy to Catholics and Muslims, while Orthodox Albanians in Epirus are “ceded” to Athens. The author, however, also shows the decisive behavior of Greece, which counts on the help of Italy in realizing their common desire to prevent Austria-Hungary’s access to the Adriatic, which sharpens mutual relations. Consistency requires Dr. Toleva to go a step lower from ambassador reports and focus on consular denunciations, which are interesting as “first-hand” information. She notes the differences between what is desired in Vienna and the reality on the ground, and the discrepancies are the result of the fact that, besides language, one must also know the psychology of Albanians. The beys clearly understand that the inevitable collapse of the Ottoman Empire threatens Albanian lands, which are thus in danger of being divided between Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece, making them inclined to accept Austria-Hungary as a protective power. The High Porte, however, does not relinquish its positions and, through local administration, strengthens its influence. The difficulties are not only political in nature, but also manifest in the field of culture, since dialects must be overcome, the language standardized, a script created, more schools founded, and the publication of newspapers, books, and magazines begun.

Bulgarian uprisings in Macedonia and in the part of Thrace around Adrianople, during 1902–1903, give the Albanians hope for independence. At the same time, they are ready to fight against their Orthodox neighbors on the side of the Turkish sultan. Dr. Toleva emphasizes the strong influence of Islam in making crucial political decisions, which is a consequence of the fact that Sultan Abdul Hamid II is at the same time the caliph. During 1910—1912 the Albanians rose up against the Young Turk government, which stripped them of privileges, but with the outbreak of the First Balkan War they lined up under the banner of the Empire. The seventh chapter of Dr. Toleva’s dissertation rightly devotes itself to the chief abbot Primo Doci, whose pro-Austrian propaganda Vienna generously finances. She concludes that Monsignor Doci has

influence among Catholic Albanians, but not among Muslims, who suspect him of being a foreign protégé. Gold does not achieve its goal in negotiations, and it turns out that the main “conduit” of Austro-Hungarian interests is too inclined to a luxurious life and to showering his kin with gifts. At the same time, he also plays on Italy’s aspirations, from which he tries to obtain an additional reward.

The acceptance of a unified Albanian alphabet and the creation of a literary language, as well as all the obstacles and compromises related to these issues, are rightly discussed more broadly in the designated ninth chapter, because they will outlive Austria-Hungary and be carried over into the independent Albanian state. The professionalism of Austro-Hungarian diplomats and consuls, who adapt both to the conflicting wishes of the Albanian clans and to the influence of the Sublime Porte, Italy, and the Vatican, leaves a strong impression. The Young Turk Revolution in 1908 created favorable conditions for resolving the heated language dispute.

21 Periodical press and the publishing of books are presented as important means for the national awakening of the Albanians, which had to be adapted to their dispersal across various regions of the Ottoman Empire. Difficulties also grow due to the requirement not to reveal who is financing this national propaganda, which, incidentally, competes with the policy of Rome. The author points out the fundamental shortcoming of Austro-Hungarian activity directed exclusively at Catholic Albanians, because as such it had no impact in central and southern Albania.

In the Conclusion, Dr. Toleva summarizes the findings and systematizes the influence of favorable and unfavorable factors on the formation and development of the Albanian nation. The Albanians are divided by religion and tribe, illiteracy is widespread, and the interests and actions of the Sublime Porte intersect with the influence of the European powers. At the same time, Austria-Hungary and Italy contribute to the awakening of Albanian national consciousness, as a result of which differences in religious affiliation are gradually overcome and a larger community comes into being.

The appendices in the book complement the research with documents, statistical data, and recollections, which are interwoven with the author’s assessments and transport the reader to that turbulent epoch at the turn of the two centuries. The authenticity demonstrated is confirmed through a comparison of the activities of Albanian political and educational centers—in Constantinople, Sofia, Bucharest, and Naples. Differences on fundamental issues arise before the Albanian nation at the moment of its formation, but all roads lead to the First Balkan War, when the Albanian state comes into being.

The monograph by Dr. Teodora Toleva reflects the qualities of its author, among which objectivity, accuracy, erudition, and scholarly integrity are most apparent, as well as the diligence that shows on every page of the work. Precisely for that reason I allow myself to recommend it as a model to all researchers, and especially to younger colleagues, who must surpass the number of pages with the number of sources read and pieces of evidence gathered so that the understanding of historical events and their heroes is grounded on a documentary basis. And one more thing: not every well-trodden path is the right one, and so researchers are sometimes compelled to persistently seek new paths.

Academician Professor D.Sc.
Georgi Markov

OR HOW THE IDEA WAS BORN
FOR RESEARCHING THIS TOPIC

“Never talk to strangers.”
Bulgakov,
The Master and Margarita

This work did not arise as the fruit of prior deeper knowledge of the Albanian question. In fact, before I began writing, I did not even imagine that there were documents to which, once I found them, I would devote years.

Moreover, if someone had told me then that I would be writing a doctoral thesis on the Albanian people, I would not have believed it at all—not only because I had not planned to do so, but primarily because that topic did not form part of my interests. Everything was prompted by curiosity, inexperience in the field of research, and a “chance find from the archives.”

At that time my intention was to research the Macedonian question from the perspective of a painful but already irreversible loss of ancestral Bulgarian territories. Perhaps I actually approached that topic in order, through intellectual work, to accept and understand the loss of my own “roots,” which I felt personally and which, as is well known, is painfully lived through—both at the beginning and with the passage of time, which I can now confirm without excessive dramatization.

I remained faithful to the set goal, although I occasionally departed from it, delving into various materials “connected” with the topic, until one day I happened by chance upon a drawer where I found and for the first time read documents about the secret consultations of 1896 relating to the Albanian question6.

I was greatly surprised to discover that everything I had read up to then about the Albanian nation these documents did not confirm, but rather re-examined and seriously called into question. Undoubtedly

6 They are discussed in detail in the second chapter.

 I am thinking of the excellent works and invaluable contributions of Stavro Skendi, Peter Bartl, Georges Castellan, Hans Dieter Schanderl, and all others who, in their research, relied on their texts and conclusions.

All these works are based on the initial assumption that the Albanian nation already existed and that, indisputably, it was clearly established in the 19th century, and perhaps even much earlier, which is why all events of that era are interpreted as an expression of the will of this nation.

On the other hand, the secret consultations from the end of the 19th century indicate that the Albanian nation did not exist and that Vienna, interpreting its strategic interests based on these assumptions, was preparing to work on strengthening national consciousness among Albanians, which at that time, according to the observations and constant claims of Austro-Hungarian diplomatic agents, still did not exist.

It was not easy to accept and reconcile this major discrepancy between the “official version” of Albanology, which I have always known and which has existed as such from the beginning, and the historical facts revealed by the aforementioned documents. That “accidental archival discovery” cost me dearly. First and foremost, I had to convince myself that everything I had learned so far from secondary sources was actually not entirely accurate. Later, I had to prove and successfully defend my position.

This “entry” into the Albanian question, so surprising even to the author herself, completely determined the methodology of the research. I had to forget everything I had previously read on this topic and start from scratch, taking into account only the content of the documents. After the first “accidental archival data,” more and more new drawers full of documents followed, until doubt, uncertainty, and hesitation gave way to the conviction that the axiom about the existence of the Albanian nation before the independent Albanian state must be reopened and re-examined.

This working method determined the essential features of the following text (against which certain people persistently, but with little success, fought—people whose greatest merit is that the text was completed in the end)—a text that risks becoming an example of belated positivism.

However, this thesis, even if it is positivistic, meticulous, and insists on presenting evidence, does not attempt to fully encompass

24 the problem of the creation of the Albanian nation. The reason for this is the fact that it is an exceptionally complex issue, which only in the indicated period, from 1896 to 1908, which the author investigates, begins to gain importance, and therefore exceeds her research possibilities and abilities.

On the contrary, this work has a much narrower goal, which consists primarily in examining certain aspects of the role that Austria-Hungary played in the process of creating the Albanian nation. At the same time, we will look more specifically at attempts to define other favorable factors, without neglecting the unfavorable ones, but always within context, without delving deeper into them.

As a starting point, the work takes the secret consultations held at the end of 1896, when Vienna decided to implement a program of action in the territories under Ottoman rule that stretch east of the Adriatic and are more or less compactly inhabited by Albanians. The period covered by this work ends in 1908, at the moment when the rise of the “Young Turk” movement to power in the aforementioned areas leads to a decisive change in the political context in which Austria-Hungary had operated until then.

Given the research goal thus set, the documentary material read, which for the most part had not previously been published, I organized into ten chapters, according to the following content:

1. Organization of Foreign Policy

The aim of this chapter is to show how the traditional conduct of foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and its organization enabled the holding of “secret consultations” during the reign of the monarchy.

a) Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

b) Functions and prerogatives of the Minister

c) Ausgleich [Compromise, i.e., the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867—editor’s note] or the apparent break that frees the monarch from parliamentary control.

2. The Plan for Albania, or Viennese Rationality and Irrationality

The aim of this chapter is to present the content of the memorandum on the situation in “Albania”—so called by Vienna—then the objectives set and the decisions made accordingly.

25 These documents are at the center of our interest, as they clearly show that at that moment the Albanian nation still did not exist7. The memorandum prepared on that

occasion by the Austro-Hungarian authorities has not been published until now8. It presents the following:
a) Four secret consultations were held, covered by a single memorandum. Although formally these may be four different events or subjects of study, in reality they actually form a single whole.
b) The consequences arising from viewing them as a single whole:
• The Albanian nation at the time of the aforementioned consultations still did not exist.
• To fulfill its own political goals, Vienna directed its efforts toward the formation of this nation.
c) Why speak of the rationality and irrationality of Vienna regarding the creation of the Albanian nation?
• Rationality is seen in the fact that Austria-Hungary needed the lands east of the Adriatic in order to amortize the pressure from Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Russia, in the long term.
• The irrationality of such a decision by Vienna lies in the fact that building a nation is by no means an easy task, and at the same time it was contrary to the thinking of military circles, who preferred military occupation without pretext.
7 With this assumption, we express our disagreement with Stavro Skendi. Namely, with his excellent work on Albania of that era, he undoubtedly made a great historical contribution regarding factual reconstruction, but in connection with his research, in our opinion, there is one problem—it is based on an interpretative model whose basic premise is that the Albanian nation already existed. This is precisely the thesis with which we disagree.
8 There is an excellent book by Hanns Dieter Schanderl, Die Albanienpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns und Italiens 1877-1908, from 1971, in which, for the first and only time, those secret consultations are mentioned, albeit with a clear intention to diminish their significance. Furthermore, the memorandum is not mentioned, precisely with the intention to relativize the actual value of these documents. Nevertheless, Schanderl publishes documents about religious subsidies, part of which are annexes to the memorandum, but in the context of a different interpretation and not at all in accordance with the material I studied.

3. Acceptance of the Plan: Diplomatic Risks and Long-term Irredentist Expectations

In Austro-Hungarian public opinion, there were two opposing views regarding the project of creating the Albanian nation—a positive one, advocated by participants in the secret consultations, and a negative one, whose supporters were some officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the military. Here, the following should be specified:
a) The memorandum was given to certain trusted diplomats to read, who, after reviewing and considering its content, had a negative reaction, motivated by several factors:
• They were surprised by the project, assessing it as unfeasible.
• They mainly pointed out the risks that the project entailed.
• They indicated that the realization of the project implied the violation of agreements and rules of an international character.
b) Representatives of the General Staff of the Army consistently opposed the implementation of the plan envisaged by the memorandum.

However, even these negative reactions did not manage to change the opinion of the narrow circle of participants in those consultations, nor did the proponents of the negative stance have enough influence to prevent further implementation of the project and the realization of the plan envisaged by the memorandum.
The participants in the aforementioned consultations, who advocate for the implementation of the decisions made at them, are considered heirs of the pure tradition regarding Austrian foreign policy, which means that they agree with acting in accordance with the methods characteristic of a civilized state.

4. Vienna's Initiatives before the Ottoman Empire or the Unrest of Peoples between Two Empires

At that historical moment, Albanian tribes were almost constantly in a state of armed rebellion, not only attacking and plundering their Slavic neighbors, but also devastating important territories dominated by the Muslim population, threatening its activities. They sought help
9 As far as I know, these documents have not yet been published.
from the Ottoman government, which decided to send a military expedition from Constantinople. However, thanks to Austro-Hungarian consuls, it was not sent. The close relations that were slowly established between Austro-Hungarian consular agents and certain influential figures among the Albanians would, in the future, be of great importance for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.
It seems that what was previously said is actually the first factual reconstruction of a specific historical moment.

5. The Activity of Austro-Hungarian Consuls in the Heart of the Albanian-Muslim Community or the Beginning of a Romantic Conspiracy

In accordance with the action plan approved during the secret consultations, Austro-Hungarian consuls were supposed to begin establishing contacts with the most influential figures in the Albanian Muslim tribes. The aim was to increase the prestige and influence of Austria-Hungary among these tribes, so that later it would be easier to instill the idea of the Albanian nation in them and thus be able to bring them under control. In search of new political contacts, the consuls organized a series of trips into the interior of the country, and the way they fulfilled their mission proved very interesting.
Based on all analyzed, I can claim that the action plans of Austro-Hungarian consuls in Albanian territories, which were adopted at the aforementioned consultations, were precisely of this type.

6. Religious Protectorate: Between Tradition and Future

This chapter clarifies:
a) What the so-called Kultusprotectorat or religious protectorate actually consisted of [“Protectorate over the cult,” i.e., the Austro-Hungarian protectorate over Roman Catholics in Turkey—translator's note]:
• How and when it was established;
• What activities were customary within it.
b) The break that implies a change in the attitude of the participants in the secret consultations and their exclusively political use of the protectorate.

c) The effective and real results of the existence of the religious protectorate, i.e.—the limitations that reality imposes on Vienna in the field of protection of religious denominations.

7. Language: Great Work on Synthesis

   At the moment when Vienna makes the decision to implement a new plan for Albania, there are approximately twenty different transcriptions of Albanian dialects. Among them, three are fundamental: one uses Arabic letters, another Greek (Cyrillic), and the third Latin. In addition, each dialectal variant has special symbols to mark specific phonemes of the Albanian language. These symbols do not exist in any other alphabet, which creates a serious problem when printing texts in this language. On the other hand, each of these three types of transcription, at a given moment, has the support of a significant part of the Albanian population, for political and religious reasons. Vienna's goal was to introduce a unified alphabet for all Albanians, but also to ensure that they remained convinced that they had created this script themselves.

Vienna succeeds in achieving its intentions, so the script that Albanians still use today was adopted at the Congress of Bitola in 1908, where the then Austro-Hungarian general consul, Kral, played a decisive role. It seems not pretentious to claim that the linguistic unification, carried out thanks to many initiatives from Vienna, accelerated the process of creating the Albanian nation and represents a significant achievement for the Danube monarchy.

The aim of this chapter is to use documentary evidence, some of which has never been published, to show how all this was achieved.

8. Schools: a difficult beginning

At a time when other Balkan peoples had built numerous schools where students were taught in their mother tongue, Albanians had only one, at most two such educational institutions.

The strategy devised by Vienna included action through the school education system, in order to achieve its political goals. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian authorities first tried to obtain from the Sultan permission to open Albanian schools, but it turned out that this was not an easy task at all, and its realization proceeded very slowly. Therefore, Vienna decided to "bypass" the Turkish authorities in implementing this idea, or more precisely, to present them with a fait accompli, encouraging Albanians themselves to request the construction of new schools, which Vienna would then organize.

The opening of new schools, however, met with opposition from the Sultan, Islamic clerics, and Orthodox clergy, so it seems that it was easier for Austria-Hungary to establish and control Catholic schools.

On the other hand, the Pope also intervened energetically against Italian secular schools with nationalist tendencies, so Vienna's success in founding new schools was to a large extent relativized.

In connection with this topic, the work also presents documents that have not been published anywhere so far.

9. The Press, or How Vienna Begins to Write in the Albanian Language

Striving to realize the plan adopted at secret consultations, Vienna decided to act through the press to achieve its political goals. Instead of launching new publications for this purpose, the Austro-Hungarian authorities chose an already existing newspaper

and contacted its publisher. Since he needed money, he accepted a regular and generous subsidy from Vienna—in exchange for control over the content of the publications. An agreement was reached, and from that moment, the illegal distribution of a very high-quality magazine began within the Ottoman Empire, with the aim of awakening the national consciousness of Albanians. Vienna suggested articles to the publisher or controlled the texts he wrote himself, and this process of mutual influence also proved to be very interesting.

Likewise, Vienna began to pay attention to the creation and dissemination of literary texts in the Albanian language, which were written and published in Austria-Hungary, with the aim of awakening Albanian national consciousness. These were, essentially, history books, calendars, grammars, etc. Also, through various initiatives to deliver materials to readers, propaganda and promotion of the Albanian language were carried out.

It is necessary to emphasize once again that such publishing activity was a direct consequence of the program on Albania, which Vienna adopted at the aforementioned consultations. This chapter also cites documents that have not been published so far. Most of the documents cited here have not been published so far.

10. Monsignor Doci: Hero, Idealist, or Power of Evil?

Vienna decided to contact the abbot of the most important Catholic community in Mirdita. After several negotiations held in Vienna, the abbot committed himself, in exchange for a significant regular subsidy, to work on reconciliation and national unification of the Albanian population. In addition, the abbot developed and presented a plan for a North Albanian principality, provided great assistance in everything related to literary creation, and played an essential, albeit dual, role in the unification of the Albanian language. Documents about him have never been published until now.

The research plan set out in this work aims to prove the influence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy on the creation of Albania. I hope that the years I spent in the archives, as well as the thousands of pages I read, have left an adequate mark in the historical arguments I present in this thesis.

CHAPTER I:

ORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

According to Austrian researchers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary has not been well studied to this day. There are two reasons for this. The first is that this ministry has only recently begun to attract the attention of researchers, specifically in the search for responsibility for the ultimatum that was the cause of the outbreak of the First World War. At that time, it became clear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represented an institution that operated according to its own mechanisms and in pursuit of its own goals. Before this realization, the foreign policy of the Monarchy in the period between 1848 and 1867 was considered part of the history of diplomacy, and adequate attention was not paid to the factors that conditioned it, namely: the international position of Austria-Hungary, the internal state of the country, as well as the situation within the Ministry itself. According to Helmut Rumpler, there is still no scientific study that reveals the essence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution, that is, the direct connection between its internal organization and its activities.

The second reason that complicates the study of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is its specificity as an institution. To summarize, this specificity lies in the fact that this Ministry not only provides the necessary institutional conditions for the development of foreign policy. Namely, unlike other contemporary European countries, the Austrian Ministry simultaneously represents an institutional and ideological center, in which the fundamental problems, ideas, and political guidelines of the entire Monarchy are reflected and considered in a global manner. Although it was established during 1848, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs actually inherits the tradition of the Secret Court Chancery from 1717, which was transformed into the State Chancery in 1753. Thus, it is not a modern institution, but rather an institution surviving from another era.

From this stem its basic characteristics: first, it is accessible exclusively to the ruling class and individuals who identify with the survival of the monarchy as a unique centralized and centralizing entity.

Second, the integrative function of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is stronger than the integrative role of the entire state bureaucracy and the army. The more threatened the Monarchy became, the more this function of the Ministry intensified.

Third, although it follows its own dynamics as the institutional center of foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains under the supervision of Franz Joseph and, until the dual period, largely depends on dynastic relations and court politics.

The fourth characteristic of this ministry is actually a consequence of the above, namely, that it stands between the Government and the administration. Therefore, as Helmut Rumpler explains, the history of its organization remains insufficiently studied in works on these other two institutions of the Monarchy.

In terms of structure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is based on three main links, which do not change but are preserved and maintained over the years. The first is the Central Administration, located in Vienna; the second consists of missions abroad, and the third of consular offices.

Undoubtedly, the Central Administration (Zentralleitung) in Vienna represents the most important structural element of the Ministry, that is, its real center, where decisions on foreign policy are made. It originates from Metternich's State Chancery and, despite the changes introduced in 1918, the regulations (work rules) from 1816 remain in force and its provisions are successfully implemented.

The Central Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of four basic structural elements, which are:

1. Department for political or foreign affairs;
2. Department for administrative matters of internal organization;
3. Personal office or the Minister's Cabinet, which over time was occupied by various individuals;
4. Department for assistance/support, which is responsible for translation and codes, clerical work, the Archive, the Consular Academy, etc.

   Of the four listed departments, the most important one, which is also the center of decision-making, is the first, i.e., the Political Department. In the hands of its

chief lies the control of diplomatic mail, as well as the making of key decisions, which are, as a rule, proposed at the initiative of the relevant minister or the monarch, and only occasionally after special consultations with other ministers and the military. In general, the chief is responsible for monitoring all political reports, receiving agents of the imperial house, and managing the so-called "political readings"16: the department chief collects reports, which are then discussed during consultations, and later, in his name or in the name of the minister, appropriate decisions are made17.

14 In practice, as is typical for the Habsburg monarchy, foreign and domestic affairs are considered a single entity and there is constant exchange of opinions and views between the two ministers. Also, the boundaries between diplomatic and consular duties are very undefined and unstable, although there is an exchange that exists between diplomatic assignments and the ministry itself.

15 The heads of these sections are called "great" or "court counselors" and have enormous significance at the moment of decision-making. Their role is especially important until 1866. Only if the minister was an exceptionally strong personality could he make decisions independently, without prior agreement with the "great counselors." After the Ausgleich, their influence increased again.

16 Or also, "secret conferences," which will be discussed later.

17 However, this position could also become honorary, which was typical for the Austro-Hungarian administration, and at certain times it was deprived of political significance, since, as a rule, all instructions were handled personally by the minister.

35 The Political Department consists of several Councils, which are distributed by geographic regions as follows:

I. The Orient,

II. The Vatican,

III. Germany, Scandinavia,

IV. Western and Southwestern Europe.

At different periods, their arrangement and grouping changed, but the most important was always the Council for the Orient or the Council for the Balkans. Viennese administrative geography, depending on the era, included Russia in one of these two councils. The council where real policy is created and where the individual authority of the minister is strongest is the Council for the Orient. For a long period, the chief of this Council was, in the political hierarchy, the second official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, immediately after the minister himself.

The personal office or Cabinet of the minister has two sections—one political and the other administrative—and aspires to imitate the functions of the State Chancellery. The political section is responsible for preparing the protocols of the Council of Ministers, for issues related to state security, issues related to the press18, as well as those concerning ministry employees19. In this section, the minister’s personal correspondence is organized and created, primarily with the Austrian and Hungarian governments20; then, protocols from the sessions of the Joint Councils of Ministers are brought here, negotiations with provincial delegations21 are prepared, contact is established with the Joint Minister of Finance regarding all issues concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina; also, all diplomatic reports that the minister and monarch22 will read arrive in the Political Section.

18 Depending on the era, issues concerning the press could also be managed by the Administrative Section of the Minister's Cabinet. The same applies to politico-commercial issues.
19 Under Goluchowski, the minister's personal office was named the "Minister's Cabinet," and its significance grew, later becoming the "central office" where important decisions were made.
20 After the Ausgleich.
21 These were principles that had to be renegotiated at certain intervals.
22 Franz Joseph personally performed the duties of the minister. He read all important reports, mail, telegrams. He had direct control, and after Andrassy, he insisted on its implementation. Every day, important...
36 There were initially five administrative sections, and later up to sixteen subsections, which dealt with informing and shaping public opinion. Likewise, these subsections were responsible for keeping statistics, church matters—including negotiations with the pope—and consular affairs.
Among the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the so-called deputy state secretaries23 have the greatest influence on decision-making. In the period 1848–1859, they were responsible for preparing diplomatic instructions and were closest in the hierarchy to the minister, but later quickly lost political significance.
Starting from 1871, the influence of officials preparing reports gradually increased. Although none of them personally managed to gain political influence, those who came to head the Balkan Council gained the opportunity to come particularly close to the minister and participate in making major political decisions.
Thus, during the mandate of Goluchowski (1895–1906), the dominant figure in the Ministry was Julius Zwiedineck von Südenhorst24. After more than thirty years of a consular career in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, in 1866 he became an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where for many years he presided over the Balkan Council. Although formally not the chief of the department, he actually managed, coordinated political reports, and presided over political councils called "political readings."
diplomatic mail, which he would read and respond to the next day, and if he was not in Vienna, it would be sent to him by telegraph. The selection of the mail was made either by the head of the so-called "political reading," who was usually also the first head of the department or the head of the Minister's Cabinet.
23 When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established, both main departments of the State Office survived within it—the political (which relates to foreign policy) and the administrative (which relates to internal policy). However, at first, they were separated and had different managers. In order to overcome this division and unify the administration over both departments, the position of Deputy Minister was created. He represents the minister only in the administrative department, while the leadership of the political department remains exclusively the right of the minister. For this reason, in the period from 1848 to 1868, the holder of this new duty does not become the permanent representative of the minister, similar to the functions of Secretaire General or Permanent Undersecretary of State, but remains responsible for the unified administration over the areas of foreign policy and internal administration of the Empire.
24 We mention him because he plays a very important role in the entire Austro-

Hungarian activity in the southwest Balkans, which is of the greatest significance for this work.
37 Consular representations, with some exceptions, have less significance for making political decisions in the Balkans than was the practice in other European countries at that time.
Consular matters were originally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade, established in 1848, with the exception of "oriental administrative and consular matters." When this ministry was dissolved in 1859, consular matters passed into the domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1859, the head of the consular department was appointed, who simultaneously managed the Press Department, established in 1860. Of all the consulates, only those in the Orient (Orientkonsulate) remain in the Political Department, under the instance that deals with the Balkans and Russia.
Jurisdictions concerning foreign trade are divided between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. However, consular reports on trade matters must be submitted by the embassies first to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from there to the Ministry of Finance. Although in urgent trade matters consuls may send their reports directly to the Ministry of Finance, in practice they do not do so, since they are subordinate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Consulates primarily fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the rights granted to diplomacy concerning the establishment of trade relations with foreign countries, as well as representing the commercial interests of the Monarchy abroad.
Nevertheless, starting from 1861, consuls also directly inform the Ministry of Trade, and from 1867, exclusively it. In practice, but not legally, jurisdiction over consular matters is again taken by the Ministry of Trade.
However, since according to the Ausgleich, foreign trade does not fall under the joint affairs of the two ministries, consular matters are definitively returned to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Likewise, the right to appoint consuls abroad is exclusively within the competence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Consuls, however, must not interfere in political matters, while the Ministry of Trade is responsible for important and practical decisions.
Thus, there is a discrepancy between the official powers of consuls and the practice in consular relations.
38 Diplomatic Missions
Austro-Hungarian diplomats cannot participate in the creation of foreign policy, but can only provide information. In fact, their positions abroad give them no room for personal initiative. As a rule, diplomatic representatives never try to influence the directives they receive, even in cases when they disagree with them. They act exclusively as intermediaries, negotiators. According to the old Austrian diplomatic tradition, a diplomat must refrain from initiatives not entrusted to him. As a result, brilliant, stylistically refined diplomatic reports appear, which the world still admires for the observational talent of their authors and their skill in describing and perceiving situations, but which, however, contain no political initiative.
What was allowed to diplomats, and what they did, was to create a favorable opinion of their country, both through the press and in high circles in the places where they were sent. Their functions, therefore, are representative: they participate in salon gatherings, appear at celebrations, in clubs, and represent the Monarchy at similar social events.

Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The advantage of this enormous organizational apparatus lies in its flexibility. On the one hand, such an apparatus is an instrument by which the minister can intervene in 39 all aspects of social life that potentially affect international relations. On the other hand, it easily adapts to changes in international relations, as well as new orientations in the foreign policy of the Monarchy itself. At the same time, such an apparatus successfully adapts to the different styles and peculiarities that each new minister brings to the manner of conducting affairs.

Although the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, despite his broad powers, is under constant threat, he has at his disposal a self-sufficient structure, independent and capable of functioning autonomously, regardless of the fate of the minister himself. This administrative machinery can boast of exceptional organization, a developed system of division of labor, and well-coordinated communication between the various departments of the Ministry, which enables excellent teamwork.

Officials of the Ministry, through their work in gathering information, making proposals, and preparing analyses, gradually acquire an increasingly significant role and begin to influence the course of policy. Thanks to the collection and interpretation of intelligence, they are presented with the opportunity to manipulate the attitudes of representatives of the highest social circles. All foreign ministers, even the most prominent among them, listen to the opinions of their advisors and allow them to influence their decisions. As a consequence of such practices, these executives become the third factor in the monarchy's politics, alongside the emperor and the foreign minister.

Therefore, employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acquire an important political role. Their word carries weight not only within that institution but also in all political and social circles. Moreover, since the early 1880s, it has become customary for the emperor himself to read reports, especially those arriving from Russia. Thus, the information and opinion of the diplomatic representative reach directly to the very top of power and influence the narrow circle of decision-makers.

Officials of the Ministry have a very high status, which society accepts as indisputable, even with enthusiasm, believing that these individuals possess exceptional qualities, such as a very high sense of responsibility, unconditional discretion, a keen sense of honor, impeccable manners, irresistible charm, all embodied in the phrase "art of living" – "savoir vivre." For their part, these diplomatic officials are fully aware of their social role and, being raised according to the standards of that society, completely approve of such collective opinion, convinced that the function granted to them is rightfully theirs. There is a mutual understanding between them and their surroundings regarding the fact that the Ministry represents a consolidated society, which neither accepts so-called "new men" – homines novi, nor is ready to change its class status. Namely, it is an aristocratic administration whose representatives have the same upbringing, education, and lifestyle, that is, an institution that attaches much greater importance to tradition than to individuals themselves, and in which a competitive spirit and rivalry are not encouraged, but rather the opposite: a relationship of equality.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is, incidentally, very cosmopolitan in orientation, so, in addition to Austrians, among the officials there are also representatives from abroad, born in mixed, not single-national marriages. They often come from the territory of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, then from the German Confederation

(Deutschen Bundes), from former Austrian provinces – for example, Belgium and Italy, as well as from Spain or France. Thus, in the Ministry there are many kinship relations and family ties, which are even forbidden in other administrations, and differences in professional rank are not greatly emphasized, which is also unimaginable in other administrative structures. One consequence of such practices is a sense of solidarity among employees, their mutual encouragement and support, but, of course, also the generation of conservative ideas.

Also, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not pay attention to the national ideologies of the various peoples from which they themselves often originate. Among them, there are neither German nor Hungarian nationalists; rather, both groups are above all Habsburg-oriented.

25 In truth, there are clear and constant influences of various "lobbies" – groups that exert pressure within the Ministry, but all these influences are in accordance with the idea of a unified empire.

An example of this is the influence that officers have in the domain of decision-making on foreign policy in the Ministry. They have never been able to fully control foreign policy, but, depending on the era, they have managed to influence it to varying degrees – for example, in anti-Italian and anti-Serbian tendencies in Balkan policy. Since 1871, not only has there been better coordination between military and diplomatic affairs, but Franz Joseph also makes important decisions concerning foreign policy, consulting both the foreign minister and the officers. This is an indirect influence, though not official. Thanks to the identical roots of both estates, diplomatic and officer, there are many cases of officials with dual careers, both military and diplomatic.

41 In addition to the great social prestige they enjoy, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also have high salaries and work in excellent conditions. The number of employees in this ministry is smaller compared to other ministries, but on the other hand, it has a greater number of executives than other institutions of that type.

A specific feature of this ministry is that officials abroad do not have higher earnings than those who remain in the country. For a time, high personal income was necessary for work in the Ministry, which would allow the employee to cover the costs of staying abroad for years on their own. Thus, Austrian diplomats could often rely only on their own income. The only exception to this rule are ambassadors, who have large financial resources provided by the state for representation, and also have very high pensions. Although not official. Thanks to the identical roots of both estates, diplomatic and officer, there are many cases of officials with dual careers, both military and diplomatic.

Another group that exerts pressure and can be identified is the group of officials dealing with finance, whose goal is to influence the Ministry to pursue an imperialist economic policy. Examples in this sense are initiatives for the construction of railways in the Balkans, as well as concern for Albanian youth in the Albanian seminary in Vienna. The interdependence between foreign policy and economic interests is quite clearly reflected in Aehrenthal's Balkan policy. The intention was to use the port of Thessaloniki to enable the entry of Austro-Hungarian financial capital into the Balkans and the Middle East and to open the way for Austro-Hungarian trade in those regions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also pays close attention to public opinion, with which it maintains constant relations through close cooperation with the press. For example,

there are newspapers that the Ministry fully subsidizes, such as Die Presse, whose editorial policy is aligned with the official criteria of the Ministry.
The problem of different nationalities within the Habsburg state is a constant in the policy conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, their German policy in the period 1849–1866 is closely connected with the attempt to achieve a centralist, rather than a federal, solution for the state and imperial problems of the neo-absolutist era.
During the period of dualism, the Dual Alliance is seen as a way to preserve the German element (das Deutschentum) in the Monarchy, which is threatened by other nationalities.
Active policy in the Balkans is also, to a certain extent, influenced by the desire to resolve the problem of the southern Slavs, that is, to prevent Slavic separatist tendencies. For the same reason, the war against Serbia and Russia in 1914 is called by some a "preventive war," one of whose goals was to eliminate Serbia as a powerful factor in the Balkans and thus deprive the South Slavs of support.
However, as an increasing number of aristocratic families gradually become impoverished, the number of those who can afford to work for the State abroad at their own expense decreases. As a result, according to Helmut Rumpler, the competence of Austrian diplomats declines, and they are no longer at such a high level nor as well prepared for their vocation.
Nevertheless, throughout the existence of the Empire, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as well as the army) remains a secure refuge, particularly attractive for a social stratum that can be characterized as the bureaucracy of the Monarchy, whose role, among other things, is integrative.
Also, until the end, the image of the Ministry as an exclusive aristocratic club is maintained, although already in the 1890s people of different social backgrounds begin to enter it. According to statistics, among the officials there are many members of the bourgeoisie. Thus, in 1847, 28% of those in high positions were from the bourgeoisie, and in 1918, 44%. In the ministry in Vienna, in the period 1847–1897, 50% of employees were members of the bourgeoisie, while in 1918 there were 66%. This trend is even more noticeable in consular matters and the Oriental Academy, which in 1898 was transformed into the Consular Academy. There is a clear discrepancy between the initial image of the Ministry as an aristocratic institution and the later, increasingly persistent presence of the bourgeoisie within it. The longevity and persistence of this image of the Ministry, despite the actual situation, can be explained by the necessary transformation of the mentality of its officials. Once they enter the Ministry, they must overcome the mentality of their origin and replace it with solidarity towards the state, the job, the mission of saving the Monarchy as a great power, and be loyal and responsible only to the Ministry and the Emperor.
This bureaucratic mentality—characteristic of all representatives of the Ministry and passed down from generation to generation—ensures the continuity, stability, and survival of this institution. Only with the change in the profile of employees do profound changes occur in the very institution they represent. In this case, these are changes introduced before the fall of the monarchy.

26 The statistics relating to Germans are also interesting. Thus, the Monarchy has 24% German population, while in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Germans make up 56%.
43
It can be said that from 1809 to 1918 there is continuity in the organization of the Ministry. The administrative changes undertaken by various ministers in order to ensure maximum control over the implementation of their policies are not fundamental changes, but rather could be described as cosmetic. They include the style of work, the relative importance of various positions, including that of the minister himself, and even the emperor. These changes are necessary to achieve a certain adaptability in the administration, without which the functioning of the institution itself would be difficult. Even the adoption of the Ausgleich (surprisingly or not) does not lead to a break in the organization of the Ministry.
To understand the function of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it is necessary to examine his prerogatives and exclusive powers on two levels: in relation to other leaders and in relation to the monarch. This necessity arises from the legal-political context of the Habsburg state itself, which, in the period 1848-1918, stands halfway between an absolutist and a constitutional monarchy, on one hand, and between centralism and federalism, on the other. Success in maintaining a semblance of balance in such circumstances is always temporary and never final, causing constant tensions at various levels of state authority. It does not seem incorrect to claim that, due to the specific state tradition and reality of the House of Habsburg, these constant tensions so affect the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that they make him a person indispensable to the monarch for preventing constitutionalism and federalism, as well as for imposing absolutism. Whenever the constitutional system sought to diminish the power of the Monarch, Franz Joseph fought ever more strongly to preserve his exclusive rights in the domain of foreign policy. His intention was not to recognize the Parliament's right to participate in foreign policy, considering this institution incompetent and representing minorities that might view the three main lines of the Monarchy's foreign policy—Germany, Italy, and the Orient—differently. Franz Joseph was prepared to destroy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the ground up, if necessary, just to completely free it from the influence of any government or assembly. In this way, an important change occurred, whereby the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not always represent the central institution of the monarchy's policy.
44 In the following work, we will look at the prerogatives and special position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in relation to other state officials, which arise as a consequence of traditional forms preserved in modern times.
Since the founding of the ministries in the Habsburg Empire in 1848, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was the highest-ranking state official, who, in terms of authority, occupied the second place in the state, immediately after the monarch as the chief administrator. This position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is a consequence of the political elite's will not to renounce its own tradition in exercising power, but rather to preserve it within the framework of new forms of government imposed by revolutionary waves and nationalist propaganda.
Thus, the new position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs emerges as a result of a legal break with tradition, and in terms of functions, he primarily represents the successor of the former chancellor. The chancellor's bureau was essentially the place of centralized

power, where foreign and domestic policy were considered a single whole and were simultaneously managed by one official. Efforts were made to preserve the chancellor's function in the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the role of the minister.
Such conduct in policy-making prevailed throughout the duration of the Monarchy, as it was in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian mentality, and was therefore persistent and very difficult to eliminate by legal means, and the political elite was convinced that this was the best way of governance, i.e., exercising power.
27 Let us look at the situation in the time of Metternich. He managed, among other things, the "Secret Chancellery of the Court and State" (Geheimen Hof- und Staatskanzlei), and since 1817 held the title of "managing minister" (dirigierenden Minister), which means that the State Chancellery, unlike other positions at the Court, was not managed by advisory bodies, but personally and centrally by a single minister. It is important to point out that this also concerns a legal statute which, since the time of Kaunitz, differs from other positions associated with the Government, being without a collective body, without council meetings, and without voting. Metternich was also given the title of State Chancellor (which was not awarded after Kaunitz), further confirming his global political dimension, i.e., with competencies not limited only to foreign affairs.
28 Indeed, the first constitutional Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felix Fürst Schwarzenberg (1848-1852), was appointed with the aim of succeeding Metternich, and during his tenure, this idea was realized.
45 When put into practice, this concept has two variants, each based on its own theory and well illustrated in the understanding and working methods of the two most important figures in the political apparatus of the Habsburg Monarchy of that era—Metternich and Schwarzenberg. Both conducted foreign policy based on the same global and coherent concept of state policy, with Metternich wanting a "centralized" and "joint" minister exclusively as an advisor to the monarch, with the monarch being the one who must make decisions, while Schwarzenberg fought for the figure of a "central" and "joint" minister strong enough to make decisions himself, instead of the monarch. The function of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, from its inception to the end of the Monarchy, oscillated between these two poles.
First of all, it is necessary to emphasize the informal recognition of this minister as the crown's advisor and the first among ministers. This unofficial recognition has practical value and is in accordance with legal norms that give the Minister of Foreign Affairs significant opportunities for action within the state, which do not fall within the domain of foreign policy.
What are these legal norms? Namely, the original name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1848 was "House of Foreign Affairs and Imperial Household Affairs." There are various official political functions which, depending on the moment, are combined in different ways, and the most enduring among them are: Minister of the Court and Imperial Family, First Minister, President of the Council of Ministers, and Chancellor of the Empire.
Thus, until 1918, the figure of the Minister of Foreign Affairs united various important bureaucratic positions, enjoying the personal trust of the monarch and possessing significant informal political power.
These additional titles and functions have practical value. Since he simultaneously serves as the "Minister of the Imperial House (Court)," the Minister of Foreign Affairs

retains all power despite the numerous reforms implemented between 1848 and 1918. In fact, he holds two functions, but the role of Minister of the Imperial House is in many ways more important, and can be considered a priority rather than something performed as a secondary duty.
29 It should be added that foreign policy in the Habsburg monarchy has always held primary importance for state policy as a whole. None of the other ministers, not even the Minister of the Army, ever had even remotely the same influence in the state as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
46
Therefore, the function of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is always secure, even when the power of the government is limited, because he is at the same time the Minister of the Imperial House.
The duty of the Minister of the Imperial House encompasses everything related to the legal and state position of the dynasty, the preservation or increase of family estates, marriage contracts, inheritance, etc. Thus, the minister is very close to the monarch and is an important figure at the Court, followed by the steward of the court (Obersthofmeister) and the heads of the German princely houses. The position of the Minister of the Imperial House not only formally grants precedence of honor, but he is always, without exception, the closest minister to the sovereign, the one closest to the Court and with direct access to the emperor; more precisely, his communication with the supreme ruler does not take place through the Cabinet Chancellor. The Minister of Foreign Affairs participates in correspondence between the sovereign and foreign rulers, in negotiations between Austria-Hungary and the Vatican, as well as in the appointment of bishops, which is an exclusive right of the emperor. Thanks to all this, the position of this minister is especially close to the monarch and at the same time opens doors to spheres of politics that significantly exceed his competencies. In terms of power, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stands above the Cabinet Chancellor (Kabinetskanzlei)—he is also an advisory body interpreting the common policy of the empire, which is ultimately decided by the monarch himself.
Another important privilege is that the Minister of the Imperial House has no responsibility to any instance or person except the ruler himself, unlike other ministers, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
This absolutist tendency persisted even in the constitutional era, thanks to the previously mentioned Schwarzenberg, who secured a truly strong position for the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his agents, even in relation to the monarch himself. However, in relation to the monarch, the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs shows instability and weakness, since he is at the monarch's mercy. From this perspective, one can best see the apparent contradiction embodied in this function: although he was the second official of the state, the Minister of Foreign Affairs could easily, by the decision of the ruler, be deprived of power and broad authority.
47 Thus, in the years of Schwarzenberg's successor, Kiibek [Kiibek – trans. note], at a time when the powers of all ministries were being redefined and limited and control over them was being strengthened, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was reduced to a mere "notary," and the monarch became the one who made decisions at will. The Minister of Foreign Affairs could only influence the monarch by preparing the necessary information for him. In this context of limiting the functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, foreign

policy, instead of serving as a unifying entity within the state and coordinating its activities, becomes a separate issue, isolated from economic policy and military matters, with respect to which it is independent and not coordinated.
Not only did foreign policy become a separate issue, but also a very exclusive and difficult topic to access. Before 1867, foreign policy was not even discussed at the Council of Ministers. Ministers were only informed about decisions that had already been made, but were never allowed to participate in their preparation or discuss them. Such practice during Buol's time [Buol – trans. note] logically led to the establishment of so-called "secret consultations" or "special consultations," which represented a truly independent institution, although completely unofficial, and persisted until the end of the monarchy. Although seemingly contradictory, the term "unofficial institution" in this case does not lead to absurdity, but helps to highlight the complex relationships within the state. These are specific, let us call them, "forms of rule," which arise as a result of the conflict between the higher echelons of power, loyal to absolutism on one side, and circles more distant from the center of state power, loyal to constitutional demands, on the other.
30 For more information on the decision-making process in the Dual Monarchy, see: Horst Haselteiner, Bosnien und Herzegovina: Orientkrise und Sudslavische Frage, Bohlau Verlag, Vienna-Cologne-Weimar, 1996; Bertrand Michael Buchmann, Hof-Regierung-Stadtverwaltung. Wien als Sitz der österreichischen Zentralverwaltung von den Anfängen bis zum Untergang der Monarchie, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich, 2002; Karl Vocelka, Geschichte Österreichs. Kultur-Gesellschaft-Politik, Verlag Styria, 2000; Erich Zollner, Geschichte Österreichs, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich, 1990; Helmut Rumpler, "Die rechtlich-organisatorischen und sozialen Rahmenbedingungen für die Außenpolitik der Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918", in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Volume VI/1, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1989.
48 Special conferences were held in the strictest secrecy, without any responsibility or public control, with the aim of making the most important decisions concerning the empire's policy. The meetings were not regulated in terms of frequency, nor in terms of participants or content. The chairman of the conferences was the monarch himself, who also chose the participants. Usually, these were politicians in power, among whom were archdukes [Erzherzogs], the president of the state council, army chiefs, and some ministers. Conferences were held at the monarch's discretion, and the government was obliged to accept his decisions on foreign policy. After 1867, the conference participants were called the "imperial" or "court party," and temporarily also the "military party." This "team" actually represented an advisory group in a completely neo-absolutist sense. It enabled Franz Joseph to conduct his policy despite reforms moving towards constitutionalism, which he was forced to adopt due to temporarily unfavorable circumstances.
The military catastrophe of 1859 caused constitutionalism to once again prevail over absolutism, thereby rehabilitating the position of the foreign minister. Also, due to German policy towards the Monarchy in that period (until 1866), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again acquired the dominant role it had at the time of its founding, and the areas of economy and constitution, as well as cultural policy, were subordinated to it.
However, the very personalities of the ministers of that era enabled Franz Joseph to

once again establish a balance between internal and foreign policy, with a tendency for the monarch to once again prevail over the foreign minister. This tendency was most strongly expressed during the rule of Goluchowski, when he was in fact no longer solely responsible for political decisions, but actually subordinate to Franz Joseph, who governed through various institutions. The foreign minister was reinstated as prime minister, but since this reinstatement could not be public due to Hungary, it was maintained only in practice. Absolutism was once again declared as the ruling principle. In that year, 1861, the goals of the Ausgleich were already clear: an agreement between the Emperor of Austria and Hungary, based on maintaining absolutism in areas that would later be defined as "common affairs" (gemeinsame Angelegenheiten), of which foreign policy was the most important, even more so than military matters. The agreement was possible
49 thanks to mutual respect for some broader principles. When these principles were finally accepted, however, it was necessary to negotiate their implementation. At that point, different understandings of the content of the accepted principles on different sides came to the fore, and problems appeared. Nevertheless, despite them, it is indisputable that with the help of the Ausgleich, Franz Joseph achieved more than he lost, above all saving those central manifestations of power of his position as sovereign, which since 1861 had been called into question.
In this effort to keep things as they were, while actually creating the apparent impression that everything had changed, each of the three aforementioned sides played one official role—intended for the public—and one unofficial role—aimed at defending their interests, according to their own understanding. In this regard, it is necessary to clarify the features of the Hungarian opposition. Namely, we can distinguish between two types of positions, that is, two currents within the "Hungarian side." One is official, represented in the public sphere, and is characterized by disagreement with the empire, while the other is unofficial, present in the highest echelons of Hungarian government bodies, and it strives for an agreement with the Austrian side. The ruling elite believed that the real interest of Hungary was one common state, not two, and therefore its representatives issued official protests, while their opposition was usually disunited. Moreover, the demands of the Hungarian opposition often coincided with the intentions of Franz Joseph, who gradually lost interest in a single imperial minister and was satisfied with the fact that he himself was actually conducting foreign policy.
31 As far as foreign policy is concerned, the fundamental difference lies in the understanding of the concept of empire. How do the Hungarians perceive the dual monarchy? According to them, Austro-Hungarian foreign policy cannot be understood as the foreign policy of a unified Austro-Hungarian empire; the foreign minister, in their view, is merely a joint representative of two long-term united states. Therefore, foreign policy must be conducted in accordance with the understanding and acceptance of both sides. How do the Austrians view the dual monarchy? In their understanding, joint foreign policy pertains to the joint empire, that is, to the common state entity. For this reason, they speak of one Austro-Hungarian monarchy, as well as of two parts of a single empire.
32 What Hungary truly wanted, but never achieved, was for Hungarian interests to be sufficiently considered in the Monarchy’s foreign policy. The Hungarian foreign minister used this goal to secure for his position the status of an unofficial, informal center of

power for the entire monarchy. It is precisely from this perspective that the "achievements" of the Hungarians in the field of foreign policy should be viewed, in order to relativize the formal and only seemingly unambiguous successes. Here, it is also necessary to take into account not only the polemic for and against imperial policy, but also the later tensions between Vienna and Budapest due to Vienna's attempts to legalize the remnants of the imperial idea.

50 One significant controversy consists in the understanding of the Ausgleich on both sides, whose practical solution seems to us the best example of the application of the new agreement, and it concerns the responsibility of the foreign minister before both Parliaments.

The Hungarians insist on parliamentary participation in decisions concerning international treaties. The Austrians, however, believe that only formal parliamentary approval is sufficient for a previously signed international treaty to be valid. In order to obtain parliamentary consent, two Delegations were envisaged, designed as committees, i.e., as parliamentary boards. These two Delegations were actually the legal body for the two state groups: before them, the ministers of the three joint ministries—foreign affairs, the military, and finance—were held accountable.

However, in reality, no law was ever enacted to regulate the aforementioned responsibilities. Although in practice the foreign minister informs the said Delegations and receives so-called interpellations, he was never truly held accountable for his policy before these, let us call them, parliamentary boards. The Delegations conducted all their business in writing, which in fact means that differences of opinion between the Hungarian and Austrian Delegations could only be clarified by exchanging notes, and that over an extended period, when the issues were no longer current, so in practice this was not done, as it made no sense. Moreover, representatives loyal to the joint government always held a majority in the Delegations, so their decisions were, as a rule, in favor of that government.

Thus, the foreign minister had unlimited opportunities to realize any idea. The Delegations did not represent any obstacle. Although they were supposed to act as a counterbalance to the two autonomous governments, in reality they represented a poorly functioning, atrophied assembly, which, through constant interruptions and failures, freed the sovereign and the joint minister from parliamentary constraints. Since the Delegations were not, in essence, a counterweight to the Assembly, they allowed the Monarchy, seemingly modern, to be governed in an absolutist manner. Hence, it seems that the complex institution of the Delegations was actually designed with the aim of not functioning, so that foreign and imperial policy would escape any control.

On the other hand, Franz Joseph continued to insist on leading foreign policy exclusively himself, never missing an opportunity to make things difficult for the minister in charge. Only when the forces advocating decentralization began to prevail did he seek to strengthen the minister's position, trying to make him an ally in the ongoing struggle to preserve the unity of the state. At that moment, Franz Joseph invited the Saxon Baron Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust to take the position of foreign minister. He was entrusted with the task of conducting foreign policy as a unified imperial policy, and was therefore expected to advocate for the expansion and strengthening of his powers.

Beust assumed his position during negotiations between Vienna and Budapest, whose main goal was to strengthen the empire through internal reforms, so that it could once again act abroad as a great power, especially in Germany and the Balkans.
Like his predecessor Schwarzenberg, Beust tried to harmonize internal and foreign policy through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a transitional period, before taking the position of foreign minister, he was minister of internal affairs, justice, and police. Starting from February 1, 1867, Beust was prime minister and in that role led negotiations with Hungary, imposing final decisions during them that were in accordance with the imperial decree sent to the Vienna parliament at the end of December 1867. After ceasing to serve as prime minister, he sought to win over the Poles by supporting their plans for autonomy, and in 1869 attempted the same with the leader of the Czech nationalist party, aiming for a legal agreement of the Ausgleich type for Bohemia. On November 12, 1866, he had already assumed the duties of foreign minister of the Imperial House, thereby being recognized as first among equals.
On June 23, 1867, Beust was appointed imperial chancellor, while simultaneously retaining the position of minister of the Imperial Court.
33 His appointment simultaneously marked a gesture of loyalty to the allied Saxon king, as well as an attempt to continue conducting German policy with the best means.
52 and foreign affairs, and it is also emphasized that he is the president of the Ministerial Council (Vorsitzender des Ministerrates). According to him, the duty of the imperial chancellor is not only to be a mediator between Austria and Hungary, but he must also represent a joint governmental institution for them. Namely, Beust sincerely wants to relativize the Ausgleich—not only because, from a political standpoint, he is close to the German centralists, but also because he is convinced that a joint institution is a necessity and has practical value. Already during previous negotiations and preparations for the final ones, which concerned the articles of the Ausgleich, a practical decision became apparent. According to it, the foreign minister de jure was not represented as the imperial minister, but de facto acted as such.
The conviction remains about the necessity of having a unified minister who, with a consolidated policy, will ensure the survival of the empire, acting as its chancellor. The basic political ideas of Count Gustav Kálnoky, who takes Beust's place, are also based on this conviction. Kálnoky was convinced that the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, for its survival, must pursue a great power policy: since it encompasses diverse parts, it must unite and mobilize them with a single common idea; otherwise, stagnation occurs, which can easily lead to the dissolution of the state. This kind of policy of a great, powerful state is possible only if there is a centralized administration, i.e., a unified imperial minister.34 Hungary, however, insists on its own jurisdiction in international trade agreements. The foreign ministers of the Monarchy fiercely fight against this, also for practical reasons: because of trade agreements, primarily with the states of Eastern Europe, which are interested in cooperation with the united Monarchy, and not with any of its parts. Another reason for their struggle lies in the desire to avoid possible reconsiderations of the validity of the decisions of the Berlin Congress.
Finally, it comes to the point that three types of international relations within the Monarchy are defined: pragmatic-joint (pragmatisch-gemeinsame), such as peace treaties, the Hague Convention, etc.; then, issues on which joint negotiations are held

34 Franz Joseph also insists that only the crown can choose the foreign minister, without interference from the two prime ministers.
53 (paktiert-gemeinsame), for example all economic agreements valid for both countries; finally, there are autonomous (autonome) foreign issues, such as agreements on mail, telegraph, railways, legal assistance, etc. In this way, the foreign minister is deprived of jurisdiction agreed upon for the implementation of the internal policy of both countries. It is also achieved that imperial diplomacy becomes the expression of the will of both states. From that moment, direct cooperation between the two governments in configuring foreign policy is realized, and this cooperation is confirmed for diplomacy and legally established for foreign trade and other foreign affairs.
Thus, seemingly, but also from an official standpoint, regarding responsibilities, the foreign ministers during the last ten years of the Habsburg monarchy were only shadows of what Schwarzenberg conceived and Beust tried to implement. In practice, however, despite official limitations, the foreign minister still, as in previous times, had a central role as the imperial minister.
This position is not entirely clear, which will make it the subject of further debate, and, according to some researchers, one of the reasons that will contribute to the internal decadence of state power and prevent flexibility in the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy.
The question arises, namely, what were the initial duties of the foreign minister, i.e., what are his competencies according to the Ausgleich? On one hand, he cannot be the object of action of individual political factors of either of the two states, and on the other hand, he does not have the right to influence administration and legislation. Accordingly, the foreign minister is excluded from parliamentary life and is not influenced by parliamentary movements. He has neither the obligation nor the right to participate in parliamentary sessions—neither actively nor passively. As a result, for important decisions in foreign policy, parliamentarians often learn from the press, and the minister himself is informed about parliamentary decisions in this way, and only in cases when these issues interest him.
On the other hand, the foreign minister is persistently recommended to be informed about the political life of both parts of the Monarchy, since his jurisdiction includes issues that must be harmonized between the two governments. According to the competencies from the Aus-
gleich, the minister deals with issues that simultaneously concern
54 both sides, while those that concern only one of them do not fall under joint jurisdiction. In fact, only one reduced area of foreign policy, which we can also call "imperial diplomacy," can be classified among the issues on which joint negotiations are held.35
Likewise, the foreign minister is competent as the last instance for consular issues, about which it is also necessary to negotiate with the minister of trade. These two ministers must reach an agreement in order to give instructions to the consuls; the consuls then send their reports to three ministries; when it comes to joint issues, "pragmatic" and those under negotiation, the foreign minister acts as an advocate, i.e., defender of the union between Austria and Hungary.36
In reality, it is an artificial construction, which is not above the state, but rather to the side, ensuring that foreign policy in the dual system remains exclusively within the

sphere of the monarch. The new legal position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in relation to the Ausgleich remains in force until the end of the monarchy.

The dual system possesses mechanisms that can prevent the Minister of Foreign Affairs from implementing decisions or, at the very least, make his position uncomfortable. The position of the minister is insecure—his appointment is approved by the ministerial councils of both countries, and he is situated between the two prime ministers, regardless of parliamentary consent. Thus, if one of these two ministers, supported by the majority in his government, wishes to put him in a difficult position, he can achieve this, since the Minister of Foreign Affairs is left without parliamentary support or any kind of backing. Between Vienna and Budapest, there was a struggle over the interpretation of laws within the framework of the Ausgleich, and as this struggle intensified, the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs became increasingly unfavorable, as he found himself on the battlefield of conflicting interests. The more the unresolved points of the Ausgleich were interpreted in favor of the dissolution of the union, the more inert foreign policy became, and the more cautious the minister had to be.

However, when the Hungarians declared that they did not want foreign policy to be joint, proposing their own Minister of Foreign Affairs, they often simultaneously represented the interests of Franz Joseph himself.

The Ausgleich represents the most significant break in the history of the legal position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Habsburg Monarchy. The laws of the Ausgleich give the impression of a complete collapse of the minister's function, listing everything that falls outside his capabilities. However, it remains a very open question whether, in practice, the Ausgleich limited or actually increased the minister's power, mobilizing some unconstitutional means of neo-absolutism, among which are the so-called "secret conferences"—an unofficial institution that increasingly established and entrenched itself as an indispensable way of conducting policy.

Another separate role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, besides the position of Minister of the Imperial Household, which granted him numerous privileges, is his function in the council of joint ministries—foreign affairs, the military, and finance. In practice, however, the premiers of Austria and Hungary also participate in the work of this council, and it is chaired by the emperor himself, in case there are important issues on which he must personally decide. Since Beust, such a relationship between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the two prime ministers has become customary, in which his connection with domestic policy is important, but the law does not allow him to intervene in that domain.

There were also frequent legal and statecraft discussions about the position of the Council of Joint Ministers. In this regard, it was agreed that it was not a "Council of Joint Ministers" (gemeinsamen Ministerrat), but only "joint conferences of ministers" (gemeinsame Ministerkonferenzen), but this is merely a legal clarification, which has been surpassed in practice. Thus, Aehrenthal not only revisited the issue of the imperial chancellor and the "joint" imperial government, but also attempted to reconsider the institution of the Joint Council of Ministers (Gemeinsamen Ministerrat). From that moment, the Joint Council of Ministers became the decisive instance of foreign policy—a body whose powers are above the Austrian and Hungarian ministries, primarily in the domain of decision-making and areas of activity, i.e., jurisdiction. Moreover, it is a government responsible only to the monarch.

The conservative spirit that dominated this ministry, combined with the privileged position of the joint bureaucracy, made the entire foreign policy the responsibility of the monarch and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and thus, in practice, it was impossible to influence or intervene in this domain. This is the opinion of various persons who held very high positions in the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy, including the author of the ultimatum to Serbia in 1914, Alexander Freiherr von Musulin. According to Karl Renner, foreign policy retained its character primarily as court policy and the policy of the Habsburg House.

The catastrophic development of foreign policy in the period 1848–1918 is seen by some as the result of a series of wrong decisions in the decision-making process itself, while others claim that the cause was the active incompetence of the administrative apparatus.

Based on the legal situation and the scope for action it provided, any of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at that time was able to conduct a very powerful policy. Surprisingly, only one of them was successful in implementing such a policy, while the others were mostly not involved. They lacked programs and dedication. They held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, but conducted policy by order of the monarch, secretly wishing to be relieved of their duties.

Since Metternich, foreign policy remained passive, later turning into a policy of reconciliation with the inevitable course of history. This also applies to cases where attempts were made to save the unity of the empire, which was in danger and, in reality, was falling apart. Schwarzenberg's Central European policy represented a tactical means to persuade Prussia to renew cooperation with Vienna; Andrassy's policy of alliance with Germany secured the Ausgleich from an international standpoint, but on the other hand, it prevented the monarchy's long-term freedom of action; likewise, Aehrenthal's policy in the Balkans was primarily provoked by reasons related to internal politics. Only the monarch, considering foreign policy as a segment of his own sphere of activity and therefore personally choosing the minister with the aim that he would later carry out his will, was the one who seriously limited the scope of the foreign minister’s activities. The rare individuals who stood out as personalities, such as Schwarzenberg, were called upon to intervene in crucial moments in areas related to internal affairs, and were later dismissed from the position where they dealt with foreign policy.

CHAPTER II:

THE STRUGGLE FOR ALBANIA OR VIENNA RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY

Between November 17 and December 23, 1896, three secret consultations were held in Vienna, presided over by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, and their aim was to address the same topic: the beginning of a vigorous Austro-Hungarian "intervention" in Albania.

The participants in all three conferences were the same: besides the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the meetings were attended by the joint Minister of Finance - von Kalay, special envoy and former minister, Baron von Cwiedinek, department head von Horowitz, Consul General Schmucker, as well as Consul, Baron von Baum, acting as secretary.

During the first conference on November 17, 1896, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, tasked Baron von Cwiedinek and Consul General Schmucker to prepare a detailed report on Albania, so that its content would determine the main

points of future meetings, which could later be focused on. The second secret conference, dedicated to the Austro-Hungarian intervention in Albania, was held on December 8, 1896, and discussed the points of the document titled "Memoire über Albanien" ("Memorandum on Albania"), which was to serve as the basis for the development of an action plan.

The insistence on this fact stemmed from the conviction that the aforementioned memorandum cannot be considered separately from the three secret conferences, which thematically and substantively form a single whole, although formally we are talking about one document and three meetings. This observation is of the utmost importance, especially if we bear in mind that our interpretation of the value of the aforementioned memorandum in the development of Vienna's future foreign activities differs from the standpoint of Hans Dieter Schanderl.

These consultations were held in the strictest secrecy, and their participants at that moment occupied the highest positions in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. No rules can be observed regarding the frequency of these meetings. They eluded parliamentary control, but it was clear that they could direct the future foreign policy of the Monarchy, as well as influence the allocation of money and the activities of its diplomatic representatives.

We are thus faced with the purest Austro-Hungarian tradition of conducting its foreign policy precisely with the help of "secret consultations as an institution." We will dwell in detail on these consultations and the memorandum for three main reasons:

• primarily because, in our opinion, they mark a new stage in Austro-Hungarian foreign policy; the novelty does not lie so much in the Monarchy's orientation toward the Mediterranean, as in the extremely concrete definition of its goals, the strict limitation of the area of activity, and the very detailed and precise listing of the means at its disposal;

• the second reason why we devote attention to the secret conferences is the fact that they represent an example of true imperial foreign policy; in this regard, we believe that it is not a simple response or an attempt to respond to the intervention of another power, contrary to what Hans Dieter Schanderl claims regarding this same documentary material;

• finally, and most importantly, Vienna first had to resolve the issue of building the Albanian nation as a necessary condition for achieving its political goals – this was, in fact, the conditio sine qua non, and this process represents the main focus of this research (thesis); therefore, in this work we will strive

42 See Die Albanienpolitik Österreich-Ungarns und Italiens 1877-1908, Wiesbaden, 1971, a magnificent book which, in addition to its many qualities, also has the merit of being the first to reveal the holding of the aforementioned consultations. However, what we do not agree with its author about is the relativization of the Memorandum on Albania, which Schanderl considers a mere proposal, an intellectual exercise without other practical consequences when it comes to Vienna’s actions.

43 For more information about this “institution,” see: Horst Haselsteiner, Orientkrise und Sudslavische Frage, Böhlau, 1996.

44 Op. Cit.: Die Albanienpolitik Österreich-Ungarns und Italiens 1877-1908.

 to explain the emergence of the Albanian nation from a different perspective than that given by Stavro Skendi.45

The First Secret Conference

held on November 17, 1896.
The conference was opened by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, in his capacity as chairman, presenting three main remarks.
In the first, he analyzes a very specific situation, namely the expected imminent partition of the Ottoman Empire, and in connection with it, he gives his prediction. In his opinion, when this happens, it is possible that the usual scenario will be repeated, and that a natural distribution of Ottoman territories will follow. In that case, however, the problem of the northern Albanian territories, inhabited by Catholic population, as well as the problem of the Muslim population living in the central area, would remain unresolved.
In his second remark, the Minister of Foreign Affairs lists the real interests of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy regarding the division of the Ottoman Empire. In his view, it is of key importance for the Monarchy that the territories inhabited by Catholic population, as well as those where Muslims are the majority, do not fall under the influence of another power, but remain independent, established as a principality under Austrian protectorate, i.e., that the power which will have influence in these areas should be precisely Austro-Hungary.
In the third remark, Goluchowski speaks about the measures that Vienna should take so that, when the time comes, it will not be caught unprepared, but ready to turn the situation to its advantage in every respect.
The following measures are involved:
a) establishment and, if necessary, reorganization of Austrian consular representations in Albania, primarily regarding the number of delegates and their geographical distribution. At the same time, it is pointed out that it is necessary to find leaders capable of carrying out such an important mission, and that it is essential to assign them to these diplomatic posts;
b) development of joint action with Greece in areas under Greek influence, so that these areas would be annexed to that
45 See his excellent book The Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912, Princeton, New Jersey, 1967.
61 country and at the same time prevent the interference of another power, especially Italy;
c) drafting of a statute for the future organization of the Albanian principality so that Austro-Hungary, when the time comes, can present concrete and detailed proposals, thus gaining an advantage over other powers.
After Goluchowski, the joint Minister of Finance, von Kallay, takes the floor, expressing agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the necessity of creating an independent Albania. He then presents a very interesting analysis, explaining the reasons for such actions by Austro-Hungary, drawing attention to some difficulties that may arise, and highlighting the positive potential of the situation for achieving the goal.
Von Kallay sees three more important reasons why Austro-Hungary should be involved in the creation of an independent Albania:
a) to definitively stop Italy’s claims to the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea;
b) to avoid all Balkan countries falling under Russian influence;
c) as a consequence of the previous point, to avoid a situation in which Austro-Hungary finds itself surrounded by an iron circle controlled by Russia.

There are four significant difficulties in the realization of the creation of an independent Albania, which von Kallay lists:
a) huge differences that exist within the Albanian people themselves;
b) three religious denominations to which the Albanian population belongs;
c) Albania has never in history been formed as a factor in the form of a state;
d) Albanian public life is limited exclusively to petty local interests.
Nevertheless, von Kallay then himself emphasizes the positive elements of the current situation, which will contribute to achieving the goal:
a) Albanians are aware that they cannot achieve anything on their own;
b) for this reason, they have always sought the support of Austro-Hungary, especially the Catholic population from the north;

c) when the time comes, the Muslim population will realize that they can no longer expect salvation from Constantinople and will show a tendency towards the creation of an independent principality under Austrian protectorate.
The Minister of Finance emphasizes the need to act as quickly and energetically as possible in order to achieve something, and to the initiatives proposed by Count Goluchowski, he adds the following four:
a) it is necessary to start with the Catholic population from the north, but the Muslim population should not be neglected, so that the wrong impression is not created that Vienna is only interested in the religious question, and not in the creation of the Albanian nation;
b) weapons and ammunition should be distributed;
c) moral support should be given to the population for possible border conflicts with Montenegro, so that at the very beginning of the action a sense of trust in Austro-Hungarian protection is built; also, efforts should be made to strengthen that trust;
d) finally, material support should be provided individually to the most influential Albanian leaders.
After the other participants of the meeting basically expressed agreement with the first two speakers, it remained to carry out a more precise and detailed preparation of the available means for action. In this regard, the following, still general, remarks are made:

1. The Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasizes the importance of the problem posed by the organization or re-examination of the Austro-Hungarian consular representation in Albania.
2. Cvidinek insists on the necessity of specifically defining the boundaries of the territory of operation, as well as the activities of the consuls. He proposes to exclude from the plan those territories where Hellenization has advanced so much that it would be too difficult to work towards the creation of the Albanian nation.
3. Von Kalay believes that the territories under the jurisdiction of the consulates do not necessarily have to overlap with those where intervention will take place, and that Greece alone will not be able to achieve much; therefore, cooperation with Greece is needed. However, he also points out that it will be necessary to

determine whether the process of Hellenization in the zones supposedly under Greek influence has advanced everywhere as much as is thought.

4. Goluchowski insists on the necessity of unified action, whose scope and objectives will be coordinated from Vienna; however, specific actions will, as much as possible, be entrusted to the appropriate consular officials in Albania.
5. Within the same issue, the most urgent actions highlighted are the upcoming organization of consulates in Albania, religious policy, as well as the policy of support, which will have to be implemented in the future.

Based on these initial observations, Baron von Cvidinek and Consul General Schmucker decide to take on the responsibility of examining the current situation (the possibilities offered by the conditions, the state of affairs on the ground, objective historical circumstances, and general relations). Their goal was to later compile a report with the results of this investigation, which would contain more concrete proposals for the manner of further action. At the same time, this report was supposed to serve as the basis for future meetings.

Immediately afterwards, the meeting proceeded to give more concrete proposals concerning various areas, varying in level of importance. Among the priority issues regarding Vienna's future actions, we highlight four:

The first concerns church policy and the policy of support. In this regard, the joint Minister of Finance, von Kalay, considers it worthwhile to try to recruit Jesuits as allies. It is noted that Vienna, with the help of Jesuits and Franciscans from Troskania, could educate new Albanian priests from Shkodra. The latter were to provide a significant service by neutralizing Italian influence, which at that time was spreading through clergy of Italian nationality. It is also pointed out that the Sisters of Charity [Hermanas de la Caridad, i.e. Sisters of Mercy of St. Vincent – translator's note] did not have sufficiently good results, but that they could be replaced by the Daughters of Divine Charity, who served Austro-Hungary very well in Bosnia.

The second important issue concerns a need that will arise later, and implies the necessity to pay more attention to education at the parishes. People should be provided access to books printed in Albanian, but with Latin transcription. Knowledge of the Latin alphabet would in the future enable them to get to know other nations and their literatures.

Third, the establishment of centers for activity outside Albanian territory is also envisaged, such as the Albanian colony in Zadar [Zara – translator's note]. The idea was to enable, from there, the introduction into Ottoman Albania not only of local books but also of those published in Vienna, thereby dispelling any doubts. As another possible center of educational activity, Bucharest is mentioned, where at that moment a group already existed that had requested contact with Vienna to undertake something in this regard. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was ready to cooperate with them.

Among the less important, but still interesting proposals, we single out one relating to the arrangement of consulates and the possibility of opening one position precisely in the place proposed as the center of the new state, namely the city of Berat.

The conference ends with the decision that the next gathering will be dedicated to the report agreed to be compiled by Baron von Cvidinek and Consul General Schmucker.

The minutes of the conference were written by Baum in the capacity of secretary, and also signed by Goluchowski, which testifies to the authenticity of the documents, as well as agreement with their content.

The Second Secret Conference
held on December 8, 1896

It would not be overly bold to assume that between November 17 – the date of the first conference – and December 8, when the second conference was scheduled, von Cvidinek and Schmucker had enough time to compile their report and share it with the participants, so that they could familiarize themselves in detail with its content before the meeting itself.

At the beginning of the second conference, the chairman, Count Goluchowski, takes the floor and with satisfaction notes that, in accordance with what was agreed at the first meeting on November 17, von Cvidinek and Consul General Schmucker have written the "Memorandum on Albania." Goluchowski emphasizes that the document covers extensive material and will serve as a future guideline, which is why he proposes that the individual points of the report be read first, and then discussed.

Before the reading began, he expressed recognition to the authors, describing the memorandum as exhaustive and documented, i.e., as

46 HHStA, PA I. K.473, Fol. 130.

an act which essentially realistically describes the current situation, and therefore it is unnecessary to question it. Then, special emphasis is placed on the approval of the Austro-Hungarian mission in Albania by an influential Albanian bey, which nevertheless represented a truly important and positive sign for Vienna—it turned out that this idea was becoming attractive to the majority of people, although it was hard to believe that Albanian Muslims could be fully won over in a relatively short period.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, thanks Von Kalay for his kind assessment of the memorandum and orders that the reading of the section dealing with means of action continue.

Thanks to the fact that the mentioned document is kept in the Austrian archives, we will present here its first three chapters (entitled Area of Action, National and Political Conditions in Albania, and Means of Action), so that we can later return to the discussion from the second secret conference.

1. Area of Action

The first part of the memorandum, Area (field) of Action, aims to determine the territories in which Vienna could intervene to realize its plans. At the very beginning, Von Cvidinek points out the first of the problems related to this, which is reflected in the fact that Albania is not a precisely defined territory—neither politically nor geographically. Therefore, he proposes that the plan also include Turkish possessions on the Balkan Peninsula predominantly inhabited by Albanian population, more or less compact. Following this criterion in delimitation, he presents the following proposal for determining the provisional borders of the area of action:

• to the north: Montenegro, Bosnia, and partly Serbia;
• to the west: the Adriatic Sea;
• to the south: the line formed by Preveza, Ioannina, Gjirokastër, and Kastoria (Kostur);
• to the east: the line formed by Kastoria, Monastir [today Bitola], Ohrid, Vranje, Priština, and Novi Pazar.

Since it belongs to the European area of the Ottoman Empire, this territory is divided into four major political-administrative provinces, and they are: Shkodra, Kosovo, Ioannina, and Monastir. Cvidinek here makes a digression in his exposition, drawing attention to the Salonika vilayet, where the Albanian element barely reaches 1.5% of the total population, but mentions that this place could only be of interest if the Albanians living there maintain close ties with neighboring vilayets—Monastir and Kosovo. According to Cvidinek's statistical data, the total population in the four aforementioned provinces in principle reaches approximately 2.5 million people, who are divided as follows:

by nationality and by religion (confession):

Cvidinek is actually too hasty here, because at the present moment it would be more correct to speak of ethnic groups rather than nationalities. It also seems important to point out that the data presented by Cvidinek are accepted by representatives of the highest level of Austro-Hungarian state authorities, without any doubt about their credibility. However, since we do not know on what sources Cvidinek bases his statistics on "national" and confessional affiliation, we retain certain doubts regarding their accuracy and objectivity. Accuracy is called into question because, among other things, part of the mentioned areas, as later clarified, was completely unknown and no foreigner had ever set foot there. The objectivity of Cvidinek's data is also debatable, because bias in attitude towards the population based on their religion and alleged indigeneity becomes evident. On the lexical level, this is manifested by the fact that entire groups of people or their specific features are sometimes overlooked, and as a fact of utmost importance it is taken that members of one ethnic group almost always belong to different confessions. All this harms the accurate perception of the overall picture of this limited territory as a field of action. Namely, this zone at the present moment was so ethnically mixed and represented a mosaic of intertwined locals, and more or less compact nuclei living mixed together, that it was practically impossible to draw "national" borders without harming various ethnic groups and without causing serious conflicts throughout the peninsula, since all of them had to be influenced at the same time.

Perhaps it is not inappropriate to add that the territory in question was inhabited since ancient prehistoric times, and that it represented a place of intersection of civilizations and migrations. It inherited the tradition of maritime and trading empires and, in that sense, the Ottoman Empire here retains a multiethnic model, even forcing its application, in order to maintain state control. The fact that there is an ethnic group, more or less consolidated, cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be placed in the appropriate context, which consists of the simultaneous presence of many compact ethnic groups, even in the same villages and towns.

Speaking about the issue of confessions, Cvidinek makes a serious mistake when he presents Orthodox Christians and Exarchists separately, as if they were two different confessions. Both these groups are actually Orthodox, with the difference that Cvidinek's

By nationality

Albanians 1,100,000 (44%)

Bulgarians 486,000 (19.2%)

Serbs 291,000 (11.4%)

Turks 240,000 (9.3%)
Greeks 238,500 (9.2%)
Vlachs 160,000 (6.5%)
Jews, Armenians, Roma, etc. 10,000 (0.4%)
Cvidinek comes to the conclusion that in the four mentioned vilayets the Albanian population is dominant, since no other nationality reaches even approximately that number. According to religion, the total number of 1,100,000 Albanians is further, by approximate estimate, divided as follows:
Muslims 848,000 Catholics 102,000 Orthodox Christians 60,000
Based on this, it is shown that approximately 77% of Albanians at that time were of the Muslim faith, while 23% were Christians.
Cvidinek, however, emphasizes that the numerical proportion of Albanians in relation to other parts of the population, as well as their grouping depending on differences in confessions, is not the same in all four vilayets, which is why he suggests establishing the ratio in each of them so that it can then be defined to what extent Albanians are the ones playing the main role.
By religion (confession)
Muslims 1,322,000 (52.8%) Orthodox Christians 695,500 (27.8%) Exarchists 374,500 (15%) Catholics 102,000 (4%)
"Orthodox Christians" were under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch from Constantinople, while the Exarchists depended on the Exarch of Bulgarian origin. For this reason, in all statistics relating to confessions, these groups should be considered together if we want to gain an objective understanding of the relations between religions. Therefore, alongside Cvidinek's figures, we will add the sum of these two groups so that the reader has a less distorted perception. On the other hand, the fact that Cvidinek and his colleagues insist on the incorrect representation of confessional affiliation may be another indicator of a biased attitude towards this part of the population of the Balkan Peninsula, that is, a reflection of their desire to present reality not as it is, but as they would like it to be. Hence, the probability of incorrect analysis and, accordingly, the choice of risky strategies in the implementation of the plan for the creation of Albania is even greater.
52 That is, a total of 1,070,000 Orthodox Christians.

General Data on the Scutari Vilayet
Area: 8,190 km²; population: 241,000 inhabitants, divided as follows:
By nationality:
Albanians 222,000 Turks 10,000 Serbs 7,500
By religion:
Muslims 150,000 Catholics 82,000 Orthodox 7,500
According to his judgment, the population of this province is practically monoethnic, i.e., Albanian. Muslims are concentrated only in the cities, as state officials, and Slavs are found only in some places along Lake Scutari. In the capital city, Montenegrin and Bosnian emigrants of Slavic origin have also settled.
According to Cvidinek's research, 63% of Albanians living in the Scutari Vilayet, approximately 140,000, always declare themselves as Islamic believers. The remaining 37%, that is about 82,000 Albanians, declare themselves as Catholics. The Catholic population prevails in the regions in the north of the province, and the Muslim population in the south. The mountain tribes north of Scutari – Hoti, Kastrati, Klementi, and Shkreli (Shkrijeli), then the five banners [orig. banatos, i.e., banovina – translator's note] of Mirdita, the Pulati tribes, as well as Fandi (Fan) – form, so to speak, a strictly Catholic area, as opposed to the Orthodox Slavs from Montenegro and the neighboring Muslim districts to the east and south.
South of the Mat River, in the districts of Kruja, Durrës, Tirana, Kavaja, and Shijak, Catholics are present in insignificant numbers.
Specific Statistics of the Scutari Vilayet
Area: 8,190 km². Population: 241,000.
Division by nationality:
Scutari Sanjak: 166,500
Albanians 160,000 Turks 5,000 Serbs 1,500
53 Again using the word "nationality," Cvidinek "goes" ahead of his time, and will do so throughout the memorandum.
69 Durrës Sanjak: 73,000
Albanians 62,000 Serbs 6,000 Turks 5,000
Division by religion:
Scutari Sanjak: Muslims 84,000 Catholics 81,000 Orthodox 1,500
Durrës Sanjak:
Muslims 66,000 Orthodox 6,000 Catholics 1,000
The tribes from the mountains in northern Albania are organized by religion and divided as follows:

1. Tribes north of Scutari: Hoti, Klementi, Kastrati, Grude, Shkreli (Shkrijeli), Trijepsi, and Koce: 24,000 inhabitants, of whom 20,500 are Catholics and 3,500 Muslims.
2. Rioli, Reçi, and Lohja: 3,000 inhabitants, of whom 1,300 are Catholics and 1,700 Muslims.
3.

Tribes from the Pulati mountains: Shala, Shoshe, Nikaj, Merturi, as well as the banners of Shengjin (Medova), Kiri, Planti, Togshana, and Dushmani: 14,000 inhabitants, who are basically all Catholics.

4. Tribes from Postriba (Postripe), composed of the banners of Drishti (Drivast), Bogshi, Suma, Shlaku (Shljaku), and Temali: 4,200 inhabitants, of whom 2,300 are Catholics and 1,900 Muslims.

5. Dukagjin, composed of the banners of Kabashi, Bugjoni, Qerreti, Puka, Iballja, Mali i Zi (Montenegro), and Berisha [orig: Kalaschi, Budjoni, Keretti, Rika, Ibatta, Malisi, Derischia, corrected to Kabashi, Bugjoni, Qerreti, Puka, Iballja, Mali i Zi, Berisha – translator's note]: 25,000 inhabitants, of whom 18,000 are Catholics and 6,500 Muslims.

6. Mirdita, composed of the banners of Orosh, Debar, Fandi, Kushneni [orig: Kuschneni], and Spachi: 20,000 inhabitants, who are basically all Catholics.

7. Banners from Lezhë, namely: Lezhë, Manati, Bulgari, Vele [orig: Veglia; see Vele], and Krusheshi [orig: Kriiesesi, see Kryezezi]: 6,000 inhabitants, of whom 5,600 are Catholics and 400 Muslims.

70 8. Banners of Kthella, Selita, and Luria (Lur): 4,000 inhabitants, of whom 2,900 are Catholics and 1,100 Muslims.

The total number of inhabitants in this district reaches 100,200 people, of whom 85,100 are Catholics and 15,100 Muslims.

General Data on the Kosovo Vilayet 54

East of the Scutari Vilayet is the Kosovo Vilayet (capital city Skopje [orig. Uesktib, but sometimes Uskiib – translator's note]). Area: 32,000 km². Population: 865,000 inhabitants, divided as follows:

By nationality:

Albanians 276,000 Serbs 268,000 Bulgarians 187,000 Turks 130,000 Vlachs 2,200 Armenians, Jews, Greeks 1,800

By religion:

Muslims 507,000 of whom:

Albanians 251,500 Turks 130,000 Serbs 77,300 Bulgarians 37,200

Orthodox 187,000 Exarchists5 5 149,000 Catholics 20,000 Others 1,800

In this vilayet, approximately 32% of the population are Albanians. They are closely followed by Serbs with 31% and Bulgarians with 21%.

If we look at how these population groups are distributed across different parts of the vilayet, we find that, according to Cvidinek, Albanians overwhelmingly prevail over other groups in the Prizren and Peja Sanjaks, and also appear in compact formations in the Pristina and Novi Pazar Sanjaks, where their ratio to Serbs is 1 to 3. In the Skopje Sanjak, their number is relatively small, making up only 10% of the population, while Bulgarians constitute as much as 64% of the total.

From all this, it follows that Albanians are numerically strongest precisely in the parts of the Kosovo Vilayet that border the Scutari Vilayet, and, with their "western brothers," in

Cvidinek's words, form a closed area, clearly defined by language and a unified territory.
54 HHStA, PA
I, K. 473, Fol 171.
55 That is, a total of 236,000 Orthodox.
71 The boundary between the population speaking Albanian and those speaking Slavic languages runs north from Kolašin, through Gusinje and Plav, continuing along the Ibar to Rožaje – Suvi Dol (Suhodol) – Glogovik – Duga Poljana, across the heights of Rogozna, to the southeast of Novi Pazar [orig: Jenizabar > probably by mistake instead of Jenibazar – translator's note], then through the area of Vučitrn and Kuršumlija to the border with Serbia, and then back to Toplica, in the region of the Bulgarian Morava [i.e., South Morava, orig: Moravia bulgara].

- trans. note]. From there, it probably continues along this river to Kumanovo, then westward, passing along the southern slope of Karadag (Skopje's Black Mountain), through the Lepenac gorge, crossing the Vardar valley almost at the mouth of the Treska, and then enters the Bitola vilayet.

The Albanian population in this province is predominantly Muslim. Albanian Catholic communities are found only in the districts of Prizren, Peć, and Đakovica, and in isolated cases also in Skopje's Black Mountain and Janjevo. However, Catholics in the entire vilayet make up only 2-3% of the total population, while Muslim Albanians reach approximately 30%.
Specific statistics for the Kosovo Vilayet
(Capital city: Skopje [Uesktib - trans. note])
Area: 32,000 km² Population: 865,000
Breakdown by nationality:
Skopje Sanjak:
Bulgarians 171,000 Turks 50,000 Albanians 26,600 Serbs 15,000 Vlachs 2,200 Jews 1,500
Total 266,300
Pristina Sanjak:
Serbs 112,500 Albanians 51,000 Turks 50,000 Jews 350
Total 213,850
56 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 171b.
Prizren Sanjak:
Albanians 122,000 Serbs 42,000 Bulgarians 15,000 Turks 5,000
Total 184,000
Peć Sanjak:
Albanians 51,500 Serbs 18,500 Turks 5,000
Total 75,000
Novi Pazar Sanjak:
Serbs 54,000 Albanians 24,000 Turks 10,000
Total 88,000
Pljevlja Sanjak:
Serbs 26,000 Turks 10,000 Albanians 1,000
Total 37,000

Breakdown by religion:
Skopje Sanjak: Exarchists 137,000 Muslims 114,000 Orthodox 13,800 Jews 1,500 Catholics 200
Pristina Sanjak: Muslims 136,500 Orthodox 71,500 Catholics 5,500 Jews 350
Prizren Sanjak: Muslims 133,500 Orthodox 33,800
57 That is, a total of 150,800 Orthodox.
Exarchists 12,500 Catholics 5,000
Peć Sanjak:
Muslims 50,700 Orthodox 14,800 Catholics 9,500
Novi Pazar Sanjak: Muslims 51,800 Orthodox 36,000
Pljevlja Sanjak: Muslims 20,500 Orthodox 17,200
General data on the Monastir Vilayet
This vilayet borders the Shkodra and Janina vilayets to the west, and the Thessaloniki vilayet to the east. Area: 32,000 km². Population: 890,000 inhabitants, distributed as follows:
By nationality:
Bulgarians 300,000 Albanians 250,000 Vlachs 120,000 Greeks 110,000 Turks 90,000 Serbs 15,000 Jews 5,100
By religion:
Muslims 433,600 Orthodox 226,000 Exarchists 225,000 Jews 5,100
Although in the Bitola province the Bulgarian element surpasses the Albanian (300,000 to 250,000), Albanians in this area form a compact group, which directly adjoins the Albanian districts of the Shkodra and Kosovo vilayets. In the Debar and Elbasan sanjaks, they are so predominant that we can say these zones are inhabited by a purely Albanian population. In the Korça (Korçë) sanjak, however, they make up only 40% of the population—there are 200,000 Albanians here, compared to 180,000 Bulgarians and 70,000 Vlachs. Also, in the Sanjak of Selfidje [Servia, Greek: Σερβία, formerly Srbica], which borders Thessaly, there are only 6,000 Albanians, versus 90,000 Bulgarians and 70,000 Greeks.
58 That is, a total of 46,000 Orthodox.
59 Thus, a total of 451,000 Orthodox.
All Albanians in this province are Muslims. North of the Durrës Sanjak, east of the Monastir Vilayet, with borders with Greece to the south and the sea to the west, we find data that differ significantly from those in the previous vilayets.
Specific statistics for the Monastir (Bitola) Vilayet
Area: 32,000 km². Population: 890,000, distributed as follows:
Breakdown by nationality (approximate):
Debar Sanjak:
Albanians 110,000 Bulgarians 5,500 Serbs 4,000 Turks 1,000
Total 120,000
Elbasan Sanjak:
Albanians 81,000 Turks 5,000 Greeks 1,000
Total 87,000
Korça Sanjak:

Albanians 50,000 Bulgarians 40,000 Vlachs 30,000 Turks 10,000 Greeks 10,000 Others 20,000
Total 160,000
Bitola Sanjak:
Bulgarians 180,000 Vlachs 70,000 Turks 30,000 Albanians 20,000 Greeks 15,000 Serbs 10,000 Others 2,000
Total 327,000
Selfidje Sanjak:
Bulgarians 90,000 Greeks 70,000 Vlachs 19,000 Turks 10,000 Albanians 6,000
Total 195,000
Breakdown by religion:
Debar Sanjak: Muslims 109,000 Orthodox 5,500 Exarchists 5,500
Elbasan Sanjak: Muslims 86,000 Orthodox 1,000
Korça Sanjak: Muslims 74,600 Exarchists 50,000 Orthodox 34,600 Jews 800
Bitola Sanjak: Exarchists 164,000 Muslims 87,000 Orthodox 71,000
Selfidje Sanjak:
Orthodox 113,800
Muslims 76,600
Exarchists.....5,600
General data on the Janina Vilayet
Area: 16,664 km²; Population: 510,000 inhabitants, distributed as follows:
60 That is, a total of 11,000 Orthodox.
61 That is, a total of 84,600 Orthodox.
62 That is, a total of 135,000 Orthodox.
63 That is, a total of 119,000 Orthodox.
64 See HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 172.
Albanians 330,000 Greeks 128,000 Vlachs 38,000
By nationality:
Orthodox 275,000 Muslims 231,000 Jews 3,500
By religion:
Turks 10,000
Jews 3,500
Here we again encounter the fact that Albanians make up almost 65% of the total population. However, they mainly inhabit the north of the vilayet, that is, the Berat Sanjak, where 130,000 Albanians live alongside 13,000 Aromanians [Cincars], as in the Gjirokastra Sanjak, where approximately 26,000 Greeks live among 110,000 Albanians. In the south, in the Janina Sanjak, the Greek element is the most numerous with 75,000 inhabitants, compared to the Albanian, which numbers 60,000 people. In the Preveza Sanjak, however, we find 30,000 Albanians compared to 23,000 Greeks, but the Albanian population in this zone is better assimilated into Greek culture.
It should be noted that the Albanian population in the northeastern districts is almost entirely of the Muslim faith, while in the part bordering Greece, almost a third of the population belongs to the Greek "non-Catholic" religion [no catolica, i.e., Orthodox – translator’s note].

The boundary between the population speaking Albanian and that speaking Greek in the Vilayet of Janina is nowhere near as clear as the one that exists between Albanians and Slavs in northern Albania. It is more clearly expressed only in the northeast of Epirus, that is, from Konitsa and Desnika [orig: Desnika], across the Pindus mountains, to Gjirokastër. West of this line, to the Adriatic Sea, these two groups are mixed. In general, it can be said that the north is purely Albanian, the south Greek, and the central-western zone, north of Preveza up to Himara, is inhabited by a mixed population.
The Aromanians predominantly inhabit the slopes of the Pindus mountains and are especially concentrated in the closed communities of Metsovo. They are also present in some villages in the districts of Zagori and Konitsa, and sporadically in Malakastër, Pogon, and in the plain of Muzakia.
Specific statistics of the Vilayet of Janina
Area: 16,664 km².
Population: 510,000 inhabitants
77
Berat Sanjak:
Albanians 130,000 Vlachs 13,000 Greeks 4,000 Turks 500 Jews 500
Total 148,000
Gjirokastër Sanjak: Albanians 110,000 Greeks 26,000 Turks 2,500
Total 138,500
Janina Sanjak:
Greeks 75,000 Albanians 60,000 Vlachs 25,000 Turks 7,000 Others 3,000
Total 170,000
Preveza Sanjak:
Albanians 30,000 Greeks 23,500
Total 53,500
Division by religion:
Berat Sanjak: Muslims 130,500 Orthodox 17,000 Jews 500
Gjirokastër Sanjak: Muslims 99,000 Orthodox 39,500
Janina Sanjak:
Orthodox 120,000 Muslims 47,000 Others 3,000
Preveza Sanjak:
Orthodox 27,500 Muslims 26,000
Division by nationality:
78 2. National and Political Conditions in Albania65
This is the title of the second part of Cvidinek's report. After the first part studied the numerical ratio between the Albanian people and other national groups in the Turkish territory, from the Adriatic coast to the zones of the tributaries of the Ibar and Vardar, and made a division by religion, the author himself proposes to continue with a detailed description66 of the national and political conditions, although he does not consider them particularly significant for achieving the goal, which is the creation of an independent Albania.
According to Cvidinek, it must not be forgotten that the Albanian population from the mentioned Turkish territories does not really constitute a national whole in the true

sense of the word, although it is geographically connected. Moreover, the population is divided into two main tribes separated by the Shkumbin river, which practically forms the boundary between them:

- the Gheg tribe, to which belong the Albanians from the Skadar, Kosovo, and Bitola vilayets;
- the Tosk tribe, which consists of Albanians from the Janina vilayet, south of the Shkumbin river.

The Baron continues by pointing out that these two tribes are alienated from each other, and their members are not on friendly terms. Indeed, they do not engage in conflicts as in previous periods, but in no case can one speak of national unity, of a sense of identical political affiliation or a community of interest. The situation, as Cvidinek emphasizes, is in reality such, despite the fact that in the minds of some Albanian patriots the idea of an independent and united Albania is being born.

The differences between these two tribes, although seemingly only superficial, as well as the differences between other tribes that until the given historical moment had no common interests, are actually noticeable at all levels and in very different forms.

As for national character, according to Cvidinek, the Tosks are generally less resistant to external influences, while the Ghegs are superior in physical strength, courage, and sense of honor and independence.

65 These are annexes I—IV of the Memorandum written by Cvidinek, HHStA, PA I, K. 473. Due to the importance we attach to this entire document, we will present it in detail, as was the case with the previous parts of the Memorandum.

66 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 172 b.

79 In terms of language, there are differences between the two dialects, since Gheg is "harder" and Tosk "softer," and the differentiation is so obvious that members of these tribes practically do not understand each other. Another specificity is that the two tribes write in different alphabets: Tosks use Greek letters, while Ghegs use Latin.

As for religious affiliation, Christian Ghegs are Roman Catholics, while Tosks have retained the Greek, Orthodox faith. The Muslim Albanians from the north are Sunnis, while those from the south often belong to the Shiite Bektashi sect (Bektashism).

Based on Cvidinek’s account, we learn that the peculiarities of the two groups of the population are most clearly observed in the domain of their ideas and political aspirations, which is especially evident among Christian Albanians67. Christian Tosks have numerous family lines in the neighboring Kingdom of Greece, with which they maintain close ties, while the Christian Ghegs, for political and religious reasons, are more inclined towards Austria-Hungary, as they feel an obligation and attachment to that country, considering the protection the Austro-Hungarian government provides to their church and the support it gives to Catholic schools in their land. Cvidinek knows of only one Gheg tribe outside Turkey, which lives in four settlements (all four in Austria-Hungary, that is, in Erice, near Zadar [Ital. Borgo Erizzo, today the settlement of Arbanasi – translator’s note], in Peroj, near Pula, as well as in Nikinci and Hrtkovci, in Slavonia).

In the section concerning Albanian Muslims, Cvidinek insists that it is important to emphasize how all of them support the Sultan, who, only in this province, enjoys

completely reliable support. The reasons for this are not only political, but are also a consequence of the fact that the population in that area is perfectly aware that under different circumstances they would not be able to enjoy the same freedom provided to them by Turkish rule. Namely, they have enjoyed certain privileges from the Ottoman authorities regarding their traditions and customs. In the event of the collapse of the Turkish Empire—which even the most loyal Albanian Muslims do not rule out at this moment—almost all prominent figures, as well as many patriots, are convinced that it is necessary to seek the support of Austria-Hungary, which is clearly concluded from the statements of a very influential Albanian bey, cited by Cvidinek:

67 Ibidem, Fol. 172 b.

68 Ibidem, Fol. 173.

80 "We, Albanians," he asserts convincingly, "know very well that Turkish rule in Europe will sooner or later come to an end. Epirus will be absorbed by Greece, the Bulgarians likewise by Bulgaria, and the Serbs by Serbia and Montenegro. But what will happen to us, Albanians? As far as I know the attitude of my countrymen," continues Syrja Bey [Alb. Syrja bej Vlora, in the original Sureja Bey – translator's note], "for us, the most favorable solution would be the creation of an autonomous province under the protectorate of Austria-Hungary. No matter how much some Italian priests and diplomats promote their country in Albania, Italy has never been truly popular among us. If we Muslims must integrate under some foreign government, since we are currently not mature enough to establish an independent Albania, we prefer Austria-Hungary over any other power. Even the lowest strata of our people know to what extent the Austro-Hungarian authorities respect our religion and our customs. The cannon salutes fired in Sarajevo in celebration of Ramadan left more than a good impression there."69 According to Cvidinek's judgment, there is another reason why Albanian Muslims have sympathies for Austria-Hungary, and it lies in the antagonism that exists in the Balkans between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia. The pro-Slavic Russian policy has found a true rival in the Danube monarchy, which fears the Russians and absolutely does not want the development of the "Slavic element"70 in this area. In the opinion of the Albanians, the main goal of Austria-Hungary is to halt the rise of "Slavization" of the Balkans. It is clear that the Dual Monarchy will never protect the "hated Slavs," but will rather do everything in its power to oppose the interests of the Balkan Slavs, as well as the interests of Russia, as their patron power. Therefore, Albanian Muslims consider it a natural ally and protector in the struggle against Russia and its protégés, the Slavs. It is true that Muslim Albanians would be most satisfied if Austria-Hungary were an ally of the Sultan's empire and a protector of their national question. However, Cvidinek believes, assuming that Ottoman power in Europe comes to an end, it is logical that, with maximum caution and discretion, an agreement should be made between Austria-Hungary and the Albanians from the north.71

69 Ibidem, Fol. 173.

70 This expression, as well as all subsequent ones connected to the "Slavic motif," was used in this form by the author of the Memorandum himself.

71 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 173b.

81 In southern Albania, however, the situation is quite different. Only a few rulers, who are in theory the Sultan's vassals or beys, support the idea of seeking support from Austria-Hungary, while the vast majority of the population remains completely

uninvolved regarding this issue. This is explained by the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire has never developed an active policy in southern Albania, as well as the fact that its consuls in this area have actually played the role of mere observers of political events.

Thus, following Cvidinek's exposition, as a summary we can draw three conclusions: first—that the Catholics from northern Albania, almost without exception, have sympathies for Austria-Hungary; second—that the Albanian Orthodox population from the south of the region gravitates toward Greece; and third—that Albanian Muslims remain loyal to Turkish rule, but, in the event of its fall, will consider Austria-Hungary the country best able to defend and protect them from the advance of Pan-Slavism.

The consul, in the continuation of the Memorandum, speaks about the existing relations among different religious groups and predicts possible consequences, depending on which political option each of them chooses.

Representatives of Austrian diplomacy know very well that the conflict between Albanian Catholics and Muslims is a fact that does not need to be discussed, although the possibility of joint action by both groups should not be dismissed a priori. The difference that truly seems impossible to overcome is that between the Orthodox and Muslims, as well as that between Slavs and Albanians.72 The fact that Catholics and Muslims get along relatively well is explained by the fact that the Albanians from the north were Catholics, i.e., their conversion to Islam was relatively recent compared to the time of the secret conferences, so the tradition of a Catholic past was still alive in their families.73 On the other hand, among Muslim tribes there are still Catholic families who practice their faith without difficulty, or it also happens that within the same family one brother is a Catholic and the other brothers are Muslims. Cvidinek also points out that there are hidden Catholics, who live in the mountains in the north and who, if circumstances change, will not hesitate to openly declare themselves as Catholics.

Another peculiarity in the social

72 Ibidem.

73 Ibid, Fol.174.

82 One aspect of life, which helps in understanding the relationship between Catholics and Muslims, is that among the Ghegs, the northern tribes, there has never existed a division into a dominant Muslim class that subjugates other, non-Muslim classes, as was the case in many other places in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, both groups, regardless of religious differences, equally persecute the "hated Slavs." The Ghegs are not fanatics. Their tribal jealousy can only be inflamed by issues concerning prejudices, formalities, or material interests.

Cvidinek also notes that both Albanian Catholics and Muslims speak the same language, have the same traditions and customs, and "unite as brothers in their hatred towards the Slavic element." As early as the time of the first League, they invaded Montenegro and ravaged it. The differences between Catholics and Muslims are expressed only in the large cities, where it is not uncommon for the fanaticism of spiritual leaders on both sides to spark clashes, fueled by mutual hatred. In the mountains and villages in the lowlands, however, Albanians are united against a common enemy.

In any case, the fundamental problem, according to Cvidinek, is that it is extremely difficult among Albanians to awaken a sense of common belonging to the same nation.

The goal was for Tosks and Ghegs to eventually organize under the umbrella of a unified state administration, but in reality, it was almost impossible even to unite just the Muslims from both tribes. There are several reasons that explain this impossibility: first, there are significant differences in the way of life of the two tribes; second, there is mutual aversion between them; they also differ in their specific way of relating to Turkish authority—the Ghegs show greater independence in their relations with the Turkish authorities than the Tosks; also, there is an obvious disagreement between the two tribes regarding political options, as well as a lack of communication between the northern and southern districts. Nevertheless, the main obstacle to achieving unity between the Ghegs and Tosks is the lack of means or media that would facilitate this rapprochement, that is, the lack of a common language. This difficulty was well known to all who considered the possibility of realizing the idea of an independent Albania under

74 Ibidem.

75 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 174 b. [In the original, after the footnote, the author also left the archival mark (174r) – translator's note.]

Austrian protection, and primarily to the Consul General von Lippich. Therefore, before any possible Austro-Hungarian intervention in Albania, the idea of attracting the Tosks was abandoned in advance, as this tribe was considered much less important for Austro-Hungarian interests.

According to Cvidinek, one should also keep in mind another feature characteristic of the social organization of the Tosks, namely the lack of a well-organized military hierarchy, unlike the Ghegs, who have one. It is precisely this military structure that helped them maintain their independence from the Turks and successfully defend themselves against any attempt at interference in their internal affairs. Thanks to this, they have preserved their earlier customs. In contrast, in southern Albania, the Turkish administration has become much more deeply rooted. Albanian beys are feudal lords who enjoy power and prestige by serving their government. They are also large landowners who keep the Christian population in servitude. While in the north the population is still partially Catholic, in the south, in areas closer to Greece, the tribes remained of the Orthodox faith; in Epirus, for example, the process of Hellenization at that time was in an advanced stage.

In Cvidinek's opinion, attempts to change the situation in the south do not favor Austria-Hungary, because it does not have sufficient means to act in that direction, and, moreover, this area of Albania is relatively distant from it. In his view, it is much more appropriate to reach an agreement with the Greek government, in which the zones of influence of each country would be clearly defined. Therefore, Austria-Hungary should act in the territory of southern Albania only where Muslim beys have sufficient influence so that, in the event of the emergence of an Albanian national movement, they could take the lead.

3. Means of Action

The third part of the report is titled Aktionsmittel, or "means of action," in which Cvidinek proposes a way of acting in the region he has just defined.

He first emphasizes the need to exploit the concern among Albanians regarding the weakness of the Sultan's power, as well as the more or less justified fear of the

uncertain future that awaits them in the event of the collapse of the Turkish Empire. The Albanian population is increasingly looking to Austria-Hungary as the only possible
76 Ibidem.
84 protector against a possible offensive by the Serbs and Montenegrins, and such an opinion, as the baron states, should be encouraged. Therefore, according to Cvidinek, it is undoubtedly of crucial importance for Austria-Hungary to bind the strongest and most guerrilla-inclined tribes, that is, those from northern and central Albania, even more closely to itself, so that they can serve as an army to protect and defend the Adriatic coast, since they have Serbs and Montenegrins on the border. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that Italy does not attempt to do the same as Austria-Hungary, and efforts should be made to ensure that its propaganda fails. In this way, the Italians will be prevented from conquering the eastern coast of the Adriatic, since that was precisely the goal of Austria-Hungary.

Cvidinek believes that special attention should be paid to the statements of several influential Albanians, according to whom both Catholics and Muslims from the north are ready to "replace Turkish rule with Austrian," and that "in the event of the collapse of Turkish power and on the condition that they commit to defending their national interests." Cvidinek, however, warns that before Austria-Hungary begins action in its own favor, it is necessary to determine whether there are minimal prerequisites among the Albanian tribes for the advancement of an autonomous state entity and whether the Albanians are able to defend themselves successfully, "since this is not about Austro-Hungarian occupation of their territories, but about possible protection and assistance in their aspiration to create an independent Albania."

In the continuation of his presentation, the Baron assures that at the present moment, the Albanian tribes from the north are making efforts only to defend their limited interests. Their patriotism is still of a local type and as such is not the most desirable when considering the material and spiritual development of a nation. Only in certain parts of the region, specifically among the Catholic tribes from the northern mountains, can an institution be found that could in the future serve as the basis for organizing an independent and unified administration of Albania. Only in this way, through joint action with the aforementioned tribes, could the currently scattered, fragmented, and divided forces be united. As an example, he cites the five banners of Mirdita united under the leadership of a captain who comes from the same tribe. Alongside him gather five standard-bearers, as well as the Council of Forty Elders. When a decision needs to be made on an important issue, the captain demands the opinion and approval of the Council. The assembly is held every year to discuss problems concerning the common interest of the five banners. Nevertheless, these types of institutions have not yielded the expected results, primarily due to the need of the Turkish authorities to interfere in the existing conflicts of the aforementioned tribes, as well as to manipulate them, with the aim of sowing seeds of discord and completely suppressing any idea of Albanian independence.

According to Cvidinek, "if we now ask what is the best way to act in order to successfully achieve the goal, which is the independence of Albania—the answer must necessarily be sought in an action that is appropriate, adapted, and harmonized with the reality of what we have previously stated; in other words, we must act bearing in mind the characteristics and nature of the people themselves, the particularity of their political

and local relations, and above all, the similarities of their religious views. Therefore, our way of acting in the north should differ from that in the south, that is, Catholics, as well as Muslims, should be separated from the tribes living in the mountains."

As for the Catholic population, Cvidinek concludes that there has been a rapprochement between this part of the Albanian people and Austria-Hungary, thanks to the protectorate that the Imperial and Royal Government has held for centuries over the church and clergy. This good existing relationship can be used by Austria-Hungary to strengthen its influence in one of the zones most important for the empire: in northern Albania.

In general, due to the low level of education among Albanians, as well as the fact that Catholicism has become a symbol under which Albanians have fought to preserve their independence, the church, Cvidinek continues, has secured a leading role for itself. The Catholic priest is not only an advisor on spiritual matters, but also on secular issues; he often acts as a judge, lawyer, and even a doctor. Hence, the Baron believes, it is precisely through the clergy that the best relationship with the people can be secured when it comes to their beliefs, ideas, and political attitudes. Therefore, it is necessary, above all, to determine to what extent their help can be counted on regarding the political action being initiated, as well as what measures should be taken, depending on the experience gained up to that point, in order to achieve the best possible results in the realization of that action.

Before we continue with Cvidinek's presentation regarding the Memorandum, let us briefly return to what was discussed at the second conference.

Namely, the joint Minister of Finance, von Kalay, notes that the actions of Austria-Hungary should be directed in two ways, that is, the situation in the south and north of Albania should be taken into account on one hand, as well as the differences between Albanian Catholics and Muslims on the other. Therefore, he proposes that Austro-Hungarian action should basically be based on support for Greece, that is, Austria-Hungary should advocate for the Greek contingent to gain greater significance. In the north, where the creation of an independent national state is sought, the situation is different, and the initial action should be aimed at awakening the consciousness of national belonging among Albanians, which would prepare the ground for the building of an independent state. There, as von Kalay notes, equal attention should be paid to both Catholics and Muslims. Regarding relations with these groups, he proposes extremely wise and cautious conduct, assuring that in this purpose the vanity and ambition of the beys, who are in the majority there, could be exploited. It is important, the minister continues, to clarify to the population that the creation of a free and independent Albania is possible only through the unity of Catholics and Muslims and their joint cooperation in the service of the national question. When this necessary condition is met, they could, at the appropriate moment, be allowed greater freedom of action compared to the Orthodox population. Von Kalay adds that in this regard, Austro-Hungarian consuls should be well instructed.

Baron von Zwidinek states that, if attention is directed towards achieving harmony between Catholics and Muslims, action should first be taken in Shkodra, where there are good preconditions for this, since, for the realization of certain common goals, contact between the Catholic and Muslim population has already been established here. This increases the probability of success in this area. He also notes that in some

districts, such as those in the Kosovo Vilayet, things are quite different, primarily because contact between members of the two confessions has never existed, and is further threatened by the fact that Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority and usually have a rather hostile attitude towards Catholics. The Baron suggests that the terrain in this zone be thoroughly studied and that consuls send much more detailed information, as the general picture that still exists about these areas is quite unclear.
In this regard, the joint Minister of Finance, von Kalay, does not miss the opportunity to point out that, according to the latest received information, there is a tendency for Albanian Muslims to draw closer to Catholics, a movement supported by the High Porte, with the aim of jointly resisting Orthodox Serbs and Bulgarians. Kalay concludes that such a movement would be very beneficial, and therefore proposes that it be supported without hesitation.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, dwells on Baron von Zwidinek's remarks, emphasizing the necessity of clarifying as soon as possible in which territories there are the greatest prospects for success of Austro-Hungarian intervention and how it can be achieved. The Baron reminds that, among other things, the creation of an independent Albania aims to drive a wedge between Serbia and Montenegro, and that, on the other hand, effort should not be wasted in those areas where the necessary ethnographic conditions for such action do not exist. Here, he primarily refers to zones where the majority is Serbian or Bulgarian, who strive for the definitive elimination of Turkish heritage, making the achievement of the goal almost impossible. Goluchowski also points out that it would not be wise to lose sight of certain desires and aspirations of the Serbian population. The Minister suggests that it is more useful to make certain concessions to the Serbs in the south than to allow them to direct their ambitions towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this sense, he proposes that the sanjaks of Pristina and Skopje be excluded from the action plan. He also points out the necessity of cartographic representation of the area of operation, which should approximately coincide with the borders of the future Albanian state.
Minister von Kalay expresses agreement with the chairman regarding the fact that expansion of Serbia to the south is the only acceptable option. On the one hand, he confirms that the ceding of the western part of the Novi Pazar Sanjak should not be allowed. Regarding this area, a direct connection with the future state of Albania will be necessary, i.e., a direct border. On the other hand, he believes that the fact that future Albania will certainly have a very weak state structure and that it will only be possible to form it over the one that already exists should not be overlooked. The Minister continues by pointing out that in territories where they are a minority, Albanians will never be strong enough in relation to foreign Orthodox elements, such as Serbs or Bulgarians. Therefore, von Kalay proposes that Austro-Hungary should not focus its intervention on these territories and that they should be ceded to other powers. If, at the appropriate moment, there arises a need to cede part of the Novi Pazar Sanjak to Serbia, this should be done only on the condition that the Serbs do not expel the local Albanians from there, as they did with Muslims in Serbia.
The conference continues with a heated discussion among all participants on the next point of the memorandum, which concerns the political use of the cultural protectorate already being implemented by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Before presenting the most important results of this discussion, we will pause at a specific part of the

Memorandum, entitled “The Political Function of the Austro-Hungarian Protectorate over the Catholic Church and Catholic Clergy in Albania; influencing the population through educational centers we subsidize.”
This part of the report was compiled under the supervision of Consul General Schmucker, in accordance with his experience and personal insight into the way Austro-Hungary deals with the Catholic clergy and the educational centers it manages.
According to this report, “Catholic Albania,” in terms of ecclesiastical-hierarchical organization, is divided into:

1. The Archdiocese of Shkodra, under whose administration are the dioceses of Pulagi, Sapa, and Lješ;
2. The Abbey of St. Alexander in the region of Mirdita;
3. The Archdiocese in Durrës;
4. The Archdiocese in Skopje.

It is stated here that among the clergy there is a division into secular and regular clergy, i.e., Franciscans and Jesuits. To them should be added the nuns from Shkodra and Prizren. The secular clergy mainly deal with the faithful who inhabit cities, plains, and valleys.
The Franciscans usually preach in the mountains, although sometimes also in the plains, as teachers of novices from Shkodra and Trosijani or in the school for boys in Shkodra.
The Jesuits manage the seminary for training priests in Shkodra, as well as the commercial school organized at the same seminary. In addition, they are mainly dedicated to preaching in various places and occasionally perform the function of parish priests.
Baron points out that in the year of the second conference, the expenses related to the clergy and education reach some 48,544 florins. He also suggests to those present to look at the appropriate distribution of funds in the attached tables, indicating that the costs for the current year have increased significantly and that subsidies tend to grow progressively.
Cvidinek expresses regret that he does not see a satisfactory level of cooperation among the clergy regarding the achievement of goals. There are many internal disagreements concerning church matters, but in the domain of life and political issues, these differences are even greater, due to personal disagreements and interests. It is true that among the clergy there are many priests close to the Imperial and Royal government, who act among the population in favor of the goals and interests of Austria-Hungary. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that there are also other, hostile priests in the Albanian clergy, many of whom are of Italian nationality and therefore act in the service of foreign propaganda.
Among the Catholic archbishops and bishops from Albania, as Cvidinek notes, there is not a single one sufficiently capable and energetic to guarantee complete loyalty when it comes to defending Austro-Hungarian interests. In the continuation of the report, the author provides a detailed and not very favorable description of the most important figures of the Albanian clergy, which is not of great significance for Austro-Hungarian intervention, except in the case of two priests – Mons. Doki [the author always uses his pseudonym Primo Doki, according to Italian Primo Docci, and not the name Prenk Dochi, in Albanian PrengDo$i – translator’s note] and Mons. Bianchi. Both will be

closely connected with the planned action of the Foreign Ministry of the Danube Monarchy, i.e., they will take prominent positions in the leadership and organization of that action, which makes it particularly interesting to learn about their
93 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol 176 b.
psychological profile, which Austrian diplomats had prepared for both priests up to that point. Thus, on page 177 of the report, we read:
"Monseigneur Doki (Albanian) is a very educated and intelligent priest, distinguished above all by his ambition. If any power decides to support him in his intentions, it will benefit greatly – both because of his extreme and energetic activity, and because of his growing influence. He currently appears as a man loyal to the Imperial and Royal government, as we have already been able to ascertain from the work he has done within the secular clergy in the service of our interests. However, we still cannot consider him a man of unquestionable trust, given that, like most Albanians, he is easily won over by greed and the desire for profit. It is said that he receives 1,500 francs annually from the Turkish government.
Monseigneur Bianchi, Archbishop of Durrës, acts as a faithful supporter of our ideas, but we cannot guarantee that he is ready to defend them energetically."
The report continues, adding that the secular clergy of exclusively Albanian origin is characterized by a relatively low level of education. It is noted that its members are generally quite intelligent, but subject to stinginess and greed; they are avaricious, ungrateful, and possess "all the bad traits of their race." Foreign missionaries are considered intruders, whom the Imperial and Royal government pays better, and therefore they look favorably on Austria-Hungary. They also express great dissatisfaction that almost all bishoprics in Albania are occupied by foreigners, so they cannot obtain them. Nevertheless, there are some Albanian priests who, by all accounts, are loyal to the Imperial and Royal government or at least act well prepared for its goals. Baron then proposes in the report an attempt to win over a significant number of priests for Austro-Hungarian plans, by explaining to them that the goal is not for some foreign power to occupy the country, but to attract the people with the idea of creating an independent Albania, under the protection of Austria-Hungary.
Cvidinek continues, providing more details: the Franciscans have been working in Albania for centuries and have a cordial relationship with the population; they have gained a good position among the mountain tribes, where they also possess great authority. They virtually constitute the militant
94 This is Cvidinek's expression, HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 177.
95 HHStA, PA 1, K. 473, Fol. 177 b.
church of Albania, and the influence of the Franciscans is a factor that should not be underestimated. Although a friendly attitude towards Austria-Hungary generally prevails in Franciscan missions, it should be borne in mind that significant Italian propaganda exists among them, which, incidentally, has intensified in recent years. Franciscans of Italian origin, although grateful to the Imperial and Royal government, are above all loyal to the interests of Italy.
The Franciscans do not manage to reach an understanding with Albanian priests. Also, they consider the Jesuits their rivals. The Bosnian Franciscans from Trošijani, besides being loyal, are very devoted to patriotic ideals and, despite difficulties, have managed

to develop a sense of gratitude and loyalty to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy among the students entrusted to them.
The Franciscans deal with novices from Shkodra and Trošijani, the school for boys in Shkodra, the missions in Kastrati and Pulati, the missions from Basija, Lurija, Biskasija and Sestane, as well as from Zumbi.
The Jesuits, on the other hand, are exclusively engaged in the education of youth, which is why they generally keep away from any political activity and, accordingly, do not try to instill any sympathies for Austria-Hungary among their students. They consider the subsidies from the Imperial and Royal government as assistance for their mission and persistently refuse to grant its representatives the right to interfere in their programs. However, since the secular clergy in Albania almost exclusively come from Jesuit seminaries, it would be necessary to implement strict control in order to increase the influence of Austria-Hungary among them and encourage further action in accordance with the goals set in these centers of religious education. Nevertheless, Cvidinek points out the fact that Albanians who studied with the Jesuits for ten years at the expense of Austro-Hungarian funds become priests and, after completing their studies, show very little gratitude and loyalty to the goals of the Monarchy. It is urgently necessary that these priests, before being ordained, be sent for further education to some Austrian or Hungarian seminary, where their indoctrination should be carried out in accordance with the interests of the Empire, so that they are properly prepared for their future priestly duties.
The Stigmatines [Hermanas Estigmatinas – translator's note], the report continues, are all Italian by nationality and primarily run a girls' school with almost three hundred students. They are usually quite overweight, but they help to civilize Albanian women, who live in great ignorance. The minister, however, considers it very unlikely that they are working in favor of Austria-Hungary among the female youth.
The nuns from Prizren are exclusively engaged in caring for the sick, since the Turkish government has not yet allowed them to devote themselves to teaching. These nuns have a highly developed sense of patriotism, but are rather uneducated, and therefore the
It is of vital importance to pay attention to the activities that the Church carries out in schools, since in Catholic districts their management is the exclusive responsibility of the clergy. Although the Habsburg government at that time already significantly supported the maintenance of these schools, up to that point, according to Cvidinek, the necessary control was lacking, which should be exercised over the teachers and the manner of education. In the schools it subsidizes, the Imperial and Royal government should make the final decisions regarding the selection of teachers—they should primarily be Austrian citizens, and if not, they should be persons of utmost trust.
Cvidinek notes that the sums allocated to schools at that time—in some dioceses—were not sufficient, and therefore need to be increased. In gymnasium schools, teachers should receive higher salaries, but always on the condition that they devote themselves solely to the education of youth, and not, as was usually the case, to the salvation of their own souls. In the largest and most important centers, if possible, new schools should be built; in the mountains as well, even if they are only Sunday schools. Likewise, a proposal was made to try using traveling teachers.

The author continues the report by stating that the construction of free kindergartens would help develop sympathy for Austrians among the population of large cities, taking as an example the model of Italian kindergartens from Shkodra. He also proposes an urgent reform of girls' schools, increasing their number and placing them under the management of Austrian nuns. The Albanian woman enjoyed a very low level of respect in society, but within the family, she was of vital importance.

Another way to secure reliable and well-trained teachers would be to select Albanians and offer them scholarships for further training in Austria-Hungary. Those who accepted such education would, upon graduation, be assigned to local schools, where they would dedicate themselves to teaching in a spirit that would correspond to the goals of the Monarchy.

Regarding teaching, the report further states, it is of vital importance to create and introduce a unified alphabet in schools, since the one currently used in Catholic schools, introduced by Italian priests, did not accurately graphically reproduce the real phonological features of the spoken language. Besides it, various other alphabets were used, more or less arbitrarily created. In this regard, Cvidinek advocates reaching an agreement with the Propaganda fide brotherhood from Rome, which was engaged in spreading the faith, as well as with the Albanian clergy, all with the aim of securing the cooperation of capable and well-educated Albanians.

Then, Cvidinek notes, all schools should immediately be provided with books containing texts composed in Austria-Hungary, so that the educational content aligns with the goals of the Monarchy; furthermore, the baron emphasizes that the Italian books used up to that point should be eliminated. He also suggests that, as the location of the publishing house on the title page, one of the Albanian colonies in Austria-Hungary could be indicated.

If the aforementioned measures enable the intellectual level of the Albanian population in Catholic areas to be raised, and if among its younger members a spirit of national unity is fostered and a sense of affection and loyalty toward the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as the benefactor of their people is encouraged, then, in Cvidinek’s opinion, the necessary preconditions will be met, which, together with other initiatives, will provide the Monarchy’s government with the opportunity to effectively influence the political development of the Albanian people.

Leaving the report aside for a moment, Cvidinek points out that the cultural protectorate exercised over Albania entails exceptionally high costs. Therefore, it is insufficient for the result of the action to be merely an indifferent attitude of the Albanian people toward Austria-Hungary, and a hostile attitude, which its mention sometimes provokes—primarily because certain individuals engage in Italian propaganda—is completely unacceptable. The main problem is that among the Albanian clergy there are very few devoted to the Austro-Hungarian cause, and Cvidinek directs this criticism at both the Jesuits and the Franciscans, the secular clergy, and the Sisters of Mercy. He proposes that the next meeting discuss how to deal with the Vatican. Regarding subsidies, he notes that they do not always have to be quite high, but that generosity should be based on actual services rendered, and that financial resources should provide greater incentive for future services.

As for the Jesuits, according to Cvidinek, they can be very useful as administrators of the seminar in Shkodra. Therefore, he proposes contacting the provincial center of the

Society of Jesus in Vienna, to persuade that clerical order that conducting Albanian national propaganda is more in the interest of the Catholic Church than conducting Italian propaganda. He also recommends that young seminarians, before ordination, be sent for some time to study in Innsbruck, where they would be indoctrinated regarding how best to act in the future.

Regarding the expenses for the Franciscan abbot in Trosijani, which the conference participants consider a matter of utmost importance, the best candidate is seen as Father Subac, whose way of thinking is beyond doubt and who, incidentally, for various reasons, is interested in maintaining good relations with Austria-Hungary.

Those present at the meeting regret that the role the nuns from Prizren could have played did not yield greater results, and they cite as the reason their limited or nonexistent qualifications. In that connection, it is emphasized that the Daughters of Divine Charity produce the best results, for which reason von Kállay is tasked with sounding out the abbess of that congregation as to whether she is willing to relocate her nuns to Prizren or to other places in Albania. In that case, they would have to learn the Albanian language and devote themselves to caring for the sick, and in an unobtrusive way could also take part in education. It would be a method similar to the day nurseries introduced by the Italians, where children are looked after during the day and receive food. This educational work should not have an official character, but rather be carried out discreetly.

Further in the paper we will return to the content of the Memorandum in order to highlight the second section in the segment devoted to the means of action, which concerns the press. This is the section entitled “Action through the print media,” which the attendees discussed in the continuation of the conference.

This part begins with the observation that the majority of Catholic Albanians have a very low level of education: barely 0.5% can read, and even fewer can write. Consequently, the possibility of influencing public opinion through the press is very limited.

However, it is emphasized that one might attempt, via the press, to expand influence among the clergy and more educated circles, through whose mediation Austro-Hungarian influence would later reach broader strata of the population. To achieve that goal, it is proposed to establish an Albanian periodical (preferably in Trieste), to be financed by the Imperial and Royal Government, with special attention in its content given to relations between Austria-Hungary and Albania.

In that case, priests and more educated Albanian citizens—those who are ambitious and entirely trustworthy—should be recruited to collaborate as correspondents. Later, articles about the Albanian situation, that is, about the aspirations and needs of the Albanian people, could also be printed in a periodical published in Austria in the Italian language (“Osservatore Triestino” or “Dalmato”), and it would be advisable to influence various foreign dailies to publish articles of similar content106.

105 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 138.

Furthermore, the idea is to influence the Catholic population effectively by distributing leaflets and brochures of appropriate content, to be handed out free of charge at the most suitable places for this purpose. Influence is also possible through the distribution of books on the history of Albania, written in the Albanian national spirit and in line with the objectives of the Austro-Hungarian initiative proposed at the conference107.

As a first condition for carrying out this project, the need is cited for the prompt drafting of a unified and practical Albanian alphabet, as was already proposed earlier; in that regard, the promotion of several specialized studies on this question is expected.
When it comes to this part of the Memorandum108, all the conference participants conclude that the effectiveness of the press, as a means of action, in a territory such as Albania will not be great; nevertheless, they agree that some success can be expected if the press carries a narrative that is popular and patriotically tinged. On the other hand, the claim is made that before anything is undertaken, it would be desirable to find some way to debate in the press the importance of existing commercial relations between Austria-Hungary and Albania. In that sense, arrangements can be made for foreign newspapers to publish articles by various correspondents from Albania, in which the information would be "slipped in" that the national idea in the country is maturing and that a movement of national consciousness is already emerging, which would contribute greatly to an Austro-Hungarian intervention109.
The second section of the Memorandum deals with "Promotion of the material interests of the Albanians." The conference participants here point out the necessity of acting in the same way as in the previous sections, which concerned the intellectual needs of the Albanians. That is to say, they must be helped so that they are satisfied and aware that they can establish multiple relations with Austria-Hungary. At that time the foreign trade of the Albanians was directed toward Austrian and Italian ports, above all those in Trieste and Venice. In the interest of the proposed political intervention, it would be desirable

106 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 179 b.
107 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 180.
108 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 139.
109 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 139 b.

to grant Albanian merchants various types of privileges, thanks to which Italian competition would be reduced to a minimum. Services of this type include, for example, the following proposals:

1. lowering travel costs or reducing tariffs, which will attract Albanian merchants to Austrian ports;
2. a subsidy granted to the Societa Ragusea to maintain regular and more frequent sailings between Scutari (Oboti) and Austro-Hungarian ports, especially Trieste and Rijeka;
3. encouraging the education, in Austrian schools financed by the Austro-Hungarian government, of young Albanians who wish to devote themselves to commerce;
4. awarding jobs to prominent Albanians in Austro-Hungarian firms;
5. a cordial reception in commercial clubs for Albanians who arrive in Trieste or Rijeka; and, finally:
6. the establishment of a professorial chair for the Albanian language in one of the commercial schools in Trieste.

On the other hand, to encourage a series of planned activities, the following measures are proposed:

1. to regulate a system of subsidies for all the most influential chieftains of the Catholic tribes from the mountainous regions;

2. a temporary courteous reception of their chiefs and persons of some standing among their followers110.
3. stronger and more dynamic contact of consuls with the most prominent social figures and their adequate preparation in case of the creation of an independent Albania;
4. providing recommendations and enabling travel to Austria-Hungary for influential figures among the Albanians.

In the continuation of the Memorandum, the participants of the conference draw attention to the necessity of providing more funds in order to increase the popularity of Austria-Hungary among the Albanians. They emphasize that this can be achieved through various measures:

1. extensive investment in the editing of texts composed in favor of the national idea;
2. support or assistance to the poorest and those most in need, especially in the mountains;

110 HHStA, PA I,K . 473, Fol. 180 b.

3. intervention by the Austro-Hungarian government with the Turkish authorities in favor of respecting Albanian privileges;
4. political use of Albanian colonies settled in Austria-Hungary, with the intention that their members establish contact with their homeland.

The second section of the Memorandum, closely connected with the previous one, is the one titled "Special Attention to the Muslim Population," which points out that the previously proposed measures are intended primarily for the Catholic population from the north of the region. It is noted, however, that the means available for action among the Catholic population—through the Church and schools, all due to the religious tutelage that must be carried out—will not be the same for Albanian Muslims. Efforts should be made to awaken in them the desire and need for public schools where the Albanian language would be used, and later to provide assistance and protection during the realization of that desire. At present, in all Muslim schools, teaching is conducted in Turkish, which means Albanian is practically excluded, i.e., it does not exist in the educational system. On the other hand, the level of knowledge offered by most of these schools is extremely low.

Therefore, activity should be limited to subsidizing mosques and schools, and intensive efforts will be needed in other areas to gain the sympathy of Muslims and achieve the necessary influence for the realization of Austro-Hungarian plans.

Based on this, the participants consider it advisable1 11:

1.

to win over the leaders of Muslim tribes and other influential persons through extensive economic investment or gifts;

2. to ensure that consuls pay more attention than before to Muslims, so that through more intensive communication they can attract more prominent citizens among them;
3. subsidizing those members of the Muslim population who are the poorest and most in need;
4. detailed coverage of the Albanian situation in the magazine "Vatan" (Homeland), which is written in Turkish and published in Bosnia; recruiting, contracting, hiring, and paying Muslim correspondents from Albania;
5. educating young Muslims in Bosnia at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian government, with the aim of their eventual involvement in the realization of the Monarchy's plans.

111 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 181.

At the consultation, the proposals from the Memorandum concerning material assistance intended for Albanians were generally accepted. Attention is only drawn to the fact that, in order to direct Albanian traders towards the interests of Austria-Hungary, it may not be enough to attract them to Trieste and Rijeka, but they should be brought to Vienna1 12. It would be of great benefit to have a commissioner who would assess the intensity of trade relations between the Monarchy and Albania. It is also proposed that maritime transport services be provided by the Lloyd company, and a more detailed consideration of this topic is postponed to the next meeting1 13.

In the continuation of the Memorandum, another section is singled out, dedicated to "The Political Activity of Consulates and Its Necessary Expansion." It states that the previously planned and explained measures will be successful only if the consulate in Albania is modified and organized so that it is adapted to the new situation. What is not in doubt is that diplomatic representatives will have to carry out much more intensive and ambitious activities than before. At the very beginning, the available consular posts in Albania are listed: Imperial and Royal General Consulate in Shkodra (representation: Consulate in Durrës); Consulate in Skopje (representation: Consulate in Prizren); General Consulate in Ioannina (representation: Honorary Vice-Consulate in Preveza); and, finally, Honorary Vice-Consulate in Bitola.

These posts should be occupied by particularly capable individuals, of complete trust and familiar with the planned objectives. They are recommended to urgently learn the Albanian language, as this is a matter of utmost importance. The report further proposes the reactivation of the Vice-Consulate in Prizren as an administrative center, since it is to play a very important and delicate role1 14.

Once the action plan is launched, it will be urgent to create new productive consulates in the areas of central Albania—in Berat, Tirana, Kruja, and Elbasan, where until recently there was no diplomatic representation, as well as in the northeast of the

country—in Pristina, Mitrovica, Tetovo; and also in Korça, in Macedonia. All the mentioned places would serve as centers of political work within this expanded
112 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 141.
113 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 141 b.
114 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 181 b.

network of consulates in Albania. It will be necessary to acquire informants among the locals and in all other places that are politically important, as well as in zones where there are difficulties in creating new centers.
The following list generally illustrates the way in which new centers in Albania should be regrouped, so that their activities can be coordinated with local political relations and according to the guidelines of the planned objectives:

- Northwest Albania:
  General Consulate in Shkodra
- Northeast Albania:

Consulate in Prizren
Vice-Consulate in Peć
Consulate in Skopje
Representations in Pristina, Mitrovica, and Tetovo

- Central Region:

Consulate in Durrës
Representations in Kruja or Tirana

- Southern Albania:

General Consulate in Ioannina
Representations in Berat, Vlora, Gjirokastra, Preveza

- Southeast Albania (Macedonia):

Consulate in Monastir (Bitola)
Representations in Elbasan and Korça
The memorandum proposes to seek the opinion of representatives from the mentioned zones, as they are better acquainted with the local situation and can provide advice regarding political needs and indicate the possibilities that exist in each place for creating new centers in Albania.
Those gathered approve and accept as ideal this solution concerning the future organization of consular offices in Albania. The only suggestion is to reject the proposed positions for Pristina, Mitrovica, and Tetovo, as well as for Gjirokastra, since they are outside the planned area of activity. Furthermore, it is emphasized that these Albanian positions must be well paid and covered by the best personnel. It turns out to be necessary
that one of the diplomats constantly visits this consular area, to maintain contact with the people working there. On the other hand, for this task, knowledge of the Albanian language will be necessary, so it can be learned at the Imperial and Royal Academy for Oriental Studies. In connection with the above, the conference participants assign Baron von Cvidinek to thoroughly analyze the last issue and present his conclusions at the next meeting.

Acts from December 23, 1896. A third private meeting held
regarding our action in Albania, chaired by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski.
Present are the joint Minister of Economy and Finance - von Kalay, special representative and former minister - Baron von Cvidinek, head of department - Horowitz, court advisor - von Fuchs, general consul - Schmucker, and secretary - consul Baron von Baum.
The chairman of the conference, Count Goluchowski, opens the discussion on some still unresolved issues regarding the protectorate, namely the clergy in Albania and the subsidies intended for that purpose. After Mr. von Kalay stated that the abbess of the Daughters of Divine Love sisterhood would be ready to participate in the mission planned for this order in Albania (compare for this the acts from the second meeting), but, to her great regret, does not have the required number of nuns for that mission, it was agreed to try again with the sisters. Von Kalay proposes that their superior be invited to Vienna and be presented with the necessity of obtaining selected material about Albania, since the sisters know the Albanian language. Also, he will be instructed that the nuns should not engage in any Croatian propaganda.
On the other hand, the Ministry will be ready to build a house for the sisters from Prizren. However, it retains the possibility of an agreement with the Propaganda, which will have to guarantee Vienna the right to dispose of that house in case the sisters, for any reason, are forced to leave it.
It is emphasized that negotiations have already been held orally with some representatives of the clergy and Vienna is, in principle, ready to accept their conditions. Nevertheless, the conference participants agree that it is necessary to precisely specify that the decision to reduce or increase staff cannot be made by the priests without Austrian approval, because Vienna, in the first case, due to the reduction in the number of people, would also reduce subsidies, while in the second case, it would not increase them.
Through Count Goluchowski, the superior of the Jesuit order from Vienna was also consulted, who promised to inform the general of the monastic order about the Ministry's complaint regarding the Jesuits from Shkodra, and, if possible, orally, otherwise in written form.
Regarding subsidies, the conference participants agree that consular offices should carefully supervise the persons who, with Vienna's approval, receive the mentioned subsidies, as well as pay attention to the submission of appropriate reports. In accordance with the received reports on the political activities of subsidized persons, and taking into account the suggestions given by the consul himself, subsidies for the second semester of 1897 will be modified.
As for the administrative division of the consulates, it was noted that the sub-consulate in Prizren has just gained independence from the consulate in Skopje, while for the others, a delegation plan is being developed.
Regarding the rather difficult process of including Albanian language studies in the curriculum at the Oriental Academy, the participants think that the following procedure should be followed: anyone who graduates from the academy and declares Albania as their personal goal, after passing the consular exam, will stay in Vienna for approximately six more months to study Albanian. After that, they will first be sent to the

General Consulate in Shkodra, to perfect the language and get acquainted with the situation and relations, and then they can be assigned a consul position in another consular office in Albania.

With this, Count Goluchowski concludes the meeting, thanking Mr. von Kalay for his great interest and engagement in achieving the goal. The minutes of the consultation were kept by Baum and signed by Goluchowski, to confirm the authenticity of the information he provides.

CHAPTER III:

APPROVAL OF THE PLAN – DIPLOMATIC RISKS AND LONG-TERM FORECASTS

The secret conferences with the attached Memorandum represent documents of great importance when it comes to Austro-Hungarian policy in the southwest Balkans at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. On one hand, they contain the foreign policy program of the Danube Monarchy in that part of Europe, and on the other – they reveal the processes of drafting and adopting the aforementioned program.

This Program has two parts, one strategic and the other tactical. The strategic part encompasses the creation of an Albanian nation with the aim of temporarily halting Serbia and Montenegro, as well as preventing their alliance; in the long term, the goal is to separate Russia and any other Slavic state entity on the southwestern border of the Monarchy from important access to the Mediterranean and the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire.

The tactical part concerns the selection and effective use of the most adequate means for achieving the political goal, such as, for example, spreading the idea of nationhood among Albanian tribes of different faiths, cooperation with the Catholic clergy to gain their support in this endeavor, establishment of a unified standard Albanian language and its promotion, opening Albanian schools, production and distribution of books and magazines with nationalistic content, etc.

Once the basic tactical means and strategic goal have been devised and adopted, the administrative center of the Monarchy proceeds to inform a somewhat wider, though objectively still quite narrow, circle of high state officials about what has occurred, as well as about the specific goals that must be achieved.

They are expected to respond with comments and suggestions regarding the devised tactics and ways to improve them. The permitted room for maneuver implies making minor changes that do not call into question the basic guidelines of action, but rather help to achieve the main objectives more quickly and efficiently.

Information is delivered via a confidential letter sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself (or in some cases
in his name, Zwiedinek) to a small number of officials who, as professionals, experts in the field, and people loyal to the authorities, enjoy his trust.

The letter usually consists of two parts. The first is a document in which the minister briefly informs the officials about the conferences held and the decisions made, specifically requesting the recipient’s opinion on the topic, of which he is considered knowledgeable.

The second part of the dispatch is the Memorandum itself, thereby confirming that it constitutes an integral part of the Program, and not just an interesting study without far-

reaching consequences, as Hans Dieter Schanderl considers in his otherwise very interesting and pioneering book on the Albanian policy of Austria-Hungary and Italy.126 In most cases, the return of the Memorandum to the Ministry is requested after the recipient has become well acquainted with its contents.127

126 Hanns Dieter Schanderl, Die Albanienpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns und Italiens 1877-1907, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1971.

127 The importance of the topic, the aforementioned Memorandum, and the fact that its confidentiality is ensured, is also confirmed by other documents – all of them constitute confidential mail kept in the Imperial and Royal Archives in Vienna since 1900, when Austrian activity in Albania was already in full swing and analysis of these documents was not so current. More precisely, they are found in HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Baron Zwiedineck to 1) Consul Pisko Shanghai; 2) Viceconsul von Kwiatkowski, Durazzo, Vienna, February 10, 1900, Fol. 462-463r.

The mentioned documents show that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed with maximum care where the sent copies of the Memorandum were located and what happened to each of them. The letter was signed by Baron Zwiedinek, intended for two recipients and had similar content for both. The first was the then (in 1900) Austro-Hungarian consul in Shanghai, Pisko, to whom, as stated in the letter, this document was entrusted in his capacity as director of the Imperial Consular Service in Skopje. The second recipient was the current vice-consul von Kwiatkowski in Durres.

Zwiedinek writes to Pisko asking him, if he finds it appropriate, to send the Memorandum back to him in a strictly confidential manner, with a seal referring to the administration of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and through the Lloyd company (For more information on the relations between the Monarchy and the Lloyd company, see Hans Dieter Schanderl, op. cit).

To Vice-Consul, Baron von Kwiatkowski, Zwiedinek writes that, based on information from Baron Winter, he found, among other things, a copy of the Memoire über Albanien (Memorandum on Albania) in the local services' vault, pointing out that since then (Sheet 463) he has had enough opportunities to become familiar with the document's contents. Although the relations analyzed in the mentioned document have already partially lost their relevance, Zwiedinek asks the vice-consul to send him back the cited document, and to do so in a strictly confidential manner, with a seal for the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

112 From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, on February 18, 1897, a secret decree was sent to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople, Baron Calice [Calice - translator's note]. This document states that the inability of the Turkish government to satisfy the needs of the various peoples in the European provinces of the Turkish Empire is becoming increasingly evident every day, as well as that its central authority is rapidly weakening, which is noticeable in all branches of internal administration. Therefore, as stated further, one should consider the disintegration of a unified Turkey as a possible eventuality—if not immediately, then in the near future. Considering these circumstances, the ambassador actually becomes aware that the Ministry is planning a change in political course. Namely, until that moment, his task had been to advocate for the preservation of the current Turkish state as the best measure for protecting peace in Europe. To that end, Calice had even contacted the relevant powers, seeking a way to

In the same document, there is a note added by Consul Winter from Vienna, dated March 3, 1900, stating (Sheet 462r) that Baron Kwiatowski again sent a copy to Cvidinek, in which the same order is conveyed to the government advisor, Mr. Pesler. The following is a list of other holders of the Memorandum:
"The third copy is in the possession of Consul (4636) Ipens in Shkodra.
The fourth copy is in the treasury safe in Prizren. Vice-Consul Rapaport will hand over the key to the safe to Consul Pari in Skopje.
Other copies are probably in the possession of:
The Minister, Mr. Kalaja, Baron Cvidinek (2), the head of the department (2), advisor Mr. Fuchs, Mr. De Maray, Baron Baum, General Consul Schmucker.
Two copies were certainly sent by secret mail to Constantinople."
At the bottom of the document, signed in Vienna, it is handwritten:
"One copy, which is in the hands of Consul Petrovic, has been assigned here to the political archive from the office of Consul Winter."
Another document, also authored by Baron Cvidinek, was sent to Consul Trojan in Janina, from Vienna on March 1, 1900 (HHStA, PA I, K.473, Wien, den 1. Marz 1900). It can be assumed that at the time, he was also given a copy of the Memoire Uber Albanien (Memorandum on Albania).
The content of the letter is as follows:
"After you have, in the meantime, also been enabled to familiarize yourself with the contents of the document, and since the relations analyzed in it are no longer entirely current, I ask that you find it appropriate to send me back the mentioned Memorandum, sealed, addressed to the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Received, etc."
128 HHStA, PA I, GA XXX / A, Fol.193-194b. We also present the contents of this secret letter, because it is identical to the secret letters sent to Count Revertera and Baron Pasetti, except that, as an annex, comments by Baron Calice have been added.
113 to eliminate the danger threatening the status quo in the Orient. However, Vienna now considers that the time has come to take appropriate measures in case internal turmoil in the European part of the Turkish Empire causes its disintegration, and that, instead, a series of new states will emerge.
Therefore, the secret letter states that one must be careful and under no circumstances change the southwestern borders of Austria-Hungary, as this would pose a danger to the Monarchy. The situation is analyzed as follows: The mere possibility that Serbia and Bulgaria might expand their borders toward the Adriatic Sea, as well as that Italy might settle on the eastern coast of the Adriatic and from there threaten the Austrians in Dalmatia and its interior, already represents a danger in itself. From this point of view, Albania is of special importance to the Monarchy. Austria-Hungary has a vital interest that this country does not fall under foreign influence, and since the ruling circles do not intend to occupy Albania, they are carefully waiting to, in the event of the collapse of the Turkish Empire, create an independent and autonomous Albania, possibly with a foreign prince, but in the form of an Austro-Hungarian protectorate.
Further in the dispatch, Vienna informs its ambassador in Constantinople that it is necessary to establish some preliminary measures to facilitate the emergence of appropriate circumstances in Albania. To this end, confidential talks are being organized in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the supervision of the relevant minister, and

from these arise the following general points, which outline the forthcoming Austro-Hungarian measures:

1. the establishment of a consular representation in Albania, as well as the organization of posts for individuals qualified to carry out their important mission in that country;
2. the reconsideration of church policy, as well as financial aid in Albania;
3. the establishment of cooperation with Greece in that part of Albania which, due to the increase of Greek influence, might one day belong to that country.

At the same time, the Ministry informs Calice that Baron Cvidinek and General Consul Schmucker are tasked with compiling a memorandum describing the current situation in Albania and, based on it, defining the means and specific individual activities that can serve for the progressive realization of the program set out above. Vienna attaches the mentioned memorandum, emphasizing that this document, with minor changes, contains the appropriately accepted proposals,

so that the preparation of valid instructions for imperial consular officials in Albania becomes unnecessary (the document itself is sufficient).

Calice is informed that the implementation of the entire action will mainly depend on the development of events, as well as on reports about specific relations in Albania and the feasibility of the planned program. This may also lead to the dismissal of the current heads of consular services in Albania, as well as the later appointment of new people to those positions.

The continuation of the dispatch states that the Ministry considers it important that, even at this stage of the operation, the ambassador be informed about all of this. They also note that they attach great importance to Calice's assessment of the plan as a whole, as well as of the individual measures envisaged to implement this program.

Calice stands out as one of the best thinkers, since, besides serving as ambassador in Turkey, he was also an analyst and strategist of the planned Albanian operation from Vienna. As a detailed connoisseur of local conditions, he could make an important contribution to the part concerning the mode of action.

In this regard, we can point out five main points:

a) The ambassador draws his colleagues' attention in Vienna to the importance of directing the operation primarily at the Muslim population, instead of making work with the Catholic one their priority. Vienna, for its part, emphasizes that Calice must not tire, in the course of his work, of a "tactical and patient" approach, which proves to be of essential importance, as an adaptation to the way the local culture functions.

b) Calice insists on changing the weight of the role Vienna assigns to the Catholic clergy. Instead of entrusting it fully with a highly political aim, such as the creation of an Albanian nation, Calice proposes that the clergy be given a role in its realization, but in a way that is less obvious. This would avoid seeking political services from the Catholic Church, as well as issues of conscience, since, in Calice's view, the clergy must not suspect that Austrian activity presupposes changes to existing political relations.

c) Calice, as a good connoisseur of the Orient, will not allow himself to underestimate the role of gifts, i.e., bribery, in exerting influence over people.
115
d) The proposal is to direct activity toward the Albanian elite and avoid working with the masses. It is therefore necessary to identify influential persons and strengthen relations of trust with them.
e) Calice proposes a tactical shift based on direct and open cooperation with the Sublime Porte, with assurances that improving the position of the Albanians—and even supporting their national aspirations—is in its own interest.
According to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador129, the most urgent task is to protect the Catholic tribes from the oppression of the Muslim beys, so that the said tribes do not yield to Montenegrin pressure. In his view, that should be the immediate goal of the entire program of action. However, its realization presupposes major changes in the structure of the current Turkish authorities, based above all on support for subordinate Muslims, in order to ensure their defense and security. Calice informs the Ministry that he has taken several steps in that direction and has tried to persuade the most important actors of the high political stratum in Constantinople of the necessity of changes in favor of the Albanians.
Secondly, and no less ambitious than the first point, Calice believes, is to achieve the introduction of a new administrative division of the Turkish Empire. He is also aware that the said task cannot be imposed by one state on another, but that its realization presupposes an important intervention in the internal administration. Therefore, preparations for achieving the goal can begin only when the requisite trust has been gained for such decisive and essential measures. Hence, the introduction of a new administrative division in Turkey as a means of action is not the most pressing and must await a more favorable moment.
Thirdly, Calice proposes establishing schools with instruction in the Albanian language even in the Muslim parts of the Albanian territories. However, as he himself writes, in these areas Austria-Hungary has absolutely neither a right of protection over the population nor even the pretext of dealing with the education of Austro-Hungarian subjects, so it lacks the personal element as well as a pretext to build these schools.
For all these reasons, the ambassador proposes that Vienna take another path, namely to exploit and strengthen the feelings of national belonging that are beginning to awaken among the Muslim population, and to assist the realization of such feeling by indirect and accessible means, for the sake of forming an Albanian nation. Calice does not agree that in these areas only Austria-Hungary should undertake the construction of schools. He believes that such an initiative would only create problems and misunderstandings, without guarantees of certain success among the people. The correct way to act, as Calice sees it, is, on the one hand, to persuade the Turkish authorities that the need to educate the Albanians there is in their own interest, and, on the other hand, to try to make contact with local Albanian leaders, with a view to advancing Albanian national culture and discreetly supporting their aspirations. In this regard, the ambassador notes, it is necessary also to help them materially as much as possible. In Calice's words, such a stance by Vienna would secure the gratitude of the Albanians and establish more effective political propaganda for winning the trust of the Albanian people toward the Monarchy. He does not recommend going beyond support

and proposes that the Ministry be satisfied with moral capital, which will be acquired without the necessity for the Monarchy to assume responsibility for the practical functioning of the new schools it envisages building. The ambassador is of the opinion that increasing this moral capital should be the main goal of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, since a strategy of providing schools and educating Albanians would only bear fruit in some years, whereas in these decisive and difficult times the Monarchy is far more interested in quickly and easily winning over the Albanian people.
129 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Privat und persönlich, Constantinopel, den 3. März 1898, Calice an Zwiedinek, Fol. 379–406.
116
When it comes to the proposed changes in consular organization, the ambassador fully agrees with the gradual and discreet introduction of new consular posts in Tirana and Berat, as if they were simple summer vacation spots for consuls stationed in Durrës and Vlorë. He supports the decision to postpone the establishment of a new consulate in Elbasan until the construction of the new railway line provides a natural occasion for such an undertaking. He also suggests considering at a later date the annexation of the Peć district to the domain of the consulate in Prizren, but this should be decided in the future, not immediately.
One of the most prominent tactical innovations represented by Kaliche is that most of the aforementioned topics must be discussed directly with the Turkish government. In this regard, he has already attempted cooperation with the government, and even with the Sultan himself, and not without success. However, for the process to develop in the desired direction for
117
Vienna, the ambassador believes it is necessary to avoid new incidents that would again arouse distrust towards the real political goals of the Monarchy. Since Austro-Hungarian policy is practically conservative, Kaliche believes that by the nature of its activities in Albania, the Monarchy should inspire trust, because the greater the trust it achieves, the greater its possibility for political influence.
As for the methods of operation, which, for example, include: 1) the introduction of regular and more frequent maritime transport between Shkodra and ports within the Monarchy and, in connection with this, the promotion of trade relations through favorable tariffs for Albanians, as well as 2) the opening of new places for Albanian students in Austrian elementary and commercial schools, and later a chair for the Albanian language in Vienna—Kaliche believes that both of these ideas already have practically increased propaganda value. However, he recommends that in practice, concessions to Albanians should be granted based on a previously submitted request to Austria-Hungary, and not on the basis of a momentary, one-time action at Vienna's initiative. Therefore, it is advisable to start working with Albanian leaders so that they would submit such a request.
However, Kaliche does not consider it a good idea to influence the Ottoman railway company to recruit employees mainly from Austria-Hungary, for two reasons: firstly—because the results will be slow to appear, and secondly—because such an initiative would give rise to rumors and unnecessarily draw attention to the Monarchy, which would then negatively affect the planned action.

For the time being, opinions about the Albanian colony in Borgo Erice should be withheld. In principle, Kaliche supports any initiative that would quickly, easily, and inconspicuously produce results. On the contrary, any initiative that draws attention and thus threatens to arouse suspicion is unacceptable to him, since he believes it would cause more harm than good. However, he does not rule out the possibility that at some later stage, the same means that currently do not seem appropriate could be introduced, if they could then have a greater effect.

In the second part of the report, Kaliche offers his own ideas for implementing the plans, without claiming to present a comprehensive strategy and tactics, but rather to offer in summary form his vision of concrete goals and adequate factors for achieving them. How does Kaliche understand the planned action in Albania? First, he distinguishes the tasks and the factors for fulfilling them. In his

opinion, these tasks directly arise from the rights of the Protectorate over the cult granted to Austria-Hungary and correspond to the highest political goal, which is the realization of an independent Albania. This new independent state, with its own internal development, will be able to withstand unfavorable external influences, thus contributing to the conservative interests of Austria-Hungary on the Balkan Peninsula gaining secure support.

He considers the embassy, consulates, the Catholic clergy, Monsignor Prima Doki, as well as the native Albanians, to be important factors for achieving this goal and fulfilling the mentioned tasks.

Among the tasks, Kaliche distinguishes those that require urgent action from those that should be achieved through constant and cyclical (centripetal) activity. He also confirms that he understands what the Embassy's activities should be, and allows himself to make the following remarks: that he has reactivated the construction of all churches, and that he has, both in written and oral form, presented all questions related to education to the Turkish government; therefore, as he points out, the favorable impression left by his last audience with the Sultan should be used—namely, he will combine all the mentioned requests on one list, which will serve him as a basis for future appeals to the Ottoman government.

His next task will be to defend the interests of the Malisori tribes, in the manner developed in the Memorandum, as well as to resolve the fate of influential Albanian beys who were arrested after talking with an Austro-Hungarian consul. Finally, he will devote himself to studying the authorities' attitude towards Prenk Bib Doda [Alb. Prenk Bibe Dodciy, Prenk-pasha—translator's note] and considering the possibilities that lead to the achievement of Austro-Hungarian interests. He admits that he is not overly optimistic at the moment, however, he does not lose sight of Vienna's wishes.

130 See the chapter on the travels of Austro-Hungarian consuls through the Albanian-Muslim community.

131 Kaliche writes that in the past he often saw and spoke with Prenk Bib Doda, who at that time, from an intellectual standpoint, was an insignificant individual, quite lacking in moral principles. Therefore, he does not share Primo Doki's opinion that Doda could have such an important role in the planned activities. Kaliche does not believe that his influence extends beyond his own tribe and family. Likewise, while he was in Constantinople, according to what Kaliche writes, Doda was dedicated to establishing

good relations not only with the Austro-Hungarian embassy but also with the French one. However, despite all this, Kaliche would not be opposed
Kaliche is not tired of repeating that for the success of the planned activities, it is essential to gain the trust of the Sultan. He claims that during his relations with the Turkish authorities, he was dedicated above all to improving and deepening their trust in the loyal policy of the Monarchy regarding the Balkan Peninsula, especially in the part concerning the western regions. He also emphasizes his engagement in convincing the Ottoman government that it is in its interest to support the welfare, culture, and national feelings of its Albanian subjects. He proposes that for future activities in this direction, he should use his connections with influential Albanian Muslims.
When it comes to the activities of the consuls, he considers it necessary to give them general, basic instructions that would serve as a foundation for their work. He notes that their ability to gather information is extremely important, and that their efforts are commendable, but that their practical activities in the field can be improved. He also points out that, at the given moment, the lack of time and experience of the consuls harmed the process of gaining the trust of the Ottoman authorities and, consequently, the possibility of influencing them. To achieve this, it is necessary for the consuls to show more tact, caution, skill, and utmost maturity and professionalism, since their positions are characterized by extremely complex interpersonal relations. In Kaliche's opinion, the consuls in the field could solve multiple problems and difficulties (challenges) that arise only by gaining
his return, if it is easily achievable and if it is true, as Doki claims, that not only the Mirdita but also the Catholic tribes in general would want him. As this issue is complicated at the moment, and attempts to reactivate Prenk Bib Doda could raise suspicions, which would lead to significant tensions, the ambassador believes that dealing with this problem should be postponed for better times and therefore suggests to his colleagues that the case of Prenk Bib Doda should no longer be considered their primary task. He adds that this task can be reconsidered only after very careful preparations, especially not before gaining the trust of the Sultan and his government. He also recalls similar unsuccessful attempts by the Armenian patriarch, Monsignor Azarian, then influential Albanians in Constantinople, as well as the papal curia.
Kaliche believes that only later, in another phase, will he be able to gain the Sultan's trust, which will enable Prenk Bib Doda from the Scutari vilayet to return as a protector of Christians. However, even if this is achieved, it will not be ensured that he has the influence over the vilayet that Primo Doki sets as the basis of his political plan or, rather, family-political activity. According to the ambassador, neither the function of Christian assistant nor the personal qualities of Prenk Bib Doda enable him to exert such influence. He recommends that he be left with hope for a return to the political scene one day, but on the other hand, that Austro-Hungarian activities in the future should not be based on his activity.
By gaining the trust of the central authorities, consuls could solve multiple problems and difficulties (challenges) that arise. In addition, it is necessary to monitor their work, while avoiding, which is very important, creating the impression that it is actually a state undertaking. The ambassador will continue efforts to gain such trust in the Turkish capital, while the consuls' job is to continue their work in their consular districts.

According to the ambassador, consuls should distinguish between their own political activities and issues that fall under the Protectorate over the cult of local customs and habits. Regarding the former, they should strive to convince the Ottoman authorities of the legality of their activities and the honest intentions of the requests they present. They must strive to be objective, without showing any bias, and, in accordance with the circumstances, try to appease all sides. Only when their own means prove insufficient and when intervention from the center becomes necessary, can they request intervention from the Embassy in Constantinople, in which it will also be advisable to distinguish between circumstances and reasons that serve pro foro interno—for internal use—from those that can be presented to the Ottoman authorities. On the other hand, details, opinions, and arguments that fall under the Protectorate over the cult of local customs and habits should be presented within special reports. It is best to write them in French, so that Embassy representatives can directly present them to the Ottoman authorities when they appear before them. The areas of political activity of the consuls not only include convincing the Turkish authorities of the loyalty of Austro-Hungarian political intentions, as well as their personal loyalty, but also improving contacts with the locals and influencing their expressions and behavior.

To achieve this goal, it is above all necessary to clearly define Austria-Hungary's political starting point in these regions. According to the ambassador, it should be based on the fact that Austria-Hungary in no way supports any kind of agitation against the Sultan's new government and, furthermore, should be convinced that for the Albanians, both now and in the future, it is of vital interest to preserve the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the Ottoman government should be convinced that it is in its interest to ensure that minorities are satisfied, to strengthen their material well-being and intellectual progress, as well as to encourage their sense of national belonging. Only in this way will the aforementioned minorities be able to defend themselves from their greedy neighbors. Both sides should know that Austria-Hungary is ready to work on this as a friend. For their part, the Albanians must also believe that the Monarchy is in no way interested in territories inhabited by Albanians, but considers it in its interest to strengthen Ottoman state power. Kaliche believes that such conduct by consuls and their assistants will serve the Monarchy's political goals far more than vague promises of support to one or another local leader, which would only harm Vienna's reputation. He also believes that, for the time being, it is better to reduce the number of consular trips aimed at establishing contacts with the Albanians.

Kaliche emphasizes the necessity of special care for Catholics and other Christians endangered by the arrogant behavior of the Muslim population, which enjoys the trust and protection of the central authorities. This is an attempt to find an effective remedy for this difficult situation. In most cases, consuls before the Turkish authorities will not be able to go beyond making proposals and offering friendly advice. When this proves insufficient, the case in question will have to be presented objectively and precisely to the Imperial and Royal government or to their Embassy in Constantinople, so that it can be used as a basis for subsequent Austro-Hungarian action towards the Ottoman government. Under no circumstances should consuls give the impression that their actions are inciting the population, but rather that they are doing everything to calm them.

According to Kaliche, it would be extremely useful for Vienna's planned activities if consuls were to draft part of their military reports intended for the Embassy in such a way that they could be presented directly to the Turkish government. With this type of arrangement, the Central government can be constantly and objectively informed about local events. The more intelligently these reports are written, the more Austria-Hungary will gain the trust of the Ottoman government and will have more influence at the moment when it must make decisions itself. Also, when local authorities realize that there is direct communication between the Embassy and the Central government, consuls will gain the opportunity to directly influence their behavior.

Kaliche reminds that consulates must always keep in mind the entire body of experience accumulated during all foreign missions. He also notes that even the most legitimate and convincing petitions could only be considered after maximum efforts and pressure, since there are still many difficulties in areas where it is easy to provoke suspicion and rivalry, as is the case in the area of planned political activity. Accordingly, no success can be expected unless the favor of the Turks is gained and persistence is shown, especially if actions are not taken in accordance with formal law, but rather with advice and demands lacking the necessary formal basis and which can be rejected on the grounds that they represent interference in the internal affairs of another state. However, even in cases when consuls undoubtedly act in accordance with the law, excessive insistence would create problems for them. Therefore, they must be tactful and know that they cannot always use ultimatums or keep the army ready to intervene in order to force someone to listen to their requests. As a great connoisseur of the Orient, Kaliche emphasizes the fact that for the success of the planned activities it is necessary to win the trust and favor of the Ottoman authorities and later, precisely through them, to realize Austria-Hungary's influence. One must be very cautious in relations with lower local authorities, in order to avoid a situation where they intervene against Vienna before the central authorities and thus nullify all previous Austrian efforts. Kaliche believes that his considerations presented in this letter can be sent to the consuls to guide them on the basic principles of action, to which additional general instructions may be added.

As for the policy of using the Catholic clergy, the ambassador believes it is a bad idea to turn members of the clergy into agents of any kind of political propaganda—firstly, because that is not their job, and secondly, because they are not prepared for such a task. Kaliche believes they could only cause confusion and diminish their own reputation. In this regard, the ambassador recommends that Vienna do everything to ensure that the clergy do not suspect that they are being used as a tool for achieving political goals. Convinced that this is not the case, the clergy, in Kaliche's opinion, should convey to everyone else that the Monarchy pursues a policy without any special personal interests and is loyal to the Ottoman authorities. In its dealings with the Catholic clergy, Vienna should emphasize that it has always exercised its right of protectorate fully in accordance with agreements, and is ready to continue in the same manner. Also, significant donations should be approved for the Catholic Church, its schools, and the humanitarian institutions of the Catholic community, from whom, of course, gratitude and loyalty would be expected in return.

Pressure on the clergy should be uniform from all sides, but for this a new type of organization of the Austro-Hungarian apparatus is necessary, which does not yet exist in the area where Vienna's political activity is planned.

Working with the Muslim Population

After this exchange of views, working with the Muslim population emerged as a key element in Vienna's tactic, a proposal put forward by the Austrian ambassador in Constantinople, Calice. According to his reports, an undeniable shift occurred in the Albanians' opinion of the Imperial and Royal Monarchy, more precisely within the Muslim part of the Albanian population. This change of attitude toward the Monarchy is based on the Albanians' concern that the Ottoman Empire on European soil will come to an end, and that in the event of the collapse of Ottoman rule their population could expect protection from no one but Austria-Hungary. It turned out that an important role in this change of opinion was played by connections with influential Albanian beys from the capital, who, thanks to powerful family ties, shape the opinion of the entire population of the Albanian regions. From this same circle of people comes a written petition requesting that the Monarchy help the Albanian element by improving instruction in Albanian, establishing new forms of communication, and continually founding and printing newspapers in that language. Calice underlines that the official defense of Albanian interests could secure Austria-Hungary considerable political benefit vis-à-vis the Ottoman government, thanks to the peculiarity of Albanian society, in which the beys determine the opinion of the entire people.

The second proposal Calice puts forward, which coincides with Vienna's initial plans and, after these consultations, is strengthened and becomes a priority, is that the education subsidized by Austria-Hungary must be in the service of Albanian national propaganda. Calice also contends that the education of the Albanian population cannot be carried out in the same way as in other Austro-Hungarian educational institutions abroad, which are devoted exclusively to educational and civilizing, not political, aims. In connection with the teaching policy that Vienna is implementing in Albanian territories, indicative is the list of all schools in the Orient subsidized by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from which

the schools in Albania are omitted, because their position is assessed in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian political approach there. 132 On that document it states as follows:

"While our action regarding schooling in Albania, apart from general cultural aims, also has a political one—as in strengthening national consciousness among the Albanian population, with the aim that it react against the active propaganda that Italy is conducting in that territory—the subsidizing of schools in the rest of the Orient corresponds exclusively to the obligation of every state to provide its citizens living outside its borders with appropriate cultural uplift, as a possible protection against the loss of national identity that threatens them, given that they live in foreign countries Almost a year later, Calice remains firmly by his initial convictions, confirmed by the current local circumstances and their further development. 133 Moreover, he adds that this activity is a process that must be built with painstakingly collected funds. The most important thing, as Calice sees it, is to achieve coordinated action, which in all its components must be subordinated to a common goal. In his letter addressed to

Zwiedinek, we read: 134 “Ongoing obligations should be resolved in an appropriate manner, and, if possible, excessive accumulation of simultaneous tasks should be avoided, since they could harm one another. It is necessary, above all, to refrain from any hasty action, even in the pursuit of the most just aims, because this can lead to a deterioration of relations between the two governments, which would harm higher political goals.

But when it comes to substantive political action, a prerequisite for its true success is to proceed slowly and cautiously, both in relations with the Porte and with the Albanian population. For that, above all, tact, patience, and the choice of an appropriate moment to begin the action are required. In other words, one should begin acting neither too early nor too late—one must not allow an opportunity to pass unused, but neither should one step onto uncertain ground.

132 HHStA, NL Szecsen.

133 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Constantinopel, am 11. Marz 1898, Calice an Zwiedinek, Fol. 407-430.

134 Ibidem.

125

In that situation, it is certainly better to do nothing that could jeopardize all the effort invested. I am pleased to note that this reasonable injunction was respected in the recent instructions to our consul. But it would certainly do no harm to provide him with general guidelines about the planned ideas and their meaning, to which I alluded in my first letter.

The Catholic clergy must be loyal to the power that protects it and, with an equal sense of devotion, spread propaganda in favor of that same power. But it must also believe that our intentions toward the Ottoman government are honest, i.e., that we are not guided by our own interest in order to realize political goals. In this way they will be more valuable to us than if they were to think that we are using them solely for supposed political services. We must be tactful, so that our protectorate is not brought into doubt and becomes hated by the authorities and the Porte, which would undoubtedly diminish its effectiveness—as, unfortunately, has already happened on several occasions.

From here, influence must primarily be exerted on the Muslim element, and any activity should be avoided in provinces where it could be interpreted as agitation.

You will surely ask yourself, highly esteemed friend, how the education of the country is directed toward friendly autonomy and true preparation for it, if it must in so many of its aspects limit its activity? To this I reply that this is our intended goal, but it should not be declared as such too early. First, it is necessary to create the essential preconditions for achieving the goal, that is, on the one hand – the Albanian population must be gradually and increasingly accustomed to seeing us as sincere friends and protectors of the integrity of their country, and not as greedy foreigners who promote their demands and mediate in the realization of Albanian aspirations in order to materially and intellectually contribute to the prosperity of their own country. On the other hand, efforts should be made so that the Porte successfully recognizes the intellectual and material significance of the development of the Albanian region, as well as to see the encouragement of Albanian national sentiment as a condition for maintaining its own territories on the Balkan Peninsula. These foundations can be built upon, but it is necessary to act

cautiously. Therefore, the word autonomy should be avoided, since from the point of view of the Porte it could mean the loss of territory, as was the case with Bulgaria, Eastern Romania [orig. Rumania, perhaps (see context) Rumelia / Eastern Rumelia? – translator's note], Crete, and all other previously mentioned areas. For the authorities, and even for the population, autonomy could have the connotation of a call to uprising. For this reason, we will use this word exclusively proforo interno – in internal communication, striving to methodically work toward achieving our goal.
However, one should not neglect one of the most powerful resources that can serve as a means for action in all directions: money. The influence of money could be great – whether it concerns the maintenance or support of educational institutions in Albania, or enabling young Albanians to attend such institutions in the territory of the Monarchy. Also, this powerful means could be used to win over and keep on our side in the appropriate areas certain leaders and influential people for whom money is the most convincing argument; finally, money can also be used to facilitate transit, as well as for various other purposes. If I am well informed, the available funds will not be sufficient for all these goals. Moreover, it will soon become obvious that a significant increase in funds is inevitable.
To the recipients of this letter, given that they are close to the authorities, it was clear what the demonstrated degree of trust actually meant and what was expected of them. However, as a reaction, voices could also be heard that do not agree with this program as a whole, that is, who consider that its basic political goal, as well as the way of its implementation, is incredible and unrealistic. In this way, among the Austrian representatives, there emerges, to put it mildly, a position of disagreement with Austro-Hungarian action in Albania. These voices are few but nevertheless brave and well-argued. There is a noticeable difference between them and a number of consular representatives, who give the impression that they are primarily motivated by personal ambitions, since they agree with everything with the important people from the Ministry and send reports in which nothing is questioned but is confirmed with enthusiasm and optimism.
135 Explicit disagreement and an uncompromising attitude are also shown by officers who do not agree to a compromise, but are clearly against the planned action and advocate for the occupation of the northwestern territory of the Balkan Peninsula. I assume that X. Kristan will deal with this in detail in his forthcoming doctoral dissertation, dedicated to the role of Austria-Hungary in the proclamation of Albanian independence.
136 Later, in the second part of the chapter, we will focus on concrete proposals for the realization of the strategic goal set by Vienna, as well as on the contributions
Two secret telegrams of identical content, numbered 663 and 664, were sent on February 18, 1897, to Rome – one to Count Revertera, and the other to Baron Pasetti. The letters inform them that discussions have recently been held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about measures to be taken to prepare the autonomy of Albania in the event that Turkish rule in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire becomes unsustainable. It is emphasized that this information is secret and intended only for the recipient of the telegram, from whom an opinion on the planned action is also requested. More information about the mentioned activities is sent to them in the appropriate annexes, which contain previously commented documents – remarks of the

Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople, as well as a copy of the Memorandum on Albania.

Strategic considerations that are in disagreement with the planned activity

On March 20, 1897, Count Revertera sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Goluchowski, a response in the form of a report, which is also marked as secret and in which the count expresses his deepest surprise at what Vienna is planning. He begins by emphasizing his disagreement with it and noting that his arguments regarding Albania remain within very modest limits, since he is not in the habit of discussing things he does not understand. He primarily claims that, despite the effort invested, he does not understand the nature and scope of the future Austrian protectorate.

He does not hide his surprise at how the Imperial and Royal government, since it does not have authority over the specific territory, should resolve all the tasks it has imposed on itself, as expressed in the Memorandum compiled by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He reminds that the High Porte would not accept that the current right...

thanks to which this plan would become a reality. In this regard, we will study in more detail the proposals concerning the collection of funds for the planned action, the reorganization of the consulate, the specific tasks of Austro-Hungarian representatives in the area of operation, as well as the requirements set in accordance with their personal and professional profiles, since they were the main bearers of the entire undertaking. We will also take a closer look at activities among Catholic Albanians on the one hand, and among Muslim Albanians on the other, etc.

to the protectorate, based on the Agreements [orig: Capitulaciones] and new state treaties that will be valid as long as the Turkish authority, extends to Greeks and Muslims. Hence, he believes that acting in accordance with the ideas presented in the Memorandum is irresponsible from the aspect of Austro-Hungarian interests, which is only vaguely hinted at due to the ambiguities in the document itself.

The count further warns his colleagues in Vienna that, if the loose bond holding together the diverse elements of the Albanian population is broken, much more than the "broad hand" of the imperial protectorate will be needed—it will actually require an iron hand to constitute Albania as a unified state or at least to restore the necessary peace among the scattered fragments of the population, on which any progress depends. According to Revertera, this will always be the case if the unified parts persist in complete disunity next to each other, as if gathered in some kind of federal union. He is convinced that Albania, left to itself, is exposed to the danger of anarchy, while on the other hand, it could become a "victim of the appetites" of its neighbors, eager for expansion. Therefore, Austria-Hungary, as a protective power, would have to prevent this possibility, so as not to lose everything it has sacrificed for the benefit of that country. Following this argument, he asks himself whether the Imperial and Royal government, if the Albanians act as expected and it in return offers them guarantees for security internally and defense externally, leaves any room for Albanian authority, so that in the end the protectorate does not become just another name for occupation.

Without trying to find similarities between the Austrian plan for Albania and the protectorates of colonial powers in Egypt, Eastern Rumelia, or Bosnia and Herzegovina, since such parallels cannot really be drawn, Revertera in his response only wishes to

remind in passing how, in its attempt to rule Bulgaria through a shadow king, Russia had a bad experience, Vestigia terrent.

In the secret report number 664, which the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent to Count Pasetti in Rome on February 24, 1897, besides the Memorandum on Albania, there was also a copy of the dispatch sent to the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in Constantinople, in which he is asked to consider and describe his view of the action planned for this country.

The recipient of the report, Count Pasetti, offers the following thoughts, appealing to the minister to be lenient if he considers them superfluous.

At the beginning, Pasetti confirms that from the exalted report of Baron Kalice he has understood the motives for which Austria-Hungary must not allow, in the event of the end of Turkish rule, for Albania to fall under foreign influence, and accordingly, Austria-Hungary is forced to support the creation of an autonomous principality, which it will then place under its own protectorate. However, under the pretext that the aforementioned report does not contain more specific details about the nature and scope of that protectorate, Count Pasetti allows himself to make the following observations:

He assumes that it is a protectorate of a political nature, which in the eyes of Catholics from Albania would represent an extension of the church protectorate that many of them desire. Otherwise, he notes that for the establishment of a Christian principality, in the event of the end of Turkish rule, there would be no legal basis.

Pasetti also assumes that the nature and extent of a protectorate with these characteristics essentially rest on the fact that the protectorate itself represents an expression of political sovereignty. This worries him because, by taking such a position, Austria-Hungary would become entangled in all the difficulties and disagreements that the young principality will undoubtedly have to face at its beginnings. Pasetti is convinced that "if national unity of the Albanian tribes against Serbia and Montenegro is achieved, that is, [...] if it is reached without armed conflict, as the result of a political decision dictated by some European conference, [...] the young state will not only have to face the hostility and pernicious influence of its immediate Slavic neighbors, but also the suspicion of its own subjects. At the first opportunity when the future Principality of Albania finds itself in a difficult situation, which can be foreseen given the problems surrounding it, it will seek our help and intervention, given that the protectorate provides grounds for this. Thus, we will sink into a dangerous abyss, in which we will have to deal with very delicate situations, more difficult than if we had direct rule over Albania."

The Austro-Hungarian diplomat is also concerned about other dangers that a potential protectorate could cause. On the one hand, he believes...

...that it is desirable to ensure that Europe recognizes this protectorate, so that the advantages that could be gained from it would outweigh the potential losses. However, he fears that the other powers would interpret this as a concession in favor of Austrian ambitions, which is particularly uncomfortable in a situation where, with the end of Turkish rule in Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina would, by itself, fall into the hands of the Monarchy. Then, according to Pasetti, another European power could easily follow Austria-Hungary’s example and demand a protectorate over other, more important parts of European Turkey, for example—over Constantinople and its neighboring provinces.

He believes that in such a case, the Monarchy would find it much more difficult to oppose such claims, since it itself aspires to a protectorate over Albania.
On the other hand, he points out that the Albanian movement promoted from Italy is aimed at creating a unified Albania under Italian protectorate. This can be prevented by categorically vetoing any kind of protectorate. However, if Austria-Hungary were the country to request this, it would provoke opposition from its allies and deep hostility between the people and the government. He reminds that there is a general conviction that any new expansion of Austria-Hungary on the Adriatic coast harms Italy, which is why Italy will, at the very least, demand some form of compensation. In this regard, Pasetti assumes that the political goals of the Italian-Albanian movement are primarily aimed at stopping Austrian penetration into Albania.
He thinks that, besides establishing a protectorate, there is another way for Austrian influence to prevail in Albania, if certain conditions are met. First, it is necessary for the northern border of the principality to be moved to the southern border of the Monarchy in Sandžak, and second, a secret pact should be signed with the future prince of Albania, who must not be a Montenegrin or a Serb, by which Austria-Hungary would guarantee the principality's creation and independence, i.e., protection and support in case of external attack. In return, the principality would be obliged, in accordance with Austrian instructions, to take necessary measures to protect its coasts, especially in the ports of Medova and Durrës, fortifying them as needed for the Austro-Hungarian navy. Also, according to the agreement, Albania would be obliged to build a road suitable for military transports, from the border with Austro-Hungarian territory to the aforementioned ports, on which the Monarchy's troops would have the right of passage. Finally, the new principality would have to build fortifications at certain localities, in which Austria-Hungary could exercise the right of occupation in case of war. For the principality to accept and financially realize these conditions, Pasetti proposes that it be provided with a loan and given guarantees for the whole or partial amount corresponding to the aforementioned costs.
Furthermore, he adds that all Austro-Hungarian consular representations in the new principality must be preserved and operate as before, without any abolitions.
Pasetti notes that with these remarks he does not intend to exhaust the content of such an agreement, but their purpose is to point out the possibility of achieving the goal set by Vienna, while avoiding the establishment of a protectorate. He once again emphasizes that, from a financial and military standpoint, a protectorate would be more harmful and dangerous than a potential secret pact, because the Monarchy, as the protector of Albania, would under any circumstances have to come to its defense. According to Pasetti, the fact that Europe would recognize Vienna's protectorate would have the advantage of providing the prevailing Austrian influence in Albania with an international legal basis. However, he reminds that under such circumstances it would be almost impossible to avoid another foreign power expanding its influence in a similar way. Pasetti also points out that Mr. Crispi dreams of Albanian neutrality, since he lives in constant fear that Austria-Hungary wants to occupy it. Since occupation is not among the imperial and royal interests, it will not be difficult for Vienna to recognize Albania's neutrality. Moreover, neutrality would free the Monarchy from the obligation to intervene militarily and defend the Albanian principality in case it is threatened by the signatories

of the future agreement (Serbia and Montenegro); on the other hand, such an action would prevent Italy from coming to Montenegro's aid if that were to happen.
Also, in his correspondence, Pasetti presents the idea of dividing Albania, according to which its northern part, inhabited by Ghegs, would become an independent principality under Austro-Hungarian rule, while the southern part, inhabited by Tosks, should be ceded to Greece. He believes that by ceding such an important territory, favorable conditions would be created, thanks to which it would not be necessary to make any concessions to Italy on the Adriatic coast.
In another confidential letter sent to Minister Goluchowski, which we present here, the closest representatives of the authorities point out certain shortcomings of the Memorandum on Albania. Namely, they observe that the document thoroughly examines the means that will be used for action in that country, but there is no information about political decisions, nor about the diplomatic stance that Austria-Hungary as a state will have to take towards Europe—both regarding specific aspects that may arise in connection with the Albanian question, and if the topic unexpectedly opens up in its entirety.
It is necessary to be cautious, the officials remind the minister that it would be desirable, in accordance with the general character of Austro-Hungarian policy, to make efforts so that the crisis does not escalate, but rather is postponed as much as possible, as this would mean a more favorable position for the Monarchy. They believe that in this way, it would be possible to ensure the implementation of numerous measures and forms of action that are suitable for strengthening Austrian influence in Albania and which have already proven to yield results. They emphasize that the geographical position, the proximity to Bosnia, the successful cultural work being carried out there, as well as the respect that the Monarchy traditionally enjoys in Albania, give Austro-Hungary an advantage over all other great powers. They are convinced that, if time and the development of events allow, and if Austrian activities in Albania are coherent and relentlessly focused on the education and enlightenment of the Albanians, as a result, the propaganda spread by Italy throughout that country will be pushed out. They support their conviction with the fact that the goals of the Italian-Albanian movement are not entirely clear and its activities are based on a purely pro-Italian stance imposed by the 'Goske'.
In a letter to Goluchowski, the government representatives raise the question of whether, if Turkish authority weakens and Serbia and Montenegro become increasingly greedy, Vienna will have enough time to counter any sudden action by these two countries, especially Montenegro. They express concern that Skadar and the free province of Bojana represent very attractive parts for Montenegro. The danger of a Montenegrin action can be prevented by reaching a formal agreement between the Catholic communities from the mountains surrounding Skadar, according to which, under such circumstances, they could jointly resist attackers with weapons in hand. They believe that the Catholic
140 HHStA, PA I, K.473.

clergy, whose center is in Skadar, should support the outlined plans. Also, the diplomats are trying to convince Vienna that armed resistance by the Albanians could serve to bring the Albanian question before Europe. In this way, the great powers would have

enough time to take an appropriate stance on this issue, and the most reasonable position the Monarchy can take is the moderate demand "Albania for the Albanians." In this way, Austria-Hungary could immediately neutralize Italy's claims, and Russia would not be able to oppose such a demand either. Bearing all this in mind, the authors of the letter emphasize that they are against a protectorate, "for the establishment of which we would have to undertake a long campaign and make sacrifices that exceed its actual value."

However, although the diplomats harbor numerous doubts about the feasibility of establishing an independent principality in Albania, fearing that they might lose the favor of Franz Joseph and his minister, they quite unexpectedly go on in the letter to make recommendations that this move must be well prepared. To this end, as they note, it is necessary to resort to the previously stated idea, namely, sending Prenk Doda (Prenk Pasha) to take the position of commander of the Mirdita territory, not only temporarily, but for the entire duration of Turkish rule. The requests of the Mirdita members addressed to the High Porte and the great powers could force Austria-Hungary to address this problem. If the Monarchy reaches an agreement with France on this topic, a single action by the ambassador in Constantinople could successfully resolve the issue.

Although the Vienna diplomats are aware of the fact that Prenk Doda has aroused distrust among many government representatives, they believe that at the present moment it is impossible to find anyone who, as the future prince of Albania, would adapt better and more loyally than him to Austrian tutelage.

However, those same diplomatic officials who disagree with the idea of an independent Albania are aware that the planned action cannot be stopped. Therefore, they nevertheless dare to add strategic considerations different from those already considered by Vienna and communicated to them. Here, above all, they have in mind that when predicting the progressive disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, one must be cautious, as these are the result of Vienna's aspirations towards the southwest Balkans, which directly border the edges of the Monarchy.

134

Thus, Count Revertera, in a secret report1 41 sent on March 20, 1897, to Minister Goluchowski, discusses measures envisaged for the Catholic church authorities, whose influence on a significant fraction of the Albanian population Vienna would like to use to achieve its political plans. Revertera considers it his duty to comment on the strategic interests of Austria-Hungary, which, as an experienced diplomat, he understands very well to be at the core of this confidential exchange of views. He does so at the end of his long and meticulous report, and the arguments he presents are commented on here primarily because his strategic analysis provides a picture (motives, long-term and short-term goals) within which Vienna's "church and educational" plan will develop. Revertera reminds us that the sphere of interest of the Monarchy, when the topic of the division of the Turkish Empire was being discussed, was defined differently in various periods. For example, in earlier periods, there was discussion about the necessary advance towards Thessaloniki, with the aim of reaching the Mediterranean. However, later the policy took a different path, due to the creation of autonomous Balkan states, which made the idea of division impossible. According to Revertera, if the Monarchy were to support the independence of Albania, it could find itself in great danger, against

which, first and foremost, it must secure a position that guarantees complete safety. This danger lies in the fact that, at some point, both shores of the Otranto Strait could fall into hostile hands, thus closing maritime traffic and paralyzing Austro-Hungarian foreign trade. If Greece, Revertera continues, by advancing towards the Shkumbi River, were to join hands with Italy, under whose rule the entire western coast of the Adriatic Sea already lies, life in Austro-Hungarian ports would be extinguished, and Pula would become the tomb of the Monarchy's war fleet. Count Revertera is deeply convinced of the necessity of extending the Monarchy's defense to Preveza, in order to avoid this. In other words, it is necessary to place all hopes in a political protectorate, not limiting oneself to a single military detachment in Upper Albania, with the border at the Shkumbi. The eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea must, under any circumstances, remain under Austro-Hungarian control, if that state is to survive, because only in that way could it one day inherit the legacy of the Sick Man of the Bosphorus.
141 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Bericht Nr.8> Geheim. (Secret Report No. 8).
142 Ibid., Fol.218.
143 Ibid., Fol. 218b.
135
In the Austro-Hungarian capital, Revertera's disagreement with the claim that Austro-Hungarian interests, due to the national and ethnographic diversity between the north and south of Albania, can only reach the linguistic border between the Ghegs and Tosks, marked by the Shkumbi River, is taken seriously into consideration. As a result of this revision, the initial idea of joint action with Greece is abandoned.

Additional Considerations on the Consular Corps

A major topic of discussion is the consular officials in Albania, their profile and preparation, considering the fact that they will be entrusted with carrying out the planned action on the ground. Consuls will have to control Catholic religious missions, win over the Catholic and Muslim population, that is, work on uniting these two groups under the national idea, coordinate everything, and serve as a link with Vienna.

In this sense, the secret reports of Consul Pisko are important, dated January 25 and June 15, 1897, as well as Vice-Consul Rapaport's report from June 29 of the same year. These documents also represent part of the process of developing the Austro-Hungarian program of action, since they are prepared according to instructions received from Vienna, and the goal is for the main points contained in the reports to be considered and followed in practice as much as possible. All three reports are devoted to the area designated as the "field of action"—two authored by Consul Pisko written in Skopje, and those compiled by Vice-Consul Rapaport—in Prizren. The time gap between the reports is further evidence of the importance Vienna attaches to this topic, as well as the weight of the task. The consuls, who will carry out almost the entire undertaking, on the one hand, must follow specific instructions from Vienna, while on the other hand, they are obliged to implement their own initiatives and react promptly to still unknown tribes. All this is by no means simple, because the reality in which the consuls operate on the ground is actually far different from the analyses in the Viennese offices. They are in the midst of the Orient and the Middle Ages, under the supervision of a network of Ottoman secret agents, and, according to one report from Macedonia, their concentration surpasses all expectations.

Thus, in Consul Pisko's opinion, when technically implementing the projected plans, consuls encounter difficulties that are by no means negligible. Therefore, he decides to undertake an intelligence journey through Albania and presents the following observations:

With regard to consular work, two sine qua non conditions again impose themselves: knowledge of the Albanian language and understanding of the Albanian mentality. Debates about the main tasks of consuls in Albania lead him to the conclusion that this job necessarily involves two activities: the consul must first personally make contact with the Albanian community, and then continually exert influence on it. His first task should be to extinguish the rumors that, since the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have spread among the Albanian population, concerning Austro-Hungarian advances towards Thessaloniki. Such an opinion should be replaced by the conviction that Austria-Hungary wishes to support an independent Albania, without in any way diminishing the old privileges of Albanian lineages.

In order for the aforementioned task to be accomplished, Pisko once again emphasizes that it is essential for consular officials in the field to know the Albanian language, since at most 2% of Albanians know some European language, and probably 70% of them speak only Albanian. However, the main obstacle for consuls in acquiring the Albanian language is that, due to the lack of textbooks and manuals in the Monarchy, as well as the difficult pronunciation and various dialects, this language can only be learned in Albania itself144. He therefore recommends that several junior officials be sent immediately to the already existing active consular offices—specifically, two each to Scutari and Skopje and one to Prizren—so that, under the supervision of a competent chief, they may organize and supervise instruction in the Albanian language. According to his calculations, in six or twelve months, with good will, it is likely that every consular attaché will already have progressed to the point of being able both to understand Albanian and to communicate in it, as well as to continue his education independently145.

On the other hand, in order to secure influence over the political views of the Albanians, it is necessary to know the Albanian mentality well. In this sense it is above all necessary to distinguish Catholics from Muslims, while Orthodox Albanians are always of lesser importance, according to Pisko, because of their small numbers and the advanced Hellenization among a large part of this population146.

As for the Catholics, the consuls, thanks to the Austrian religious protectorate, note a rapprochement of the population toward the consulates, although at the same time they also warn that it would be completely wrong to adopt the view that Albanian Catholics without exception sympathize with the Monarchy. Quite the contrary, they believe that the influence of Austria-Hungary within this group of inhabitants has in recent years decreased considerably for three reasons147. The first is Italian propaganda, which apparently wishes to shift its focus to the interior of Albania, namely to Valona. In the meantime the Italians, especially by founding vocational schools, have managed to achieve excellent initial results in Scutari, specifically among the urban population148. The second reason is also connected with Italian propaganda and is reflected in the "disloyal" attitude of a part of the clergy, particularly several members of the Franciscan order, who have shown themselves to be diligent advocates of Italian aims. The third reason lies in the fact that Albanian Roman Catholics do not sufficiently understand the

“protectorate over the cult,” and thus demand from Austro-Hungarian representatives not only a general religious protectorate but also protection, that is, the defense of every individual Catholic who feels oppressed by the local authorities or by Albanians of the Muslim faith.

In this regard, Consul Pisko recommends as an effective solution the appointment of bishops and priests who are well disposed toward Austria-Hungary, since those from Scutari, Skopje, and Prizren have not shown an inclination to cooperate with the Monarchy.

In Consul Pisko’s next report149 three main points are emphasized: 1) the role of the consul as the most important person establishing relations with the local population, 2) “inter-consular” relations, and 3) the establishment of a support center in Vienna.

In his opinion, the Albanians judge the government he represents on the basis of the consul’s personality as an individual150. For example, if

144 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Uskiib, January 25, 1897, Secret, Consul Pisko: Elaborate on the Consular Offices in Albania (Secret, Consul Pisko, Treatise on the consular offices from Albania), Fol. 662–684.

145 HHStA, PA I, K. 473,

Ibid., Fol. 662 b.

146 HHStA, PA I, K. 473,

Ibid., Fol. 663.

147 HHStA, PA I, K. 473,

Ibid., Fol. 663b.

If the consul is magnanimous, they conclude that so is the government; if the consul's private life is not impeccable, then immorality prevails in his homeland as well. In view of such a state of affairs, Vienna should proceed very carefully when choosing the head of mission. First of all, it is recommended that this person know the Albanian language, and it is also important that his private life be in keeping with the ethical norms of the Albanians—"if he is unmarried, his way of life must be strictly moral; if he is married, his wife must without fail adapt to the customs prevailing in the country" [151]. The recommendations to the Austro-Hungarian consuls on how to become popular among the Albanians are interesting. The essential thing is to take into account the opinions and prejudices that have persisted in that country for centuries. Unfortunately, as Consul Pisko states in his report, "in just the last few years there have been consulate officials who openly entered and left the church with their loved ones; others were discredited because their wives, by their behavior, left an unfavorable impression—they did not adapt to the customs of the Albanians or interfered in the consul's activities; all these facts aroused much suspicion and it turned out that the activities of certain consuls represented effort uselessly thrown away" [152].

As for the rest, the consul's basic task would be to maintain close and personal contacts with the inhabitants. For this, according to Consul Pisko, not only tactful behavior and flattery in address are required, but also a great deal of time, especially given the distrustful character of the Albanians. Accordingly, the Austro-Hungarian diplomat continues, it would not be advisable to replace consular officials in Albania too often, since once the Albanians have gained confidence in one consul, they will accept his successor only after much time and with suspicion.

It was precisely the too frequent changes of consular representatives in Prizren that, in Pisko's opinion, for years harmed Austrian diplomatic activity in that place.

Another requirement placed before the consul is that he make every effort to be loved by the population. Vienna is already in an unfavorable position in this regard, since there have been cases in which the "head of mission, by his crude and arrogant behavior, for a long period lost the favor and sympathies of the Albanians, both toward himself and toward his office and government" [153].

151 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 733b.

152 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 733b-734.

These requirements concern the consul's relations with the population. Another important aspect of consular activity is the mutual contact among the missions located in Albania. It has been confirmed that the consul from Skopje knows absolutely nothing about what his colleague from Shkodër reports, and vice versa. However, working with a people such as the Albanians, "who almost without exception are illiterate people" and who "in most cases will gladly keep the mot d'ordre, the given word"—it turns out that "it is also very important to spread one opinion throughout Albania or to produce disagreement with an idea that is not in their interest"; for that reason alone, Pisko notes, "mutual communication among consular officials in Albania imposes itself as a necessity" [154].

Third, Consul Pisko proposes the creation of a specific department for the Albanian question in Vienna, from where action in Albania would be prepared, as well as the organizing of a rapprochement of Austrian diplomats to the Albanian populace and the

directing of influence upon it. As head of this department [155], according to Pisko, someone should be appointed who is a deep connoisseur of Albania, the Albanian people and language, as well as the tendencies in Albanian cultural policy; he should visit the consular officials in Albania every year in order to inform himself personally about the development of the action. Thus he himself, during his travels, could also come into contact with the population and, on the basis of the collected data and the general impression, provide the necessary instructions to the consular officials in that country—both on cultural policy and on the purely strategic aspect. At the same time, the head of the Albanian department could formulate some practical proposals concerning such an important question as the selection of appropriate persons for consular posts.

In this Albanian department, or under its patronage, work should also be done to encourage the Albanian movement or strengthen Albanian national feeling. In this sense, of vital importance, first and foremost, is the creation of a unified Albanian alphabet [156], by means of which instruction could be given in all Catholic schools; likewise, textbooks would be written and printed in that script, and perhaps some newspapers as well. Finally, the Albanian department would also deal, in passing, with the question of the influence that Vienna should exercise in order to clear the way for commercial relations between Albania and Austro-Hungarian exporters.

The conclusion is that action must begin as soon as possible, since the Greeks, in the south, have already succeeded in Hellenizing the Orthodox Albanians; then, Italy is with increasing success encouraging agitation in Shkodër, as well as on the Albanian and Epirote coasts; finally, in the north, in the mountainous area, some Albanians of the Catholic and Muslim faiths already serve as mercenaries in the Montenegrin army.

As for the consular corps in Albania, Vienna also takes into consideration the secret report that was sent from Prizren on June 29, 1987 by Vice-Consul Rapaport, in order to include it in the general Memorandum on Albania, as is noted on the report itself [157].

153 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 734b.

154 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Ibid.

155 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 735.

156 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Fol. 735b.

According to that report, the existing conditions are nowhere near sufficient for the various goals that Vienna currently sets, since in order to uncover the intimate political beliefs of Muslims, as well as to influence them, personal contact with this part of the Albanian people is also necessary.

First and foremost, it is essential to thoroughly understand the Albanian spirit. To achieve this in the best possible way, it is necessary to find an intermediary who is well acquainted with the prominent personalities among the Albanians and who could connect the consuls with them in the most discreet manner. The selection of these individuals would mostly be carried out during travels and in the company of community leaders, and would require a monthly expense of no more than 60 gold florins.

These considerations are further specified in the correspondence. Rapaport considers it desirable that, at a more mature stage of the action, a regular subsidy or generous donation be approved for prominent representatives among the Albanians, both in cities and villages. This should only be implemented for thoroughly tested and truly influential

trusted individuals, or possibly in some special cases, for which specific requests would be necessary for the approval of subsidies.
Rapaport suggests that at the very beginning of establishing relations, charity should be resorted to, presented in the form of aid for widows, the poor, and orphans. He is aware that refusal to give a larger amount of money could result in a cooling of relations with influential persons. Therefore, he believes that some of these requests should be carefully considered, so that the funds remain within realistic limits, and should not exceed a total of 60 gold florins per month.
The next recommendation concerns travel through the area where the mission will be conducted. Rapaport raises the issue of the necessity for the most important and influential people in the country to be able to regularly come to Prizren. If this proves impossible due to the developed spy system of the local authorities, Rapaport suggests making contact with some foreign representative. In order to meet them personally and not rely on others' reports, there is no other way but to visit them during travels undertaken under the pretext of hunting and similar activities.
The vice-consul provides proof of his dedication and enthusiasm regarding the planned action. Namely, he suggests that as soon as the weather improves and the condition of the roads allows, he should first visit the immediate surroundings, and then, striving to make the most of the summer months, extend his journey into the interior, until it becomes possible to safely, without exposing himself to danger, with the help of personal acquaintances and contacts, reach even the most inaccessible places for a foreigner. However, he adds, in carrying out this plan, one should not act hastily so as not to arouse suspicion among the local authorities.
Due to meteorological conditions, the main part of the activity (especially in the high mountain districts) should be limited to the period from July to September, including those months.
All these considerations and proposals were taken very seriously in Vienna and their implementation began immediately. We will present this in the chapter dedicated to this topic.

Agreement with the Vatican and Work with the Catholic Clergy in Albania

Another point of great importance for Vienna is the work with Catholic religious missions in the territory within the area of activity, with the aim of winning them over to spread propaganda among the Albanian Catholic population that suits Austro-Hungarian political interests. The direct way to achieve this was to reach an agreement with the Vatican at the outset. In this regard, the first exchanges of opinions among Austrian diplomats take place, and the response of the Austro-Hungarian representative in the Vatican is particularly significant. Here we present part of Revertera's report concerning this topic, because his thoughts contribute to Vienna's orientation towards seeking out certain representatives of the Catholic clergy in the country who would be willing to cooperate on their own initiative, not necessarily waiting for prior recommendations from their superiors.
In his report, Revertera primarily seeks to point out how the Vatican functions in practice, since the author of the sent Memorandum (Cvidinek) believes that it is necessary to achieve cooperation with the Vatican and rely on its support and understanding. Revertera emphasizes that it is "a multi-member organism in which not

only do many hands work, but also many heads think and there are several different authorities, which operate very independently, under the supreme authority of the Pope [...] The fact is that those outside Rome usually have a mistaken idea of the Vatican and underestimate the difficulties that must be faced in order to carry out complex tasks."
Furthermore, he points out that the Albanian clergy is in no way under the direct administration of the Holy Father. Although he represents the highest church authority in dogmatic and disciplinary aspects, the Pope is actually limited in carrying out other functions due to the rights held by brotherhoods, bishops, generals of monastic orders, and even permanent parish priests, where they exist. As a missionary country, Albania, Revertera continues, is under the influence of Propaganda Fide, upon which the appointment of bishops depends. Bishops are further responsible for maintaining discipline over the clergy subordinate to them, and their decisions are final and leave no room for appeals, except through judicial means, within the framework of the canonical process.
Only abbots are exempt from episcopal jurisdiction—in Albania, this is the abbot of San Alessandro, in the territory of Mirdita, and besides them, the Jesuits, who are subject to the superiors of their order, provincial and general, even when they are assigned to care for souls in the diocese.
According to the Memorandum, the will of all these actors for joint action should be encouraged. Revertera interprets this in a practical way, emphasizing that it is necessary to make an effort to gain influence over each of them, depending on their individual characters. According to Revertera's opinion, this can be achieved by choosing appropriate means, so that the desired agreement with the Vatican is broken down into a series of aspects, which he analyzes through three broad points.
The first point concerns the bishops. Revertera reminds us that consuls have been complaining for years that the bishops from Albania are not up to their task, but that their personal protests sent to the cardinal, prefect of Propaganda, meet with fierce resistance. The reason for this, Revertera notes, is the fact that the Austro-Hungarian protectorate in Albania does not establish any patronage or right of representation, which means that Propaganda may hesitate when giving any promise. Furthermore, one must always take into account the possibility that a cardinal who is not very favorably disposed toward Austria-Hungary may be appointed as prefect of Propaganda.
For this evil, in his opinion, there is a remedy, and that is subsidizing each bishop to the extent that he meets Vienna's expectations. The same system could be applied to the lay clergy and lower orders in Albania. All these measures would result in the clergy being obliged to maintain a close relationship with the consular authorities and, regarding specific issues, to take into account the opinions and wishes of the Imperial and Royal government. Revertera proposes that subsidies be brought to Albania through the consuls, as this would completely avoid the mediation of Propaganda. This, according to Revertera, would double the necessity for consuls to behave with great tact toward the clergy and, in that sense, they would have to accept great responsibility.
In the second point, the Austro-Hungarian representative studies the lower clergy, both regular and lay, who are in daily direct contact with the population and, therefore, have considerable influence over them. According to Revertera, this clergy should be appropriately reformed, with the help of desirable

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teaching and educational institutions, whose influence could correct its current shortcomings.
Revertera believes that subsidies from the Imperial and Royal government for various institutes are not sufficiently justified, since students provide no guarantees for their future actions. As for the reforms proposed in the Memorandum, he considers them not entirely satisfactory and, in some cases, simply impossible to implement. Therefore, he suggests that either one of the existing provinces, specifically Northern Tyrol, be assigned the Albanian mission, or that, in time, a unified Albanian diocese be created, which would be an appropriate means of raising the regular clergy that exists there to a higher level. Revertera notes that overcoming the resistance that may be encountered in implementing this plan will require money and patience.
Further in the report, he states that the lay Albanian clergy at that time were being educated in the papal school in Shkodra, run by the Jesuits, noting that members of this order, with the exception of a single individual, are exclusively Italians from the Venetian parish. Therefore, according to Revertera, it is impossible to implement two measures envisaged in the Memorandum: first—that the Imperial and Royal government and its representatives be granted a certain right of greater influence over the teaching staff; and second—that members of the local clergy, before being ordained as priests, spend two or three years in an Austrian seminary. In addition, Revertera points out that he has been advocating for years for the transfer of the College to the Austro-Hungarian province, but has so far had no success in this.
Revertera notes the unpleasant fact that at that time, very little sympathy for Austria-Hungary was being instilled in the students at the Shkodra school, since the school superiors were not Austrians. He expresses doubt that Venetians feel much affection for Austrians and, in this regard, wonders how students can be grateful to Austria if they do not even know who is financing their studies.
On several occasions in the report, he emphasizes the recommendation that the school from Shkodra be transferred to the Austro-Hungarian parish of that order, in order to correct poor results.
164 IHd.y Fol. 214b.
165 Ibid.
145
The other points of the Memorandum, writes Revertera, do not fall within his competence. In general, he emphasizes the necessity that the promotion of material interests should proceed in parallel with the cultivation of intellectual and religious needs.
Fundraising
The question of how to collect the money necessary for the operation planned by Vienna is also considered. Since the revenues foreseen by the Imperial and Royal Ministry were not sufficient, the creation of an organization or some private entity that would serve this purpose and facilitate the government’s goals is considered.
Since it was not possible to prompt the bishops from the Monarchy to take more energetic steps, more work with the lay part of the population is proposed, appealing to their patriotism.
An attempt is being made to reform the statute of the Leopoldine Society from Vienna,

with the aim of turning it into a center for supporting missions under the patronage of His Royal Highness. However, after the statute was accepted by the episcopal conference and signed by the Imperial and Royal Ministry of the Interior, the movement stalled, and this society, like most others, is merely vegetating, remaining at the level of a simple diocesan association.

The idea under discussion involves selecting one society that would expand its network throughout Austria, with Vienna remaining at the center; it is expected that in every diocese people of goodwill would be found to establish a local committee, to which a women's committee would then be added, with the common goal of collecting money. It is proposed that on a certain day of the year—for example, on the occasion of the commemoration of the battle against the Turks at the gates of Vienna—a sermon would be held in all parish churches and money collected for Christians in the Orient. All donations would be forwarded to the central committee, which, following the model of the Propagation de la foi from Lyon, would have to submit an annual report on their use. At the head of the association, as president, would stand an imperial prince, something like the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, whose officials and treasury would serve this patriotic purpose and the public good. For the general assembly, an invitation would be sent to all presidencies of the diocesan committees, whose permanent members would be bishops. On that occasion, His Imperial Highness would have the right to gather the presidium at the table once a year. Those especially deserving would receive imperial honors or recognition. Patriotic feelings, humanity, and charity would be the basic noble goals of this activity.

It would be easier to expand the committee to include ladies if it were chaired by one of the archduchesses close to the ruling throne.

However, the implementation of this plan is only possible with the cooperation of the Imperial and Royal Ministry of the Interior. The associations should be provided with the support and backing of the administration, without having an official tone themselves. Without renouncing their independence, they would be an auxiliary body of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose political goals they would support spontaneously and benevolently.

It would be desirable to attempt something similar in Hungary. However, it seems that the main obstacle to the successful implementation of this action was the lack of agreement between the government and circles of the population, to whom it was first necessary to address directly. The only possible solution appears to be the temporary convocation of the already existing Ladislaus Association, to cover with its support the needs for which it would be tasked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is emphasized that it is necessary to attract suitable persons for cooperation, without arousing distrust in the intentions of the government.

As the practice of collecting donations has shown, the best results are achieved by promotions regularly carried out in all places, during which people practice their faith and the parish priest announces them on every occasion. In order to collect money for the Austro-Hungarian action in Albania, it is considered desirable to follow the same practice. Therefore, bishops should promote and announce the collection of donations for “Catholics from the Orient” once a week, which will then be organized in an appropriate manner.

Teaching and Promotion of the Language:

its creation and codification, schools,
press, distribution of texts in Albanian

During the exchange of opinions, the creation of the Albanian alphabet is given primary importance. A unified Albanian script should form the basis for the authentic establishment of the language, as well as for all future activities that will develop further thanks to the language. It is emphasized that work towards this goal should be carried out as quickly as possible, because it is known that “competition,” the Italian organization Societa nazionale albanese, plans to create an alphabet, but has not yet completed it. In order for Austria-Hungary to gain an advantage over it, it must act quickly.

There are disagreements regarding whether the alphabet should be “unified,” that is, whether it should be the same for all Albanians, as stated in the Memorandum, or not. Some diplomats express certain doubts even before having the opportunity to get to know the country. Some, however, think it is more advisable, both at the present moment and in the future, to offer in advance an exclusively Gheg alphabet, and that with Latin letters. As for Albanian Muslims, considering that they cannot read or write in Turkish, it is considered more advisable to combine Latin letters with Turkish ones in the Gheg alphabet. The reason for such a position lies in the belief that Austria-Hungary has an interest in deepening the linguistic differences that already exist between the Ghegs and Tosks, thus making it more difficult for Greco-Albanian propaganda coming from the south to spread. As justification, it is stated that the Albanian colonies from southern Italy also belong to the Greco-Albanian line, as can be concluded from all indications. It is also considered that one should not be limited only to the alphabet, but as quickly as possible, a grammar (Gheg) and a dictionary should also be compiled.

In foreign relations, it is considered that it would be best if the initial impetus for creating an alphabet, grammar, and dictionary came from one of the Austrian settlements inhabited by the Ghegs, and that the same approach should be attempted regarding textbooks. There is consideration of the possibility of opening modest elementary schools in the Albanian language for Albanian-Austrian settlers, with the aim of gathering professors educated in the Monarchy in Albania. There is an opinion that it is also desirable, if appropriate teaching staff are available, to gradually introduce the Albanian language as a subject in religious schools under Austro-Hungarian supervision. At the same time, it is important to continue learning the Turkish language, so as not to arouse the suspicions of the Turkish authorities.

Once this principle is established, it will be possible to open departments for the Albanian language. The proposal from the Memorandum that the seat of education be in Trieste does not seem most suitable, considering

that Trieste is predominantly under Italian influence. Diplomats therefore propose Vienna as the best option for founding the planned school, where, along with the language, some commercial subjects as well as basic concepts of agriculture could be taught. In such an educational institution, young Albanians could gain a deeper impression of the size and power of the Monarchy.

The same comment (regarding location) is given in relation to the Albanian newspapers, for whose founding the Memorandum also proposed Trieste. The idea of establishing newspapers and journals in the Albanian language is highly valued and it is requested

that it be implemented as soon as possible. The proposal is to follow the Italian example. Austrian diplomats note with concern that recently newspapers and magazines with Italian-Albanian propaganda content have been very successfully distributed in the settlements.
The reach of Italian propaganda is taken into consideration, such as the printing house run by the Albanian Papal School from Shkodër, as well as the printing house from Troksijani, which have enabled the spread of various prayer books and literature in the field of construction in the Albanian language, making no distinction as to whether they were written in the Gheg or Tosk dialect. It is noted that La Typographia di Propaganda already published an Albanian grammar in Italian in 1866, which was sold at a price of 4.50 Italian lira, and there is also a dictionary "Italian-Epirus and Epirus-Italian vocabulary" which, according to the title, is of Greek-Albanian character.
As the last point in his letter, Revertera highlights the Shkodra system, in which almost everything, according to him, "still needs to be done." However, he advises not to act hastily, as the Albanian population is deprived of the most elementary culture, and their sudden erudition could produce dangerous consequences.
Given the situation, he believes that the school should perform more of an educational than an instructional function, in order to eradicate prejudices and vices rooted in Albanian society and culture, which "connoisseurs of the country describe in truly frightening terms." Therefore, good priests are expected to be the best teachers, and the schools should have a confessional character. It is advisable to build parish schools for the rural population, where possible, and for these institutions to be well equipped
166 Ibid., Fol.216.

and to have certain amenities—for the children as well as for their parents. All this would always be presented to the public as a charitable intervention by the protecting power. In this way, Revertera emphasizes, great results can be achieved with little expense.
In the cities, according to Revertera, it will be necessary, as needed, to raise education to a higher level. He allows himself not to comment on all the details regarding kindergartens, didactic materials, traveling teachers, Dominican schools, and other topics that are thoroughly elaborated in the Memorandum. Although these are issues that deserve to be considered, Revertera believes that it is not so much theory that decides all of them, but rather practice adapted to local conditions.
In Revertera's opinion, the role of consuls is immensely important. They know the country and its people well, maintain relations with bishops based on firm foundations, and have resources with which they can win the affection of the Albanians. Hence, consuls are in the best position to provide practical suggestions in each individual case. He notes that the rich experience accumulated by members of the Jesuit order around the world should be applied here. Revertera believes that this Catholic order, due to its global nature, is particularly suitable to be entrusted with all actions to be undertaken to achieve the goals of Austrian policy as set by the minister.
It may also be useful, in agreement with the bishops, to seek the help of other brotherhoods and sisterhoods, especially for teaching in elementary schools. When selecting them, as Revertera notes, it is necessary to proceed carefully, so that,

alongside teaching, positive feelings of Albanians towards the protecting power are cultivated and encouraged.
Finally, bearing in mind that Albanians will never have to be brought to Austria, Revertera concludes that the curriculum by which they are educated, as well as the spirit it carries within itself, are not of great importance.
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H H S tA , PA 1 , K. 473.
151 г/лъ^*- s&ŽŽ&ć-c^i s^- /žc s л
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CHAPTER IV:
A REBELLIOUS PEOPLE
BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES

In 1897, the Ministry began to receive alarming reports compiled by the consul in Scutari, Theodor Ippen. These reports described a tense situation caused by the armed uprising of the Mirdita tribe. Members of this tribe, as stated, attack and kill representatives of the Central Government, its soldiers, and law enforcement officers, the so-called gendarmes; they also plunder nearby villages, continuously causing unrest in which no one is safe regarding their life or property. According to the information available to the Austro-Hungarian consul, the unrest caused by the Mirdita uprising is neither spontaneous nor accidental. Of the 21,000 inhabitants of this tribe, between 100 and 300 are indeed professional bandits, who often rob and kill. This time, however, it is a planned and coordinated action, with the intention of achieving a specific goal: the restoration of the former leader of the Mirdita tribe, Prenk Bib Doda, who is in exile. Muslims from the towns are preparing a petition to be sent to the Sultan's government, demanding that the Mirdita be punished. The Turkish general governor for the entire province is unable to impose order with the means at his disposal and is requesting extraordinary powers from Constantinople, convinced that with them he could end the unrest and restore order. While the Turkish governor awaits these powers, a military expedition is being prepared in Constantinople to be sent to the territory of Mirdita.
This event greatly disturbed the Austro-Hungarian consul, causing fear that the Turkish military expedition has a dual purpose: to restore order, but also to try to take away the special privileges of the mentioned tribe and thus force its members to abandon their efforts to obtain local self-government. Based on the information available to the consul, the Turks fear that if Prenk Bib Doda returns, he will try to establish the Principality of

Mirdita and proclaim himself prince, which the Turkish government is not prepared to allow.
Ippen asks the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna to do everything in his power to prevent the arrival of this Turkish military expedition, for two reasons. On the one hand, such action would cause intervention by other powers, which does not fit with Vienna's political goals in these territories: Austria-Hungary must work with the local population, preparing them to one day seek their independence under its protection. Until that day comes, Vienna has no interest in other powers intervening in this area. On the other hand, the mentioned military expedition could weaken the Mirdita tribe, incapacitate them from offering resistance and fighting for "autonomy," and disrupt all rules and relations within the tribe, which should also be avoided, because such a development in northern Albania does not suit the interests and plans of the Danube Monarchy.
Consul Ippen proposes to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople declare to the Turkish government his opposition to the military expedition, emphasizing the following reasons: first, the affected zones are close to Austro-Hungarian territories and the unrest will spread to border areas; second, military expeditions will not succeed in pacifying the Mirdita, but will, on the contrary, increase the number of murders and robberies; third, the establishment and maintenance of order, which is the common goal of both empires, should be achieved by peaceful means and by establishing patrols between the lowland and mountain areas.
According to instructions from Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople actively advocated for a solution to the problem before the Sultan's government, adhering to the warning to be cautious with the measures planned for the Mirdita area, as they may have the opposite effect from the desired one and may increase the resistance and disobedience of the mentioned tribe.
The consul in Scutari receives instructions from the Ministry to intervene directly with the tribe and persuade it to improve relations with its neighbors, pointing out that maintaining peace is in their own interest. In order to achieve this goal, Vienna thinks it necessary to enlist the tribe’s abbot, Monsignor Doki, loyal to the Imperial and Royal government, to begin acting according to his own program 177 and attempt to pacify the Mirdita tribe. Ippen receives instructions from Vienna to speak with the abbot to that end and to follow future events with the greatest care, because there is a danger that, if peace is not achieved, the tribe will lose the "privileges" it has always had.
At the same time, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople continues his initiatives to block any attempt by the neighboring tribes from the north, Montenegrins or Serbs, to make contact with the Albanians or to spread propaganda among them to their own advantage. He also uses the discontent of the Albanian tribes to warn the Sultan that he must protect them better from the Montenegrins. He fears that Albanian discontent could culminate in bloody uprisings that would very likely attract the attention of all Europe. However, according to the instructions received from Vienna, the ambassador in Constantinople constantly emphasizes that the measures proposed by Austria-Hungary are solely in the Sultan’s interest 178.
These Austrian initiatives end successfully: no Turkish military expedition is undertaken, and the revolts, little by little, lose their initial intensity. A favorable consequence of this engagement is the increase of the Austro-Hungarian consul’s prestige among the

members of the Mirdita tribe - he gains a guarantee of trust that will henceforth help him act in the interest of Vienna’s political aims.
For such a "fortunate outcome," however, two fundamental reasons are responsible that are not directly connected with the initiatives of the Austrian consul or ambassador.
177 See the chapter on Monsignor Primo Dokmju.
178 HHStA, PA XII, Liasse XXX, K. 301, Copy of a dispatch to Freiherr von Calice in Constantinople, dated Vienna, 11 October 1897, No. 886, fol. 47-48b.
157
On the one hand, the Porte does not want a radical clash with its Albanian subjects; rather, it prefers that they retain their privileges so that it can use them as strategic allies in the European part of its territories, which, from its point of view, are under constant threats - both from local Christian tribes and from the European powers. The Albanian uprisings harm primarily the neighboring Christian settlements and constitute a tried method of intimidating them and keeping them in a subjugated position, instead of bringing about administrative, judicial, or economic improvements.
On the other hand, the Albanians themselves do not actually want a break with the Porte, but, under the pretext of alleged political aims, plunder, steal, and satisfy their violent impulses.
Ippen uses this favorable moment to draw closer to the Albanians and undertakes his first journeys through his district in order to deepen contacts with local leaders and influence their thinking and actions. He travels first to Elbasan, where he spends two days, October 5 and 6, 1987 179. He is pleasantly surprised to find that a core of people think the same and act in accordance with Vienna’s political aims. He writes to the Ministry stating that Austria-Hungary is finally, and unexpectedly, in a favorable situation; that is, what Cvidinek’s Memorandum recommends should be encouraged actually already exists in reality. Here he primarily has in mind the recommendation to establish a school in which the Albanian language would be taught, and in this connection he cites the following part of the Memorandum: "In the Mohammedan districts of Albania we can also try to awaken the desire and the need to create a national school where Albanian would be taught, and later, if possible, to realize that aim" 180.
In Ippen’s opinion, one should react quickly in order to take advantage of this situation 181, since he has contacts and sympathizers in the smaller surrounding places, but it is a narrow circle of people.
179 HHStA, PA XII, K. 301, Liasse XXX, Reports Nos. 50, 52 and 53 (all three from Scutari), 29 October 1897, fols. 116-118, 120-123 and 124-130.
180 HHStA, PA XII, K. 301, Liasse XXX, Report No. 53, Scutari, 29 October 1897, fol. 126: "We can try, also in the Mohammedan districts of Albania, to awaken the desire and the need for national schools with Albanian as the language of instruction, and then to support the realization of this desire as far as possible."
181 HHStA, PA XII, K. 301, Liasse XXX, Report No. 53, Scutari, 29 October 1897, fol. 126-126b.
158
However, Ippen explains that he still does not dare to discuss political topics with his new friends, noting that in conversations he limits himself exclusively to cultural themes. Nevertheless, the consul assumes that his interlocutors also have political aspirations.

In his report he states that he meets with a prestigious Albanian of the Muslim faith, whose name is Dervish-bey 182, and who comes from one of the oldest families of Elbasan. According to Ippen, he is the leader of a group of Albanian patriots, who has at his disposal about a thousand armed men and is more powerful than the Turkish mutasarrif of that province 183. During his stay in Elbasan, Ippen advocates that Austria-Hungary help the Albanians in everything, but he does not directly seek permission to open a school in which the Albanian language would be taught and instruction conducted in it. Ippen explains such conduct by caution, since he believes that open Austrian interventions in favor of establishing such a school could arouse the suspicions of the Turkish government.

However, Ippen continues in his report, by acting in this way, he is actually acting contrary to the normative instructions set out in Cvidinek's Memorandum, on page 22 of the copy he has at his disposal, from which he quotes the following:

"When in Muslim districts the desire and need for the establishment of national schools in which the Albanian language will be taught arises, we should, on our part, if circumstances permit, support the realization of this desire." Aware that he has disregarded the instructions from Vienna, Ippen apologizes to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At that moment, waiting for the Albanians themselves to take the necessary steps to obtain permission to open the school in question, the consul focuses on the preparation, publication, and distribution of texts in the Albanian language. In his correspondence, he notes that his host in Elbasan requested new copies of some of the books he had previously received from Bucharest and had already distributed. This concerns a total of 2,000 new editions, of which 1,000 copies are of Sami Bey Frashëri's book, 500 of Naim Bey Frashëri's general history, and 500 of Sami Bey Frashëri's geography. This request means that new editions must be prepared. The consul promises his host assistance, assuring him that Vienna will address this issue. In order for the Ministry to approve this initiative and the expenses it entails, he sends copies of each of the three mentioned books as an attachment to the correspondence.

With the aim of achieving the unification of the Albanian script as soon as possible, Ippen tries to persuade his Albanian host to accept the alphabet composed during the Vienna Conference of 1895. However, since this initiative proved futile, Ippen has no choice but to request that the new 2,000 copies be printed in the same script as the previous editions. He also suggests that Vienna be listed as the place of publication this time, so that the Albanians know the true origin of the mentioned books and to whom they should be grateful for them.

The second journey Ippen undertakes with the same goal—to examine the possibility of acting among Albanian Muslims from the interior of the country in accordance with the program set out in Cvidinek's Memorandum—takes him this time to the southern part of the Scutari province. In his report, the consul focuses exclusively on Tirana, because in his opinion, this journey was not in vain.

He believes that Tirana is the center of political life and that the entire Austro-Hungarian action in Albania should designate this city as the center of its activities. The reason is that one of the most influential and oldest Albanian families lives in Tirana. The beys of Tirana belong to the TopTani family and claim that their ancestors are from the Tkopi dynasty, which inhabited Kruja and was closest to the legendary Skanderbeg. At the

present moment, as the consul reports, the mentioned family is on very good terms and is very well connected by kinship with other influential families.
Therefore, Ippen recommends that, when the time comes, someone from the TopTani family be chosen as the prince of the future independent Albanian principality.
During his stay in Tirana, the consul lived in the house of two brothers from this family, thus creating good contacts for the realization of his political goals. One of his hosts was a relative of the Albanian publisher in Romania, and he also befriended Monsignor Dokija, whose patriotism was in line with the plans Vienna had for his activities. Ippen notes that even on this occasion he did not dare to discuss anything other than literary and cultural aspirations with his new friends. However, based on what he heard and saw, he concludes that in central Albania the necessary contacts for the Austro-Hungarian mission already exist, enabling the commencement of activities according to the devised plan. Also, in his report, Ippen expresses the expectation that Vienna will decide on the immediate and active participation of its representatives in the founding of schools, the publication of an Albanian newspaper, textbooks in Albanian, and other texts of a folkloric character.
Regarding Vienna's intentions and preparations to open new consular offices in Tirana and Berat, Ippen thinks that the same result would be achieved if, in the months when the weather is harsher, the employees of the consulates in Durrës and Vlora moved to Tirana and Berat instead of going to the coast. In this regard, he insists that Winter, the vice-consul in Durrës, spend every year from June 15 to October 15 in Tirana.
In Ippen's correspondence it states:
"He will deal with the initial steps necessary for the realization of this nascent plan, which is indicated in the aforementioned report; he will exert a favorable influence on them, serving our interests and at the same time developing his activities and observations on the areas between Tirana and Mat (mountainous areas in Tirana), which, until now, are completely unknown and without any foreign influence."
By establishing a consular post in Elbasan, according to Ippen's words, a great void that had existed up to that moment between Scutari and Janina would be eliminated (and the consequence of such a situation is that all of central Albania and a large part of southern Albania remained outside the zone of knowledge and influence of Austria-Hungary).
However, just as the Austro-Hungarian consul returned to his office in Scutari, the Ottoman authorities arrested all his hosts, both in Elbasan and in Tirana, and the new situation caused panic among the Albanians. The whole world considered the consul the main culprit for these arrests, because of his stay in the houses of the aforementioned beys. Ippen, on the other hand, as could be expected, tries to justify himself before the Ministry and rejects these accusations, stating that the real reason for the mentioned arrests was the lack of caution of his Albanian hosts, who had shown themselves several times. Ippen claims that everything will be resolved and that the prisoners will be released if Vienna threatens the Ottoman government because of its extremely offensive behavior towards Austria-Hungary, when it accused its consuls of conspiracy, insisting before the Ministry that it demand compensation.
However, Monsignor Doki also accuses the consul as the only one responsible for these arrests and all the damage they cause to Austro-Hungarian activities. Based on information he received through his contacts, the abbot claims that Ippen, not knowing

the relations in the country well enough, inappropriately embarked on an adventure, leaving, due to his inappropriate generosity, the impression among the local population that he was trying to bribe people for the interests of Austria-Hungary. This criticism made by Primo Doki perhaps influenced the consul more than it should have, who was more of an enthusiast than a man of experience. Therefore, Ippen decides to refrain from similar initiatives in the future, leaving Abbot Mirdita free hands to act as he sees fit. Accordingly, not long after, following Vienna's request to state his opinion on the usefulness of Monsignor Doki in political activities, in order to decide on his subsidies, Consul Ippen confirmed that the abbot was indispensable and that he preferred to have him by his side rather than lose him.

In conclusion, we can say that at the end of 1897, Vienna established a solid network of informants, which would in the future, firsthand, provide accurate and detailed information about the aspirations and thoughts of Albanians, about their attitudes towards the Turkish and other authorities, as well as personal data for every individual who might interest the Austrian authorities: about his social position, origin, contacts, relationships, prestige and potential to influence the Albanian community, but also about his character, positive and negative traits, his past, inclination to a great power, and aspirations.

On the other hand, Vienna seeks and encourages personal contacts with important people from various tribes. It tries to win their sympathies, strives to instill trust in them and to accustom them to always seek support from the Austrian capital. Cooperation between Austria-Hungary and several prominent Albanians in this phase is realized in the field of language, publishing books in Albanian and their distribution in areas of political activity, as well as in awakening national aspirations and convincing them of their achievability.

In addition, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy strives to maintain peace and order in the areas where it has political interests. It also does everything possible to consolidate the Albanian part of the population, while trying to preserve intact the special privileges of various tribes within the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, it tries to avoid the influence and any kind of intervention—either by the Turkish government or by another country. In this way, Vienna tries to preserve this zone from all foreign influences except the Austrian.

Its other goal is to establish good relations among the Albanian tribes and, above all, to stop the "blood feud."

A year later, as a countermeasure to Austrian activities, Constantinople decides to organize an assembly of Albanians, to which they readily agree to respond. The consular representatives of Austria-Hungary were immediately informed of this initiative of the Porte, and it caused concern because of the Ottoman goals—the unification of various branches of the Albanian people under the leadership of the Porte and the encouragement of Muslim religious feelings. Preparations for convening the Albanian assembly were accompanied by the spread of a rather unfavorable opinion about relations within Austria-Hungary itself, as well as increased Italian propaganda, which was supported by the Ottoman government itself, as a countermeasure to Austro-Hungarian activities and goals, which were already well known in the Turkish capital. Reports from January and early February 1899, from Skopje, Monastir, Prizren, and Durrës, are primarily devoted to this assembly. Consular officials are mobilizing all their

contacts to gather as much information as possible about the preparations and development of the assembly. For example, on January 8, Consul Para from Skopje sends to the Ministry information about the current situation provided by his informants. For instance, in a conversation with a prominent Albanian, one of the consul's informants learns that a conference of influential people will be held in Shkodra or Peja—at that time, it was not yet decided which of these two places would host it. The purpose of this conference, as stated, is to revitalize the Albanian national sentiment, which should be placed above all religious differences, as well as to end the bloody clashes throughout Albania. Another goal is to establish a general besa (pledge) for all Albanians, so they can respond, on one hand, to the challenges posed by Bulgarians, Serbs, and Montenegrins, and on the other, to the reformist movement spreading within Albania. Furthermore, this influential Albanian adds that Albania is in immediate danger from the three aforementioned nations, who threaten to partition it, and are firmly supported in this by Russia. He fears that if the Sultan abandons the Albanians to their own fate, they would not have enough strength to fight independently, so their hopes would once again turn toward Italy or Austria. The consul's report continues as follows: After a detailed analysis of the urgent need to devote exceptional attention to the Albanian mother tongue—both spoken and, above all, written—since it is the only link connecting Muslim and Christian Albanians, the bey reopens the topic of Italian and Austrophile aspirations previously mentioned. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian informant explains that Italy is already making great efforts to expand its influence, especially in the field of linguistics [...], to which the bey, smiling, responds: "Austria is doing the same, although [...] it has many Slavic peoples who, like other nationalities within the Monarchy, do not live in harmony."

This viewpoint, according to the consul's informant, is slowly beginning to spread throughout Albania, and for this, among other factors, Italian propaganda is also responsible. Its creators do not miss the opportunity to inflame the Albanian public with the belief that the Austrian monarchy is on the verge of collapse and that if the Albanians accept its protection, they will soon end up under the Slavic yoke, which would not happen if they joined Italy. Such propaganda was not without success.

In this light, it seems that Italian agitation also received support from the Turkish government. This is indicated by the fact that Turkish newspapers are intensively reporting on all existing disputes in the internal politics of Austria-Hungary and are describing in detail personal political conflicts, debates between parties, etc.

The consul's informant especially notes that for months now, among Turks and Christians, the most derogatory opinions have been heard about the events taking place in Austria-Hungary. He describes how one night he sat at a table with an influential bey from Đakovica, due to his recent stay in Skopje, pointing out to him the need for Albania to have the protection of a powerful force. According to the informant's report, the mentioned bey replied literally as follows: "It is a pity that Austria is so weak; there is no unity in it; the Slavs are leading it to ruin," to which the bey's companion added: "From what I hear people say, the Austrian people have exceptional love for their emperor; as long as he lives, Austria will also remain united, but after... only God knows!"

Although the informant does not provide many details here, in order to be brief, he does note that it is worth knowing that travelers, members of all foreign nations, especially Germans from the Empire, whom he sees in inns and other public places in his area,

quite openly, without any shame, speak about Austria being so weak that it can no longer be considered a power in Europe. They, according to the informant, cite some ethnographic arguments leading to the conclusion that Austria still remains united solely thanks to the love the nations that comprise it feel for their ruler.

Vice-Consul Rappaport, on January 19, 1899, from Prizren, informs the Ministry that on that very day, all influential Albanians from his district decided to participate in the assembly which, according to his information, was convened in Peja. Rappaport reports that the assembly, it seems, is dedicated to reconciling different Albanian branches and ending blood feuds, as well as introducing military service. The latter proposal is quite unpopular among Albanians, and Rappaport explains it with rumors that it is about the actualization of a postulate from the Quran, according to which it is the duty of every Muslim to take up arms in defense of the caliph when infidels are preparing to attack. Manipulation of religious feelings, the vice-consul writes at the end of his report, is typical of the current system, which supports Muslim fanaticism, and is imposed by some members of the Sultan's government.

Vienna, concerned by these developments, sends instructions to its representatives in Shkodër, Prizren, Durrës, Vlorë, and Monastir to continue gathering information about the aforementioned assembly.

Fulfilling these instructions, Rapaport prepares a detailed report, in which he writes that the distrust of Albanians toward the ambitions of neighboring Slavic states in his district remains alive and is even growing. The reason for this is the unrest stirred among the Muslim population by suspicions that the government is not only interested in pacifying the area and ending blood feuds to justify the introduction of mandatory military service (part of Ilava), but also aims to implement another, even more unpopular measure: the general disarmament of the population and tax collection.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the written statements sent that year, as always when winter arrives, by Albanian local leaders to their colleagues in other parts of Albania, attracted somewhat more attention than usual. For example, the leaders from Peć sent a statement to influential people in Prizren, informing them that a call had come from Shkodër, Debar, Priština, Novi Pazar, and even from more distant southern provinces of Albania, for joint action to defend Albanian interests. Although no decision has yet been made in either Peć or Prizren, according to reliable information obtained from the vice consul's trusted associates, whom he has already managed to gain among influential people of the Muslim faith, there is little chance that any agreement will be considered between Albanians living outside the northern half of the Kosovo vilayet and those from Peć, Prizren, Novi Pazar, and Priština. Among this second group of Albanians, at best, a pact could be made to thwart the ambitions of the Slavic states and the alleged intentions of the Turkish government, but this would essentially be nothing new, as there has long been a tacit agreement among them on this point. According to the vice consul's information, the agreement is, on one hand, based on religious fanaticism, and, on the other, created on the fact that the local Muslim population views the current situation as a kind of national privilege and is not only ready to take action to defend itself from its neighbors but also to protect itself from the plans of the Turkish government.

Rapaport's trusted associates consider it unlikely that the Albanians from Prizren will adopt any positive stance on such an issue, which exceeds their "simply local" horizon.

On the other hand, the ambitions of the southern Albanians will not find support in other parts of the country, although their goal is to achieve autonomy for Albania, create a unified literature and language, and establish a network of national schools. Except for the few Tosks living in those districts and the Ghegs who, during their travels, have encountered their ideas or European points of view, the reformist ideas of the southern Albanians are absolutely incompatible with Islam. Thus, even the small number of supporters they count on do not dare to publicly express their opinions or spread propaganda in their favor among the much larger Muslim population.

Also, on January 21, 1899, Consul Para reports from Skopje about information just received from a fairly reliable source in Bujanovac (a railway station on the border between Skopje and Serbia). The letter states that all Albanian leaders from the Bujanovac-Preševo district have been invited to come to Prizren to discuss the national question. At this joint assembly, according to the consul's informant, the first priority will be to take a position against the definitive renunciation of Crete, as well as to address the Sultan, requesting autonomy for Albania; if the autonomy project cannot be realized, the informant reports, an appeal would be made for Austro-Hungarian protection; thus, the danger threatening the nation from neighboring Slavic states would be averted, and recent events have caused a loss of confidence in the Sultan's power, who, after a victorious military campaign, sacrificed Crete.

Indeed, the consul was able to confirm that about a week earlier, two Albanian leaders from the vicinity of Preševo had set out for Prizren, passing through Priština.

Regarding the news about the alleged intentions of the Albanians to seek protection from Austro-Hungary, Consul Para recommends that they be received with extreme caution. However, Para adds that it should not be forgotten that, according to report no. 18 from Vice Consul Rapaport, dated the 17th of this month, the planned assembly had not yet been held in either Prizren or Peć. According to information obtained by his informant, at that time, there was a rapprochement between different Albanian branches, which, due to the great distances between their places of residence, usually did not come into contact with each other except on very rare occasions.

At the end of January, Vice-Consul Winter from Durrës informed Vienna that there was talk there as well about the distressing situation in Macedonia and the reforms that were intended to be implemented, although it was unlikely that the Albanian population would take any stance or express any opinion regarding them.

As for the small number of influential figures living in loco, the Vice-Consul emphasized that all of them were in government service and therefore directly dependent on it, a situation exacerbated by the uncertain financial circumstances in which they lived. Only from time to time, in a close circle of friends, do they allow themselves to make brief comments about

the abandonment by the authorities experienced by the Albanian part of the population, and they never miss an opportunity to demonstrate their humble and loyal subordination. In general, Vice-Consul Winter's opinion is that political conformism is the characteristic that best fits the influential Albanian leaders: they would be able to support some independent action to strengthen national consciousness only if the existing conditions were fundamentally changed. There is no doubt that these people would prefer to stay by the stove rather than go to Peć to discuss the stance Albanians should take on the Macedonian question.

Regarding the beys from Tirana, the Vice-Consul reports that, with few exceptions or perhaps none at all, they are occupied with fulfilling their personal economic interests and therefore show exceptional fear of the government.

Meanwhile, prominent residents of the towns of the Kosovo Vilayet were meeting in Peć, where the announced assembly was held from January 23 to 29, 1899. Representatives from almost all towns of the Kosovo, Monastir, and Scutari Vilayets attended—a total of about 500 people, all of whom were well-known and influential figures among the Albanian population. The only ones missing were representatives from Scutari and Debar, who sent telegrams stating they would accept the decisions of the assembly.

A few delegates who did not belong either to the Albanians from the Kosovo Vilayet or to those from towns in the European part of Turkey, and whose presence was expected, did not attend the assembly in Peć. They apologized for their absence and sent a written statement expressing their temporary agreement with the decisions that would be reached, reserving the right to disagree with them later.

A well-known captain of the imperial Ottoman army, born in this town, also arrived in Peć, bringing mail and instructions from Constantinople, which were to be read at the assembly sessions.

According to the report of the Serbian consul in Priština, compiled based on information from an informant who attended the event, on January 26 all Albanian representatives gathered in the Hamam Mosque, whose entrance was guarded by troops. There were patrols in the nearby streets, and a crowd gathered in the mosque courtyard. The first session was turbulent, as confirmed by the informant, who noted that the echo of the noise from inside the mosque could be heard outside. In the same mosque, on January 27, the second session was held, lasting until noon. On January 28, there was no daytime session, but a secret session was held during the night, attended by only one representative from each town or district. It was then that all planned business was completed and the goals of the assembly were achieved.

The result of these sessions was a series of agreements that Austro-Hungarian Vice-Consul Rapaport received from one of the participants. These agreements were ratified on January 29 at a Muslim ceremony, which included an oath on the Quran and the usual honorary salutes, after which the assembly was dissolved. In the attached confidential message, the Vice-Consul lists in full the following decisions made by the influential Albanian representatives at the aforementioned meetings:

a) No authority other than the Sultan will be recognized.

b) Land and property taxes must be paid, along with the tithe, and proceedings will be initiated against anyone who refuses to make the appropriate payment between April 1 and July 15, unless exempted due to lack of funds.

c) Male residents between the ages of 18 and 40 will in the future be required to serve in the military when called up.

d) The carrying out of blood feuds, regardless of the nature of the offense committed, is temporarily suspended; this besa will last until the next Ruz-i-kasem (Kasem, i.e., Mitrovdan, November 7, 1899).

e) In the event of an attack by a foreign power with the intention of provocation, it will be answered in kind, and for that purpose, it will be necessary to send weapons to the threatened districts (as needed).

f) To facilitate the supply of weapons, prominent men from each district will be responsible for reporting the amount of money needed and later secretly distributing packages to the population.
e) Addition to the clause under d), which the Turkish government will keep secret: Ammunition for the aforementioned weapons will be withdrawn from the state arsenal.
f) Whoever kills someone with any weapon during the besa, will have their house confiscated and burned; furthermore, they will be punished by having the authorities decide on their life and fate; if they flee, their relatives will be exiled by decision of the assembly of influential people.
g) The same decision applies to anyone who injures another person with any kind of weapon.
h) Whoever fires warning shots will be handed over to the authorities as punishment. If they flee, their house will be burned to the ground.
i) Thieves and bandits will be handed over to the authorities for
In the agreements, for that purpose, the withdrawal of ammunition from the state arsenal is approved. Although it was officially presented that the government must keep this point secret, Rapaport, taking into account the composition of the Peć assembly, acts as if this is actually concealing the government's secret consent to such actions. In any case, it is possible that since the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the creation of the Albanian League, a tacit agreement has remained fully in force between the palace and certain Albanian leaders regarding their supply of weapons in certain cases, for the purpose of repelling foreign attacks. Also, as Rapaport points out, there is a possibility that the aim of the agreement from Peć is only to appease influential Albanians, who were disturbed and distrustful due to the return of irregular Albanian troops from the Greco-Turkish war and the Berane affairs several years earlier, as well as the resolution of the Cretan question. Namely,

the mentioned agreements actually offer the Albanians a kind of renewal of a secret pact, in exchange for concessions regarding taxes and compulsory military service, since in Constantinople (perhaps not without reason, judging by the existing goodwill) they still believe that they will manage to keep the Albanians on their side if it becomes politically necessary.
Along with all this, there still exists the danger that artificially inflamed religious fanaticism will not be able to be brought under control in time and completely by those who incited it, which could have consequences from which Turkey would know how to benefit.
In addition to the previously mentioned difficulties (the fact that all the details of the Peć agreements must be discussed and ratified in the district assemblies), the vice-consul notes that one must also count on the opposition of some influential people who were offended by being excluded from the making of the agreements, among whom is the well-known R Bey from Đakovica. He even sent a telegram to the palace, stating that the besa from Peć is not valid according to Albanian customary law, since during its consideration, representatives of certain cities or influential clans and families were not present.
Another objection of great weight among the conservative inhabitants of the country is that Albanian assemblies have since ancient times been held in the Kosovo vilayet, in

Prizren, or, if not there, then in Babin Most (where the tomb of Sultan Murad I is located, near Priština), but never in Peć.
Rapaport assesses that it will be necessary to wait until after the Ramadan Bayram to evaluate the echoes of these opposition movements.
In the Prizren area, on February 27, influential Albanians gather again to extend the peace among Muslim Albanian clans until Mitrovdan (October 26 / November 7). At the beginning of March, in Debar, and in mid-March, in Shkodra, influential Albanians meet once again to clarify the decisions from Peć and to keep alive the Constantinople initiative that, under their leadership and through the Muslim faith, Albanian tribes gather and are kept away from Austro-Hungarian nationalist propaganda. Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, on the other hand, continues its line of action, assessing the results of these gatherings as local and considering that they have a narrowly Muslim scope.
204 HHStA, PA XII, Liasse XXXIII, K. 312, Prizren, February 5, 1899; Uskiib, March 8, 1899.

During the last quarter of 1900, Vienna directs attention to the personal contacts of its consular representatives and local leaders, and in the instructions it sends, it emphasizes the importance of establishing good relations with them in order to achieve the political goals of the entire action.205 The activities, by all accounts, are increasingly taking on some conspiratorial characteristics with elitist elements that are becoming more pronounced.
Based on the reports sent by the Austro-Hungarian consular offices in Albania, the Ministry concludes that the national movement in the country is experiencing slow but steady progress and that, by all accounts, the circles of the population deciding to join it are each time broader.
However, in order to better orient itself regarding the individuals mentioned in the reports and who can be considered initiators of this movement, Vienna considers it would be useful for its consular authorities to compile specific lists of those prominent individuals who have patriotic awareness and especially emphasize their social status, influence, or wealth.
Thus, the Ministry calls on its consular representatives to compile the lists in accordance with how each of their official districts is described. Consuls are recommended to limit themselves to those individuals whom they personally know well or can at least provide accurate information about, based on data previously collected from reliable people.
Vienna considers that a valuable addition to the requested lists would be brief information about the mentioned individuals, their biographical data, or other significant information.
The Austro-Hungarian representative from Valona206, regarding the list he attaches in response to this request, emphasizes that he included only prominent Albanian patriots who enjoy a certain status in the country, while all other persons were automatically excluded. Thus, for example, it happened that some Albanians recognized as influential by the Albanian committee abroad or individuals highly esteemed among Albanophiles, etc., were omitted from the list.
205 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V /l, Albanien V: Alb. Patrioten I Allgemeines 1900-1909, Ref.I, Vienna, November 23, 1900, Secret, Circular to the Consular Offices in 1)

Scutari, No. 337; 2) Durazzo, No. 338; 3) Valona, No. 339; 4) Monastir, No. 340.
206 HHStA, PA XIV, K.7, Liasse V /l, Albanien V: Alb. Patrioten I Allgemeines 1900-1909, Valona 1900.
175
In this regard, the report of Vice-Consul Ranzi is also interesting, though of a much later date, dedicated to one of the most prominent families in Valona—the Vlora family. Since there are numerous stories about the noble lineage of Vlora and the fate of its members, and since they were often the subject of reports sent from the consulate in Valona, Ranzi believes it may be interesting to learn, to some extent, the origin and genealogy of this family. Therefore, the vice-consul undertook to compile its family tree, starting from the branches that existed at that time. According to Ranzi's information, the founder of the Vlora lineage in Albania was Sinan Pasha, from Konya, who in 1518 (under Sultan Selim), as commander of the Turkish fleet, was sent to Albanian waters to support the then governor of Valona, Dias Pasha, in overcoming the until-then independent inhabitants of Himara. The following year (1519), Sinan Pasha himself was appointed governor of Valona, where he then spent many years. His descendants settled permanently in this country.
Therefore, according to the Austro-Hungarian consul, this family is of Turkish (Ottoman), not Albanian origin, and this tradition has been preserved within it. However, after settling in the country, it did not take long for them to become Albanianized, and they even adopted the name of the province of Valona (in Albanian, Vlora [Vlore]) as their surname.
In accordance with the proposal signed by Goluchowski on February 3, 1900, Zwiedinek prepared a memorandum which he sent to the consulates in Shkodra and Monastir. In the letter, officials of these institutions were given information and instructions on how to deal with Albanian representatives whose names were listed at the bottom of the document.
Zwiedinek begins by recalling the difficulties involved in gaining the trust of Albanians and achieving the desired results in the action to awaken their national consciousness, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had initiated in that country. The problems and difficulties were mostly the result of the hostile attitude of the Turkish government towards Albanian national aspirations.
207 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V/l, Albanien V: Alb. Patrioten I Allgemeines 1900-1909, Bericht Nr. 10, Valona, am. 18. April 1905, Viceconsul Dr. Ranzi: Über die Abstammung und Genealogie der Familia Vlora, 1 Beilage (On the origin and genealogy of the Vlora family).
208 Vienna, Wednesday, January 17, 1900. Zwiedinek to Goluchowski. Then sent in Communication No. 51 to Shkodra, as well as in Communication No. 52 to Monastir—both letters dated February 14, 1900.
At the beginning of 1899, Zwiedinek continues in the letter, it seemed that the attitude of the Sultan and his government on this issue began to change, since Constantinople encouraged the holding of an assembly of Albanian delegates in Peć. It appeared that the Ottoman authorities, as a goal of the gathering, set the revival of the national feeling of all branches of the Albanian people, regardless of religion, encouraging them to set aside the bloody conflicts that took place among them, with the aim of uniting to resist the threatening attempts at expansion by other Balkan peoples. However, Zwiedinek

explains, it soon became clear that the Turkish government saw the assembly in Peć only as a warning about circumstances that did not align with its wishes, concerning foreign interference of any kind in Albanian affairs. Constantinople in no way intended to accept measures that could encourage the unification of Albanian national branches. Catholic lineages from the mountains of northern Albania, as well as representatives of Orthodox and Muslim branches from central and southern Albania, were excluded from the discussions in Peć. When they tried to convene another Albanian assembly near Murat's tomb in Pristina—it was banned. Also, the attempt to expand the partial besa (peace agreement) concluded in certain districts, which would allow the formation of an alliance for general peace and its extension to all parts of Albania, was thwarted due to harmful interference by the Kosovo governor. There was no reaction to the petition letters sent by the Albanian Committee to the Sultan, requesting the construction of Albanian schools or the introduction of Albanian language classes in already existing Turkish schools, and the distribution of Albanian newspapers and other national publications throughout the country was also not permitted.

Zwiedinek admits that the determined opposition of the Turkish authorities to the national aspirations of the Albanians made it difficult for consular representatives to confirm the goodwill and interest of the Imperial and Royal government in supporting such intentions. On several occasions, various leaders of the national movement individually sent petitions to Austria-Hungary, asking it to support these efforts and to provide, through its consulates, educational resources which their own government had denied them. However, Zwiedinek notes, granting this request would seriously compromise the position of Austro-Hungarian consuls in Albania, who, not wishing to enter into conflict with the authorities, were forced to carefully maintain their distance in relations with national circles. However, Zwiedinek continues,

It would be in Vienna's political interests to maintain relations of good understanding with the most resolute individuals among the Albanian population, so that the Austrian authorities could keep abreast of views concerning the development of national propaganda and, insofar as possible, mitigate any foreign influence in Albania. In Cvidinek's view, despite unfavorable conditions, the consuls strove to fulfill this task with praiseworthy care, and he goes on to illustrate this position with examples: Consul Ippen visited the Catholic districts in the mountains along the Montenegrin border several times and developed a relationship with the head of the leading lineage of the inhabitants of that place; in Bitola, Consul Kral is in contact with agents of national propaganda from the districts of Korça, Debar, and Elbasan, where there is a significant Albanian population; the heads of the consular offices in Durrës and Valona used their summer stays in Tirana and Berat to draw closer to the local Muslim beys.

However, Cvidinek emphasizes, Austria-Hungary must retain the contacts it has acquired, and the consular representatives must be provided with sufficient financial means to secure the loyalty of those who, during the execution of this task, served as intermediaries. It is necessary to constantly monitor developments in the Albanian districts bordering Montenegro, which Prince Nikola is attempting to annex to his principality. According to Cvidinek, it would be advisable to galvanize parts of the population from that area who, despite their difficult economic situation, have remained indifferent to Montenegrin attempts to win them over to their cause. Those Albanians,

Cvidinek notes, should be further motivated to maintain a loyal stance by being offered certain assistance.
In view of the conditions described above, Cvidinek allows himself to propose sending a sum of 4,000 francs from the reserve fund of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Consul Ippen, so that, by way of compensation, he may dispose of that money as he considers best, granting aid and rewards to those within his official district whose influence and attitude have served the political interests of Austria-Hungary in Albania. Cvidinek recommends that Consul Ippen, insofar as possible, keep in mind the individuals recommended by Monsignor Primo Doci.
In response to the petition of Vice-Consul Kral from Monastir, Cvidinek recalls that in 1899 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved a donation of 20 napoléons d'or for the Albanian school for children in Korça. If, in the current year 1900, such a donation were repeated, and another of the same amount granted to the Albanian girls' school in that place, then, in Cvidinek's opinion, the national leaders of central Albania, who, despite the hostility of the Turkish government, strive with their own resources to maintain these exceptionally useful educational centers for Albanian youth, would not cease to show special gratitude to Austria-Hungary. Hence he proposes that a sum of 1,500 francs from the reserve fund of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be sent to Consul Kral. Of this, 400 each should be donated to the two Albanian schools in Korça, and the remaining 700 used as he himself deems important, in order to maintain established relations with the national circles in his official district.
The activities of the other Austro-Hungarian consular officials in Albania's political sphere, in Cvidinek's assessment, remain—due to the circumstances in the country—very limited. It will therefore be necessary to provide them with the requested financial means to strengthen their contacts and, if an opportunity arises, to find trusted intermediaries with the aim of establishing relations with the most esteemed figures among the Albanian population.
209 In this connection, among many documents of similar content, we single out the one cited here. We have chosen it because it seemed to us representative and clear in its concision. See HHStA, PA XIV, Liasse XVI, Weisung nach Durazzo vom 9/12/1901, Nr. 523. Politischer Gegenstand. Ubersendung eines Actionsfonds von 2000 Frcs. Special fund. Notice to Durrës, 9/12/1901, no. 523. Dispatch of a fund of 2000 francs for operations. Political matter.
"Noble Count,
In execution of the high decree of 9 December 1901, Ref. 523 secret, I have the honor to remit to Your Excellency the exact sum of 2000 francs of compensation placed at my disposal to cover the stated expenses, asking you kindly to acknowledge the payment with certification.
The said expenses concern approved assistance intended to maintain stable contacts, as well as contributions and donations to influential Albanians who, truth be told, do not belong only to my district but also to those of Elbasan, Mat, etc., with whom I have established ties and with whom it seemed advisable to maintain good relations.
I enclose justification of the expenses in the form of appropriate receipts for the greater part of the money delivered.

As Your Excellency will ascertain, if you would be so good as to examine the attached payments, after deducting an advance of 2000 francs, I have a positive balance of 197.96 c.
HHStA, PA XII, Li XXX, K 301.
To cover these expenses, I have faced other similar ones and guaranteed individual assistance to some of the students who come to our schools, with the aim of neutralizing Italian competition in the field of education. It will be my honor to ask you, with all respect, for your benevolent cooperation in the form of a remittance of an identical sum."
Kvjatkovski
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HHStA, PA XII, Li XXX, K. 301.
184

CHAPTER V: JOURNEYS OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN CONSULS INTO THE HEART OF THE ALBANIAN-MUSLIM COMMUNITY OR THE BEGINNING OF A ROMANTICIST CONSPIRACY

An important segment of Vienna's tactic in fostering national consciousness among the Albanian population was, as we pointed out in the previous chapters, the establishment of contacts with Albanians of the Muslim faith and working to make the Ministry's positions appealing to them.

Practice shows that, in order to grasp the intimate political convictions of the Muslims—and especially to exercise influence over them—it was absolutely necessary for consular representatives to maintain regular and intensive personal relations with them, as well as to give them regular generous payments in gold.

Among the first to point this out was Vice-Consul Rappaport, based on his experience in Prizren. In order to fulfill his tasks, his first need was accurate information about the feelings of Albanian Muslims. However, to obtain such information, he lacked an intermediary who knew the prominent members of this community perfectly and who could secure for him contact with them without attracting attention. Rappaport wished to cover all areas of the country and, if possible, the places of Luma, Hasi, Djakovica, Pec, and perhaps Gusinje, which he lists in order of importance. According to his calculations, this would require monthly expenses of no more than 60 gold florins. The vice-consul's plans were, above all, to select informers during his travels from among the chieftains of influential Albanian clans.

As for prominent figures, both in Prizren and in the rest of the country, he did not find it advisable to approve regular subsidies or lavish donations while the Austro-Hungarian action was developing, nor even when it had sufficiently matured. Rappaport believed they should be reserved only for entirely reliable and truly influential men of trust, or, as the case may be, exceptional individuals, with the funds to be given for specific requests.

On the other hand, he noted that there would surely be many occasions, as he began to establish initial contacts, when he would be asked for alms for widows, the poor, and orphans. Refusing such requests usually results in a cooling of relations with the most influential local figures, although their interest does not entirely cease. Therefore, part of such requests should be granted, as long as they remain within reasonable bounds—for example, not exceeding 60 gold florins per month.

Regarding travel within his official district, Rappaport considered it practically an unavoidable necessity, since the most important and influential persons in the country rarely came to Prizren. Even if that were not the case, he was aware that the conspicuous spy system of the local authorities would most likely thwart any conversation with a foreign representative. To gain direct experience of these figures, and so as not to be forced to judge them on the basis of hearsay and others' opinions, the vice-consul was convinced he had no choice but to visit them, justifying his trips as excursions, hunting outings, and similar reasons.

As soon as the rains—which up to the time of writing his report had fallen abundantly—ceased, and as soon as the weather improved and road conditions allowed, Rappaport intended to make the most of the summer months in order to visit the nearby surroundings as soon as possible. He then planned gradually to expand the territory of his travels, each time going further into the interior, until through contacts and personal acquaintances he could safely, without danger, reach the places most inaccessible to a foreigner. To avoid arousing the suspicions of the local authorities, he would refrain from hastily engaging in any activity.

Summarizing the monthly costs that would have to be anticipated, not taking into account other smaller payments arising from his travels and impossible to determine a priori, he estimated the total at about 200 gold florins.
Finally, he again pointed out that, for climatological reasons, he would have to limit most of his activities—especially in the high mountain areas—to the months from July to September inclusive, which is why he wished to set out on his travels as soon as possible.
185
210 See Memoire iiber Albainen (Memorandum on Albania), HHStA, PA I, K. 473, commented on in chapters II and III of this work.
211 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Viceconsul Rappaport, Prizren, June 29, 1897, Secret, fols. 307–312.
186
From the Ministry they reply to Rappaport [212] that they have taken note of the particulars he describes in detail in his report and that they accept his request concerning the inclusion of trustworthy Muslims from Prizren, in order to ascertain the sentiments of the Muslims of that place. They also approve including some other informants in the operation, partly Muslims and partly Christians, so that the appropriate tasks could be carried out in the rest of the district under his jurisdiction. For that purpose they authorize him to withdraw from the reserve fund in the local office, against appropriate receipts, the sums of money necessary for the operation, specified as follows: an approximate amount of 40 forints per month for the informants from Prizren, as well as 60 forints for all the other informants together and, finally, up to 60 forints per month for assistance and gifts for various individuals. At the same time they emphasize that these amounts should not be understood as a regular salary usually paid to the aforementioned informants, but that their fees must be paid entirely depending on the work they perform.
As for travel through his official district, they remind him that it is necessary at first to be very cautious. Namely, if the journeys are too frequent immediately after he assumes his post, especially at the present moment, when nervousness has gripped the Muslims as a consequence of the results of the Greco-Turkish War, they may anger the local authorities and cause them to take a much less favorable stance regarding his plans. Vienna therefore considers it desirable that the vice-consul for a time limit himself to short tours of the surroundings, which must pass completely unnoticed, and that he not undertake long journeys until an opportunity arises to present them in the eyes of the authorities as business trips.
Under these circumstances, the heads of the Ministry agree with everything Rappaport proposed regarding notifying Constantinople by telegram of each departure and return. They also have nothing against authorizing him to, against receipt from the reserve fund, starting from 1 July (1897) until a new order, withdraw an exceptional sum of 24 forints per month to cover expenses that arise on those journeys.
212 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 24, Albainen, Liasse XV, Vienna, 21 July 1897. To Rappaport in Prizren.
187
Rappaport follows the Ministry’s instructions and begins his activity primarily from his official post, not undertaking travels through the district. In his reports he underscores

the dissatisfaction and unrest of the Albanians regarding the future, the blood feuds that cannot be ended, as well as the ineffectual measures of the central government to put an end to the unrest. His activities are directed toward winning informants, entering, as far as possible, into personal contact with the most prominent members of various tribes and striving to befriend them so that he can influence their way of thinking and behavior in the direction of what Vienna desires.

In parallel, Vienna gives more precise instructions to its new vice-consul in Durrës [213]. After they received his oral communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concludes that these reports largely enable them to keep abreast of tasks of a political nature, inseparable from the duties that the vice-consul has at his post in Durrës. As for the rest, the Memorandum on Albania, which was sent to him for personal use only, offers some more precise explanations of the tasks entrusted to him, analyzing certain points in more detail and linking them with the ideas that guide his activity.

In any case, the letter emphasizes that Winter must immediately and as a priority devote himself to obtaining the most precise possible information about the situation and about persons of significance on the political plane, so that he can inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in detail. His immediate task will encompass thoroughly precise reporting on the relations maintained by the various clans in central Albania— both among themselves and with the clans from other parts of the country. Also, the vice-consul is obliged to report in detail to the Ministry on the persons who lead those clans, as well as on any existing foreign influence or attempt to influence them. Nevertheless, they recommend that he temporarily refrain from going on long journeys, due to the risks this entails for overall Austro-Hungarian activity.

However, after spending eight months in Durrës, the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul becomes convinced that from the place to which he has been sent it is impossible to gain a realistic picture of the authentic nature of the sanjak under his jurisdiction: on the one hand, because Durrës is above all a port and a place from which trade is conducted with the border regions, and on the other, because the city has no greater political significance except as the seat of the sanjak authority and administration [214].

213 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 24, Vienna, 20 July 1897. To Vice-Consul von Winter in Durazzo.

The central point, in political terms, is in Tirana, a city that at that time had approximately 20,000 inhabitants (almost entirely of the Muslim faith) and lies on the main line leading to Bitola. According to the remarks that the Austro-Hungarian representative could make, it represents the authentic center of the sanjak. Although it was proposed several times to transfer the seat of the Austrian mission there, that project was never realized due to a lack of suitable roads for communication (no passable road reaches Tirana, only bridle paths). This was very important, especially considering the situation in Durrës, from which, thanks to various steamship lines, it is easy to maintain contact with other cities in Turkey.

However, of particular importance for the goals that Vienna sets for itself is the fact that in Durazzo there is not a single Muslim whose attitude or opinion, whatever it may be, needs to be taken into account, whereas in Tirana old noble lineages live, and particularly influential is the Topkab family [orig: Topcab — not mentioned further in the text, perhaps the author had in mind Toptan (Toptani)? — ed. note]. The vice-consul

fears that he will not be able to develop a relationship with them in a discreet manner, unless he is allowed to spend longer periods of time in that city.
He believes that this last-mentioned circumstance in itself is quite sufficient to justify his request for authorization to travel to Tirana. However, Winter considers it his duty to draw Vienna's attention to another matter: the obvious fact, corroborated by his earlier experience, that it will be impossible to build the desired relations with influential Albanians in any other way.
In the dispatch he notes that it is certain the Ottoman authorities will follow his every step, and that because of this he will have to be extremely
214 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 24, Liasse Albanien XV, Berichte uber den Sommeraufenthalt der osterreichisch-ungarischen Consuln in Berat und Titana, 1898-1907, (Reports on the summer stays of the Austro-Hungarian consuls in Berat and Tirana, for the period from 1898 to 1907), Fol. 1-179. Durazzo, den 16. Marz 1898, Fol. 1-3b.
Unfortunately, not all the reports from the cited years have been preserved, nor could they be found in other sections of the archives. Therefore, on the following pages we will present only those reports that we were able to obtain during the research.

cautious. Being fully aware of this undisputed difficulty, he will continue to behave with restraint and therefore expects that his presence will not provoke any conflict.
Winter explains that at the present moment he is not in a position to answer either positively or negatively the question of whether the beys, with this strategy, will finally dare to accept him with confidence, since Tirana, in comparison with Durazzo, is quite another, to him unknown, world.
In short, his position is as follows: it is unlikely that a stay in Tirana could complicate anything, and it is possible to achieve positive results; for the latter, however, he cannot offer reliable guarantees; conversely, if he were to remain in Durazzo for an indefinite time, the scope of activity of his consular office would automatically be narrowed and he would be able to do nothing but draw up reports on the basis of indirect testimonies. There is no doubt that the importance of this issue makes the attempt worth the effort, and therefore he willingly takes upon himself the not inconsiderable effort and obligations that he and his family will have to accept and go through, should the plan of action in Tirana be carried out.
Winter asks to be provided financial means in the amount between 1,200 and 1,500 gold florins. At the end of the dispatch, he adds that he will subsequently send a separate report in which he will list the individual expenses necessary for his relocation to Tirana. Vienna permits him to reside in Tirana and approves the requested subsidy.
In the meantime, the Grand Vizier in Constantinople meets with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Calice and expresses his dissatisfaction over the recent summer stays of Vice-Consuls Petrovic and Winter in Berat and Tirana, respectively. In the Grand Vizier's opinion, those stays will cause a scandal among the Albanians and it will be very difficult for the Ottoman authorities to protect them from insults and possible attacks by the local population. The ambassador does not yield to these objections, but in advance shifts the responsibility for potential unpleasantness that the Austro-Hungarian consular organs might experience, as well as the question of their safety, onto the local Ottoman authorities.

Vienna, however, warns Petrovic and Winter that they must be extremely cautious and that, under the pretext of protecting them, the local authorities will follow them from very close by215.

215 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 24, Liasse XV, Wien, am 30. Juni 1898, Goluchowski an: Viceconsul Winter in Durazzo; Viceconsul Trojan in Janina.

Petrovic begins his report by emphasizing that his stay arouses many impressions among the population and increased unease among the authorities216. The mutasarrif, who has spread rumors that the vice-consul is coming in order to win over the local Albanian leaders for Austria-Hungary, monitors his every step closely. The great distrust of the central authorities affects the population. Petrovic writes that he clearly feels the confusion of his earlier acquaintances from Valona during each of his visits.

He also notes that gendarmes pass day and night in front of his door, watching those who visited him and reporting it to the authorities. The consequence is that the population avoids even the consulate's local interpreters.

After a month in Tirana, Petrovic thinks that the benefit of his stay is that the Albanians have understood very well that Austria-Hungary is interested in Albania and their future. He believes it is very likely that in the coming years, when his stay in Tirana will no longer be a novelty to anyone, the fear felt by the local authorities themselves, as well as by the population, will diminish, which will allow him to have more contact with the Albanians.

The population, on the other hand, believes that his arrival is connected with the imminent opening of an Austro-Hungarian consulate in that place, and thus expects that trade will revive and that Austria-Hungary will open better post offices than the Turks.

The most important family in Berat is Vrioni, whose leaders are connected by marriages with influential Albanian families from other regions. However, contacts between the small number of patriots from Berat and other places are very scant, and at the time he is writing his report several months have already passed since they last received any periodical in Albanian.

In Berat, as the vice consul points out, there is only one elementary school, and it is Romanian. It is attended by 35 students, most of whom are from Berat and do not pay for their education. Half of the students are Romanian, and the other half are not Romanian, but are also Christians.

The period from mid-July to the end of September of the following year, 1899, vice consul Petrovic also spends in Berat and once again concludes that Austria-Hungary is in a rather unfavorable situation there.

The attitude of the population is hostile – Christians see in him an enemy of Orthodoxy, and Muslims fear that he is coming with the aim of creating new problems so that Austria-Hungary could intervene in that area.

His first task is to dispel the aforementioned suspicion and, above all, to establish good relations with the Ottoman authorities, because only friendship with them can ensure the establishment of contacts with Albanian local leaders. Soon, representatives of the central government, as well as the population, realize that the purpose of his stay in Berat is not religious propaganda at all, and they are reassured. Nevertheless, the vice consul remains under constant surveillance.

However, the Greeks fabricate accusations against him, which later turn out to be false, and instead of causing him harm, they actually help him in the long run to gain the sympathy of the local population and authorities.

Falsely reassured that he is not a political agitator, the Albanian authorities become more courteous toward him, and the beys are no longer afraid as before to approach the foreigner. Among them, Petrovic is primarily interested in representatives of the Vlora family, and he fills his report with various details about them.

According to Petrovic's observations, among the local population in Berat, fear prevails, and he is convinced that there is no future for any movement not approved by the Ottoman government. The reason for this is not only the fact that the Albanians of Berat are fearful, but also a fundamental trait of their mentality: they are very conservative. Although it may happen that some bey, in a very intimate setting, makes a critical comment about abuses of the Turkish administration, Petrovic feels that no one wants the government of another state. In the same way, it can be said that most of the population does not think about the idea of Albanian autonomy. This idea, for religious reasons, also seems utopian to them: Muslims believe that all Christians are Philhellenes [Hellenophiles, i.e., lovers of Greeks – translator's note], and Orthodox do not see the difference between Albanian Muslims and Turks.

According to vice consul Petrovic's reports, part of the youth in Berat has some notion of independence, but it is rather vague and indicates a very poor understanding of the matter. Therefore, it is difficult for the Austro-Hungarian representative to take their ideas seriously, and he remarks that every day he is more convinced that there is no national movement in that area.

Also, it seems that the Albanians themselves are indifferent to whether their tribes will develop into a nation or not. Petrovic notes that the population in Berat is satisfied with achieving prosperity in a more or less honest way, striving for a certain order in life, and also obtaining titles that give them prestige. Therefore, it is most important for them to befriend some governor or someone who has influence in the Palace: under the protection of such a friend, they can do as they please, that is, they can satisfy their vanity and have the opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of their most unprotected neighbors. Moreover, these beys are not united at all and are envious of each other. The vice consul believes that in Albania, in general, there is no family that has prestige throughout the country.

Petrovic reminds that, as he has already reported, influential Albanians are, for the most part, quite indifferent to the national idea, which makes it much more difficult for Austro-Hungarian representatives to work on developing the aforementioned idea. Quite the opposite, attempts to work in that direction lead to misunderstandings, and Petrovic fears that his initiatives will have an undesirable effect. Therefore, the vice consul expresses his belief that at that moment the best tactic would be to abandon the goal of creating an all-Albanian nation and for Austro-Hungarian consular representatives to concentrate on strengthening good and lasting relations with influential Albanians. It is precisely through these relations that Albanians should be convinced that Austria-Hungary is great and powerful, that it is Albania's strongest neighbor, that the future of that country is important to it, and that it wishes prosperity for Albania. This strategy seems to him the most suitable, considering the circumstances and the rivals, namely, the attitude of Albanians toward Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Greece. He thinks that of

these three countries, Albanian Muslims will choose Austria-Hungary as their protector power. Power and wealth are what impress Albanians the most, and therefore, according to Petrovic, Austria-Hungary has an advantage over Italy. Another favorable factor is the order in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian administration.
At the end of January of the same year (1899), based on the report of vice consul Winter, Vienna has the following information about relations in the Durrës district:
When it comes to the beys from Tirana, the vice consul reports that, with rare exceptions, they are focused on their personal interests, but also, on the other hand, they are incredibly afraid of the authorities.
The indicator that this is true, in his opinion, is the subtle comment once made by the then governor: "The beys from Tirana live in more or less modest economic conditions, although they are extremely greedy. If the (Ottoman) government were to offer each of them a position that allows for a sufficiently large income, the rumors that circulate would suddenly cease and the problem with the beys would be solved for us."
According to Winter, the governor in Tirana actually perfectly summarizes the key to the whole issue in broad strokes. Perhaps a rare individual among the beys would not be so easily bribed, but there is no doubt that the vast majority of them would indeed accept some sort of arrangement.
As the Austro-Hungarian representative points out, another detail indicating that the aforementioned prominent figures are not independent and do not have complete freedom of decision is that none of them dare to visit him, although most have passed through Durrës once or more or have, due to business matters, stayed for some time in that city when returning from Tirana. Neither the influential people from Shkodër, nor those from Prizren, nor even those from Vlorë have shown such clear fear of the Ottoman government.
Within the most influential families of the TopTani lineage, relations are very bad. The opposing clans need to be reconciled, but this seems unlikely, as the gap between them is too deep. Therefore, the vice-consul believes that the TopTani lineage will probably not have political significance in Albania for quite some time.
Finally, regarding the overall population of the Durrës Sanjak, Winter believes he can partially explain the reason for their scant involvement in national debates. Namely, the people of Durrës are surrounded on all sides by compatriots, so they feel safe in their homes, while Albanians from the north fear neighboring foreign peoples. The inhabitants of the border districts of Albania are the natural initiators of the struggle for national autonomy, while those from central Albania only have indirect knowledge of the topic, through pioneers from the north; furthermore, the lack of solidarity prevailing among the people contributes to the inhabitants of central Albania remaining inactive.
However, judging by the behavior of the inhabitants of central Albania, Winter takes into account one additional circumstance, which he emphasizes should not be neglected. Since they enjoy greater peace than Albanians from the border and, as already mentioned, feel more or less secure in their own homes, they maintain a closer, more friendly relationship with the government and the governors of that area than their northern brothers. The Albanians from the north, on several occasions, have suspected that the Ottoman authorities would hand them over to their neighbors.
Winter reports that in recent weeks, security measures have been intensified in the limited area separating them from the Sultan, which is undoubtedly a consequence of

Prince George's visit to Crete. Hence, the vice-consul is convinced that the Albanian chiefs who support the patriotic movement in that area are, at the moment, inclined to avoid the Albanian question, which turns out to be a favorable circumstance considering the general situation in the country.

In the summer of that same year, Vice-Consul Winter travels to Tirana. He prepared his journey well. The governor from Shkodër was at that time staying in Durrës for a routine inspection of the region, which the vice-consul used to establish a friendly relationship with the high representative of the Ottoman authorities, with whom he was also to spend some time in Tirana. The Turkish governor finds the Austrian vice-consul a house to stay in Tirana, so Winter travels there on May 19.

The role of the governor's friend enabled the vice-consul to ensure that the population did not feel fear, but rather showed him a friendly disposition. This time, he was visited by beys who the previous year had not dared to return his visits.

The Austro-Hungarian consul has the same goal as the governor himself: to win over the beys. The governor wants to win them over for the government from Constantinople, and the vice-consul for the political goals of Vienna.

The governor has instructions to end the blood feud that was ravaging the area at that time, caused by members of the two most significant bey families. Although he was not successful in that endeavor, there were other tasks he had to address. One of them was to improve education, which meant opening new schools, naturally Turkish ones. However, the population rejected this initiative, since they were supposed to cover the school expenses, but did not have the necessary means. Nevertheless, the Ottoman government opened one school in Tirana. The governor also tries to improve communications, if it is appropriate to say he tries to improve something that does not exist, and therefore undertakes the opening of a road from Durrës to Tirana and to Kavajë.

Vice Consul Winter closely follows the mood of the people and the beys, trying to determine who the informal leaders among the Albanians are, which individuals possess real power, what their attitudes are, and how relationships function; in other words, he seeks to gain insight into how Albanian society is organized, since it is a closed world, completely different from the Viennese offices and everything the vice consul had seen or known until then. He confirms his previous predictions that the TopTani family is the most important and that its members must be won over in order to finally achieve something. He also notes that the beys have a good relationship with the governor, while the people behave differently, as they are dissatisfied due to serious abuses by the administration.

He manages to establish contacts with some members of the TopTani family and realizes that they show sympathy for the Young Turk party, are patriots, but have no political program, nor do they know what they want, but only clearly show what they oppose.

The population is also very dissatisfied with the Albanian beys themselves, who seriously abuse their power. At that moment, unrest is successfully avoided only due to fear of repression by the Ottoman government. Albanians in Tirana live in extreme poverty, while the Turkish government does nothing to help them. All this indicates that their future is very bleak and sad.

Another problem is the immorality of the Albanians, which, according to the vice consul, results in the entire population being considered infected.
Winter observes four different groups among the Albanian population: the beys, the aghas, the people, and representatives of the central government.
He also tries to establish good contacts with the aghas and records information about those who have patriotic inclinations.
Regarding the opinion prevailing in Tirana about Austria-Hungary, the vice consul notes that no one considers the Monarchy a force that could help them. Although they praise the Austrian administration in Bosnia and its successes, they do not express the slightest desire to be under its rule themselves.
Finally, Winter concludes that Austria-Hungary, without the help of the Ottoman government, will not be able to win over the Albanians from central Albania to participate in its political program in the near future.
Nevertheless, circumstances and social relations are changing, and thus the attitudes of Vice Consul Dr. Remy von Kwiatkowski, in his report from 1900, are more optimistic regarding Vienna's political goals. Kwiatkowski stayed in Tirana from June 2 to August 10, 1900. It seems that in the meantime, the Turkish authorities had already become accustomed to Austrian consuls spending several months in Tirana during the summer, and this no longer arouses suspicion.
However, according to Kwiatkowski's observations, the problem is the Greeks, who agitate the local population and authorities, insisting that the goal of the Austrian consuls' stay in Tirana is to establish a pro-Austrian party in the area. Part of the Ottoman administration ignores Greek accusations, but another part attaches great importance to them.
The vice consul first makes an effort to win over high representatives of the central administration so that the Albanian beys would not be afraid to contact him. This tactic yields good results, as the Ottoman representatives are very corrupt and can easily be won over with flattery and gifts.
Two years after Winter's stay in Tirana, there is a noticeable change in the attitude of the authorities, as well as part of the population, towards the Austrian vice consul. Namely, they no longer fear him, they visit him—as he does them—and he is in contact with almost all the most influential personalities. Thus, Kwiatkowski goes for walks, but not alone as before, always accompanied by representatives of the central government, under the pretext of caring for his personal safety, while in reality, they strive to follow him closely. From that moment, this diplomat believes that every Austrian representative in the area has an open path.
Kwiatkowski clearly distinguishes supporters of the government from those who are not, but does not show differences in behavior towards representatives of these two groups so that no one could guess his political preferences. This conduct brings him good results, and little by little, he wins everyone over to his side.
For the first time in 1900, one of the Albanian beys dares to invite the Austrian vice consul to his house, without the presence of Ottoman authorities at the visit, which means that the pattern of their previous connections is changing, which had implied a dose of fear and caution.
Regarding the political attitudes of the Albanian population, Kwiatkowski notes a great improvement from Vienna's point of view. On one hand, the conviction that the Ottoman

government is weak is growing, and on the other, national consciousness is strengthening. This picture is surprising, especially when compared to the situation just two, or even only one year earlier, when the population was extremely loyal to the government and the sultan.

Kwiatkowski says in his report that he has already gained some trusted individuals, who, thanks to their prestige and influence, help to root and develop the sense of national belonging among the Albanians.

During each visit to one of the Albanian beys, he pays a lot of attention to the psychological profile of his interlocutor, so that he can later develop a strategy for each of them and gain insight into whom and to what extent he can count on in the future.

He is struck by the fact that the children of Albanians who declare themselves supporters of the Ottoman government show signs of interest in the Albanian language, which means that in the future, they too can be counted on.

Interest in the language is clearly evident through the increase in the number of students at the Catholic school, which is above all dedicated to teaching the Albanian language. Kwiatkowski notes that before he began his travels, there were only four to six students at that school, and at the time he was writing his report, there were fourteen, nine of whom were Muslims. Also, there are Albanians who take private Albanian language lessons from the Catholic school's professors because they are afraid to publicly and openly show that they are learning the language. Likewise, there is great interest in copies of the alphabet published in Sofia and Bucharest, and there is still a shortage of them.

To better understand why this progress in the development of national feelings among Muslim Albanians from the Tirana region is happening, it should be viewed in a social and political context. The vice-consul explains how the authorities, through excessively high taxes, keep the population in a state of deep ignorance and poverty. To this can be added the obligation to provide soldiers for the Ottoman army, which takes away the little fresh, young strength among the Albanian population. At the time the vice-consul was writing his report, the local authorities could rely only on the support of the most corrupt parts of the population.

Whenever an initiative was undertaken to build schools or roads, the local population bore the burden, but these works were never successfully completed. Thus, for example, in the entire vilayet at that time, there was not a single road passable in winter; the Durrës-Tirana road was only traced, but never actually built. Attention has always been drawn to the complete lack of initiative to improve agriculture, which is very backward. Likewise, there is not even the most basic security for people's lives or their property. On the contrary, bandit activities are on the rise, even in the towns themselves. Even the gendarmerie is powerless against them, and at the time Kwiatkowski was writing his report, they had not received their salaries for twelve or fourteen months.

In such a situation, the population looks abroad and places all its hopes for improvement there. Among the powers towards which the most sympathy is felt are, first and foremost, Austria-Hungary, and then England. However, all hopes for real help and intervention on their behalf before the Turkish government are placed in Austria-Hungary. The fact that various nationalities live side by side within the Dual Monarchy is seen as a guarantee that the Monarchy will protect their identity as well.

Most beys are materially ruined. They use any means to maintain at least their power. Although they own vast lands, the only thing they grow is corn, which brings them very little income. Of all the beys, only six earn a good living, while all the others barely survive and engage in various speculations. The agas are generally in a better economic situation and often oppose the beys. However, only two are truly honest and therefore enjoy great respect among the suffering population, as well as before representatives of the Constantinople government.

The Ottoman government tries to win the support of the beys so that Austrian influence does not take root too deeply, but it fails in this, which causes a loss of prestige. In fact, no one can influence the beys, not even the representative of the Muslim religion.

Another characteristic of this region, according to the consul, is that in Tirana and its surroundings, one cannot talk about administration or jurisprudence, since the beys either completely block any attempt to discuss these issues, or they themselves, at their own discretion, make important decisions in these domains. For their part, the gendarmes introduce "private" justice, in exchange for compensation in gold coins. The vice-consul succinctly concludes: "that immeasurable harm can be done to those who try to seek justice."

The only preoccupation of the administration is how to collect the maximum amount of taxes. Since the regions of Durrës, Kavaja, Shijak, and Tirana finance the Shkodra vilayet, the financial authorities apply drastic measures of extortion and corruption to satisfy the urgent economic demands of the governor from Shkodra.

They do not hesitate even when it comes to causing trouble for their own soldiers and gendarmes. For example, the mutasarrif of Durrës sent a hundred soldiers who had returned home after mandatory military service to prison, on the pretext that they were not paying their taxes. It is likely that this is not true, considering that they pay taxes through special coupons, which they receive from the central authorities and use as a means of payment with the local government. In response to this action by the mutasarrif, another two hundred soldiers gathered in front of the local government building, as well as the post office, until a document issued by the sultan arrived from Constantinople, confirming the value of the coupons as a legal and satisfactory means of paying taxes.

Since this method of action, with the help of pressure and rebellion, proves successful, the gendarmes undertake a similar action and stop performing their duties until at least part of their overdue salaries is paid.

Kwiatkowski, in his report, predicts that similar situations will repeat in the future, since the system of rebellion has proven to work well.

However, in such circumstances, so as not to appear in a bad light before the government in Constantinople, its representatives in Tirana spread rumors that Kwiatkowski is responsible for the aforementioned disturbances. The reason for these accusations was found in the threat of the protest participants that they would turn to the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul if the Turkish government did not meet their demands. Kvjatkovski goes to speak with the head of the local government, the governor, explaining to him how inconceivable it is that an Austro-Hungarian representative should be talking with discontented Ottoman subjects. The vice-consul successfully resolves that case and finally gains the governor’s trust, which later proves very useful for his activity among the local Albanian population.

Kvjatkovski concludes that everything that happened was favorable for the future of Austro-Hungarian action in Albania. Since Tirana had always been very loyal to the Sultan's government, the protests and disturbances that occurred during his stay point to an important change in attitudes. The vice-consul explains that there is some latent dissatisfaction, but despite the objectively difficult situation for the inhabitants, the local authorities still refuse to implement the promised reforms222.

On the other hand, even the supporters of the central government no longer expect anything good from it, and there are fewer of them every day.

According to Kvjatkovski's observations, a new idea is beginning to gain ground among the Albanians: positive change and help can come only from outside, and exclusively from Austro-Hungary. This view is spread by the vice-consul's friends, but even they are not quite clear in what way that improvement will be achieved. Some say that this will

222 This refers to the reformist action that the authorities envisaged after the Bulgarian uprisings in Macedonia, after which there followed a massacre and the complete destruction of most of the Bulgarian population in Macedonia, carried out by the official Ottoman army with volunteer units. Namely, as early as 1900 the activity of armed groups of Bulgarians in that area intensified, which worried the authorities, as they no longer wished to deal with the Eastern Question. However, the situation worsened and in 1902 a mass uprising of Bulgarians in Macedonia began—of that part of the population that had survived the genocide of 1878. The result, as in the case of the chronic genocides carried out against the Armenians in the Asian vilayets of the Ottoman Empire, was mass slaughter, complete destruction, expulsion. With this tragic development, the "Bulgarian question" was temporarily frozen, until the Balkan Wars and the two world wars.

happen through the attainment of independence, while others think they will not be able to maintain an independent administration at least for the next few years. In any case, they are of one mind that the only course of action by which something can be achieved is to intimidate the Sultan. Friends of Vienna believe that Austro-Hungary would intervene only if the population had first risen in revolt, but under the given circumstances such an initiative seems unlikely to them. Therefore they are convinced that at that moment it is most appropriate among the population to develop the idea of a possibly better future. In that sense, it is very important to encourage people to learn the Albanian language, as well as to awaken and strengthen their national feelings. Only when those feelings take deep root will it be possible to think about undertaking decisive steps.

According to Kvjatkovski, his friends are completely right. He reports that some of them are considering traveling to other regions in order to exchange views and ideas, thereby preparing the ground for future activities. Others will set out on trips to Catholic districts, with the aim of avoiding possible conflicts between Albanian Muslims and Catholics. This significant change is owed to Vienna's support for the development of the Albanian language. Therefore the beys express their deep gratitude to Vienna and expect further assistance. They are ready to become part of the Habsburg Empire, but are concerned about problems in the interior. The vice-consul writes that it would not surprise him if they soon asked him for more concrete and more resolute help for the opening of Albanian schools.

Vienna is satisfied with the new development of relations in the Durrës region and asks the vice-consul to keep it fully informed about prominent Albanians who harbor sympathies for the patriotic movement in the district under his jurisdiction223. Kvjatkovski is preparing a report,224 in which, in a table with two columns, he provides information on seven persons: in the first column the name is recorded, and in the second, biographical data and other important facts about influential personalities among the Albanians, as well as the psychological profile of each of them. They all belong to the Toptani family.

223 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 24, Albanien Liasse XV, Erlass Nr. 338, Wien, am 23. November 1900. The same order, but under number 340, was sent at that time to the still-serving vice-consul Kral, in Monastir. Kral replies with report no. 73 of 10 December 1900 (HHStA, PA XIV, K.24, Bericht Nr. 73, 2 Beilage, Monastir, am 10. Dezember 1900, Viceconsul Kral an Goluchowski), which has two annexes and was also sent to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople. Kral's report, like that of Kvjatkovski, contains only a few names of the most important Albanian patriots from that vilayet who, thanks to their social position, prestige, wealth, or their activities, can more or less favorably influence the national movement. Annex I, according to Kral himself, contains names arranged by zones, with the left page intended for prominent

The following year, 1901, Vice-Consul Kwiatkowski returned to Tirana and stayed there from June 6 to August 11. In the meantime, the situation in the city had significantly deteriorated. Sympathizers of Vienna were deeply fearful due to the mass imprisonment of Albanians suspected of disloyalty to the Sultan and the government, i.e., of acting against Turkish rule. Some of Kwiatkowski's friends were already in exile. Although the governor allowed the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul to stay in the house of one of his Albanian friends, the fear among all others was very strong and noticeable. Many good acquaintances and trusted individuals, who had communicated with him without hesitation the previous year, now warned him that they could not visit him.

Such circumstances forced Kwiatkowski, contrary to local customs, to be the first to pay visits, not wanting to remain completely isolated and without engagement.

Despite the loss of social contacts and influence, Kwiatkowski noticed that national feelings among Albanians were strengthening. Gradually, through appropriate advice, with much tact and patience, Kwiatkowski succeeded in increasing the number of supporters of the national idea, despite the difficult times they were experiencing.

The number of students in the Catholic school had significantly decreased, among other reasons, because representatives of the Muslim faith did not look favorably upon attendance there. However, more people were learning the Albanian language: about 25 individuals took private lessons to learn to read and write in Albanian. During the vice-consul's stay in Tirana, 300 copies of the alphabet were distributed, as well as editions of Naim Bey with nationalist content, and the magazine Albania was already being read in the city.

A small circle of Albanian patriots was collecting funds, which they then sent abroad for the publication of books and magazines in Albanian. Kwiatkowski believed that, if more such groups could be formed, even if they were small in number, the network of collaborators could expand to the entire region designated by Vienna as its field of activity.

Apart from the increased interest in their language, the beys, unlike the previous year, were ready to take more decisive steps towards achieving the goal of Albanian independence. They felt that things were progressing too slowly and wanted to initiate action. They believed that if they did nothing, Austria-Hungary, no matter how much it wanted to help, would not be able to make any progress and they would never achieve state autonomy. They did not expect the Sultan to grant them autonomy, nor schools, nor to help them improve their situation. They considered that the opportune moment to begin action would be when the Porte was occupied with other urgent matters, but such conditions had not yet arisen. Some of the beys wanted to travel to the region of Albanian Catholic highlanders and prepare them for rebellion, so that together with the Albanians from Tirana they could rise up. The rest they left to Vienna, expecting help from the Austro-Hungarian authorities with full confidence.

Such plans greatly troubled Kwiatkowski. In conversations with the beys, he insisted that they take no action, assuring them that contact between different tribes was insufficient and that an Albanian uprising was not yet a sufficient motive for intervention by the great powers. He pointed out that they should focus on educating the population, strengthening the national idea, and spreading the alphabet, both in schools in the cities and throughout the countryside.

These incentives from Kwiatkowski yielded the desired results, so that one of the beys, a friend of the vice-consul, after learning the alphabet, began teaching the peasants working on his land to read in Albanian. Another bey, who owned three schools, allowed Albanian to be taught unofficially in one of them, but without textbooks. A third bey, owner of a vast estate stretching all the way to Kruja, popularized the alphabet in such a way that soon, according to Kwiatkowski's assessment, the region from Tirana to Kruja could be joined to the area where interest in the Albanian language prevailed. Kwiatkowski was impressed by the bey's behavior and selfless commitment, as well as his willingness to make sacrifices, but was also a bit troubled by his impatience to achieve great results.

Despite the worsening of their economic situation, the beys did not complain to the vice-consul. On the other hand, their vast estates provided them with fewer and fewer resources due to the very unfavorable state of the economy in that part of the Ottoman Empire. The beys suffered due to speculation regarding tax collection and because of violence, which was becoming increasingly intense every day. They had withdrawn from their lands and only went to Tirana when there was a specific reason. They still had influence in the province, but in the city that influence was waning, due to the distrust of the local government and corruption in the administrative system.

Although national consciousness was growing among the Albanian people, the city and administration remained loyal to the Sultan and the authorities. The vice-consul noted that no Albanian of patriotic or pro-Austrian orientation in Tirana or its surroundings could play an important role in realizing Vienna's plans.

The only Albanian bey who has a solid position and can influence the others is, however, a great friend of Greece. The others are indecisive or are guided solely by material interest, so Kvjatkovski concludes that they cannot be relied upon in any way.

The central government, for its part, has increased its level of caution. All Albanians who are vice-consul's associates and supporters of the national idea are under strict surveillance. The governor himself, who two years earlier had shown sympathy for the

national idea, in a direct conversation with some of the vice-consul's friends, forbade them, for their own good, from dealing with Albanian issues in the future. Kvjatkovski is quite clear that among his most trusted friends there is actually an informant who leaks information to the opposing side, thanks to which representatives of the central government are fully up to date with all the details. He also notes that recently administrative affairs have been handled by distinctly corrupt and poorly educated people, who are moreover loyal to the Turkish government.

The vice-consul very carefully monitors the psychological profile of each of the key members of the administration, in order to determine on whom and to what extent he can rely, and who might eventually turn out to be an opponent of his plans. When it comes to Austro-Hungarian activities, a fortunate circumstance is that one of the highest representatives of the central government in Tirana is a supporter of the teaching and spread of the Albanian alphabet, which means that work will be done on this in the near future. However, Kvjatkovski fears that precisely for this reason, as well as because he openly shows his sympathies for Albanian issues, the aforementioned high Ottoman official might be removed from his position, which would harm all of Vienna's activities.

It seems that 90% of the population, together with the official representative of Islam, is against the Sultan's government, due to poor administration and corruption throughout the district, and they openly express their dissatisfaction. Kvjatkovski notes that the hodjas – priests responsible for Muslim education in Turkish schools – have warned several times during that year (1901) that they will no longer teach unless they are paid the salaries owed to them for the last 20 months, in addition to two years. And indeed, these threats are being realized, so the hodjas close the school and hand over the key to the deputy governor – the head of the local government, who, only after long conversations, persuades them to return to teaching.

In a similar way, officers of the central army also threaten. Although the discontent is widespread, national consciousness among the people remains deeply dormant. Albanians do not even consider what they could do or what changes they could demand – no one sees the possibility of acting on their own behalf, nor do they believe in their own strength. The increase in dissatisfaction makes them somewhat more confident compared to previous years. In such circumstances, the idea that only Austria-Hungary can help them spreads easily and quickly among Albanians.

Soldiers who rebelled the previous year threaten to do so again, and this time to side with the Austro-Hungarian representative, which has led to several arrests that contribute to the rise of general discontent.

Bandits, violence, and the lack of any security for life and property represent a constant danger. Another serious problem that no one, not even the central government, can cope with is blood feuds. Representatives of the central government allow those seeking revenge to behave as they wish and not be held accountable for their actions, i.e., no one prosecutes them criminally, nor threatens them. On the other hand, however, even the slightest suspicion of political activity is enough to send someone to prison and into exile, so even talking about politics causes great fear among the population.

All hopes are pinned on Austria-Hungary, to such an extent that the idea of possible help from Italy does not even cross their minds. It can be concluded that the population in the interior of Albania, including Elbasan, is already indifferent to Italian ambitions. At

best, they feel a certain curiosity about Italian policy towards them, but they do not attach much importance to it. There is speculation that Montenegro may be influencing Rome due to newly established marital ties between the two ruling families.
According to the feudal structure of Albanian tribal society, the beys are the only ones who have the right to their own opinions, and they think that in Italy, as an ethnically homogeneous country, Albanians, if they were to join it, would be assimilated and disappear as an ethnic group. From their perspective, the sudden Italian interest in the Albanian question is driven by self-interest and aims at other goals.
However, the interest of Austria-Hungary in the Albanians seems acceptable to the beys because the internal structure of the Monarchy allows for the coexistence of different ethnic groups. At the same time, the Habsburg state is strong and can help them economically, while Italy, no matter how much it wants to, cannot provide such support, as it is unable to support even its own inhabitants.
In conclusion, Kvjatkovski insists on the claim that Italy no longer enjoys any sympathy among the unofficial leaders of the Albanian population from the Tirana region, and all hopes are pinned on Austria-Hungary. However, even the beys expect more initiatives from the Monarchy, especially for the Muslim population from the central Albanian region. Their comments about the extensive funding of the Catholic clergy, which ultimately does nothing significant for the unification of Albanians, as well as about the relative neglect of the Catholic tribes and Muslims from the central part of the country, the vice-consul understands as criticisms of Austria-Hungary's behavior, which are not without foundation.
The following year, 1902, the situation in Tirana was even more tense compared to previous years. The vice-consul had trouble renting a house near the homes of those beys whom he most often wished to visit, and he believed that these problems were caused by his opponents.
He managed to partially overcome these difficulties and eventually settled in a house that was not as convenient for connecting with the local Albanians as he would have liked. Also, because of these problems, he had to postpone his arrival in Tirana, so his stay in the city lasted from July 9 to September 8.
There were significant changes in the local government in Tirana, and new influential representatives of the Ottoman authorities were appointed to the most important positions. In this way, the message from Constantinople became clear: more than anywhere else, the new measures would be implemented in Tirana. The response to this was that the beys finally concluded some sort of league with the mountain population in the spring, which made them feel stronger in anticipation of difficult times ahead.
The new governor of Tirana had a mission to strengthen the position of the government from Constantinople, which was destabilized by the dissatisfaction of the Albanians due to poor administration, as well as by the nationalist idea that was gaining more and more supporters.
On the other hand, an important step for strengthening the "nationalist party" was the accession of another member of the Top-Tani family, who was also the richest bey and enjoyed the greatest respect among all members of the lineage, and thus prestige in the region. This fact was a great achievement for Kwiatkowski, since Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, as previously mentioned, had pointed out the influence of the Top-Tani

family even before the vice-consul began his summer stays in Tirana, and moreover—the very reason for those stays was to establish contact with members of this family. The center of power was not in the government building, but in the person of one of the beys, since his extensive private contacts and personal prestige replaced the government's failed administrative and legal systems. During his stay in Tirana, Kwiatkowski managed to befriend this person, who at that time was also the leader of the Albanian party.

The mentioned leader of the Albanian group was very active and worked tirelessly to attract new members. However, his economic situation was not enviable, which is why the vice-consul feared that he might accept help even if it came from the wrong side.

However, the decisive step for the development of the national idea was taken when Muslim leaders were won over to that goal, since the most fanatical population is precisely in Tirana and its surroundings.
Certain merchants among the aghas, despite frequent clashes with the beys, are also gradually joining the nationalist group. A clear example of their support and commitment was given by one of the wealthiest aghas, by bequeathing a considerable sum of money for the Albanian cause.
Everyone's eyes are fixed on the school in Tirana where Albanian is taught. At that moment, among its pupils there are 11 Muslims, 3 Orthodox, and 3 Catholics. Because of various obstacles that the authorities place before the Muslim inhabitants, the number of pupils is not growing. The vice-consul thinks that this number would be much higher were it not for the aforementioned restrictions. Given the attitude of the local government toward the school at the present moment, Kwiatkowski fears that, unless Catholic pupils bolster it, it will be empty by the end of next year.
The beys continue to harbor strong sympathies for Austria-Hungary, from which they expect the main assistance in attaining their state independence. It was not easy for the vice-consul to persuade them to abandon premature and ill-conceived initiatives, and thus he cannot prevent them from expecting stronger support than they currently have in order to obtain from the government in Constantinople permission to open additional Albanian schools. Kwiatkowski notes that, compared with the previous year, the dissatisfaction of the beys caused by the slow development of the Albanian question is now much more pronounced. He also observes that they do not at all like having to link their independence with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire or, at least, that this independence must be postponed to an indefinite, unknown time. If, for the moment, the prevailing belief is that they do not have enough strength to achieve their aims, it is also true that their characteristic rebellious spirit is being stirred, strengthened by the thought that prolonging the present situation will inevitably bring about an economic collapse.
Italy in this region, in Kwiatkowski's assessment, is no longer a rival of Austria-Hungary. It can no longer set in motion the active energy of the Albanian population, since the Monarchy already does that. What Italy is undertaking under the given circumstances: opening consulates, post offices, schools - Austria-Hungary had already done earlier. The population does not harbor sympathies toward Italy, but only curiosity because of its attitude toward the Ottoman Empire.
209
Kwiatkowski's relations with the beys are constantly deepening and, over time, becoming ever closer. Confidence in him has also grown markedly—not only in the vice-consul, but in his wife and sister-in-law as well, who maintain very good relations with the women of the beys' harems. Furthermore, adhering to an old Albanian custom, Kwiatkowski allows one of his friends among the beys to cut his son's hair personally, which marks the beginning of kinship ties between the Kwiatkowski family and the family of the bey in question. This episode leaves a very good impression on all the beys, who sincerely believe in the vice-consul's friendship and feel honored by the fact that he considers them his equals. Hence the relations between them become even firmer than before.
What is the situation on the opposite side, in the so-called "government party"? According to the information Kwiatkowski gathered on the spot, the government's

supporters, although dissatisfied with the central administration, remain on its side. They do not do so because they support the Ottoman Empire as such, but because they are guided primarily by personal gain and influence, and they see supporting the government as a way to obtain them. Although they are not definitively against the Albanian question, they operate through anonymous denunciations, which induce fear and paralyze the population. It is natural that they should have adherents under such conditions.

The consequence of such a state of affairs is a drastic deterioration in relations between the pro-government and pro-Albanian beys, even though there is no personal jealousy among them. The pro-government beys have not shown sympathy for any foreign power, but to some extent they have found support in Italy, primarily to oppose the pro-Albanian beys, who were everywhere known as Austrophiles.

During Kwiatkowski's stay in Tirana, all three governors received the task of attending to Albanian questions. Since it was precisely at that time that they received their assignments, the vice-consul does not know what action they intend to take, but he notes that the entire administration is at the moment motionless. In any case, it is clear to everyone that the government is focusing its attention on the beys and either manages to win them over to its side with praise and gifts, or, failing that, sends them to prison and into exile. Up to the moment when Kwiatkowski drafted his report, no action had been taken against the pro-Albanian beys of Tirana, and as a possible reason for this the vice-consul

cites their strong ties with the Malissori from the mountains, who are merely looking for a pretext for rebellion. The population of Tirana also seeks conflict, since it cannot pay the taxes that have piled up. The government's problem is that it is too passive, has no clear idea, and thus remains without a plan of action. The highest representatives of the central authority themselves fail to reach agreement on how to proceed, because their personalities are completely different, and thus they cannot view the problem in the same way or act in unison toward its resolution.

In such circumstances, the vice-consul fears that acts of violence cannot be avoided, despite the fact that the beys themselves are trying to remain as reasonable as possible. The government, however, has adopted a draconian measure in order to keep the population in a state of constant fear. They have opened mobile gendarmerie posts, where they appointed the worst criminals as gendarmes, and paid their wages only after they had collected taxes from the population.

No foreigner visits the Malesia region, except the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul. This region lies west of the Dajti mountain range, bounded on the south and east by the rivers Arzen and Maće, and on the north by the river Terkar. The area is divided into two mountainous parts—Bena in the west, and Tamale in the east—which comprises about 23 villages, many of which have 1,000 to 3,000 inhabitants. According to Kvyatkovsky's data, of the total population approximately 10,000 are Serbs, although it is thought there are 15,000.

As for administration, most of Bena belongs to the province of Matija, more precisely to the Chelja clan. The new administrative division aimed to weaken this clan, but it established a new administrative structure called Malesia of Tirana.

The population very rarely pays levies, and only when the beys from Tirana demand it. Nor do they provide soldiers. When a problem arises, it is resolved according to clan customs. It is customary for the elders of the clan to make decisions, and if they cannot agree, they ask the beys from Tirana for advice. Neither side, neither the eastern nor the western, has a common organization. However, as the vice-consul reports, the representatives of these two regions last year signed among themselves, as well as with the beys from Tirana, the creation of an alliance for joint defense against the authorities. Only the beys from Tirana—and, more precisely, Kvyatkovsky's friends—can influence this population.

211

The government has completely neglected this region, and there are no conditions either for the development of agriculture or for engaging in trade. The economic situation is very difficult. The inhabitants earn a living by herding, and in winter many of them go abroad to survive. There is no form of communication whatsoever.

This area has remained completely unexplored, unknown, and the vice-consul believes that it might be useful to visit and become acquainted with it.

In the interior, Italian propaganda is still imperceptible, but if it were to receive financial support, Kvyatkovsky fears that it would yield positive results for that country. His Italian colleague intended to spend some time in the interior, but changed his mind due to the poor reception by Albanian nationalists and Kvyatkovsky's friends, as well as the tense relations he had with the Ottoman authorities.

The Orthodox in Tirana are of Vlach origin and hold pro-Albanian sentiments. There are only five Catholic families. He notes that the Catholic population in that area could be strengthened by relocating there part of the impoverished population, members of the Malisori. In that way the Catholic school would also be strengthened, but such initiatives would require material resources.

The town and district of Kavaja are, in the vice-consul's opinion, completely indifferent to the Albanian question. About 22,000 people live there. The situation is such because the two sons of the heir from that area show no interest in the Albanian question. They are sympathetic to Austria-Hungary, because Emperor Maximilian Habsburg had a hunting ground in that area and gave it to their father. Kvyatkovsky reports that during the four years since he has been vice-consul, he has not ceased to cultivate good relations with both brothers.

The previous year he accepted an invitation and spent a day in their house in Kavaja. But the local representative of the central authorities accused his host of a political conspiracy and was ready to send gendarmes and soldiers to arrest him, as a result of which the latter had to flee to the mountains, where he hid for three months. Only then did the local authorities realize that they would turn him into their enemy, and he was one of the few beys who did not engage in politics. So they pardoned him, as well as his brother, who had already been sentenced to three years in prison. Despite all that, his standing is growing

212

among the population, and because he often behaves violently and is in conflict with the authorities, he is beginning to be credited with the character of a man fighting for Albanian independence. On the other hand, the prestige of the representative of the local authorities who tried to undermine his authority suffered irreparable damage.

According to Kvyatkovsky's report, the situation in Tirana in 1903, compared with the previous year, deteriorated. From the very beginning of the year, people all over the city talk about "reforms," while no one knows exactly what this word should mean in practice: whether the political and economic situation will improve, whether circumstances will remain as before, or whether they will worsen.
The Muslim population is very tense—both because of events in Old Serbia and because of the danger of war, due to the constant deterioration of the situation in Macedonia.
The lack of security felt by the population is also due to the economic exhaustion of the country, caused by the taxes imposed by the government.
Instead of taking advantage of this difficult moment for the Porte and uniting, the leading Albanian figures, according to Kvyatkovsky, put first a harmful political reasoning, characteristic of the Albanian mentality and caused by envy and disunity.
Thus it happened that, for economic reasons, in Tirana a group of patriotically minded beys split. The same is happening in Elbasan. At the same time, the beys from these two cities are in conflict with one another. The authorities in Constantinople are very close to completely destroying the party of pro-Albanian beys, summoning some of them to the capital and offering them high positions. In that sense, Constantinople is using the greed and gullibility of local high representatives to destroy the party.
The patriotically minded population, in Kwiatkowski's assessment, is very tense and has lost all hope. This is also contributed to by the harsh measures of the government of the Kosovo Vilayet, whose representatives, under the pretext of eliminating individuals who oppose the reforms, are in fact eliminating Albanians who desire independence.
On the other hand, the beys do not understand why Austria-Hungary, regarding this question, is on Russia's side, since the goal of the reforms is to strengthen central authority, and that is harmful to present and future supporters
228 PA XIV, K. 24, Liasse XV, Bericht Nr. 28, Durazzo den 19. Dezember 1903, Kwiatkowski an Goluchowski.
213
of the Albanian national question. Therefore they accuse the Monarchy of having united with Russia, demanding strict measures against Albanian criminal groups, which had in fact fought against the Greeks. The vice-consul notes that in such circumstances it is very difficult to separate patriots from criminals.
The Albanians have suddenly become fearful. In Tirana they fear that the strengthening of central authority may have a long-term negative impact on them and on the Albanians of Shkodër, Debar, Mat, and that the mountain clans will experience the same fate as the Albanians from Kosovo: exile. They ask whether anyone will help them if the Turks carry out a mass expulsion of Albanians. Although Russia has in principle declared itself against the Bulgarian insurgents in Macedonia, it nevertheless enabled some of them to receive amnesty and managed to mitigate some sentences.
The Albanians' fear is that even the Turkish government will not recognize them as a separate nation, which would result in their being left without support and assistance on all sides. All other Balkan peoples enjoy at least recognition of their nations.
However, what makes a particular impression on the patriots are the events in Macedonia. They expect that, if there is a change in the statute of Macedonia, it will also be possible to secure a statute for Albania. Kwiatkowski notes that the beys, and even a

part of the Turkish administration, show sympathies toward the Bulgarian insurgents, since, based on their own experience, they know the inconsistency of the Turkish system. Although resolved, should it come to that, to fight against Bulgarian or Serbian aspirations to expand toward the sea, they do not conceal the respect they feel for the former because of their courage, resistance, and readiness to sacrifice.
According to the vice-consul, if the Constantinople authorities, despite the existing opposing feelings, ultimately win greater favor among the Albanians, the reason will be religious fanaticism, which they resort to at critical moments, but through which some mountain tribes justify above all their desire for plunder.
Kwiatkowski is convinced that, in the event of war with Bulgaria, the authorities can fully count on the Albanians. He notes that he obtained this information firsthand, from reliable sources.
During the last days of the vice-consul's stay in Tirana, the beys often discuss which of the Great Powers would act in favor of creating an independent, united Albania, in case

the resolution of the Macedonian question should necessarily require its intervention. After this discussion, Kwiatkowski is left with the impression that the beys still doubt that Austria-Hungary would support such a project with anything other than good advice.
As a recapitulation, in 1907 the Austro-Hungarian representative prepares a comprehensive report on his impressions and conclusions that he acquired during three summers spent in Tirana and during which he was able to establish contact with numerous notable personages from that place and to get to know many of them more closely.
In his opinion, since Tirana is one of the national and political centers of Albania, it is interesting to give a brief account of the conditions in which its inhabitants live and to characterize the personalities who determine the way of life and rules of conduct in this city. The inner and northern part of Albania very well represent a general regularity, namely, that every individual part of a geographically isolated country represents a closed territory, with particular interests, different outlooks on the world, and specific customs. The inhabitants of such different regions in most cases feel very different from all others, have rather scant relations with their compatriots, and know very little about the way of life in the areas with which they border. On that basis one gets the impression that the particularism which the Albanians cultivate within their internal law is still (in 1907) just as strong as it has been throughout the entire history of Albania.
Tirana and its immediate surroundings, in that sense, represent an area closed in on itself, which can be geographically determined with almost millimetric precision if Arsen is taken as the southern border, the Mat River as the northern, the mountain range that starts from the small town of Kruja as the eastern, and to the west the western range whose slopes extend to Cape Rodoni in the north.
The figure around whom the territory is organized is the bey. Almost three quarters of the usable land is the property of various great landowners, who mostly belong to the Toptani clan. One must bear in mind their position as landowners (who in Albania are a separate caste), as well as the authority they represent among the people in comparison with
229 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V/1, Albania V: Albanian Patriots I General 1900-1909, Durazzo, on 19 March 1907, Indexed: on 12 April 1907. To His Excellency the

high-born Mr. Alois Lexa, Baron von Aehrenthal, etc. etc. etc.
215
With the administration, so that the important fact can be understood that the members of a single family hold feudal rights over a district that encompasses almost 600 square kilometers.
The landowner has power that is almost unlimited, both on his own land and in the nearby villages inhabited by free peasants. He determines what is just, resolves disputes, carries out blood revenge on behalf of others, and thus holds in his hands a powerful instrument of pressure: leasing land in exchange for a tithe. Not even the authorities can undertake anything against these feudal lords; the hegemony they possess within the country and their influential friends from the Yildiz clique protect them from any unfavorable interference by the authorities in their affairs.
A fortunate circumstance for the authorities is the fact that most beys are divided among themselves, and that discord has from ancient times characterized the mentality of the Albanians. Although they are closely connected with one another by marriages, each of them is guided above all by his own interests, to which he subordinates everything else. It is rare for all the beys to gather in order to act together and present some issue to the government. Many of them are obvious profiteers; they oppose the current Turkish government because they expect to extract great personal benefits from a change of system. However, in essence, they submit to the Sultan, whom they respect as caliph and 'sovereign of all believers', though they sharply criticize his decisions and wish for the end of his temporary rule over their country.
An interesting illustration of the beys' two-faced attitude toward the authorities is their behavior regarding the Russo-Japanese War and the serious illness that struck His Majesty the Sultan the previous year. During the said war, every success of the Japanese was greeted with indescribable joy, not only because it was, after all, a humiliation for Turkey's greatest enemy, Russia, but also because it was thought that the Japanese, since they are not Christians, are closer to Muslims than the Slavs are.
216
This way of thinking serves as proof of the deep-rootedness of religious fanaticism among the Albanian beys and other notable figures from Tirana. In complete contrast to this is the fact that during the illness that in recent years tormented the Sultan, all the more prominent men wished for his death. This can be explained by the widely accepted opinion in the country that
the death of the caliph will bring with it a decisive revolution, about which everyone talks a lot although no one knows exactly what changes it should bring.
Toward the Christian population in general, and especially toward the Catholic settlers, all the beys usually show a high degree of tolerance, and it is not uncommon for them to actively come to their aid during the construction and repair of churches and parish houses.
In response to the request formulated by Decree no. 339 of 23 November 1900, the Austro-Hungarian representative in Valona sends to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a list of influential notable persons from this consular district who possess a developed patriotic consciousness. Petrovic adds certain remarks, which reveal a manner, i.e., a commonplace of the entirety of Austro-Hungarian activity in Albania: authentic problems are to be viewed as an opportunity for authentic achievements. In other words, the

desire of the Ministry's officials to realize the proposed goals is often so excessive that it influences them to keep their eyes closed to reality and to the real problems for a long time.
The said remarks are that the national movement is making slow but noticeable progress in southern Albania, which can be seen from the significant increase in the number of those who learn to read and write in Albanian, as well as from the number of readers of Albanian newspapers. The Austro-Hungarian representative adds that the idea of an independent Albania is flaring up and spreading, although it is still not yet clearly discernible what all it entails. Even if it is indeed true and praiseworthy that the national movement is spreading and attracting ever wider circles of the population, the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul notes that it is regrettable that many of the sympathizers of this movement whom he meets do not carry genuine patriotic feelings within. In some cases, he gains the impression that engagement with the Albanian alphabet is in fact a matter of current fashion, even practically constituting a kind of game; in other cases, by contrast, it serves solely to channel the insane ambitions of individuals among the influential figures. Something strikingly similar happens with the expression 'national independence', which has a wide spectrum of meanings, so those who utter it often have
230 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V/1, Albania V: Albanian Patriots I General 1900-1909, Valona, 11 December 1900. To His Excellency the high-born Count Agenor Goluchowski.

with a completely different connotation in mind. For example, while some expect from independence the building of schools, the printing of newspapers and the development of literature in the Albanian language, as well as a free national life—the Valona patriots, on the other hand, essentially understand independence as something that will give them the possibility to rule, at their own discretion, the area over which they have influence. Despite everything, it cannot be denied that the national movement is making progress, especially among the youth. Therefore, the Austrian authorities may rightly hope that in the next generation a kind of true national consciousness will be formed, provided that the growing Muslim fanaticism does not hinder its development. The rise of fanaticism, in the consul’s opinion, is a phenomenon that very much deserves attention, all the more so given the fact that the Albanians of the south had until then been very indifferent to all things religious.
The vice-consul precisely informs the Ministry about his summer stay in Berat, which lasted between 12 June and 14 August 1901[231].
Petrovic notes that in the past year the Turkish government began to pay much more attention to the Albanian national movement than had previously been customary. It is quite true that books and newspapers in Albanian had already earlier been banned and that the Albanophiles known to the authorities—both in Valona and in Berat—were subject to strict surveillance. However, according to the vice-consul, that year the authorities approached this movement so seriously as if it itself represented an immediate danger to the survival of the Ottoman Empire[232].
231 HHStA, PA XJV /V, K. 24, Liasse XV: Alb. Patrioten, Bericht Nr. 49/res., Valona, 26 August 1901, Petrovic to His Excellency the high-born Mr. Agenor Count Goluchowski.
232 The nervousness of the government begins shortly after one influential Albanian,

Ismail Kemal Bey, fled from Constantinople. At that moment it was still not clear to the vice-consul why the Turkish government attached such importance to this man and considered him exceptionally valuable. Ismail Bey stands out among Albanians in the service of the Turkish state. According to the vice-consul's information, he had recently begun gradually to win more and more followers in southern Albania, who knew him personally from Constantinople and saw in him a highly educated leader of state. In Valona, the number of his sympathizers is always high, given that thanks to various high functions he performs in Constantinople he has many opportunities to render important services to his closest compatriots. Ismail Bey is particularly supported by those who oppose the Vlora family and who on several occasions

found in him a protector, despite the fact that he himself was a member of that family, although he had fallen out with his relatives.

Hence, at first his flight caused a great scandal and was much commented on even outside Valona; however, in the vice-consul's opinion, it would not have taken long to be forgotten had the Turkish government not contributed to conferring a certain aura of glory on this man. Namely, a high Ottoman official, by order of the Palace, set out to collect signatures for a manifesto against Ismail Bey. When it later became known that similar activities were being carried out in northern Albania as well, the population of the sanjak came to the conclusion that Ismail Bey is a leader whom the authorities must take seriously. After the population also realized that Ismail Bey could in no way move around the country at his own discretion, they were inclined to think that he was in league with someone even more influential—more precisely, with a Great Power that protects him and will support all the steps he undertakes in Albania. Most citizens believe that the power in question is England, and to this are added brazen rumors that have for months been passed from mouth to mouth. Finally, Albanian patriots, but also all others dissatisfied with the current situation, place great hopes in Ismail Bey, turning him into the most celebrated person in the country.

Distrust and nervousness of the Turkish authorities are growing significantly, as evidenced, among other facts, by the arrests of Albanians—both in the country and in Constantinople—as well as searches of the homes of various patriots. During the vice-consul's stay in Berat, the houses of two well-known patriots (Duda Karbonare and Islam Bey Vrioni) were searched, but nothing suspicious was found in them.

Ismail Bey's prestige in that sanjak remains great. Representatives of the patriotic movement and, in general, all malcontents still see in him the most prominent advocate of their ideas.

The national movement exists and is undoubtedly making progress, but, from the vice-consul's point of view, without enough schools it will achieve no success. He also notes that the number of supporters of the movement is significantly greater than the previous year. When this aspect is examined in detail, one notices that many of them are nationally and autonomist-minded or simply declare themselves as such[233]

233 When the Brussels Albania announced the news that Shahin Bey Kolonja and Faik Bey Konica had become enemies of Ismail Bey, the friends he has in Berat and Valona did not want to believe in his guilt. The event itself was interpreted with the conclusions that Faik Bey had surely been bribed by the Turkish government to write against Ismail Bey and that Shahin Bey—whom people in the country generally consider an honorable

man—fell into a trap because of Faik's persuasions; the accusation that Faik Bey receives money from the Palace had circulated in previous years as well. The vice-consul thinks that this rumor was probably spread by the Young Turks because Faik does not write against the Sultan. However, Albania's disclosure creates a certain uneasiness among Ismail Bey's sympathizers, and in some of them doubts inevitably arise about Ismail's importance and honesty.

219 - because of dissatisfaction with the administration in the country and because they directly bore the consequences of the absence of real authority. It is certain, according to the vice-consul's assessment, that nowhere else in the country is the number of the discontented as high as in the Janina Vilayet. Violent and corrupt individuals have absolute influence over the vilayet's authorities, which govern in a ruinous way, and its decisions could hardly be more arbitrary and less consistent. Every well-to-do man is exposed to the danger of extortion, in proportion to his wealth. The sanjak authorities are completely powerless in the face of such practices, and those affected by abuses of power do not know to whom to turn for protection; all complaints sent to Constantinople remain unanswered.

At the beginning of the summer of 1902, the impression arose that things would improve 234. It seems that the government, fearing political frictions, was considering removing from the country notable men of the greatest influence, as well as the followers of those who behaved in an exceptionally violent manner. Some were transferred to Constantinople, and some of them were kept there. At the same time, one of those who had terrorized died, because of which the population of the Sanjak of Premeti breathed a sigh of relief. It was expected that in such a situation the authorities would do everything necessary to neutralize those who so arbitrarily exercise power in Valona. These expectations, unfortunately, were not fulfilled. The vice-consul records that the most corrupt and most violent persons are once again reconciled with the governor and remain in the Palace, receiving the title gratissima, which means "the most esteemed person"; some, therefore, were honored with even higher appointments (for example, a Bey of Rumelia), while many others, without bearing any consequences, remain in the country. Only some opponents of the greatest strongmen were removed, which, in the vice-consul's opinion, will harm Valona, since the despotic influence will henceforth be exercised without hindrance, whereas earlier the evident disagreements between the two sides often contributed to weakening the power of both sides.

The vice-consul states that the bad administration of the past years has produced a large number of discontented people among the population. For that reason, it is easy to explain how the Young Turk movement and ideas of autonomy could gain ground in the minds of the beys and aghas of the whole country. These malcontents, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul, can

234 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 24, Liasse XV, Politischer Gegenstand, Bericht Nr. 53/res., Valona, 18. August 1902, Viceconsul Dr. Ranzi: Bericht iiber den Sommeraufenthalt in Berat.

be characterized as Young Turks—they want just administration and reforms. Although at first glance they keep the Albanian autonomist wing in the background, thinking about the possibilities for change is surely nothing more than a consequence of their doubts.

The vice-consul informs Vienna that, on the basis of several conversations with a few prominent citizens of Berat, he came to the conclusion that the autonomist movement, with a just administration in the country, would be considerably weaker, because people become the greater nationalists the more personally and directly they have suffered under the current government.

As for Italian propaganda, the vice-consul confirms that the unusual and vigorous activity of the Italian government in Albania, especially in Valona, has not yet spread to Berat. At the moment when the Austrian diplomat writes his report, neither the Italian consul in Valona and Janina nor the Italo-Albanian Committee had undertaken activities in that direction. However, the visits of the Italian delegation to Valona and Durazzo, as well as debates on Albania in the Italian parliament, finally aroused maximum attention in Berat as well. Just as in Valona, in Berat there is a general impression that important events await Albania and that Italy wants to force a favorable opportunity in order to intervene in that country. The situation gradually calms only when the Italian delegation leaves Durazzo. On the occasion of that visit, the Austro-Hungarian representative has the opportunity once again to note that, of all foreign states, Muslim Albanians harbor certain sympathies only toward Austria-Hungary. However, he is aware that this benevolent attitude is more than relative; all in all, Albanians of the Muslim faith are more inclined toward Turkey than toward any other foreign state, despite its poor administration.

In the half-year of the vice-consul's stay in Berat, the section of the Vlach Institute in that town, as well as its boarding house, ceased to exist. During all the years of its activity in Berat, Romanian propaganda did not achieve the slightest success. There were never more than four pupils from Berat who attended the section of this institute, while the other pupils were children of poorer people from the surrounding sanjak villages whom their parents sent to the Vlach Institute only because there, along with lessons, they had a free meal. As happened in Berat, Vlach schools were closed in other places of that vilayet as well.

Finally, the vice-consul comments that that summer his intercourse with the notable people of Berat was significantly reduced in comparison with previous years. He explains this by the fact that they are extremely intimidated by the wrath of the authorities, frequent arrests and searches of homes, so that even some of his most reliable associates avoid any contact with the vice-consul 235.

221

In general, the situation the vice-consul found in Berat in 1903 differed very little from the previous year236. On the one hand, the trials from Janina that had lasted for months, the pronouncement of partial sentences, as well as new persecutions that had recently been ordered, inflamed a sense of insecurity among the population; on the other hand, events in neighboring Macedonia also left deep consequences. If the mobilization of troops from the Redif and Ilave aroused in the people suspicions that there would soon be war, they were reinforced by stories, largely exaggerated, about soldiers who were returning home from Macedonia when their replacements arrived and who presented war as something inevitable. Interestingly, for some time all the soldiers upon their return from Macedonia pointed to Austria-Hungary as the state with which they would ultimately clash, since it supports the Bulgarians. These stories, in the vice-consul's opinion, obviously have their root in the incitement of the insurgents, who

thereby strive to secure support for their aims. However, the fact is that this belief for a time was firmly rooted both in Valona and in Berat, and there were even some individuals who assured that they knew the exact date the conflict would begin. Only at the beginning of July did space begin to open for a more reasonable course of thought. It is clear that all this in 1903 could not contribute to creating a favorable climate for his visit to the settlement of Berat, whose population is restless and obedient toward the government. However, in his report he confirms that on that occasion he essentially managed to broaden his relations with the notable people in the country:

"I renewed the ties established the previous year with influential people, who this year already showed much more attention, and I also made a series of new contacts, which turned out to be simpler, due to the fact that many of them were the first to come to see me. I also had the opportunity during the journey to meet numerous

235 At the same time he sends another report (Bericht No. 49) on the same subject to the High Imperial and Royal Embassy in Constantinople and to the Imperial and Royal General Consulate in Scutari.

236 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 24, Albainen Liasse XV, Valona, den 17. August 1903, Vice-consul Dr. Ranzi an Goluchowski.

beys from the environs of Berat and from the border cantons, and conversations with them were all the more interesting to me because those beys, since they do not live in Berat and are not under the immediate pressure of the government, usually expressed their opinions far more freely.

In the report on my stay in Berat last year I refrained from expressing a judgment about the local national movement. I admit that the conditions for making that type of analysis that year were not at all favorable; nevertheless, I would like here to point out some aspects from which one can, at least partially, obtain an answer to that question.

Berat is among the towns of southern Albania with the worst economic situation. Trade and crafts, the two branches of the economy that guarantee a town's prosperity, are here in a state of absolute decline. It is true that conditions in many other towns in the south of Albania are no better. Yet a lot of money circulates through them, since people employed abroad send home the wages they earn or else, after they have amassed wealth, they return again to their homeland. The case of Berat, however, is not such. Hence it is clear that in this town there is almost no prosperous middle class. The greater part of the population lives in deep misery and poverty and is practically unable to earn a living. There is no doubt that it will be very surprising that this population, which struggles hard for its survival, pays little or no attention to current national questions, since here, perhaps more than anywhere else, it is necessary that some degree of well-being first be guaranteed to them so that they can devote attention to them.

On the other hand there are the beys, most of whom belong to the extended Vrioni family and its relatives. Under the currently existing conditions they are the only ones capable of becoming a support of the national movement. The reason why they still today keep themselves discreetly apart from the national question certainly lies not so much in a lack of interest, which in many cases I would by no means wish to call into question, as in the stance of the current head of the House of Vrioni, Aziz Pasha, since

the other beys are forced to adapt their positions to his because of the enormous power he has always had in the country”237.
The stay of Dr. Ranzi as vice-consul in Berat in 1904 coincides with a period in which calm prevails among the population.
237 Ibidem.
223
The profound agitation that the Macedonian uprisings had aroused the previous year had subsided, giving way to renewed confidence238.
Given such a state of affairs, the vice-consul’s contact with the notable people of the country was much more spontaneous and freer than in previous years. This especially concerns communication with Muslims, with whom he established a relationship of a very active and cordial nature. This was particularly aided by Ranzi’s decision that year to lodge in the Turkish quarter itself, where almost all Albanian Muslims live, so that this proximity would facilitate for him a fuller integration into their circle. As soon as he arrived, the influential people expressed their satisfaction that this time he had chosen a home among their houses and expressed the hope that as neighbors they would be able to cultivate more active relations, and he on his part, as far as possible, did not cease to fulfill this expectation of theirs.
The opening of a livelier communication with notable personalities gave him the opportunity to get to know better the ideas they were considering at that moment. In fact, it took him quite some time and an intensive personal relationship in order to gain their trust, that is, so that in front of a foreign consul they would sincerely declare themselves on any question.
Skumbi-Вгпске by Kjuks, October 1899. HHStA.
238 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 24, Albania Liasse XV, Valona, on 13 September 1904, Vice-Consul Dr. Ranzi reports on the summer stay in Berat, fols. 135–140, (Vice-Consul Dr. Ranzi reports on his stay in Berat during the summer of 1904).
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Hagji Bekjar Bridge over the Skumbi near Miraka,
October 1899. HHStA.
225 H H S tA , PA X IV , Li X V , K. 24. c, Г
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228 H H S tA , PA X IV , Li X V , K. 24.
229 CHAPTER VI:

RELIGIOUS PROTECTORATE: BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE FUTURE

There are two fundamental views on the right and application of the religious protectorate over Roman Catholics, which Austria-Hungary exercised in the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century. It seems to us that this question is well studied in two documents from that period, which we will present immediately.

The first document was composed by the Austro-Hungarian consul Ippen and was intended not only to clarify the said protectorate, fostering a positive opinion of it in Austrian society, but also to provide answers to objections against it launched by rival countries, which from 1900 onward become increasingly sharp.

The propagandistic aims, however, do not deprive Ippen's text of scholarly value, above all in all those parts where the Austrian consul devoted himself solely to argumentation, without intending to appeal to public opinion.

The second document was prepared for "internal" use by Count Kufenstein, a prominent German diplomat who undertook a re-examination of Austria-Hungary's right to exercise the religious protectorate.

Ippen's document appears in the form of an article in 1903. It is composed of four parts. In the first, the author explains the nature and scope of application of the Catholic protectorate, which was granted to Austria-Hungary in the Ottoman Empire. In the second part, he investigates who may lay claim to this protectorate. In the third, he considers the controversial moments introduced by the Berlin Congress. In the fourth and final part, he appeals to Austrian society to support its state in exercising the protectorate.

Ippen's argumentation is built on a comparative analysis of the law and practice of the religious protectorates of Austria and France. The author's intention was to compare them and highlight the advantages of the rights to the protectorate granted to his country, as well as to defend it from French claims, which in that period were also very ambitious.

Before explaining the nature of the religious protectorate and the scope of its application, Ippen briefly introduces readers to the context of the Treaties, that is, the relations between the Habsburg state and the Ottoman state, marked by a series of wars that practically fill three centuries—from 1524 to 1791. These wars gave rise to the signing of several peace treaties containing provisions that give the Habsburg state legal support for the protectorate over the Catholic Church in the Ottoman Empire.

Next, Ippen offers the very provisions from the treaties that relate to the Catholic religion. They are the following:

The Peace of Vienna, signed in 1615 between Emperor Matthias and Sultan Ahmed I (modification of the Peace of Zsitva-Torok of 1606).

Art. VII. Those who are called the people of Jesus Christ, followers of the Pope, priests and monks or Jesuits shall have the authority to build their churches in areas under the rule of the Turkish emperor and in them read the Gospels, assemble, and perform religious rites according to their customs and in accordance with the rules of their order and ancient tradition.

The Treaty of Carlowitz between Emperor Leopold I and Sultan Mehmed IV, 1681.

Monks, Jesuits, and the rest of the clergy, members of the Catholic Church living on Turkish territory, must not be persecuted nor harmed without reason; otherwise, they shall enjoy the protection guaranteed to them by the agreements and regulations approved by the High Porte, so that no violence against them is tolerated.

241 All are cited from Ippen's text. They were translated from German into Castilian by Roberto Bravo, who is responsible for the excellent translation of several other documents cited in this work.

232

The Treaty of the Peace of Karlowitz between Emperor Leopold I and Sultan Mustafa II, 1699.

Article XIII. The decisions contained in the imperial agreements that were approved under the glorious reigns of previous sultans, and in firmans and special decrees, insofar as they concern the clerics in the service of the Pope of Rome and those who preach the religion of Jesus Christ, I confirm, so that from now on they shall likewise be deemed valid in the following form: that no obstacles be created to the repair of their churches on old foundations, nor to the performance of their customary religious rites; that the aforesaid clerics, whatever their category, shall not be subjected to monetary demands, nor to other pretexts contrary to the law of the Ahdname and the imperial agreements; on the contrary, that they shall enjoy my imperial protection, in perfect peace, and that the ambassador of the Roman ruler, who has come before the Sublime Porte, may present to me the requests that concern his faith and their places of pilgrimage in Jerusalem.

Treaty of the Peace of Požarevac between Emperor Charles VI and Sultan Ahmed III, 1718. Art. XI. Same as the preceding.

Treaty of the Peace of Belgrade between Emperor Charles VI and Sultan Mustafa, 1739. Art. IX. Same as the preceding.

Treaty of the Peace of Svishtov between Emperor Leopold II and Sultan Selim III, 1791. Art. XII.

As regards the profession of the Catholic Christian religion in the Ottoman Empire, its priests and faithful, the preservation or construction of its churches, freedom of faith and of person, the visitation and protection of the holy places in Jerusalem and elsewhere, the Sublime Porte, adhering strictly to the rule of maintaining the status quo, renews and confirms not only the privileges guaranteed to this religion by Article IX of the Belgrade Treaty, but also the later rights granted to it by firman or other imperial decrees.

Ippen emphasizes that the agreements in question between Turkey and Austria-Hungary establish a legal relationship that supports the right of protectorate of that European state, which enables it to look after the interests of the Catholic Church on Ottoman territory. By these agreements, the sultan recognizes for Austria-Hungary the right to intervene by way of proposals insofar as they concern relations with and the

regard due to the Catholic Church, whenever necessary. The sultan also permits Austro-Hungarian involvement in religious matters—interventions and intercession—in favor of the Catholic Church, and undertakes to accept a good part of those interventions. In Ippen's view, this follows explicitly from the agreement with the emperor where it says: "that the ambassador of the Roman ruler, who has arrived before the Sublime Porte, present to me the requests that concern his faith and their places of pilgrimage in Jerusalem."

Ippen notes that through these agreements the Habsburg state became the guarantor for the concessions that the sultans granted to the Catholic Church.242

On the basis of what is set out in the said agreements, the consul notes, Austria-Hungary should have the right of protection over the Catholic Church and clergy, as well as over the faithful in general, without any kind of limitation anywhere in the Ottoman Empire. However, he is struck by the fact that the Monarchy imposed upon itself a territorial limitation: up to that time the Monarchy had exercised the right of protectorate in a regular and specific manner in those Turkish provinces that lay along its borders; but in those territories to which only a sea connection was possible, given that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it did not have a navy at its disposal and could not rely on maritime transport, the Monarchy renounced the direct exercise of its protectorate right.243

This assertion by Ippen was given concrete form at the documentary level in the shape of a memorandum drawn up in May 1902 by Court Councillor Fuchs on the scope of the Austro-Hungarian protectorate in the Ottoman Empire.244

242 All this also applies to France. However, between the articles that Turkey agreed with France and those it agreed with Austria-Hungary there is one difference in favor of the latter: the articles of the agreements with France always speak of bishops and clergy who are French subjects (Treaty of 1673) or who depend on the French sovereign (Treaty of 1740), so that the right of protectorate is limited to those who meet that condition. By contrast, the articles of the agreements signed with the Austrian emperor contain no such limitation—they always speak of the "Christian Catholic religion [...], its priests and followers."

243 In these provinces, according to Ippen, France had always undertaken service on behalf of the Catholic Church, since it had there several trading centers and monasteries administered by clerics from French monastic orders. However, Austria-Hungary had also intervened on several occasions at the holy places in Jerusalem.

244 HHStA, PA XII, K. 271, Mémoire des Hofrates Fuchs über das Kultusprotektorat, May 1902.

According to this memorandum, Austria-Hungary exercises a religious protectorate over Roman Catholics in certain vilayets in Turkey and, in addition, in those of Kosovo, Scutari, Janina, as well as in one part of the Monastir Vilayet. On the other hand, under Austro-Hungarian protection there are also some parishes in Bulgaria, the Franciscan mission in Upper Egypt, the Coptic Catholic community in Egypt, and the Central African mission.

As for the rest, according to the memorandum, Austria-Hungary guarantees the establishment of Austrian or Hungarian congregations and national clerical institutes in the Orient, such as those founded by the Sisters of Mercy from Agram (Zagreb) in Adrianople; the Mechitarists from Vienna, in Smyrna; Austrian Franciscans in the same

place; Austrian Passionists in Varna; the St. George orphanage in Constantinople (administered by Austrian Lazarists and nuns from Graz); the Austro-Hungarian shelter, i.e., a hostel for pilgrims in Jerusalem; and a small number of churches and chapels, such as Santa Maria in Pera, the Cathedral of St. Mary in Smyrna; Mechitarist churches in Aydin and Pamaldi; Catholic churches in Magnesia and Burnabat; a chapel in Kordelio; Austria-Hungary provides protection to all the aforementioned institutions and churches, representing them before the state authorities.

The parish church of Piraeus enjoys the honorary protectorate of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty.

We also have a list of churches, parishes, and religious institutes in the Ottoman Empire that are under the Imperial and Royal protectorate, compiled by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Rome, Szécsen.245 According to this list, Austria-Hungary exercises a protectorate over the following institutions:

1 The territory of the archbishopric of Scutari, Durres and Skopje (Prizren) and of the archiabbacy of St. Alexander of Mirdita (vilayets of Scutari, Janina, Kosovo and part of Monastir).

Archdiocese of Scutari

1. The archbishopric building of Scutari
2. The cathedral in Scutari, likewise the parish church
3. The archbishop's residence, Scutari
4. Parish house in Scutari

   245 HHStA, NL Szapary, K. 3.

   235
5. Collegium pontificium Albanense, Scutari
6. Collegium Francisco Xaverianum, Scutari
7. Missione volante Albanense
8. Church of St. Mary Magdalene in Kaseni (Scutari)
9. Church of St. Anthony, Scutari
10. Sanctuary of Our Lady of Good Counsel, Tabaki (Scutari)
11. Franciscan monastery of Gjuhadol with a school for children, with a seminary and a section for the postulancy before admission to the Franciscan order
12. Franciscan monastery of Aramali (Scutari)
13. Convent of the Daughters of the Holy Stigmata in Scutari, with a girls' school
14. Hospital of the Sisters of Charity, Scutari
15. Convent of the Servite Sisters, kindergarten, Scutari
16. Church of St. John in Rashij, Scutari
17. Church of St. Lorenzo in Zuosi, Scutari
18. Parish church and parish house of Shiroka
19. Parish school, Shiroka
20. Parish church and parish house of Bitolja
21. Parish church and parish house of Brdica
22. Parish church and parish house of Trunshij
23. Parish church and parish house, together with a chapel in Bushat
24. Parish church and parish house of Barbulush
25. Parish school of Barbulush
26. Parish church and parish house of Kukli

27. Parish church and parish house of Renci
28. Parish church and parish house of Jubani
29. Filial church of Ganjola
30. Parish church and parish house of Sheldinj
31. Parish church and parish house of Oboti
32. Filial church of Selme-Prena in Shirch
33. Parish church and parish house, together with a chapel in Dajç on the Bojana
34. Parish school, Dajç on the Bojana
35. Filial church of Samrish
36. Filial church of Gorica
37. Parish house and parish church of Pentar

38. Parish house and parish church of Klesna
39. Parish house of Pulaj
40. Chapel in Reçi
41. Parish church and parish house of Kolaj
42. Parish church and parish house of Rioli
43. Parish church and parish house of Reçi
44. Parish church and mission house in Bajza, Donji Kastrati
45. Parish church and parish house in Shkrel
46. Filial church of St. Mary of the Snows in Shtrklj
47. Parish church and parish house of Boga
48. Parish church and mission house of Kastrati (Ober)
49. Parish church and mission house of Rapsha (Hot)
50. Chapel in Kushi
51. Chapel in Drumi
52. Parish church and mission house of Trabojin (Hot)
53. Filial church of Vuksanaj
54. Parish church and mission house of Gruda
55. Filial church of Krševa
56. Parish church and mission house of Selce (Klementi)
57. Parish school of Selce
58. Parish church and mission house of Vukli

Diocese of Sapa

59. Cathedral and house of Nenshat
60. Parish church and parish house of Nenshat
61. Filial church and house in Kodeli
62. Parish church and parish house of Hajmel
63. Parish church and oratory of Narach
64. Church of Kacha
65. Parish church of Lach with the church in Mjet
66. Filial church of St. Mark in Van-Dejus
67. Parish church and parish house of Pistul
68. Filial church of Shkeza
69. Parish church and parish house of Babe
70. Parish church and parish house of Dajç and Ladrime

71. Parish school of Dajç
72. Parish church and parish house of Gramsh
73. Parish church and parish house of Dadrija
    237
74. Filial church of Zojsi
75. Parish church and parish house of Blinisht
76. Filial church of Saint Stephen
77. Parish church and parish house of Grika-e-Gjadrit (Grilka-e-Gjadrit)
78. Parish church and parish house of Vjerze
79. Church of Shurce
80. Parish church and parish house of Masrekua
81. Ruins of the Church of St. Nicholas in Shetaj
82. Parish church and parish house of Shlakua
83. Parish church of St. Nicholas and parish house of Dush
84. Filial church of St. George and parish house of Ober-Dush
85. Filial church of St. Mary Magdalene in Leja
86. Parish church of St. Sergius and parish house in Kchira
87. Filial church of St. Theodore
88. Filial church of Zestrit
89. Parish church and parish house of Chelse
90. Representative church of St. Paul in Kabash
91. Representative church of St. Mark and parish house in Koman
92. Chapels of St. Sergius, St. John, St. Michael, St. Nicholas, and St. Andrew
93. Parish church and mission house in Berisha
94. Parish church and mission house in Ibalji
95. Representative church of St. Pren in Krijezi
96. Representative church of St. Nicholas in Ibalji
97. Parish church and mission house in Firi
98. Parish church and mission house in Darsu
99. School in Trosijani

Diocese of Lezhë

100. Bishop's residence and prayer chapel in Kalmet
101. Institute of the Sisters of Mercy of Kalmet, school for girls, clinic
102. Franciscan monastery in Trosijani, where two subjects from that order’s seminary are taught simultaneously
103. Parish church in Kalmet
104. Parish church and parish house in Kakaricia
    238
105. Chapel of St. Euphemia in Kalmet
106. Parish church and parish house in Mrkonj
107. Parish church in Baldren
108. Parish church of St. Nicholas in Lezhë
109. Parish church of St. Anthony on the Drin opposite Lezhë
110. Parish church of St. John in Medua
111. Franciscan monastery of Rubik with novices
112. Parish church and parish house in Bregamatia

113. Parish church and parish house in Zejmen
114. Church in Bokjani
115. Chapel of St. Alexander in Spiten
116. Parish church and parish house in Pedana
117. Parish church and parish house in Bulgaria
118. Parish church and parish house in Krijezi
119. Parish church and parish house in Manati
120. Church in Grika
121. Parish church and parish house in Velje
122. Chapel in Rzeja

Diocese of Pult

123. Bishop's residence and church in Đovane
124. Parish house and parish church in Suma
125. Parish house and parish church in Plantia
126. Chapel in Pogu
127. Chapel in Mugali
128. Parish church and mission house in Kir
129. Parish church and mission house in Shoshi
130. Parish church and mission house in Shala
131. Representative church in Lotaj
132. Representative church in Ginjaj
133. Parish church and mission house in Sesi
134. Parish church and mission house in Dushmani
135. Parish church and mission house in Toplana
136. Parish church and mission house in Mertur (in the Kosovo Vilayet)
137. Parish church and mission house in Nikaj (in the Kosovo Vilayet)
138. Representative church in Turaj

Abbacy of Mirdita

139. Residence and church in Oroshi
140. School in Oroshi
141. Parish house and church in Spaç
142. School in Spaç
143. Parish house and church in Fandi
144. Parish house and church in Kalivar
145. Parish house and church in Çafa-Malit
146. Parish house and church in Blinishta
147. Representative church in Shpal
148. Parish house and church in Nederfandina
149. Chapel of St. Demetrius in Bukmiri
150. Parish house and church in Kachinari
151. Parish house and church in Shnerch
152. Parish house and church in Kashnjeta
153. School in Kashnjeta
154. Parish house and church in Fregna
155. Parish house and church in Vigë

156. Parish house and church in Muele
157. Parish house and church in Koropule
158. Parish house and church in Gomsike

Archdiocese of Durrës

159. Archbishop's residence and cathedral in Delbnishta
160. Parish church and parish house in Milot
161. School in Milot
162. Chapel in Gursi
163. Church (in ruins) in Shamkhil in Malibari
164. Parish house and mission house in Laç
165. Church and monastery (abandoned) in Shna-Noj
166. Parish house in Shijak
167. Chapel in Ujbarc
168. Church (in ruins) in Shamri
169. Parish church and parish house in Derven
170. Parish church and parish house in Blaj
171. Parish church and parish house in Markinj
172. Chapel in Malkoch
173. Church (in ruins) in Shlince in Kulaj

174. Parish church and mission house in Bishan
175. Church and ruins of the monastery of Shna-Noj at Cape Rodoni
176. Representative church in Durrës
177. Representative church Holy Cross in Shetaj
178. Representative church in Kodralac
179. Representative church in Shkala
180. Chapel in Shpjetër
181. Church (in ruins) of St. Demetrius in Shkafon
182. Parish church and parish house in Kurbina
183. Parish church and parish house in Skuraj
184. Parish church and parish house in Bushkash
185. Parish church and parish house in Ksele
186. Church in Rshenia
187. School in Rshenia
188. Mission house and prayer chapel in Basa
189. Parish church and parish house in Pertalaj
190. Parish church and parish house in Selita
191. Parish church and parish house in Juba
192. Parish church and parish house in Durrës
193. Catholic school for children in Durrës with a seminary
194. Sisters of Mercy and convent with a girls' school with a clinic
195. Parish church and parish house in Tirana
196. Catholic school for children in Tirana
197. Parish church and mission house in Lurija (Monastir Vilayet)
198. Parish church and parish house in Valona (Ioannina Vilayet)
199. Parish church and parish house in Preveza (Ioannina Vilayet)

200. Mission house and chapel in Ioannina (Ioannina Vilayet)

Archdiocese of Skopje

201. Archbishop's residence in Prizren

202. Convent and girls' school, run by the Sisters of Mercy together with a clinic, in Prizren

203. Cathedral and parish house in Prizren

204. Catholic school for children in Prizren

241

205. Parish church and hostel in Zumbija

206. School in Zumbija

207. Oratory in Bituchi

208. Parish church and hostel in Peć

209. School in Peć

210. Mission house and chapel in Zlakočan

211. Parish house and chapel in Đakovica

212. School in Đakovica

213. Chapel of St. Anthony in Djakovica (The preceding institutions belong to the consular district of Prizren.)

214. Parish church and parish house from Skopje

215. School from Skopje

216. Girls' school and Sisters of Charity clinic from Skopje

217. Parish house from Verisovici

218. Parish church and parish house from Janjevo

219. School from Janjevo

220. Parish church and parish house from Letnica

221. School from Letnica

II. Churches and monasteries of Constantinople, of the vilayets of Adrianopolis and Aydin, as well as of the sanjak of Jerusalem

In the consular district of Adrianopolis

222. Sisters of Charity Girls' Institute from Adrianopolis

In the consular district of Constantinople

223. Parish church and monastery of St. Maria Draperis in Pera

224. Parish school from Pera

225. Church and monastery of St. George in Galata

226. School for children from Galata

227. St. George Sisters of Charity Institute in Galata

228. Armenian Catholic parish of the Holy Trinity in Pera

229. Mekhitarist Institute from Pangalti

In the district of the General Consulate in Smyrna

230. Church of St. Mary with monastery and school in Smyrna

231. Church of St. Mary from Bournabat with a school

242

232. Church of St. Leonard in Magnesia with a school

233. Mekhitarist mission, church and school in Smyrna

234. Mekhitarist mission, church and school in Aydin

235. Slav Monastery from Smyrna

236. St. Anthony's Hospital in Smyrna and its church

237. Rothschild Hospital in Smyrna

In the consular district of Jerusalem

238. Austro-Hungarian House for Pilgrims of the Holy Family from Jerusalem

239. Hospital of the Knights of the Order of Malta in Tantur

240.

Rothschild Hospital in Jerusalem

241. Edler von Laemel School from Jerusalem

242. Israelite House for Pilgrims on Zion

Note: In addition to those listed, there are other church institutions in:

Constantinople

1. The Austro-Hungarian National School
2. The Austro-Hungarian National Hospital
3. The German-Austrian Israelite School

Skopje

4. The Railway School

Despite the fact that, as Ipen was informed, approximately 120,000 Roman Catholics live in Turkey who are subjects of the Sultan, the Catholic Church does not have an official status that the Ottoman authorities could proclaim; therefore, it persists as a congregation that is simply tolerated as such.

To establish which rights the Catholic Church enjoys in Turkey, Ipen first begins to consider the agreements with the emperors of the House of Habsburg. These agreements, according to his research, convey part of those rights, also referring to other sources such as certain regulations of the Sublime Porte (e.g., the Agreement of Constantinople), old agreements and sultanic edicts (for example, the Treaty of Karlowitz), firmans and other imperial decrees (the Treaty of Sistova).

Ipen analyzes this set of legal sources in great detail, resorting to the terminology used in the agreements

243

and dealing with the terms used by Turkish law. This group of sources, in Ipen's view, includes246:

1. firmans and imperial decrees directly dictated by the Sultan; they may contain general decisions, although, judging by their application in the past, it is ascertained that they were for the most part proclaimed for individuals, institutions, or specific cases; they can therefore be considered charters and privileges247;
2. ministerial orders signed by the viziers, that is, legal norms in favor of the Catholic Church that the grand viziers of each period sent to the provincial governors;
3. all other laws promulgated in favor of the Catholic Church248.

On the basis of these three groups of legal sources—agreements, tradition, and approved laws—Ipen concludes what the rights of the Catholic Church are, clarifying them, giving examples where necessary and comparing the recognized right with

practice, so as later to justify the existence of the religious protectorate and the Austro-Hungarian intervention in Ottoman matters concerning the Catholic faith.
It seems that the great contribution of the Austro-Hungarian consul to understanding the right to a protectorate, which at that time Austria-Hungary exercised in the Ottoman Empire, rests precisely on this analysis. This protectorate safeguards the following rights:

1. Freedom of religion. Those who profess the faith of the Catholic Church shall not be insulted, subjected to violence, nor persecuted or punished on account of their religious convictions (Hatt-i Humayun, art. 8)249;

246 We will cite this part of the text almost verbatim from the consul's appendix on this topic.
247 It would be difficult, writes Ipen, to collect a significant number of such documents, since the bishops, monasteries, and other persons who once received them could not preserve them properly. In any case, he points out that this is not such a serious loss, since practically all the mentioned documents contained privileges that have since been generalized and regulated by laws, or pertain to privileges that no longer exist.
248 Before continuing the analysis of these groups of legal sources, Ipen notes that Turkey itself developed legislative activity in the true sense of the word from 1839, when a sultanic decree known as the Hatt-i Sherif was approved, which established the basic state law and is similar to what European constitutions represent.
249 However, reality is different, and the consul strives to provide a realistic picture of this. He writes that in Turkey there are still districts in which Catholics

2. Freedom of the clergy to perform their priestly calling. Catholic clergy, monks, whatever order they belong to, including the Jesuits, must not be harassed or abused, since they enjoy imperial protection (Treaties of Constantinople and Karlowitz, Article XIII).

Ipen explains that certificates, better known as imperial decrees, are issued to Catholic bishops and archbishops, which guarantee them freedom of passage on journeys undertaken to visit their diocese250.
Also, another imperial edict from 1856, the Hatihumajun, contains interesting decisions concerning the Catholic Church. On the other hand, there are the laws of the 7th month Du-l-hiyya 1281 (June 1864) on exemption from customs duties, as well as the ministerial decree of the 7th month Safar 1278 on the wills of Christians.

3. Freedom of public worship. Those who profess the Catholic faith may gather in their churches in accordance with the rules of their faith and hold liturgical services (Peace of Vienna, Article VII). No church is subject to restriction in the public performance of religious rites, as long as another religion is not present at the location in question (Hatihumajun, 6).

Their compatriots of the Muslim faith behave violently, pressuring them to renounce Catholicism; the government has no power with which it could stop these difficulties, which are contrary to freedom of religion.
250 As an example of one of those edicts, Ippen writes the following:
"To the governor of the monastery, the commander, and the qadi of Shkoder. The embassy of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, has reported that Friar Giulio Marsili has been appointed Bishop of Sapa in the province of Shkoder and

has requested that the imperial certificate be extended, so that, in accordance with our agreements, he may enjoy our support and protection. Article IX of the Belgrade Agreement between the said government and our government states that the concessions agreed for all ecclesiastical persons before and after the Peace of Pozarevac, included in the imperial agreements proclaimed under the glorious reigns of previous sultans on account of the French priests, in addition to those concerning the clergy, remain confirmed by me. Since it is my imperial will that these privileges be preserved, I hereby make known that all agreements and arrangements between the said government and our government must be maintained, and the necessary decisions will accordingly be made. You, the deputy, the commander, and the qadi, must behave and act in such a manner. Delivered on the 20th day of the month of Yumada 1-ula, year 1291."

Another consequence of the freedom of the clergy is that every Catholic order is allowed to found institutions in Turkey (Peace of Vienna, Article VII). According to the practice which at present is the rule, the order that is the founder has the right to request from the Turkish government a binding imperial permit. Centers of religious orders that do not fulfill this requirement have their immunity annulled and will be excluded from the rule they could initially enjoy.

245 Accordingly, in the outskirts of the city and in villages whose population is entirely of the Catholic faith, any religious ceremonies may, without any hindrance, be organized outside the churches as well, such as processions.

However, Ippen notes that the criterion then observed regarding the use of church bells does not conform to that decision. According to the above, it is legal to ring from churches in villages and parts of the city that are entirely Catholic; however, in practice the installation of bells and their ringing is not permitted without the express authorization of the central authorities for each occasion.

4. Freedom to build new churches and repair old ones. Catholics have permission to build churches in areas under the rule of the Turkish emperor (Peace of Vienna, Article VII); Catholic clerics may repair their churches (Treaty of Karlowitz and other later agreements).

Despite these decisions, Ippen observes that a custom has become established of preventing the construction of churches in places where there had not previously been any. According to him, only in 1856 was it set by law that villages and towns whose population profess the same faith enjoy complete freedom to build and repair churches, schools, hospitals, and cemeteries; by contrast, in villages and towns where members of different religions live together, this would only be allowed if those religions are distributed in separate quarters of the town (Hatihumajun, 5 and 6).

Ippen adds that in villages and quarters where Catholic and Muslim families live intermingled, the construction of churches is in no way permitted, whereas there is no restriction for Muslim mosques.

The consul, however, explains that the freedom to build new churches, as established by the laws, is not unlimited; namely, when construction is planned in places whose inhabitants profess one faith, the project must receive approval in the form of an imperial order; likewise, he writes that in religiously mixed places it is necessary to obtain authorization for the erection of churches, parish houses, schools, hospitals, or cemeteries, on the basis of an imperial decision. According to the agreements and laws,

repairs to existing churches may be carried out entirely freely, provided they do not entail any enlargement. However, according to Ippen, in practice it is obligatory to request permission from
246
the governor of the province in order to begin repairs, and often even approval from the central government in Constantinople.

5. The right to open schools is the legitimate right of every confession, and the same applies to the opening of public schools for education in the fields of science or crafts (Hatihumajun, 10).

This right has also experienced a limitation in practice, adds Ippen, since to open any school, even elementary schools in rural areas, it is necessary to have an imperial decision.

6. The laws of the Catholic Church are recognized as valid in matters such as marriage between Catholics; Catholic diocesan courts may also decide disputes concerning inheritance, in case both parties accept their jurisdiction (Hatihumajun, 13).

Catholic canon law is the one that has the appropriate standards for the wills of Catholics; the Turkish authorities recognize to Catholic bishops notarial competence with regard to the wills of their faithful (Ministerial decree of the 7th month Safar, year 1278).

7. Exemption from the obligation to pay certain taxes for the clergy. Buildings that belong to the clergy and in which representatives of the clergy reside are exempt from the direct payment of taxes. Gardens planted with vegetables, vineyards, orchards, and olive groves are likewise exempt from this payment when they serve to feed the parish priest or the monastery. A tithe shall be rendered from the yield of arable land.

Ippen's list also includes the following cases:

Clerics or church institutions are exempt from the tax on alcoholic beverages for wine they produce exclusively for their own needs, as well as for rakija that they distill. They are also exempt from paying customs duties on all foodstuffs used for the support of churches and imported from abroad.

Clerics and church institutions may receive from abroad a certain quantity of items necessary for their own maintenance, such as clothing, food, etc., without having to clear customs.

As Ippen himself asserts, whenever any of these rights that the Catholic Church officially enjoyed was in practice infringed or violated, Austria-Hungary asserted its right of intervention so that certain provisions would be carried into effect. Starting with the Treaty of Karlowitz, including it, all subsequent agreements
247
contain a decision according to which the representative of the Austrian emperor has the legal right to submit to the Porte proposals and to present demands concerning religious questions. Ippen points out a very important consequence: since the agreements always speak of clerics and Catholic believers, not excluding Ottoman subjects, the same rights apply to Turks from Catholic regions.

Studying the cases in which Austria-Hungary used its prerogatives, the consul concludes that the protectorate is still necessary and that it would not be morally justified to renounce the right to it.

The Controversy Introduced by the Berlin Treaty

In Ippen's view, the controversy that could lead to a modification of the legal conditions of the religious protectorate is rooted in Article LXII, 6 of the Berlin Treaty, which reads: 'To the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Great Powers present in Turkey is recognized the right of official protection of the aforementioned persons (ecclesiastics, pilgrims and monks), religious edifices, charitable establishments and other such institutions in the holy places and in the Catholic enclave.'

The consul explains that those who press this controversy interpret the cited article as follows: the clergy of foreign nationality on Ottoman territory enjoy the protection of the diplomatic representative of their country of origin; consequently, since those clerics administer religious institutions, these likewise enjoy the same protection, which would render the religious protectorate of a third power meaningless.

251 Cited by Ippen, and translated from German by Roberto Bravo.

252 This is, in fact, the main argument of the "new" powers, Italy and Germany, which are attempting to replace Austria-Hungary in the role of protector of the interests of the Catholic Church in the Ottoman Empire. The intention of these powers was to exercise the religious protectorate so as to conquer zones of their own influence. These relations and the problems connected with them are well explained in the previously mentioned article by Ana Hedwig Bene.

In Ippen's opinion, such an interpretation is not correct, which he argues as follows:

First: had it been the aim of the Berlin Congress to annul the existing rights to the protectorate, this would have been expressly stated, for a right that has been signed in numerous agreements and as such implemented for centuries cannot be tacitly annulled by some interpretation of these documents.

Second: the right to special protection of religious rights by the relevant diplomatic representative, established in the said clause of the treaty, belongs to the power he represents.

Third, Ippen maintains that the Church likewise wants a single representative for its interests, and that must be the representative of the power that exercises the religious protectorate. The aim was for the cited article to be interpreted in practice in this way, as can be concluded from several cases that occurred after 1878, among which stands out the injuring of foreign priests in Turkey.

Finally, the consul draws attention to the fact that in the case of church institutions it is often difficult to determine to which country they belong, since these are Catholic institutions that gather their members from different states.

As an additional argument for settling this controversy, he adds that only a small part of the activities of the religious protectorate deals with the protection of persons, whereas its fundamental concern is the protection of rights.

In conclusion, Ippen draws attention to the position of the Catholic Church and emphasizes that it has always, insofar as it is within its competence, recognized and approved the existing legal relationship between Turkey and Austria-Hungary. Up to that time the Church had never intimated that any of the legal provisions established by the treaties should be changed, nor the secular enforcement of certain privileges. Judicial decisions have been rendered against the manner in which the protectorate is exercised, but they have never produced consequences in Rome. Ippen adds that there

are also official declarations in favor of maintaining the status quo as regards the religious protectorate, such as the one found in the decree of the Papal Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (Propaganda Fide), 'Aspera rerum conditio,' of May 22, 1888:

'The French protectorate in the Orient has existed for centuries and its validity has been renewed by agreements between the governments that participate in it. It is necessary to refrain from introducing any changes whatsoever to the said (French) protectorate, for the aim is that it be fully preserved in all the regions in which it is in force. Missionaries must be referred to it so that, as soon as they need assistance, they may turn to the consul and other diplomatic representatives of France. Likewise, the protectorate must remain unchanged

249

which Austria carries out in those territories within the mission under its jurisdiction

Let us now examine the opposing view set out in Kuefstein's study mentioned at the beginning of this chapter253.

According to Kuefstein, the concept and scope of the right of protectorate that various powers exercised over the Church in the Orient at the end of the nineteenth century had nowhere up to that point been precisely established so as to attain universal validity. He presents arguments to support his claim. Namely, he first notes that the question of the protectorate again gained importance at the Vienna conferences of 1855 and 1856, as well as in the other negotiations that preceded the Treaty of Paris. He then points out that Article 9 of the Treaty of Paris formally excludes interference by foreign powers in what was agreed between the Sultan and his subjects. However, this provision is in itself too insubstantial to regulate the more than complicated relations among the interested parties. Hence it lost its value, since the imperial decree on which it was conditioned was ultimately not implemented in Turkey with respect to what was essential to achieving the stated aim.

In Kuefstein's words, the first and only article that to some extent deals with this question is Article 62 of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which may be considered a modification of the corresponding article from Paris, in order to better adapt it to the circumstances. But even that wording, in his opinion, is so unclear that it proves difficult to avoid interpretations of various kinds.

In Kuefstein's view, the authorization to provide a protectorate given to foreign representatives in Turkey is not defined in such a way as to make clear whether the right of religious protection applies only to citizens of their own nationality. On the other hand, the authorization itself does not explicitly state what should be considered France's acquired rights and whether this is to be understood as referring to the persons and institutions that were then under French protection or to the original concept of the French protectorate as a whole.

253 HHStA, NL Szapary, K. 3, Promemoria des Grafen Kuefstein vom 26. September 1892. Allgemeine. Das Kirchliche Schutzrecht im Oriente in seiner heutigen Gestaltung (Preliminary memorandum of Count Kuefstein of 26 September 1892, General rights to the protectorate over the Church of the Orient in its present form).

250

Whether intentionally or not, Kuefstein continues, delving into the details of a question that would create enormous difficulties and could not be simply resolved was avoided.

Therefore, a formula was established that covered general aspects, but when examined more closely, it was insufficient to lay the foundations for obtaining a proper solution. The only thing that can be said, in his view, is that the intention of Article 62 was to maintain the existing state of affairs, although, due to the imprecision of its sentences, one can hardly speak of that article laying down rules.

Kuefstein insists that turning to the texts of the agreements with Turkey would not shed any further light on this issue. The count believes that they, just like the agreements with the Roman emperors, the Archdukes of Austria, the Kings of Hungary, and the agreements signed with France, Venice, and other powers, were composed primarily with general expressions guaranteeing Christians the free exercise of religion and the right to protection. He argues that, under those same agreements, the Roman emperors, the Kings of Hungary, and others were also recognized as having the right to intercede on behalf of Christians and the Christian religion, without any limitation, in certain regions on their own territory, and the same applied to institutions or orders. However, Kuefstein concludes, it is not possible to find more precise specifications concerning the right of protectorate. In his opinion, it simply arose through usage, as customary law. Hence certain divisions emerged, zones of protectorate within which each power, quite naturally, exerted every effort to avoid foreign interference that might cause a disturbing influence. In a similar way, Kuefstein continues, different powers in different territories gradually developed various forms of protectorate that differ markedly from one another—both in their nature and in the rank of the rights attributed to them—so that no absolutely uniform norm exists. Thus, for example, Kuefstein notes that, through the Imperial and Royal ambassador in Constantinople, an imperial decree was obtained for the Albanian bishops, while bishops under French protection enjoy privileges that have been granted through practice.

In his view, it is important to establish some basic distinctions regarding the exercise of the right of protectorate.

The first is that earlier—specifically by Russia—this right was extended not only to the ecclesiastical institutions of the country exercising the protectorate and their members, but also to subjects of the Sublime Porte and of other foreign powers, provided they were members of the religious community in question. After what was agreed by the Treaties of Paris and Berlin, this interpretation could, at least in essential matters, be considered discarded. It is not known whether any other party still advances similar claims.

The second distinction lies in determining whether the existing ecclesiastical protectorate applies also to foreign nationals who belong to a particular religious community, or only to those citizens who by nationality belong to the power exercising the protectorate.

Given that, under the conditions still in force, church institutions in Turkey cannot forgo firm protection, the German diplomat considers that they should be assured that security is guaranteed to them in all their activities, including questions relating to their members insofar as these affect ecclesiastical matters. For that reason he, despite everything, also argues that if members of church institutions invoke the protection of the authority representing their country, or if the state in question wishes to provide them that protection, the law on diplomatic representation should replace that on the

protectorate. Kuefstein explains such a position by the fact that diplomatic privileges, both under general international principles and under the agreements of the Berlin Treaty, cannot be diminished by those tied to the protectorate.
Finally, Kuefstein believes that determining whether the right of protectorate encompasses all church institutions in a given territory could cause disagreements. In that regard, it should be noted that in those cases where national church institutions exist or new ones appear, the right of protectorate must be demanded for them very energetically and that situation must also be maintained, even if at the beginning, by chance, various kinds of obstacles were to arise on that path.
Kuefstein holds that one should bear in mind that the right of protectorate does not imply only representing the clergy and the Catholic Church before the local and central government, but that it develops in another sense as well. Specifically, the protectorate includes the provision of support

to the church, church institutions, and also to individual clerics, and this activity very often proves decisive. In his words, it is evident that the interference of a foreign power in these small matters can ultimately be the cause of disagreements that can harm the church organization and its composition.
Kuefstein, like Ippen, thinks that the Catholic Church cannot renounce its protectorate. Moreover, it is occasionally broadened and unjustifiably serves other political aims. Having in view both its legal limitation, directed toward ecclesiastical interests, and the geographic conditions and the relatively small number of Catholics in the Orient, the risks it carries for the Great Powers cannot, however, in Kuefstein's view, be ignored if the point is reached at which the subject in question would have to be discussed openly, even if only in very general terms.
According to Kuefstein, the decisions of the powers cannot be considered a satisfactory solution to the problem and scarcely serve this aim, since the only available texts, those from the Paris and Berlin treaties, because of ambiguities and imprecise wording, allow interpretations of various kinds. On the other hand, the material offered touches on this question very superficially, and therefore does not provide enough to base any judgment on the complexity of the relations that exist in reality solely upon them.
However, in Kuefstein's opinion, besides the foregoing there is another motive because of which the decisions from the much-cited Article 62 are practically impossible to regard as a completely definitive norm, namely the article most closely connected with the topic that concerns him. The fact is that the general conditions agreed in the earlier text of the Paris Treaty have not been fulfilled. Even today, writes Kuefstein, the Catholic Church of the Orient still does not have the peace and security that would, according to what was established, be due to it, but must on several fronts fight against hostility and intolerance, which not only limit or prevent it from expanding freely, but often also compromise its pacifist existence or, simply, the performance of religious rites without hindrance. For that reason he concludes that the Church cannot renounce effective protection abroad, and that is above all a task pertaining to the powers that have always professed that faith and whose competence for it is recognized before the Sublime Porte.

On the functioning of the Austro-Hungarian protectorate in practice, interesting information is provided by the study of the ambassador in Constantinople, Calice, on that topic254.

He, like Ippen, begins with the old, still valid state agreements between Austria-Hungary and the Sublime Porte. They contain provisions in favor of the Catholic clergy in Turkey, but were translated from Turkish into French, except for the last agreement, written in German, so we translated them into Castilian255. We did not find differences compared with those that Ippen presented in German; however, we offer them in a note at the bottom of the page256.

254 HHStA, Liasse Turquie / XIII B, Buyukdere, 18 July 1892, Studie uber das katholische Schutzrecht in Albanien, 1 Beilage, Freiherr von Calice an Seiner Excellenz Herrn Grafen Kalnoky, Wien, (Study on the right of protectorate for Catholics in Albania, Annex I to report no. 39 E, Buyukdere, 18 July 1892, Baron de Calice to His Excellency Count Kalnoky.).

255 An excellent translation was, of course, done by Roberto Bravo.

256 Article XIII of the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699 (in the original document it is translated from Turkish):

The provisions contained in the imperial capitulations issued under the glorious reigns of the preceding Sultans and in the firmans and special commands with regard to the religious dependent on the Pope of Rome and professing the religion of Jesus are confirmed by me, so that they henceforth may also be considered valid, as follows: that no obstacle be brought to the repair of their churches on their ancient foundations, nor to the exercise of their customary religious ceremonies; that the said

that the clergy, whatever category they belong to, shall not be harassed by claims for money nor under other pretexts contrary to the Sacred Law and the Imperial Capitulations; that, on the contrary, under My Imperial protection, they shall enjoy perfect tranquility; and that the Ambassador of the Roman Emperor, upon coming to My Gate of Felicity, shall make known their requests concerning their worship and their places of pilgrimage in Jerusalem.

Article IX of the Treaty of Belgrade of 1739 (translated from Turkish):

The concessions granted before and after the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz to all religious, and especially to those called “Padri Trinitari” (who depend on the Roman Emperor and devote themselves to the redemption of slaves), which concessions are inserted in the Imperial Capitulations issued under the glorious reigns of preceding Sultans and in the firmans and special commands issued regarding religious subject to the Pope of Rome and professing the religion of Jesus, are confirmed by Me, so that they shall henceforth also be regarded as valid, as follows: that no obstacle shall be raised to the repair of their churches in accordance with what is admitted by the Sacred Law, nor to the exercise of their usual religious ceremonies; that neither the aforesaid religious shall be molested by claims for money nor under other pretexts, contrary to the Sacred Law and the Imperial Capitulations; that, on the contrary, under My Imperial protection they shall enjoy perfect tranquility; and that the Ambassador of the Roman Emperor, upon coming to My Gate of Felicity,

shall make known their requests regarding their worship, their places of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and their churches situated in different places.

Article XII of the Treaty of Sistova of 1791:

“In what concerns the profession of the Catholic Christian religion in the Ottoman Empire, its priests, its faithful, the preservation or construction of its churches, freedom of religion and of the person, the visitation and protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem and elsewhere, the Sublime Porte, strictly adhering to the rule of the status quo, renews and confirms not only the privileges guaranteed to this religion by Article IX of the Treaty of Belgrade, but also the rights later granted by firmans or other imperial decrees.”

254 Kaliche insists that, on the basis of the decisions cited, one cannot dispute the existence of the granted legal grounds in the various agreements that guarantee the protectorate that we exercise over the Catholic Church in the Ottoman Empire. In a sense, he thinks that the right of protectorate receives its blessing from the very first moment in which, in the previously mentioned agreements, the privileges and competences that the Sublime Porte grants to the Catholic clergy are combined: the freedom to perform religious rites, permission to build and repair their churches, and other matters, which hold in accordance with the compromise agreed between the Sublime Porte and the Habsburg Monarchy. From these there necessarily follows the right that belongs to them to, should the need arise, press for the fulfillment of these compromises and to provide Austrian support in the claims and complaints of the Catholic clergy, particularly by appealing to these concessions. But, Kaliche continues, the Austrian right of protectorate does not arise only indirectly from the decisions of the aforementioned agreements; it also follows directly from Article XIII of the final settlement of the Treaty of Karlowitz, as well as from Article IX of the Treaty of Belgrade, which were cited earlier in the text, in which the imperial ambassador is recognized the right to present himself before the Sublime Porte as the representative of the demands of the Roman clergy on ecclesiastical questions, thereby entrusting to him the defense of their interests. It should of course be noted that a decision to this effect, and with the general formulations to which only allusion is made, is found only in the agreements with the Habsburg Monarchy, and not in those with France.

Kaliche underlines that such a right of intervention necessarily establishes a closeness between the Catholic Church in Turkey and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as the guarantor of its security. Thanks to this, the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic authorities are, in his view, legitimately called upon to assume the role of arbiter before the local government in matters concerning religion, with the same official character as they would have in the defense of their own citizens. From this there arise rights to protection and consular assistance analogous to those enjoyed by Austro-Hungarian foreign nationals in Turkey, in relation to the local authorities, in accordance with the exemptions granted to them in the relevant agreements.

This interpretation of the clauses contained in the agreements, in his view, fully reflects the spirit of Austria’s existing protective relationship toward the Catholic Church in Turkey. The Austrian diplomatic authorities cause the consular offices to afford protection in matters concerning the Catholic clergy and religion to the same extent, under the same conditions, and in the same manner as when Austrian citizens are concerned. Kalice writes that diplomatic agents officially inform the authorities of their interventions with regard to the clergy and are tasked with approaching the local authorities in order to obtain permits to build or improve their churches and monastic buildings, to establish schools, hospitals, cemeteries, etc. Kalice goes on to say that

they also guide the competent authorities and support them with respect to requests and complaints in matters connected in any way with the interests of their churches, monasteries, and educational institutions, the free exercise of religious rites, the protection of their houses, etc. He also writes that the Austrian side, on behalf of its monasteries and schools, submits appropriate requests for exemption from taxes and customs tariffs, and helps them before the Turkish courts in proceedings concerning the material interests of churches, monasteries, and schools. Kalice claims that the Austrian side does not accept any form of direct action by the local administration or the executive against the persons or institutions in question and insists on the intervention of the consular authorities in all cases falling within their jurisdiction.

According to Kalice, thanks to the numerous dossiers on activities carried out in the exercise of their competences, which are kept deposited in the archives of the Austro-Hungarian embassy and its offices, Austria-Hungary is in a position to prove constant support in all these matters, and from this there derives credible proof of the existence of the right to the protectorate in question. In that sense, particular weight attaches to the custom of requesting from the Sublime Porte letters with a certificate, known as recommendations, which the holders of the relevant episcopal representations under Austro-Hungarian protectorate

obtain through the mediation of the Imperial and Royal Embassy, a custom that is not applied to dioceses under French patronage. All these recommendations, which usually also include the text of the above-mentioned article of the Belgrade Agreement, constitute an additional set of documents which, in Kalice's opinion, justify Austria's right to the protectorate and remove any doubt as to the recognition of that right in continuity by the Sublime Porte.

To anyone who knows the conditions in which this work is carried out, it will be, according to the ambassador, obvious how great the need is that Catholic interests in the Ottoman Empire should continue even today to rely on a protectorate such as this, on the basis of the specific right guaranteed by each agreement. In his opinion, it is very uncertain whether, without the effective application of that right, the Church in that country could be in a position, over the long term and without decline, to preserve the condition of its property in religious buildings, not to mention increasing its holdings. Kalice further writes that the apparent tolerance which the Turkish government pursues in the interests of the state is not supported by goodwill, nor does it accord with the disposition of the Turkish authorities to support, through their actions, the interests of the Christian faith. As the ambassador reports, their conduct in dealing with questions of this nature regularly reveals negligence and rejection, quite often expressed through attempts to deny the existence of generally recognized rights. This creates prejudice against future demands or indefinitely prolongs the approval of concessions that cannot be refused. However, according to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, what would, without an effective protectorate from outside, reduce the Catholic Church in Turkey to even more unstable conditions is its exposure in many remote places among a population predominantly of the Muslim faith—especially because hatred directed against the Christian faith is today, as it was centuries ago, most widespread among the lowest strata of this population, and is coupled with the well-known weakness of the Sublime Porte to oppose sudden outbursts of Muslim fanaticism. He claims that in

cases when that fanaticism has entered into play it has always been difficult to compel the Sublime Porte to act energetically; today, when it is less than ever in a position, if needed, to demonstrate its authority, it would not spontaneously undertake decisive action in favor of Catholic interests except under the pressure of a foreign protectorate. 257

However, Kalice underlines that action by the ecclesiastical protectorate with the intensity set forth above would be completely impossible if the Catholic clergy in Turkey were not composed almost exclusively of foreign nationals. As regards their nationality and personal legal circumstances, they would not enjoy the applicable exemptions vis-à-vis the local authorities, since, lacking the advantage afforded by the difficulty of separating the personal from the ecclesiastical question, the effectiveness of the Austro-Hungarian protectorate would be significantly reduced if the local authority were to regain the right of direct action against the clergy, invoking their Ottoman nationality, even if only in matters of private law. Moreover, there are the circumstances in which the right to the Austro-Hungarian protectorate over clergy of Ottoman nationality has, from time to time—and especially recently—been reexamined before the Sublime Porte; accordingly, there exists a controversy on that aspect which can in itself always give rise to prior discussion that would delay the effective resolution of Austrian claims.

Maintenance of the Protectorate and the Oriental Funds
And Changes in Their Function and Use

Turkish pressure exposes members of the Catholic Church on Ottoman territory to significant trials and deprivations. In order to prevent the dissolution that increasingly threatens these missionary societies, the Imperial and Royal Austrian Crown establishes a relief fund called "Oriental Funds" 257.

The sum of money, already quite large in the decade after 1790, increases until the capital reaches 90,000 florins in interest-bearing government bonds. For this purpose they were issued by the State Chancellery, the Royal House and the Court, which from that moment manage it. A decision of the Ministerial Cabinet of 30 December 1842 orders the preparation of a report to provide an expert opinion on whether the mission funds, known as Oriental, should be applied to some specific purpose.

257 HHStA, NL Szapary, K. 3. The information below comes from a report of the section called "Oriental Funds," whose purpose is to inform the Ministry’s officials briefly and comprehensively on the subject.

258

According to this report, the Archbishop of Vienna, in a document dated 14 May 1843, declares himself against collecting the annual rent and in favor of the possibility that the accrued income be used for churches in the Orient. This use of the annual rents also receives the support of the Court Chancellery.

Later it was written: "It is of the highest political interest to maintain and expand our influence in the Orient, so that, should we have to make some intervention in that regard, part of the rent from the mission fund would be used to guarantee this goal."

It is indicated that the authority to manage these assets, according to the decision of 29/9/1843, in accordance with the decree of the Court Chancellery of 28/10/1843, Z. 34.527/3783, and later, according to the decrees of 14/10/1843, Z. 348 and 25/10/1843, Z. 5653, belongs to the General Imperial and Royal Accounting Office (instead of the Accounting Office of the State, the Royal House and the Court, as had been

customary). On the other hand, the management of the fund, its administration, the official accounting books to be used, the obligation to keep daily statements in accordance with the established instructions, to prepare a balance sheet for the United Court Chancellery and to submit a final accounting report at the end of each quarter, is set out in a decree published by the same body on 22/11/1843, 3. 34667/3798.
The United Imperial and Royal Court Chancellery, 7/3/1844, Z. 7422/819. Ref. no. 15559/120 of 1847 approves the report of 21/12/1843, Z. 40070, on the use of the funds for carrying out the mission in the Orient.
In addition to the established centers in the Turkish areas bordering Austria, churches, monasteries and missionary institutions in Egypt, as well as the Franciscan convent of Santa Maria Draperis in Pera, have the right to seek assistance from the mission fund.
In another secret report of the State Chancellery (of the Royal House and Court, of 22 November 1841 and 11 December 1842), which also bears the title Oriental Funds,258 and was drawn up for the same purpose as the previous one, it is confirmed that these initial funds were created from contributions collected in various provinces of the Imperial Austrian state in 1798, with funds raised to meet the needs of priests and Catholic churches in the Orient.
258 HHStA, PA XII, K. 271.
259
The manner of using this money is determined at that same time. Conversely, it is specifically established that the fund for the liberation of slaves, according to the report of the United Court Chancellery of 20 May 1847, will inherit the property of the closed monasteries of the Holy Trinity.
The rents from this fund are originally directed to ransoming the freedom of imprisoned Christians who are in the power of unbelievers.
They later serve for the maintenance of hospitals in Constantinople, Alexandria, and Smyrna.
In the future, when those hospitals are maintained from the income arising from the treatment and stay of patients, the report states, the proceeds of the funds for the liberation of slaves will be used for the maintenance and promotion of Catholic teaching and faith in the border provinces of Turkey.
Based on the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 21 January 1864, Zl. 417, the Austrian Emperor, by a decision of 28 January 1864, approves the transfer of matters relating to the funds for the liberation of slaves and the Oriental mission funds, which until that moment had been handled by the State Ministry, placing them under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the report of the State Ministry of 8 February 1864, Zl. 7172/235 (Prot. Z. 2388 of the year '64), in accordance with the order of the State Ministry of 15 March 1864, Zl. 2532/U.M., any question concerning both funds dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is forwarded to the Chamber for General Accounting. Its duty takes effect from that moment and it receives all applications that arrive and submits every report dealing with these matters, including those whose subject is already formulated applications. In addition, the Chamber intervenes in matters relating to the hospital in Galata (V. Z. 2982 of the year '64).259
In accordance with the order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 25 June 1866, Zl. 7362/K, and with the order of the Ministry of Finance of 16 June 1866, Zl. 8716 and 35961, the management of the Oriental mission funds, which until that moment had

been under the competence of the General Accounting Office, is transferred to the Accounting Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, effective 1 July 1866.
259 Below we will present two additional documents from the same section, which in summary form provide information on the funds for the protectorate and on the evolution in the use made by the Habsburg state itself.
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In accordance with order ZL 1350/IH of 1869, Accounting is instructed that, starting from 1 January 1869, the fund for the emancipation of slaves and the Oriental mission funds are to be handled together in a single ledger.
The capital status of both funds must be recorded separately so that, in the event of their possible separation, a record can be issued of the portion corresponding to each of them.
By order Zl. 16845/III of 1874, the General Accounting Tribunal issues the report on the final accounts of the Oriental funds, with a request that in the future a copy of it be provided to this institution once a year.
In accordance with decision 6946/6/1880 of 11 April 1880, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is assigned authority to direct subsidies in its field of activity, taken from the Oriental mission funds and the reserve fund, in an amount up to a maximum of 1,000 florins, subsequently informing His Majesty thereof by means of quarterly reports.
CHAPTER VII:
MONSIGNOR PRIMO DOKI:
IDEALIST, HERO, OR THE POWER OF GOLD?
Monsignor Doki, abbot of the local abbey, abbot nullius of the Church of St. Alexander of Orosh, is a friend of Vienna, on whose activities in Albania the Ministry counts. He obtains information on the Albanians, their state of mind and political thinking, helps establish contacts between Vienna and his pro-nationalist compatriots, conducts pro-Austrian propaganda among the population, actively participates in the drafting and adoption of a unified Albanian alphabet. In close cooperation with Vienna he establishes the Albanian Literary Society and writes texts of a nationalist character, works to spread the idea of nationhood among Albanians of the Catholic faith, attempting to reconcile the different branches of the Albanian population and to secure peace and unity among Albanians of different confessions.
According to information at Vienna’s disposal, 260 Monsignor Primo Doki, abbot nullius of St. Alexander, was born in Orosh around 1849, in the place Stame Bulgari near Lezhe. He was a student of the Collegium Urbanum at the Propaganda in Rome. He became parish priest of Mirdita in 1875 and there grew close to Prenk Bib Doda when the latter returned to the town in 1876. With the aim of liberating Mirdita and Albania from Turkish rule and establishing a principality, on the one hand he entered into contact with Garibaldi and with the leader of the Italo-Albanian Committee, Pietro Chiara in Messina, and on the other, via Montenegro, with the Committee of the Southern Slavs and the Slavic Society in Russia. In December 1876 he moved to Cetinje, intending to win the sympathy and support of Prince Nikola for his project, for which reason Bishop Malcinski was appointed in his place. As he took part in the uprising against the Turks in the Mirdita district in the spring of 1877, they arrested him near Gusinje while he was fleeing to Montenegro, after which he was extradited to Constantinople. In the Ottoman capital he was handed over to the papal envoy on

condition that he never return to Albania. After a short stay in Rome, he traveled to Canada as secretary to a high church dignitary; he lived there for approximately six years. In December 1883 he passed through Corfu and Bar [Antivari — trans. note] and finally settled in Athens as assistant to Archbishop Marango. He counted on the sympathies of the Greco-Albanian Committee from Corfu. In September 1884 he accompanied then-Cardinal Antonio Agliardi when he was sent to Bombay (Mumbai) as papal envoy to East India, where he remained until 1887.
260 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V/1, Albanien V: Albanische Patrioten I Allgemeines 1900–1909, Bericht Nr. 1, Scutari den 31. Janner 1901, Generalkonsul Ippen uber die Notabilitaten der nationalen Partei in Albanien, 1 Beilage, Fol. 39–40 b. An Seiner Excellenz Goluchowski. (Albania V: Albanian Patriots I. General data 1900–1909. The Consul General Ippen reports on prominent Albanians, adherents of the national movement, for Goluchowski, Annex 1 of the report).
Upon his return to Rome, he was proposed to take on the charge of Abbot of Mirdita, and this appointment was conditioned on the Ottoman government raising no objection to his return to Turkey, counting also on the approval of the Austro-Hungarian government. He moved to Constantinople, where, through the mediation of the Armenian Catholic Patriarch Azarian, he obtained the Ottoman government's permission to return to Albania. From there he returned to Rome, passing through Vienna. His appointment as Abbot of Mirdita took effect in 1888, when he again went to Constantinople to obtain the Ottoman permits, and in November of that year he arrived in Albania.
Why is Vienna interested in Prima Doki, already known for his activities aimed at gaining independence, which is why he was under the authorities' close surveillance and suspicion, besides the fact that he is in close contact with the Vatican and Rome? Vienna required its consuls to draw up a list of important Albanians who were participants in the so-called "Albanian national movement" in each region within the approved field of action. According to the report arriving from Scutari dated 31 January 1901 (which on the previous page is named in footnote at the bottom of the page number 1), for this area there is only one name on the list: the Abbot of Mirdita, who for some time had been a friend of Vienna. It is assumed that there are two other persons, two dervishes, but the Austro-Hungarian representative does not know them and until that moment had maintained no contact with them that would have enabled him to provide more precise data about them261.
261 This concerns a Bektashi dervish, the head of the dervish monastery (tekke) of Fushe-Kruja in the village of Derven very near Kruja, and at the same time the ecclesiastical head of all the Bektashis of the district of Kruja, as well as a dervish, a member of the Bektashis, who lives in his house in Kruja. After the former, he is the one who holds the highest rank among all the Bektashi dervishes in the district of Kruja.

To the fact that a movement so important for the future of the country had so little resonance in that part of Albania, which, as the best known, albeit wrongly, was considered the usual pivot of every change, the Austro-Hungarian representative replies that geosocial conditions are responsible for this unfavorable and unexpected situation, and he continues with a more careful study of the social conditions in that province (34) of Scutari.

The larger part of the population consists of Catholic peasants who live in the mountains. He brings in a historical analogy in order to determine that among such a segment of the population national consciousness cannot take root, since it yields its place to a different idea of community, one closer to the village. The analogy he has in mind concerns the original Swiss cantons; although the population was German, it never had a national consciousness nor did it launch a patriotic movement; the idea that prevailed among the Swiss peasants was the desire to free themselves from foreign rule (346) and to achieve an autonomous, free life in the particularity of each canton. Similarly, for Albanian peasants living in the mountains, only this ideal of life is in mind: to free themselves from the supreme authority of Turkey while retaining the specific characteristics of their own clan; the idea of a nation remains very distant to them. Thus, the Albanian mountain peasants will at any moment be ready to rise up against Turkish authority, even if that call comes from their immediate opponents, such as, for example, Montenegro; however, they regard the national idea itself as a doctrinaire principle that scarcely has practical meaning.

The other important component of the population of this province are the Muslims of Scutari; for them, the national idea and its consequences mean, as I have explained earlier in various reports, social upheaval and economic debacle. Those Muslims would need to have a motivation based on foundations different from those in question; only thus would they not a priori reject the idea. There are few Muslims among them who do not consider their economic interests endangered and therefore share the ideas of the Albanian patriots; this nationalist shoot, however, is very weak, and it is not possible to foresee whether it will develop or wither.

Finally, the population of the Catholic towns and the clergy practically constitute the bulk of the patriots, since most of them come from there; however, this patriotism is confined exclusively to informal conversations and high-flown words, and it easily yields to other considerations, such as profit and economic advantage, which govern them.

Thus, considering a situation that promises little for a spontaneous and rapid development of the Albanian national question in this area, Vienna activated its contact with the Abbot of Mirdita and, despite its doubts and the obvious flaws his candidacy entailed, turned him into its informant.

It turned out that the opinion of Baron Cvidinek was also important for making this decision; during a lengthy stay in Vienna at the beginning of 1897,262 he spoke with him and a few months later wrote that Monsignor Doki is "a patriot, displays loyalty toward Austro-Hungary and the conviction that it is the only power that will help Albania; he is an intelligent and energetic tribal leader of exceptional renown among all the mountain tribes." For all these reasons, Cvidinek is of the opinion that he will likely not find a more ideal person for spreading effective propaganda for the unification of all the Albanian tribes in order to achieve national independence263.

Primo Doki wins the favor of the Austrian baron with a series of ideas that align with the views of that high official himself, his wishes and plans, and which Zwiedineck was pleased to hear. The abbot describes a picture of the state of affairs in the intended field of action that is more wished for than real and that, in regard to Vienna’s plans, promises much. At the same time, the Albanian abbot shows himself to be a great connoisseur of Austrian strategic interests and expresses the opinion that Austria itself would have the greatest interest in a strong Albanian state eventually being born, one

that could follow its own policy rather than a Slavic, Greek, or Italian one, and that such a thing would not be contrary to Austria's interests. According to the monsignor, a divided and weakened Albanian state would be merely a plaything of the neighboring powers. Therefore, he believes that for
262 See HHStA, PA, I, K 473, Wien, am 29. Marz 1897, Report written the day after departure from the Austrian capital, Fol. 716-722.
263 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Wien, 6. April 1897, Promemoria Freih. v. Zwiedineck uber das Memoire Docchi s betr. Albainen, Fol. 688-689, (Baron Zwiedineck's memorandum on Doki's memorandum concerning Albania).
264 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Wien, den 29. Marz 1897, Fol. 716-722.

Austria it would be interesting to encourage the national consciousness of the Albanians, not only of the Mirdita, but of the entire Albanian people.
On the other hand, he assures that Italy, the main rival of Austria-Hungary, does not enjoy any sympathy among the Albanians but arouses their deepest distrust. This, although not entirely accurate, was credited to the Austrians responsible for activity in Albania.
Doki puts forward some useful proposals, some already known to Vienna but now confirmed, so that the Ministry begins to put them into effect. Among them are those concerning schools and books. According to Doki, the state to which the Albanians would give the greatest recognition would be the one that had in view certain books and Albanian schools, since these would not arouse distrust. If those schoolbooks also spoke of the national spirit, this would be an enormous contribution to maintaining a sense of closeness.
Another idea he shares with Vienna, and which seems correct to him in the longer term, is that of Albanian newspapers. Doki is of the opinion that founding Albanian newspapers would be successful, and the papers would—though on an indefinite timeline—have to enter the country easily.
Another point of agreement between Doki and Vienna is the importance and need to secure the goodwill of the Catholic bishops for Austro-Hungarian aims. According to the Albanian abbot, with regard to Mirdita it would above all be desirable that during the period of action there be present hierarchs—bishops of national-patriotic convictions. Since the incumbents have only the interests of the Church in mind, which appears to be their main task, this would, in the event of a political action, paralyze everything, because the lower clergy would not dare to step outside the bounds of church activity and act upon national feeling.
His view of whether at this moment there are those who could take up the Albanian question is interesting. He believes that, unfortunately, the answer is negative, since, under the pressure of the Turks, the families of notable men have been seized by a kind of resignation that allows only concern for their immediate surroundings and closest family. At this moment, the Albanians are not capable of engaging in far-sighted politics for the future. They do not understand it; they know only their immediate interests.
265 See note no. 7 on this same page, Fol. 720 b-721 b.

Another point of interest the Albanian abbot discussed is the role of his tribe, the Mirdita, as well as the violent relations within Albania's heterogeneous composition. Numerically

they are the weakest. They do not have enough strength to establish the core of a political formation if the group were formed only of Muslims or only of Orthodox Christians. One or the other would lack strength. It would be entirely different if all three sides—Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox Albanians—were united and created a single political entity. Then the Mirdita would see to the balance, representing neutral ground for compatriots who are still distrustful, thereby gaining incredible importance. Supremacy would then be taken by those to whom the Mirdita were inclined, that is, the Muslim or the Orthodox Albanians.

Alongside numerous confidential conversations between the abbot and Austro-Hungarian officials, which are mentioned in several reports, Primo Doki's political view was set out in a Memorandum on the means that should be applied for the development of autonomy in Albania, registered on March 14, 1897 and written in Vienna during his stay in that city.

This document has two parts, each further divided into two. As for the ideas, the first part concerns the necessary means to progressively achieve the independence of Albania; the second part deals with the establishment of the Albanian state. Each of these two ideas is first presented in summary and then recounted in detail.

The first step that will above all need to be achieved, in order to attain independence, according to Monsignor Doki, is to develop among the Albanians and spread the very idea of "independence." The obstacle he sees consists in the existing great diversity in the internal governance of Albania, because of which he himself does not know how, from the standpoint of unification, to describe the current situation of the Albanians. He writes:

"In the cities it is different than in the mountains, the relations between Muslims and Christians are different; even between some Muslim places there are differences, just as among Christians of different tribes.

Some of these communities enjoy the maximum freedom; by contrast, others—both Muslim and Christian—are heavily oppressed. In some cases, above all among certain Catholic"

266 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Vienna, March 14, 1897, Promemoria by Primo Docchi on the means to be applied for the development of Albanian autonomy. Summary of the same, Part I.

272

Among the tribes, mutually exclusive local laws and traditions are applied, while among the Muslim tribes, the code of the Ottoman Empire generally prevails.

There are mountain tribes, both Catholic and Muslim, that have never been oppressed, just as it cannot be said that the cities of Shkodra, Jakova, and Debar have in all respects been forced to submit to the will of the Porte.

However, he does not consider this autonomy a right, but rather a poor copy of what it ought to be. On the other hand, he is convinced that the idea of independence and self-government is rooted in the hearts of many Albanians, and that they already have a developed sense in this regard. Therefore, in his opinion, it would be desirable to develop this idea and the already existing sentiments, spreading this idea even among Albania's enemies. This would provoke a negative reaction from the Ottoman authorities, which would then play a unifying role for many fragmented parts of the Albanian population, who would finally merge into a single state.

Once the spread of the idea of independence is achieved, the next necessary stage to be reached is a general truce.
Why is this “absolutely necessary” according to Monsignor Doci? In order to stop hostilities and blood feuds, which still exist among various Albanian tribes, and to avoid another power intervening in the region under the pretext of wanting to pacify it.
Is this entirely achievable? Monsignor Doci believes it is, because, first of all, there are precedents, which the Albanians themselves initiated in the past, and secondly, because once they start something, Albanians have a custom of strictly persevering.
How can it be achieved? According to Monsignor Doci, by involving in confidential communication the most influential and intelligent persons, both Christians and Muslims, from both the mountains and the cities, with the aim of reaching an agreement on how to achieve the aforementioned truce. He explains more precisely that a truce should be agreed upon, on the one hand, between individual tribes, and on the other, between opposing factions in each region.
267 He refers to the League of Prizren from 1878 to 1879, whose goal was to oppose some decisions of the Berlin Congress, which concerned the cession of territories to Montenegro that, according to the Albanians, belonged to them.
273
The abbot believes that, in order to win over the mountain Albanians who practice blood feuds, the general truce may, as well as resistance to part of Turkish authority, require financial assistance and that in any case it will be necessary to proceed discreetly and cautiously, so as not to arouse the suspicions of the state authorities about the real reason for achieving the truce.
As a third step, Monsignor Doci recommends the proclamation of a league or “besa” for national defense against any foreigner who would want to invade or usurp the territorial integrity of Albania. According to the abbot, it will have to be proclaimed by the same persons who worked on the general truce. Unlike the previous league from 1878 to 1897, which the Turkish authorities did not oppose, this time it would be necessary to proceed with much caution and to make the idea of the league come from the masses of Albanians, especially from the Muslims, and to avoid opposition from the authorities. He expects that the state authorities will recognize the need for a possible new league and consider it a “pleasant support for their authority in Albania,” taking into account the current situation in Turkey, which is under pressure from all sides, the constant danger of attacks on Albanian territories by their neighbors, as well as “the lethargic apathy of the Albanians themselves.” On the other hand, he thinks that the league will not be to the liking of Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece, whose governments will do everything in their power to prevent and suppress the league, seeing in it a precursor to the autonomy and independence of Albania.
As a fourth step, according to Monsignor Doci, the league should appoint a commission that would deal with the preparation and creation of a very concrete program of action. This commission should be composed of the most influential and intelligent persons in the country. Its program would have to include three main points:
First, to maintain good relations with the Sultan’s government, which will be recognized as the legitimate sovereign.
Second, to ensure that the country’s internal administration passes from the hands of the current Ottoman officials into the hands of locals, but gradually, cautiously, and with

great tact, so as not to arouse suspicion that the league is actually a conspiracy. Therefore, the abbot recommends that at first no changes be made, especially in the cities, where local governments and political functions are in the hands of foreign Turks, who enjoy the utmost trust of the central authorities and have the army at their disposal. However, over time, they must be replaced from their
274
positions in the government and gendarmerie, and locals, regardless of religion, should take their places. The rights, demands, and prestige of old Albanian families must also be respected, the privileges of semi-autochthonous tribes strengthened, and work done on the widespread dissemination of ideas of independence.
The danger that must be eliminated is internal unrest, especially those occurring near the borders with Slavic states, since this kind of conflict could provoke foreign intervention on Albanian territory.
The third point that the commission should fulfill is the precise identification and effective protection of Albania's true interests in relations with foreign countries, while at the same time keeping alive the will to defend the nation.
According to the Abbot of Mirdita, among the true enemies of Albania are, on the one hand, states—namely the Balkan countries and Italy—and, on the other, politico-cultural movements, Pan-Slavism and Hellenism. While for the neighboring countries, for obvious reasons, it can easily be acknowledged that they are enemies, Italy is particularly dangerous because it seemingly shows sympathy toward Albania, while in fact it wishes to seize that country and annex it to itself. Why? According to Primo Doki, it wishes to seize it as a neighboring territory inhabited by the same Pelasgian race, since it needs territory onto which it could transfer its ever more numerous population; it needs brave Albanian soldiers; because it wishes to place obstacles before Austro-Hungarian trade and influence in these lands and, finally, in order to recover from the financial losses and the lost prestige it suffered in Africa.
On the other hand, Germany and England are indifferent toward Albania, while French flatteries do not impress but contribute to stronger isolation of the Albanians.
However, the only friend with the will and interest to defend Albania is Austria-Hungary. According to Primo Doki, neither the wealth of Albania, nor the origin, nor the language of its inhabitants motivates the Monarchy to annex it. Moreover, Albania would represent for Austria-Hungary a constant danger of war, even if it were ultimately to occupy it, because in such a hypothetical case it would have to go to war with Italy, with the Balkan countries, with Russia, and perhaps even with the Albanians themselves of the Muslim and Orthodox faiths. For that reason, the latter should rid themselves of their suspicion
275
regarding the widely held notion that the Monarchy wishes to occupy Albania. The only interest Austria-Hungary has is to see Albania as a friendly and allied, independent and strong country. Thus, an important part of the commission's work will consist of maintaining good relations with her.
The second essential idea from this Memorandum of Monsignor Primo Doki concerns, as we previously mentioned, the establishment of Albanian state structures. The beginning will be the creation of a Catholic principality in northern Albania, which will become a center around which, over time, other small and independent Albanian states

will gather. Although he cannot precisely state the exact number of Albania's inhabitants, he estimates it at approximately two million, of whom he assumes a little over one million are Muslims. The territorial span of the new united state should already be composed of four vilayets: Scutari, Kosovo, Bitola, and Janina, and each of them, before merging into a single common state, should, according to Monsignor Doki, first become an independent state.

He insists that the work to transform these four vilayets into states should take place after the establishment of the Catholic Albanian principality in the north. Catholic Albanians, with the help of Orthodox Albanians, would be the civilizing element and together "would in an exceptional way contribute to the formation of a united Albanian state under a single government."

The abbot then begins a detailed description of the future Catholic principality in the north, highlighting interesting information about the Albanian composition of that time, and for that reason we will quote it in full:

268 The exact borders that the Albanian prelate proposes for those future states are:

"The Region of Scutari: it borders Montenegro from the mouth of the Bojana, passing along the Adriatic Sea to Gusinje. From there, the border goes over the mountain ranges of Miskodra, Pulati, Puka and the Mirdita mountains, descending toward the Mat River and continuing to Cape Rodoni where it flows into the sea, leaving on the opposite bank the Region of Kroja.

The Region of Kosovo: on its western side it borders the aforementioned mountain ranges of the State of Scutari, and its border runs along the Bassa Debra which belongs to the Albanian-Macedonian region, goes to the border with Serbia, reaches the border with Bosnia and ends in Gusinje.

The Region of Kroja: the Mat River separates it from the State of Scutari. Kroja includes the region of Mat as well as the towns of Durres, Tirana and Kavaja.

The Region of Toskeria: with the town of Elbasan and the Epirus region with Janina (Ioannina)."

276

"With the exception of the Catholics of the Archdiocese of Skopje and a few of them between Durres and Delbiništi on the other side of the Mat River, the other Catholics (about 160,000) live within the borders of the aforementioned Scutari region.

This district is not overly large, but it is very densely populated, and within it mountains and plains, forests and rivers interlace. There, close to one another, are found the Archdiocese of Scutari, the powerful dioceses of Lješ, Sapa and Pulati, and to the east of this region, the Abbey of Saint Alexander in Orosh, the capital of Mirdita. Three rivers—the Bojana, the Drin and the Mat—provide access to the seas.

In this district, which lies between Montenegro, the Kosovo vilayet and the region around Kroja, the number of Muslims barely reaches 50,000, and the number of Orthodox Slavs barely 10,000. The Muslims are not as brave as they boast, and their strength consists only in the fact that they are the majority in the town of Scutari. If that can be called strength, since the true masters in Scutari are the Catholics from the nearby mountains.

The Catholic population of the State of Scutari is divided into the tribes of Mirdita, from Koslje, Lješ, Puka, Pulati, Miskodra (or the Malisori of Scutari), from the Scutari parishes along the Bojana and Drin rivers, from the parishes of Sapa in the Podrima

plain on the other side of the Drin and in the parishes of Lješ below the mountains of the same name, between the rivers Mat and Drin and the sea. The port of Medova is located in the west of the region a few miles from the Diocese of Lješ and at approximately 7 hours' ride from Scutari [orig. S. Giovanni di Medua; although the author also uses Medua, it is certainly the place Shengjin, Alb. Shengjin, formerly Medova or Saint John of Medua – trans. note]."

All the previously mentioned Catholics are directly or indirectly under the authority of the governor-general (name) in Shkodër. He directly governs, besides the Turks, also the Catholic population of Shkodër, as well as the parishes along the Bojana and Drin rivers; and through his representatives—the deputy governors (kaymakams, whom he selects with the consent of Constantinople)—also the previously mentioned tribes, and, when there is distance or unevenness among them, the deputy governors are represented by mudirs or buljubashas.

After the death of Bib Doda, the Catholic prince of Mirdita, in 1868, the Porte did not recognize the right of succession to the kingdom for the Doda family of Orosh, the chief town of Mirdita, and only the presence of Austria-Hungary and France at the Congress of Berlin prompted

the Porte to allow the Mirdites a Catholic governor chosen from among Doda's relatives. But, by not appointing the lawful heir to rule, that is, Doda himself, and by depriving the new governor of the traditional title of captain or duke of Mirdita, new laws and new rivalries were created within that noble family. Later, according to information provided by the Albanian prelate, in the summer of 1896 the Turkish government sent to Shkodër an Armenian, a Catholic, who was supposed to be the official governor of Christians. However, he does not deal with Christian problems—whether because of ignorance of the language and customs or because he was sent precisely to be an additional official alongside the general governor and, in practice, to do nothing. The danger lies in the fact that the special envoys of the central government in Shkodër have lately caused the strength of the tribes' internal organization, which they had preserved despite everything, to weaken significantly, with the unfavorable consequence that the local government is appropriating the old privileges of Albanian self-government. Therefore, appropriate countermeasures should be taken, one of the most important of which is the appointment of Prenk Bib Doda as governor of the Christians in the Shkodër Vilayet, in place of the aforementioned Armenian of the Catholic faith. Monsignor Doki holds the view that he, thanks to his office, would be able to replace official authorities with Christian functionaries and thus preserve the old laws of the Kanun [orig. Kankan, i.e., Kanon — trans. note], which from time immemorial regulated the internal life of every Albanian tribe, and thereby also revive their moral strength. However, the Albanian prelate recommends that the functionaries be close to Prenk Bib Doda, for example, the very children of his uncles. The advantage of this option is fourfold. First, these new functionaries would belong to the oldest aristocratic family in Albania, and second, they would also be from the Mirdita tribe, that is, the foremost in the country. Third advantage: through them a family bond of all the tribes with the princely Doda line would be achieved; and, finally, the fourth advantage: as relatives of the prince, they will be the bravest of all governors. But not only that. The direct consequences of this situation would be that disputes between the Catholic tribes (which, according to Monsignor Doki,

were being fomented by the Turks) would cease; all the tribes would merge into one—the Mirdita tribe; and finally, not at all to be underestimated, a Catholic principality would be formed in northern Albania, with its center in Shkodër, which would…

…it encompassed a land with 160,000 Catholics living between Montenegro, the Kosovo vilayet, the Mat River, and the Adriatic. Primo Doci is certain that this so-desired development of the situation can, as a whole, be achieved quickly, without problems with the Porte and without bloodshed, under Prince Prenk Bib Doda, with the investment of energy, courage, and money. Even the Muslims themselves, following the example of the majority of the Christian population, would accept the new regime. However, what is truly important is the strategic position of an Albanian state formation in that part of the peninsula, opposite the Serbs. In that sense, the Albanian prelate does not doubt that he well understands the real importance of this desired new formation and its significance for Austria-Hungary in the form of a forward enclave, a strong point against the Serbian element. In concise form, he writes:
"After the establishment of the principality:

1. The expansion of Montenegro along the Albanian coast will be prevented forever, since the new state would be a sufficient block to Montenegro.
2. As for Serbia, the Kosovo vilayet will always be an ally of northern Albania and will never allow Serbia to seize even a foot of Albanian territory.
3. This new principality could, on the internal plane, be considered Austrian, since it will adopt the structure of Austria-Hungary and because only that power will be able to guarantee it its support and protection."

Another positive consequence of a possible principality will be that, at the right moment, through it the whole of Albania will obtain a unified government. That government will be charged with initiating action among the Italian Albanians of Calabria and Apulia. They, being Orthodox, originating from Epirus and speaking the same language, will spread the same propaganda of independence among the Orthodox Albanians of Epirus.
The Memorandum ends with new recommendations on the usefulness of Prenk Bib Doda for the planned action and mentions the great interest shown by the Pope at a reception for some higher members of the Albanian clergy, who took the opportunity to renew the request on February 2 of that same year, 1897. Primo Doci suggests that, if the Austro-Hungarian government were to use its influence with the Pope, he would act before the Sultan who, seeing the circumstances, would likely grant that request.
279
Baron Zwiedinek translates Monsignor Doci's Memorandum into German and presents it to the minister, adding a series of comments on its content, on the personality of its author, with whom he has frequent conversations about his plan, as well as on the benefit to Austria-Hungary through cooperation in implementing the aforementioned plan269.
According to Baron Zwiedinek's understanding, Monsignor Doci's plan can be reduced to three points. The first, fundamental for all that follows, is to achieve as soon as possible the unification of all the Catholic tribes from the mountains, under the leadership of Mirdita. The second, parallel to the first, is to attract notable Muslims from Shkodra to that same idea of independence and, through them, to achieve that the city also be included in the field of the envisaged action. The third point, which is a

necessary condition, is that the Imperial and Royal government enable the return from exile of Prenk Bib Doda as deputy governor of the vilayet.
According to Zwiedinek's report, drawn up to inform the minister, to his question as to what would happen if this preliminary condition were not fulfilled, Primo Doci replies that it would put the entire plan in jeopardy, since no other chief of an Albanian tribe has the prestige required by the stated task. In order to persuade Vienna that his plan should be supported, Doci, as a good connoisseur of the Monarchy's strategic interests, skillfully uses them to his advantage and says that only when the unity of the Catholic tribes is achieved will the very task of winning over the Muslims of Kosovo to an alliance for the common defense of Albania be almost easy. The realization of the goals of that alliance would be considerably facilitated if the Serbs and Bulgarians were to show a desire to expand their territories. Likewise, if a union "from the north" were achieved, it would have a catalytic effect so that the Albanian tribes from the center, following this model, would unite. The same would happen with the beys from the south of Albania, who would seek an alliance with all the other Albanians, if only they saw that Greece threatened them, which seems to the baron "particularly worthy of mention"270.
To the concern expressed by Zwiedinek that the movement among the Italian Albanians, which Doci mentioned (according to the Albanian prelate, the Albanian colonies in Apulia and Calabria could
269 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Zwiedinek, Vienna, on 6 April 1897.
270 Ibid., Fol.691.

contribute to improving national consciousness and the promotion of independence271), does not have as its aim the establishment of an Italian protectorate in central and southern Albania, the abbot replies that there is no basis for this, since "precisely the Albanians of the south ardently desire a united Albanian land from the southern to the northern border, and that a confederation between the north, center, and south of Albania would seem much more useful to them for preserving an autonomous administration than an Italian protectorate which, in the end, would only place Albania in the service of the interests of a foreign power."272
This favorable prospect, although based solely on the words and opinions of a single person, fits perfectly with the plans of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy and Zwiedinek, one of the main instigators of the Austro-Hungarian action in Albania. After the submission of the memorandum by the Albanian abbot, Zwiedinek confirms the previous conclusion that it seems highly advisable to him that Vienna secure the cooperation of Monsignor Doci. As for the baron, there is no doubt that Primo Doci desires the fraternization of all Albanian tribes, a project whose realization requires the help of Austria-Hungary. Zwiedinek, despite everything, admits that carrying out an action of such scope is unlikely, but what is most important for Vienna: the creation of an entity that could "counter possible rumors about the enlargement of Montenegro and Serbia." In this way the interests of the Monarchy, in his words, would remain sufficiently protected, and this could be achieved with a Catholic Albanian principality in the north and an alliance with the Albanian tribes in the Kosovo Vilayet.
Zwiedinek also reports that the abbot reserves the right not to follow certain instructions in the part relating to procedure, since among the necessary conditions for the success of this action is the condition that he be given the greatest possible freedom of action.

Taking into account those conversations with Primo Doci and the aforementioned clarifications, Zwiedinek considers, correctly, that the tasks of the Austro-Hungarian consuls in the north, in the center, and in the south of the region should at first consist in establishing contact with the most cautious among the Albanians [273] and in determining to what extent the tribes from these areas are prepared to form an alliance for the defense of Albania.

271 Ibid., Fol. 691 b.

272 Ibid., Fol. 692–692 b.

273 Ibid., Fol. 693 b.

According to his latest information, the Albanians of the Islamic faith in the border districts along the Sanjak and Serbia are already showing a willingness to join Austria-Hungary. The high Viennese official is concerned that the real reason for this is not the existence of a hope that the Monarchy will not allow the enlargement of Serbia and Montenegro at the expense of the Albanians. In Zwiedinek's view, it would not be beneficial for Austrian interests if the Albanians were to expect the defense of their independence directly from the Monarchy, without themselves preparing all the means. It is very important, in his opinion, that the Albanians first of all recognize that it is their duty to defend their national rights against foreign interventions and that they can only count on the support of Vienna when they have fulfilled this duty to the extent possible. The Austro-Hungarian consuls in Prizren and Skopje, together with Monsignor Doci, according to Zwiedinek, must work on that plan with the Albanians from the mentioned districts.

Zwiedinek considers that, for the forthcoming assumption of Austro-Hungarian consular functions in Valona and Durres, information is particularly important that in those places Italy, by means of pacifist propaganda, is trying to win over influential Albanian families to the idea of an independent Albanian land under Italian protectorate. The idea is that the consuls be prepared to act in good time against this tendency.

The memorandum of the Albanian prelate was sent from Vienna to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople for him to set out his opinion of its practical value. The baron replies with a detailed report of 11 March 1898, [274] in which he says that the memorandum is of modest value in its conclusions and practical proposals, although it is interesting in the part that relates to the description of the Albanian situation [275]. In the first place, the ambassador thinks that the future hypothetical state is "indeed of fantastic proportions," and secondly, it is impossible to achieve the return of Prenk Bib Doda from exile and for him to fulfill the fundamental function assigned to him by Primo Doci in the founding of the principality. On the one hand—because the ambassador's recent investigations do not allow him to rely either on the character or on the real abilities of the recommended future prince, and on the other—because the task that Doci has prescribed is exceptionally difficult to accomplish, given the real circumstances, which is why "perhaps it belongs to the realm of pure imagination" [276]. Thirdly, since the main support for the action, according to the Albanian abbot's understanding, would be the Christian population in the north and south, the ambassador foresees that the action in question will in advance have both the Porte and the Muslims against it. The fourth point in Primo Doci's scheme that worries him is his conviction that the Catholic tribes that are not Mirdita will be ready to

unite with the Mirdita. Quite the contrary, according to the diplomat, based on the information available to the ambassador, there is a deep and worrying discord between the Mirdita and the Malisors, expressed in frequent and uncontrolled incidents of violence [277]. Contrary to Monsignor Doci's expectations about the operation of the league, Calice does not expect "any real advantage, but unrest that would provoke the distrust of the Porte and the Muslims" [278].
In conclusion, in the part that refers to the first section of the memorandum, that is, to the "formation," as the ambassador himself puts it, of High Albania with the aim of achieving its autonomy, he considers that "it has a poor basis and that its promotion would be harmful" [279].
274 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Constantinople, 11 March 1898. Baron Calice to Zwiedinek.
275 Ibid., Fol. 408 b.
282
Calice also does not agree with Primo Doqi's proposal to begin a similar action in the Albanian lowlands, through negotiations with the Italo-Albanian Orthodox element, since, according to the ambassador, this part of the population is the most open to external influences and Italian propaganda would have the advantage, which would again lead to a revival of the mistrust of the Porte and of the Muslim population. He warns of the dangers such an adventure may bring: a renewed and strong revival of the mistrust of the Muslim population, which will paralyze any fruitful activity and restore the mistrust of the Ottoman government against which he himself fought for many years, whose return would "not only hinder the development of a Balkan policy that corresponds to the interests of the Monarchy, but could lead, in the extreme, to the Porte, depending on circumstances, feeling the temptation directed against the very right we have acquired in the occupied
276 Ibid., Fol. 411 b.
277 See also chapter VI of this work.
278 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Constantinopel, den 11. Marz 1898, Baron Calice an Zwiedineck, Fol. 412.
279 Ibidem.
283
region, and to exploit the rivalry of precisely those neighbors from whom the Albanian region ought to be protected, namely Montenegro and Serbia." 280
Among the significant shortcomings of Primo Doqi's project, Calice also emphasizes the very little consideration it shows for the Muslim part of the population, since it is dominant among the Albanians.
Despite the fact that Don Primo Doqi's ideas seem to him barely applicable in practice and not particularly advisable, Ambassador Calice advises the minister of foreign affairs "not to discourage his ambitions and to subsidize him sufficiently to ensure that he does not give up." 281 Calice is certain that the abbot, if he is not for Austria-Hungary, will be against it, and this view is taken seriously in the Foreign Ministry, as can be seen from the marginal comment "very important" and from the subsequent financial assistance granted to the monsignor.
Another recommendation of the ambassador that Vienna will follow is to maintain close contact with the abbot, together with advice for caution, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is not as near as he assumes in his memorandum, and with the

clarification that he must work calmly and discreetly, without any haste, in order to avoid incidents and complications that could compromise the objective as a whole.
The countermeasures that Calice proposes on the basis of the latest information collected relate above all to activity among the Muslim population, using their fear of the uncertain future of the Ottoman Empire. Recently there has been a shift in the thinking of Albanians of the Muslim faith about the Monarchy as the only power from which they can expect protection, and whose wisdom, justice, and impartiality, demonstrated in the occupied lands, have produced good results and made an impressive impression.
The ambassador confirms the importance of improving education, re-establishing an Albanian newspaper (in Constantinople), and creating new channels of communication. He does so bearing in mind confidential conversations with Albanians from high state positions in the capital, as well as influential beys from the region who maintain an active political exchange among themselves and with their relatives and friends from the areas from which they come. 282
280 Ibid., Fol. 413–414.
281 Ibid., Fol. 414 b.
282 According to Calice, from this circle came the slogan that Albania should place its trust in its future prosperity through Austria-Hungary.
284
The same circle holds the view that Austria-Hungary, if it dares to defend the interests of the Albanians directly and openly before the Ottoman government, will significantly raise its influence among all Albanian tribes. Calice reports that these high officials have already identified possible means on the part of Austria-Hungary to support commercial development in the area of operations.
At present, in Calice's view, one must above all proceed cautiously, with tact, in close coordination, and patiently.
Primo Doqi left the Austrian capital on 28 April 1897. Upon his arrival in Scutari he came into contact with the Austro-Hungarian consul there, Ippen, whom Zwiedineck had personally instructed in Vienna regarding Monsignor Doqi. 283 According to the reports the consul sends to the Ministry, among the first questions the abbot puts to him is the one regarding the sum that Vienna would place at his disposal to carry out what he had proposed to them. The consul, following the instructions received in the capital, does not mention any concrete figure, but confirms the Ministry's desire to work with him, as well as Vienna's good will to grant him substantial means for that action.
The consul uses this meeting to put very concrete questions to the abbot regarding his activity. Monsignor Doqi then explains that he expects Vienna to place at his disposal a rather luxurious house, something like a small palace, in which he could lead a life similar to that at a small court, thereby attracting many people, above all the influential and decisive. Doqi is convinced that through them he will gain the possibility to influence in favor of propaganda for the idea of national autonomy, as well as to persuade those to whom that idea is already familiar to spread it in the place where they live. He counts on thus attracting Muslims from Tirana and Mat, Albanians from Prizren and Djakovica, as well as from the mountainous areas south and north of the Drin River, and also those from Skute, and to found a party that would support the action planned from Vienna.
The consul writes that he cannot agree with what the abbot proposed and adds that this mode of operation entails expenses and that it will therefore be necessary for the

Albanian abbot to have a house open to his guests, to practice exacting hospitality, and to go frequently himself on visits and journeys, during which he must present himself in splendid
283 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V/2, Bericht Nr. 13, Scutari, den 14. Mai 1897. Ippen an Goluchowski.
285
and in a generous manner; that is, he estimates that he will need 10,000 forints each year.
According to Consul Ippen's report, part of Doki's plans also includes employing collaborators, at first predominantly church figures, to whom influential secular personalities will later be added, who also need to be paid. Finally, it would be necessary to win over figures from his own province, within his sphere of action, through favors and cash gifts. Doki believes that for these last two groups a total sum of approximately 40,000 forints is needed, and in addition, he wants the consulate to place 50,000 forints a year at his disposal.
Ippen asks the minister to respond to these requests urgently. While awaiting his reply, he informs Doki that he will not arrive before the end of June.
In the consul's opinion, in the first year for payments and cash gifts, instead of the requested 40,000, 20,000 forints would be sufficient, which Doki would have to distribute. As for the annual allowance of 10,000 that Doki asks for himself personally, the consul does not venture to express an opinion, since he considers this a sensitive point, a confidential subject, and a risk that the Ministry must assume. The prelate promises to begin the action, but does not guarantee that his activities will be successful. Ippen considers that this sum of money is considerable for local circumstances, but he does not wish to take upon himself the responsibility of advising that it be reduced and thereby, for the sake of small savings, call into question the success of a major operation. Ippen also points out that he himself will soon find himself in a situation where it will be necessary to give cash gifts to the population on the Montenegrin border and to the Muslims of the same town, which will also require several thousand guilders.
Ippen goes on to report that Primo Doki insists on conducting the entire propaganda activity according to his own criteria and that the entire operation be entrusted to him, the point being that at least at the beginning a general impression should be left that this action was not inspired by the Imperial and Royal government, but is a spontaneous undertaking by some patriots, primarily by himself.
The consul approves Doki's last postulate and believes it fits the Ministry's intentions. However, he continues to harbor doubts regarding the previous ones, and writes that he still cannot render a completely clear judgment, since they have not yet been verified. As the moment for action
286
has not yet arrived, there is more time to think about the problems. He therefore undertakes to indicate them in broad outline. As for Doki's first postulate, in which he claims that he wishes to act solely according to his own criteria, Ippen believes that this can be checked by influencing him and supervising everything he does, by maintaining with him a close and friendly relationship. Doki's second postulate, that is, his persistent insistence on being the sole bearer of the entire activity, seems excessive to him, and

he believes that on the Ministry's part it would not be reasonable to get involved in the entire operation and entrust it to a single person.
Vienna replies to its consul284 that, with regard to money, it does not wish to deny that appropriate means are necessary for carrying out the program. It is therefore in principle prepared to place at Monsignor Doki's disposal the necessary funds, especially those relating to personal expenses devoted to increasing his influence and the reputation of Austria-Hungary among the members of the tribes.
However, Vienna is of the opinion that, bearing in mind the Albanians' way of life, quite simple in itself, a sum of 8,000 guilders per year would be sufficient for Monsignor Doki to maintain a luxurious household. It therefore confirms that it intends initially to provide him with that amount in advance for one year, in quarterly installments.
As regards the funds that Monsignor Doki requests for gifts, allowances and the like in order to promote propaganda in favor of the national idea, the Ministry does not think that these funds can be quantified, but considers that they will result from its evolution. They consider that even Doki himself at that moment is not in a position to assert with arguments to what extent he will increase effectiveness in the first year.
According to Vienna's conception, the procedure would be to make the necessary means available to Monsignor Doki to the extent that he informs about his activities and provides convincing explanations of his work. With the aim of creating the conditions for the start of his activities, it is prepared at the present moment to grant him a sum of 6,000 guilders.
Vienna fully approves Monsignor Doki's initiative that the entire activity should appear as a spontaneous national

284 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse Albainen, Erlass Nr. 780, Vertraulich, Wien, den 12. Juni 1897, an k.u.k. Consul Ippen, Scutari. (Bundle Albania, Confidential decree no. 780, Vienna, 12 June 1897, to the Imperial and Royal Consul Ippen in Scutari).

action of the Albanians and that Austria-Hungary should remain in the background, but that at the same time, through close contact between the abbot and the consul, the latter should gain the possibility to influence and control it. Vienna instructs its consul that Doki must regularly inform him of his actions and intentions, so that he can follow, direct and correct them, if this is deemed necessary to defend the interests of the Monarchy.
Consuls need not behave as agitators, but it is necessary that they win the sympathies of Albanians from all strata of society. If they achieve this, they will thereby be able to better monitor Doki's activities and control him.
Vienna issues important instructions for all future Austrian activity in Albania: first, establish contact with the Albanians, above all with those of the Muslim faith and, if possible, with the most prominent among them, who can influence the others; second, assure them that this is not Catholic propaganda nor any possible occupation of their country by the Monarchy. To the necessary extent, arguments may be reinforced with gifts. This means of action is permitted solely for the purpose of Vienna's ultimate and only goal: to rouse the Albanians, make them immune to other foreign influences, and ensure that, should they need assistance, they seek it only from Austria-Hungary.
Since a Catholic abbot cannot act much among Albanians of the Muslim confession, it is the consuls who, through instruction and education, must prepare them for national

unification. Thus prepared, Albanians of the Muslim faith will later join their compatriots of the Catholic faith, whom Doki has been preparing in favor of Vienna's activity.
In the meantime, Vienna closely observes, through informants, the Italo-Albanian movement and becomes well acquainted with its aims and scope. Vienna is already familiar with the means used by Italian propaganda and its connections, and becomes determined to take countermeasures with the aim of strengthening Albanian national consciousness and orienting it toward independence. In this sense, it has already taken some important steps: it is attempting to exercise direct control over the clergy that receives subsidies from it, as well as over the schools cared for by that clergy. It has also carried out some personnel

285 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V/2, Telegram, Secret, No. 785, Vienna, 16 June 1897. To Passetti, Rome.

changes in its consulates, in order to be able to establish contact with the most prominent figures among the Albanians and, through these contacts, secure access for Austro-Hungarian officials within the Albanian population.
In a private note addressed to Consul Ippen on 19 June, Von Cvidinek informs him that, as recent reports from informants state, Monsignor Doki is in contact with the leaders of the Italo-Albanian movement. It even appears true that the prelate is in contact with the Italian government and the colonial department of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For Vienna it is very important to know how close Monsignor Doki's relations are with the Italo-Albanian propaganda and the Italian government, as well as the form in which they manifest themselves in practice in Albania. Therefore, Cvidinek continues, the minister has tasked him with investigating the prelate's activities on this question, as well as his relations with the consuls of the Kingdom of Italy in Albania and with supporters of Italy's aspirations for expansion on the southwestern Adriatic. If possible, Ippen should keep them under close surveillance and report on his observations case by case.
At that moment Vienna adopts the initial assumption that Monsignor Doki expects nothing from the Italian government other than the encouragement of the national question without self-interest, and that he does not wish, in return, to support Italy's political aspirations in Albania; therefore it considers that, for the time being, no changes should be introduced in the relationship with this prelate (as envisaged by the Ministry). At the same time, despite doubts as to whether the plan for a confederation of all the tribes from the north, the center, and the south of Albania can still be implemented in practice, in the manner indicated by Monsignor Doki, the Ministry is taking steps to study the feasibility of Doki's persistent recommendation, which Consul Ippen has also confirmed. It calls for the leader of Mirdita, Prenk Bib Doda, who has been living in exile for years, to return to Shkodra. Therefore the consul asks his ambassador in Constantinople for information on the extent to which this Albanian, about whose conduct during that long exile reports are lacking, actually possesses the personal qualities

286 HHStA, PA XIV, K 7, Liasse V/2, Wien, am 19. Juni 1897, Konzept, Vertraulich, (Draft, confidential).
287 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Erlass Nr. 791, Vertraulich. Wien, den 22. Juni 1897. An

Baron Calice, Constantinopel. Fol. 38. (Confidential edict to Baron Calice in Constantinople, Vienna, 22 June 1897, No. 791, Fol. 38)
by virtue of which, together with the governor of Shkodra, he would successfully defend the interests of the Catholic tribes of the Albanian highlands. They have already charged the Consul General Hikel to conduct an inquiry into this on his trip to Constantinople and to inform Calice of its results. In this connection, they also ask the ambassador to provide them with the information he has obtained, as well as to submit his opinion on the suitability of Prenk Bib Doda's return and, also, on whether it could finally be achieved that the Sublime Porte appoint him muavin of the Shkodra vilayet.
At the beginning of July Monsignor Doki visits the Austro-Hungarian consulate to collect the money that the political-ecclesiastical section had approved for him to pay some of his debts and shows displeasure at the fact that the Ministry's explicit decision has still not arrived to pay him 80,000 francs annually for his activity, in quarterly installments of 20,000 francs each. The consul then tries to persuade him that it is quite natural for Cvidinek to want to ascertain the appropriateness of the expenses already incurred, which must still be justified through the results of Monsignor Doki's activity and the successes achieved.
According to Consul Ippen's report, Doki replies that his action is something immeasurable and inestimable, and that accordingly there is no possibility for the results to be determined and quantified. According to the prelate himself, his action consists in creating an atmosphere that often manifests itself and is perceived only on an internal plane. For all these reasons, his mission is a confidential matter and he should be given the trust to judge for himself whether his action is appropriate or not.
Ippen is not sure what is behind such insistence on Docchi's part. On the one hand, it may be that he wants, in a short time and without oversight, to acquire large sums of money; on the other hand, the consul still does not dare to suspect that the abbot is speculating in a "dishonest manner." He also does not completely rule out the possibility that his conduct is guided by convictions and by his patriotism.
So as not to fuel the conflict and to finally move onto the terrain of active measures, Ippen proposes that they refrain from further discussions and get down to work until the money arrives. He also allows himself to remind the abbot that the funds from which allocations are approved
288 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Li V/2, Scutari, den 9. Juli 1897. Uber die Verwendung des Mgre Docchi fur eine Aktion unter den Albanesen, Ippen an Goluchowski, (On the cooperation of Monsignor Docchi in the Albanian action).
290
are not inexhaustible. But he has no doubt that Monsignor Docchi likes to live lavishly. However, what is truly alarming for Consul Ippen is that, during his conversations with Docchi, he became aware that the operation entrusted to him over time, according to the Albanian prelate's plans, could turn into an Albanian "Ethniki Etaria."
The situation is still under control for the moment, since Monsignor Docchi confirms to the frightened consul that he has been unable to develop any activity, given that he has not received the funds promised to him. He also confirms that this whole delay is paralyzing the operation and causing irreparable losses.
Aware that it has little choice, Vienna continues with the planned payments for Monsignor Docchi. By secret mail, sent to Ippen from Vienna on July 8 of that same

year 1897,289 the dispatch of 5,000 francs is confirmed as payment for the first quarter, an additional 5,000 also for his personal fund, and 1,000 for political purposes, at Consul Ippen's discretion.
By another letter, dated August 6 of the same year, Ippen confirms that he received all 11,000 francs and encloses a letter from Monsignor Docchi, dated July 12, 1897, attesting that he had taken receipt of the allocations intended for him.
On September 15 of the same year, Consul Ippen asks Vienna to send 5,000 francs as the second quarter's payment for Docchi and informs them that the Albanian prelate has already spent the 10,000 francs sent and has requested that an additional 6,000 be sent to him urgently.
On October 29, Ippen confirms to Vienna that he has received 5,000 francs for Docchi, and on December 6, 1897, he is informed from Vienna that they are sending him 5,000 as the last quarterly installment of the 20,000, and the final 5,000 of the 15,000 earmarked to be sent each year for Docchi's activities in favor of Austria-Hungary. On January 25 of the following year, 1898, Ippen confirms that he has received both sums of 5,000 francs each.
However, the Ministry requires more information on Monsignor Docchi's activities and asks Consul Ippen, responsible for maintaining contact with him and transferring the funds, to report on the results obtained in promoting Vienna's political goals. Doubts still remain as to whether Vienna should continue state support for the Albanian prelate. To dispel the doubts, which are by no means negligible, the consul asks Docchi himself to
289 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V/2.
291
draw up a report on his activities, which the consul attaches as an appendix to his own letter290.
The consul first states that he would like to be able to count on Monsignor Docchi as an assistant for as long as he has to serve in this post. However, Ippen writes that assessing whether Docchi's assistance is really worth the expense it entails is beyond his remit. Ippen admits that his remarks on Docchi's activities are not precise. He was unable to visit the scope of the abbot's operation and therefore was not in a position to verify the claims that Docchi made about his activity through contact with intermediaries from his circle. Because of this, he could not produce authentic impressions from the field nor grasp the necessary local tone in order to form the most accurate possible judgment on such a delicate subject.
Ippen writes that he can only more clearly perceive the visible results achieved by Docchi's activities up to that point and reports that so far he has accomplished nothing within his mission to reconcile the Malisors with the Mirdita, and that the Mirdita raids continue, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent. As for the change in mindset among the Muslims of Scutari, which Docchi credits to himself, the consul's opinion on this subject differs.
Nevertheless, he requests that 5,000 francs be sent corresponding to the third quarterly installment of Docchi's remuneration, as well as 5,000 francs from the final installment of the total payment for the entire operation.
In the spring of 1898, Docchi goes to Vienna to explain his work directly at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is received very well and is told that his patriotism and friendship toward Austria-Hungary are highly valued291.

However, having become better acquainted with the situation in the field of operations, Vienna recommends that Docchi temper his enthusiasm and be more cautious when advocating among the Albanians for the adoption of the national idea.
Vienna attempts, through certain changes and tactical adjustments, to achieve favorable results. Its ambassador in Constantinople
290 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V/2, Bericht Nr. 66, Vertraulich. Scutari, den 14. Dezember 1897. Auszugsweise Ubersetzung einer Eingabe Mgr. Primo Docchis uber Seine bisherige Thatigkeit, Ippen an Goluchowsky. (Report no. 66, confidential, partial translation of a petition by Monsignor Primo Docchi regarding his activities up to that time).
291 HHStA, PA XIV, K 7, Albainen, Liasse V/2, Wien, Geheim, Erlass Nr. 1032, den 19. April 1898, an Consul Ippen en Scutari.
292
He tries to persuade the Sultan that it is in his personal interest, if he wishes to maintain control over the Albanians, to pay more attention to petitions for administrative improvements, with regard to Albanian national interests, reforms of education, etc.
For his part, in order to be convincing, the ambassador must provide the Sultan with evidence of the loyalty of his Albanian subjects, that they are in no way seeking independence, which is contrary to the agitation in favor of the national idea. For that reason, in this newly arisen situation, Vienna temporarily tries to halt the initiatives of the Abbot of Mirdita, as he explained them in his memorandum of 1897, and temporarily suspends his payments.
However, during his visit to Vienna, they promise that his financial assistance will be renewed if, in the near future, he succeeds in achieving more visible results in favor of increasing the prestige of the Monarchy among the Albanians.
At the same time, Consul Ippen is instructed to continue paying him the money intended for him as an individual fund—15,000 for this year, that is, 5,000 per quarter—but to make those payments in accordance with the abbot's conduct and thus postpone a definitive decision about him until later.
The vice-consul this time, in a letter from Shkodra, dated 18 June 1898, confirms that he delivered the last portion of the prescribed sum for the annual subsidy: 5,000 francs, and encloses a written receipt by Doki.
On 19 October, Consul Ippen informs the minister that Doki was surprised by Vienna's decision to temporarily suspend his subsidies and maintains that he did not understand the results of his talks in the Austrian capital that way. Ippen adds that the prelate let slip some differences in nuance and that he (the consul) fully approves Vienna's decision. At the beginning of the following month, however, Ippen is forced to inform Vienna that Monsignor Doki is requesting the renewal of his subsidies of 8,000 gulden or 20,000 francs per year, which had been negotiated in June of the previous year, and he also asks that they be sent to him in gold.
Not knowing exactly how to act, and not wishing to lose the abbot, Vienna temporarily opts to continue the subsidies. They decide that by July 1899 he will receive a further 20,000 francs paid over the next three months, in a single lump sum.
292 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Vienna, Decree No. 1247, Secret, 7 November 1898 (secret decree no. 1247).
293

The consul receives instructions to inform Primo Doki of this decision of Vienna and to hand him 10,000 francs, which is the amount provided for the quarter covering the period from 1 July 1898 to the end of September 1898, as well as the amount for the second quarter, from 1 October to the end of December of the same year, requesting a written receipt from the Catholic abbot that he has received the money.
At the same time, Ippen is to remind him that Vienna expects him to fulfill his promises and to establish among the Catholic tribes from the mountains peace, a broad dissemination of the national idea, loyal behavior toward their friend—Austria-Hungary—as well as not to allow other powers to influence them. In short: Vienna demands more information about his activities.
By a letter of 24 November 1898, Ippen confirms that he received 10,000 francs under Vienna's decree of 7 November and encloses a written confirmation by Primo Doki of the receipt of the subsidy.
Doki, however, attempts to put pressure on Vienna. He entrusts this mission to another Albanian Catholic priest from Shkodra, a man of his personal confidence. That priest travels to Vienna to speak there with Cvidinek. Cvidinek describes his impressions of the conversation with Monsignor Doki's friend in a letter of 23 November 1898, addressed to Consul Ippen.
The priest informs Cvidinek that Doki is very worried because of the change in Vienna's attitude toward him and fears that he will not be able to count on the assistance he had received until then. Cvidinek does not understand why the Abbot of Mirdita has such an impression, and so the priest tells him that it is about the subsidies that are no longer being given to him. The abbot told him that they are intended for the unification of the Catholic tribes, and then also for unification with the Albanians of the Muslim faith, and without the mentioned subsidies such unification cannot be achieved.
Cvidinek is compelled to say that there are no changes—neither in the attitude toward him nor in the part that concerns financial aid. He clarifies his version of the conversation with Doki in Vienna: that the abbot, by means of his prestige, will work on establishing peace among the Catholic tribes; that he will also work on the development of their cultural interests so that the Albanian population does not lose strength. Vienna sees its interest in a strong Albania, and the conclusion of peace among the Catholic tribes will provide a good example to all Albanians.

Nevertheless, at that moment Cvidinek does not see any of the expected results. Doki's friend replies that although there is no peace, relations have improved greatly, but that definitively, for the establishment of peace, it is necessary that Prenk Bib Doda return, to which Cvidinek responds that Doki's prestige, together with the subsidies Vienna gives, must be sufficient to achieve peace. He asks the priest to convey to Doki that Vienna has not changed its stance toward him.
Then the priest tells him that the Italian school in Shkodra receives abundant subsidies from the Italian government and they make an impressive impression, so it would not be surprising if those subsidies induce Albanians in general, and not only those from Shkodra, to forget the Austrian schools.
In the meantime, Ippen undertakes journeys through the interior of Albania with the aim of establishing contacts with prominent figures among the Albanians of the Muslim confession who can shape public opinion. The results do not resemble what was

expected and were commented on in the previous chapter.
Six months later, even the results achieved by the Catholic abbot left little room for optimism, having moved quite far from what the monsignor had promised293. Through Consul Ippen, Doki was informed that Vienna, instead of the requested 40,000 florins for the maintenance of his house-palace, would give him 20,000 and an additional 15,000 to be paid quarterly, four times a year, so that the Catholic abbot could establish contact with various Albanian tribes and form groups of his collaborators among them, as well as to bring about peace among the Albanians and to found a league.
However, Doki's activities yielded no results. The abbot blamed this on Vienna's stinginess and on Ippen's unfavorable initiatives, both on his travels, which aroused the suspicions of the central authorities, and in his generosity and conversations with certain Albanians, which, according to Doki, left them with the impression that the consul was spreading Austrian propaganda.
Ippen himself was very perplexed by the arrests of prominent Albanians with whom he had made contact and by the fear arising from this and spreading among the population, so he abandoned his plans to establish numerous friendships and to invite some of them to his house. He decided to reduce his field of activity.
293 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Liasse V/2, Konsul Ippen, Bericht vom 7. Dezember 1898.

Doki insisted that his action was having an effect, but that these were not so visible at first glance, and he continued to receive subsidies from Vienna.
From this there also arose an idea that would prove very suitable, namely to promote national consciousness through already existing Albanian newspapers, which were compiled and published abroad, rather than by founding new ones. The goal was for those newspapers to win Albanians over to Austrian propaganda.
In January 1899, Vienna showed concern about the insufficient information it was receiving on Doki's activities294. For the first time it expressed doubts about his loyalty, but it temporarily accepted Ippen's version that, rather than a lack of loyalty, the issue lay in misunderstandings due to existing cultural differences between the Albanian Catholic abbot and the Austrian diplomats. However, the Ministry insisted that, when Doki next received financial assistance, he be clearly told that, if Vienna did not interfere in the way he chose to handle matters as he deemed best, the Ministry likewise could not renounce the right to receive regular information about his work and to supervise it.
Explanations from the Abbot of Mirdita followed, as well as somewhat implausible stories about his work295, which Vienna could not verify. In that same letter, however, discrepancies are evident between what was achieved and the description of the problems he was facing (rendering the aforementioned results unattainable), and it is hard not to doubt the truthfulness of the statements made.
The monsignor insisted that on several occasions, in order to better fulfill his obligations, he had asked Consul Ippen to specify Vienna's wishes regarding his work, and that he had understood it as action aimed at ending hostilities in the region, influencing priests sympathetic to Italy to return to patriotic thinking, and informing the consulate in Shkodër about the development of the Albanian national movement.
Doki persistently assured that his activity was having an effect in all the promised directions. He insisted that it was so

294 HHStA, PA XIV, Albainen, Liasse V/2, K. 7, Wien, den 18. Jänner 1899, an Konsul Ippen, Scutari, Fol. 102–104.
295 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 7, Albanien, Liasse V/2, Docchi an den Ministern des Aeussern, den 1. Juli 1899 (Doki's letter to the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, of 1 July).
296
important that in his area there was no longer a single Albanian Catholic priest who harbored sympathies for Italy, and that the most important spiritual leaders of the Albanians visited him equally often and allowed him to guide them in all things.
By Decree No. 532 of 5 November 1899, Vienna replied that it was ready to finance the persons recommended by Doki. The abbot already had three persons envisaged, all three very important among the Albanians, and he wanted 200 gold Napoleons for each of them. The consul did not know what to do and asked Vienna to issue him more precise instructions, because Doki was impatient to hear the answer.
By a letter of 28 September 1899, Vienna informed the consulate in Shkodër that, in compliance with Order No. 368 of 19 July of the same year, 5,000 francs were being sent for Doki. By a letter of 3 August, Vice-Consul Ranzi confirmed receipt of 5,000 francs for the personal expenses of Primate Doki for the first quarter of the 1899/1900 period. From the consulate in Shkodër, another letter was sent to Vienna on 9 November confirming receipt of a further 5,000 francs, which was the second quarterly payment for the personal expenses of Primate Doki, and a written receipt from the latter was also enclosed.
Vienna's reply arrived with the confidential mail on 8 January 1900. They first had to decide what amount they could allocate for the political orientation of Albania as a whole, and only after that would they be able to decide what sum was available for trusted persons in the Shkodër consulate. In principle, Vienna would not pay out a substantial sum to someone all at once, because it preferred to maintain prolonged contact with this kind of person in order to be able to work with them, and thus believed it should approach such persons through regular and multiple tokens of consideration. However, as for the exact sum that could be offered, even though funds were allocated for several different occasions, Vienna is not in a position to answer, and so shifts the responsibility back to the consul to determine the amount more precisely. It gives him one criterion: the degree of influence that Doki actually has and to what extent he can be counted on in a political sense. The motif of the Catholic abbot's loyalty to Vienna reappears, which will be a constant theme, and without resolution, until the end of the long relationship with him.
Despite all that, money for Monsignor Doki continued to be sent regularly throughout 1900. By order no. 368 from Vienna to him, on 7 January 1900, 5,000 francs were sent through the Scutari consulate as the third quarterly payment. On 31 January Doki confirmed in writing the receipt of the money. With a secret order of 12 April, 5,000 francs were sent as the fourth quarterly payment. On 31 May Ippen sent from Scutari a written confirmation by Prima Doki of the receipt of the money. On 10 June Doki sent a letter to Vienna in which he requested that the subsidy of 20,000 francs be renewed. By order no. 221 a response was sent from Vienna on 25 July: Doki's request was approved. On 18 August Ippen sent confirmation of the receipt of 5,000 francs for Doki according to order no. 221 of 24 July 1900. From Vienna on 28 September they sent the

second quarterly payment of 5,000 for Doki. Consul Ranzi on 1 November 1900 confirmed the receipt of those 5,000 francs.
With regard to financial assistance for Monsignor Doki during 1901, based on the correspondence between the Ministry in Vienna and the consulate in Scutari296, it is clear that on 4 January 1901 Vienna sent the third quarterly payment of 5,000 francs, and on 2 April a confirmation was sent from the consulate in Scutari written by the consulate staff, as well as Doki's own written confirmation of the receipt of that sum. From Vienna on 10 April 5,000 francs were sent, which was the fourth quarterly payment for Doki. The consulate on 25 April confirmed in writing the receipt of the money, and on 21 May the same was done by Monsignor Doki.
In the same (cardboard) box there is correspondence about the regular subsidies, with the sending of the approved amounts and the written confirmations of the consulate staff and the abbot, up until 1911, when Vienna finally decided to stop subsidizing him297.
296 HHStA, PA XIV, Liasse V/2, K. 7.
297 As time goes by, Vienna's opinion of Monsignor Doki worsens. Significant is the assessment by one of his most active agents in the Albanian action, Kral, which he allows himself to make regarding the Monsignor's behavior on the question of the alphabet. It is found in the document HHStA, PA XIV, K. 24, Liasse Albainen XIV, Bericht Nr. 30 Streng vertraulich, Scutari, den 23. Marz 1906, Consul Krai an Goluchowski (File Albania XIV, Report no. 30, of the highest confidentiality, Scutari, 23 March 1906, consul Kral to Goluchowski): "…the main traits that define his character are vanity and ambition. However, he is distinguished not only by these qualities, but also by the fact that, as an excellent connoisseur of the human soul, he has learned how to use pride and greed, which in him, as in most people, lie dormant, for his own ends."

CHAPTER VIII:
LANGUAGE: A GREAT WORK ON SYNTHESIS
For Vienna it is above all necessary to resolve the problem of the Albanian alphabet so that it can begin to develop Albanian literature and literacy, which, according to its political program, is a key moment for spreading the idea of a nation among the Albanians. At that time there existed several different transcriptions of spoken dialects, a fact that harms any initiative of nationalist propaganda.
In these circumstances, the Ministry's aim is to impose a unified alphabet. This can be achieved by imposing one already existing, or simply by seeking a compromise, unifying the various transcriptions within a single graphic system. If that does not succeed, one could attempt to create a new alphabet and impose it as the standard. Distinguished Albanologists of Austrian origin are cooperating with the Ministry in this direction, and in fact their works are often motivated by concrete requests of the Ministry.
However, in order to choose one of the three options for action, the Ministry first needs current and objective information on the different transcriptions and the spread of each. Baron Cvidinek, active privy councillor to the emperor, charges the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul from Prizren (Ottoman Empire), Rapaport, during his last stay in the Austrian capital, to prepare the said information.

On January 31, 1898, Rapaport, from his post in Prizren, sends the results of the research in the form of a detailed report and an annex on the question of the Albanian alphabet, and the said documents contain three tables that he revised.
298 Some letters from the entire correspondence—for example, between Professor Meyer of the University of Graz and the Ministry—can be found in HHStA, PA I, K. 473.
299 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Geheime Akten XXX / V. Another copy of the same report with similar content, but somewhat differently composed, is also found in HHStA, PA XIV, K 4, Liasse II.
300 We will comment only on the first table, since it contains a list of the different forms of writing that are current at this moment. The second is an extension of the first:
307
We will begin with the annex, more precisely with table no. I, because it represents the essence of the whole report as well as a true picture of the Albanian linguistic situation. The annex consists of a list enumerating 17 different forms of writing of the Albanian language, and its author considers it incomplete, since in fact there are at least 20 methods of transcription, but he does not have the sequence of all the relevant ones. We will list them briefly, while at the end of the chapter we offer a copy of all of them. The first is the old alphabet of Elbasan, whose origin is unknown to Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, and its signs do not resemble the graphemes of any modern language. The second is the old Gheg, introduced approximately at the end of the 17th century by Bishop Bogdan. Since then it has been used in religious books published by the Catholic Propaganda and the Jesuits of Shkodra. The third is the reformed and simplified Gheg alphabet. The fourth is that used by the journal Albania from Brussels. The fifth is that used by the Albanologist Professor Meyer of the University of Graz. The sixth is that proposed by the Austro-Hungarian consul Pisko in his work Nordalbanesische Grammatik. The seventh is the Gheg alphabet compiled in Constantinople in 1872 by Kristoforidhi and published by the Bible Society. The eighth is the Italo-Albanian alphabet from Caratteri e Gramatica della Lengua Albanese (Corigliano Calabro, 1848). The ninth is the alphabet introduced by Dozon for the Tosk dialect: Manuel de la langue chkipe ou albanaise, Paris, 1879. The tenth is the alphabet for the Tosk dialect compiled by Vasa Pasha [Pashko Vasa] in Grammaire albanaise (London, 1887). The eleventh is by Jubani: Raccolta di canti popolari ecc. (Trieste, 1871). The twelfth represents a transcription with Greek letters from old versions of the Bible and is used, among others, by Xylander: Die Sprache der Albanesen oder Schkipetaren (Frankfurt am Main, 1835), as well as by Hahn: Albanesischen Studien, Jena 1854). The thirteenth is the transcription in Greek letters of the latest versions of the Gospels; the fourteenth is analogous to the thirteenth, but with some variations, and is used by many Albanians from Italy, among them, for example, Camarda. The fifteenth alphabet of the Tosk dialect is from Diturija (Diturija), and its creator is Sami Bey Frashëri.
it includes 12 existing alphabets and, through a graphic representation, shows what the signs for different phonemes of the Albanian language look like. The third contains a transcription of some folk songs from northern Albania in the three forms of writing that are best known among Albanians.
308

from Bucharest; the sixteenth is the application of the previous one to the Gheg dialect, attempted by Benusi, also in Bucharest in 1890; the seventeenth involves transcription in Turkish-Arabic letters.

According to Rapoport, the fact that there are so many Albanian alphabets and that, at present, among their authors and users are counted the most renowned Albanologists, such as Xylander, Hahn, Camarda, Dozon, Meyer, shows that it would probably be best not to offend these very eminent professors by forcibly composing and introducing a new alphabet at Vienna's behest.

The Vice-Consul is of the opinion that the desire for the continual creation of new alphabets serves only to increase the confusion that already prevails, and not to improve what already exists, and therefore should not be supported.

However, if one must choose one of the existing alphabets, he believes that they can be assessed from very different points of view, but that the two most important criteria are the scientific one and the one he calls the "technical-national."

Science says that in an alphabet each phoneme of the language in question must correspond to a unique and simple symbol. This condition is met above all by Professor Meyer's transcription (alphabet no. 5) and, to a lesser extent, some of the remaining variants of the script, such as those numbered 7, 13, 15, 16. But the Albanian language has more phonemes than there are pure Latin symbols.

Nevertheless, it is well known that almost none of the modern languages of European cultures, such as English, French, German, Russian, etc., is written according to this principle, and that at the time of the development of the corresponding literatures orthographic inconsistency was far more pronounced than today: the editions of Chaucer, Rabelais, Luther's Bible, etc. For that reason, the Vice-Consul thinks that, during the creation of an Albanian script, its precision and logic should not be taken as a sine qua non condition.

For him it is more important to keep in mind the national criterion and to demand that the Albanian alphabet not include foreign elements. However, so as not to slip into ridiculous chauvinism, Rapoport warns that from the outset it should be noted that Latin and Arabic symbols should not be considered foreign to Albania, since they constitute a shared international asset of the Christian and Muslim world.

But even with this clarification, the Vice-Consul is aware that the national principle cannot be applied, since the alphabets from

number 2 to number 16, including those two, for the most part or in part contain symbols or combinations from the orthographies of the Slavic peoples, as well as Greek and Italian, who are not overly well-disposed or are even hostile toward the Albanian national idea.

Then, according to Rapoport, only alphabet number 1 would remain, which disqualifies itself because of its strange characters, and besides, its origin and authenticity still need to be determined. Therefore, only the Arabic transcription remains, but it is intended exclusively for Albanians of the Muslim faith. However, there are Albanian Muslims who also reject it, because it is the alphabet of the Turkish conqueror. To them, Rapoport always replies that it does not belong to the Turkish conqueror, but to Islamic peoples such as Arabs, Persians, Afghans, Indians, and Malays.

When it comes to schools, according to Rapoport, it would be most appropriate to introduce a single uniform alphabet that would at the same time satisfy two conditions: that it not be too illogical, nor too difficult. That dual condition is fulfilled by the Jesuit alphabet, number 2 from the annex, above all in its reformed variant, numbered 3 in the annex. In the Vice-Consul's opinion, Vienna refuses to use this alphabet without sufficient reason. Later we shall see that Vienna has its reasons, but its consular representative at the time was not aware of them.

Rapoport believes that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to introduce any of the aforementioned alphabets as a single national alphabet in the country, even by the Ottoman authorities. However, if someone tries to do it from outside, they risk awakening the Albanian spirit of resistance, which is only looking for a pretext to move. For all these reasons, he thinks it is best not to burden teachers, otherwise competent and responsible, with the introduction of a new alphabet at all costs.

There are further reasons why, in the Vice-Consul's view, one should not hurry with this initiative, and the course of events will show that he was right. It is quite a long road leading from the school to the development of a literature and, in the best case (which in practice has never happened), Rapoport reckons that it would have to last at least a year and a half. But even that fantastically short period is actually longer than the one Vienna sets for itself for the national strengthening of the Albanian Arnauts.

Therefore the Vice-Consul considers it logical to think that it is better to create a literature a priori, and that, in time, the question of the alphabet

in the interior of the country can resolve itself, as happened with other languages.

He proposes that, for the emergence of a literature of this kind, every author be granted the greatest possible freedom regarding orthography. For the reproduction and publication of their works, each author, according to Rapaport, should primarily use the form that ensures general comprehensibility, without concern for differing tendencies.

With this Rapaport leads us to the question of who at this moment in Albania knows how to read and what kinds of scripts have actually been used so far. Commenting on the results of a questionnaire on this topic conducted in the Austro-Hungarian consular offices, he writes, in the form of a summary, that all optimism should be set aside, for the result is quite discouraging and the Albanians cannot be proud of it.

According to the investigations that the vice-consul himself conducted in the consular districts of Skadar and Prizren, only two types of alphabets are known, namely number 2 and number 17.

The so-called Jesuit script, or the Propaganda script, is read and written only by Catholic priests in the interior of the country, in the mountains and in the towns, as well as by a smaller part of the Catholic population in some larger places.

According to the vice-consul's information, the only city in which there live Catholic laymen who know the script in a number worth mentioning is Skadar, although, Rapaport adds, one should not forget that even there only a few of them can read and write fluently, so it would be difficult to adapt to a new alphabet that would depart even slightly from the one commonly used.

The Turko-Arabic script in Albanian villages is mastered only by hodjas (Muslim religious leaders), and in the towns by a few more Muslims, who are above all engaged in trade.

Without any doubt, the Muslims of Prizren are relatively the best educated in northern Albania, while those of Skadar know writing the least and care about it the least.
It is true that the Turkish–Albanian alphabet had until that moment been applied primarily to the Turkish language and only very rarely to Albanian. However, the experiment with the newspaper Ittifak, published in Sofia in that alphabet, was well received among many Albanian readers, so the use of the Turkish–Albanian alphabet cannot be dismissed.
311
Taking these facts and the desired goal into account—to have at least a single Albanian newspaper or brochure be intelligible to all Albanians from the north who currently know how to read and write—Rapaport proposes the following: that the newspaper or brochure be published simultaneously in the two scripts mentioned earlier: number 2 and number 17, so that the Tosks could read it as well. In addition, he considers it desirable to add one of the most established transcriptions from southern Albania, for example, number 15.
For the understanding of literary works, the alphabet is more important than faith and dialects, since the bringing together of the latter depends on publishing, in turn, alternately, works in the Gheg dialect, the Tosk dialect, by Christians and by Muslims, in three scripts.
In this way both Muslims and Christians, Tosks and Ghegs, would from that moment have the possibility to exchange their ideas, as well as to get to know each other and draw closer to one another.
In order to reduce the additional costs arising from this great diversity of scripts, Rapaport proposes using a different process instead of printing, for example, lithography, cyclostyle, and the like. It will not be necessary to print a large number of copies, given the current cultural level of the Albanians.
What would, however, in the vice-consul's view, be useful for Vienna is the attempt to have most Muslims overcome their prejudices against alphabets written from left to right, given that they see in them a kind of unbelief. The hopes and concerns of Muslims and Albanian patriots are in many cases similar, so it is not necessary for Albanians of the Muslim faith to be so uncompromising and suspicious toward the alphabet.
However, in the column with the symbols transcribed with Arabic characters they would, in any case, see proof of respect for their religion and a homage to their prestige and influence, which would gratify their vanity and lead them toward national unification, without their even being aware of it.
Vienna adopts the proposals of its vice-consul and acts accordingly. However, since the problem of alphabets does not settle itself, it also makes efforts to impose a single alphabet, seeking an optimal variant which, even if it does not satisfy at the same time such heterogeneous elements, would at least anger them considerably less.
In the archives we find correspondence between the Ministry and some Albanologists, such as the Austrian professor from
312
the University of Graz, Meyer, or the court counselor, Dr. Thalloczy. From one of the last letters, dated 9 August 1898, it is clear that the consul Ippen was also charged with the task of drafting a new alphabet, as were some representatives of the Catholic clergy. Several variants were being experimented with.

According to these reports, Vienna prepared an edition of the Bible in Albanian, using a new alphabet which the consul Ippen had compiled together with some Catholic clerics, following the model of the first-grade elementary school textbook in Bosnia. However, before taking the measures necessary for printing this book in 1,000 copies, it turned out to be necessary to review once again the orthography of the book's editorial text, as a problem had arisen that had not been foreseen in advance, owing to the enormous differences in mentality between those who devise political action and those to whom it is addressed. This time, the problem lay in the fact that those who read from among the Catholic population were used to Italian orthography. Religious books are written in that language, and the few books of Albanian literature published so far are also printed in that language. The Catholic clerics, as well as all the fathers from Catholic families whose children were supposed to read the aforementioned Bible, love that language and no other.

Thanks to Vienna's initiatives, besides this new alphabet, other plans for orthographic reform also appeared, but all of them, as the Ministry reports, have the same flaw. They do not constitute an intensive cultural movement originating from within, but rather represent more or less impractical suggestions, whose dissemination is difficult for two reasons: the first lies in the circumstance that other alphabets were being used in the Albanian press at that time, and the imposition of any different one would shock its readers; the second obstacle is the hostile attitude of the clergy and the literate population of the interior, both of whom are hostile to any kind of reform and would oppose the introduction of a new alphabet.

The clerics warn the Ministry that experience shows a single book cannot resolve the question of orthography; what is needed is a series of popular books and the constant development of literature; otherwise, that book would only contribute to increasing the chaos.

301 HHStA, PA I, K. 473.

313

For that reason, since he knows the clergy well, Consul Ippen, one of the authors of the new alphabet, chooses to preserve the old orthography, but at the same time wants the book to be compiled as soon as possible so that it can be introduced into instruction in the winter semester. Hence it appears that the most practical option is to print the book in the old orthography.

This confused situation persists despite the exceptional efforts that Vienna invested to correct it, together with its collaborators from the interior of the country as well as linguists from abroad, negotiating with everyone, providing evidence of impeccable tact, goodwill, patience, and even great generosity expressed in cash.

In some of the Albanian schools subsidized by the Imperial and Royal government, professors, despite the lack of sufficient supplementary materials for teaching in the Albanian language, refuse to use books written according to the new alphabet and published with Vienna's help.

Doki, using several methods, tries to get all Catholic priests to accept the new alphabet, but without success. Thus, on April 23, 1901, he goes to Delbenisti to visit the archbishop, Monsignor Bianchi, one of the main opponents of the new alphabet, and at first politely, but later threateningly, notes that Vienna will not approve his resistance, attempting to get Bianchi to accept the new alphabet. Archbishop Bianchi's answer is

definitive: he will not accept that alphabet without the convocation of a council in which all priests who are at the same time teachers in Catholic schools would participate. Then Doki decides to work on convening the aforementioned assembly, but seeks to ensure that the Bashkimi society, the promoter of the alphabet, also participates in it and that the assembly be under his influence. The assembly must once and for all decide on the question of the Albanian alphabet.
302 HHStA, Adm. Reg., Fach 27, K. 35, Bericht Nr. 615/2, Scutari, am 29. November, 1901, Viceconsul Dr. C. Ranzi an Goluchowski.
303 HHStA, Adm. Reg., Fach 27, K. 35, Bericht Nr. 87/2, Durazzo, am 10. Mai, 1901, Viceconsul Dr. von Kwiatkowski an Goluchowski.
304 The Bashkimi society is a literary association founded by Doki at Vienna's suggestion and under its influence. It has educational aims.
314
Vienna acts in that direction and encourages the abbot to be more devoted to the opposition and to seek a way of reconciliation with both archbishops, in order to end a situation that had already become unbearable for Austrian diplomacy.
At the same time, the members of the Bashkimi society prepare a memorandum in which they state in writing that their goal is the unification of the Albanian language and that the creation of a new alphabet is only a means of achieving that aim. They write that they are ready to withdraw the alphabet they composed, in case there is a better proposal. They propose the founding of an institution similar to an academy of sciences for northern Albania, in whose work the administrations of all the archdioceses would participate. That academy should, in a scholarly manner, decide definitively on the question of the Albanian alphabet.
However, the memorandum contains a clause according to which, in the event that the decision made is not competent, the Bashkimi society reserves the right not to obey it. Vienna does not approve this clause, which makes it necessary for Doki to prepare another memorandum of the same content, but which, without this divisive clause, would be considerably milder and more accommodating.
Archbishop Guerini, head of the Catholic mission in Albania, also agrees to cooperate in convening the assembly. At Vienna's request, he sends to the bishops Bianchi in Durrës and Trokshi in Skopje (the main opponents of Doki's alphabet) only the second memorandum of the Bashkimi society, together with one of his own enclosed texts for each of the recipients.
Vice-Consul Ranzi finds that his text is very favorable—the tone is courteous, crafted with much tact, with a large number of compliments addressed to both bishops, with a request to seek the possibility of an agreement and to accept the new alphabet temporarily until this problem is definitively resolved. He asks them to begin by accepting the idea of organizing an assembly and deliberately avoids giving concrete proposals for implementing that project, appeals to them to show trust, and reminds them what an unfavorable image
305 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Bericht Nr. 615/2, Scutari, am 29. November 1901, Viceconsul Dr. Ranzi an Goluchowski.
The text of the archbishop, Monsignor Guerini, is known to us from the report no. 621/2 of Vice-Consul Dr. von Ranzi, addressed to Goluchowski and sent from Shkodër on December 7, 1901, as an annex in Italian, and also from decree no. 80212/6, which

Vienna sent to Kwiatkowski, in which, in the form of a summary, its content is found. Both documents are kept in HHStA, Adm. Reg., Fach 27, K. 35.
315
was caused by the fact that the gathering of Albanian bishops could not reach an agreement on an issue as important as the alphabet.
Ranci makes available to Vienna the exchange of letters with the bishops and archbishops, as Doki did with the two memoranda mentioned earlier. For its part, Vienna tries to influence both sides so that they reach some agreement. It provides instructions to its consular missions to recommend to both bishops that they accept his invitation and attend the assembly306. It also tries to influence them to accept the proposal of the Bashkimi society,
which, for its part, must be ready to show willingness to accommodate the views of the two bishops.
Vienna asks its consuls to act neutrally, because it does not believe that openly advocating for one side or the other would contribute to solving the problem. However, it gives them instructions to approach Monsignor Bianchi, whose arrival is expected in Durres, orally or in whatever way seems appropriate to them, and to make it known to him that accommodating behavior would make a better impression and would be of great benefit to the country, and above all to the interests of the Catholics.
Monsignor Doki is also given instructions that he should be accommodating and understanding.
However, it turns out that both sides are less susceptible to Austrian suggestions than expected, and that fact causes uncertainty in Vienna. From the Austrian capital they continue to send instructions to their consuls in an attempt to set things right. By decree number 81326/6 of 30 December 1901 they ask Consul Pare in Skopje and administrator Mutsam in Prizren to do everything they can to find some opportunity to encourage the archbishops to send their representatives to the assembly.
From Vienna they write307 to Consul Ippen that the debate on the two alphabets does not concern them directly, but they instruct their representatives in Durres, Prizren and Skopje to do whatever they can to influence Bishops Bianchi and Troski in favor of the assembly.
At the same time, they ask Consul Ippen to inform Doki that Vienna is also vigorously supporting him at this stage, which deals with the question of the alphabet.
306 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Wien, Erlass Nr. 80212/6, den 18. Dezember 1901, an Kwiatkowski.
307 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Wien, Erlass Nr. 81330/6, den 4. Janner 1902, an Ippen.
316
Vienna considers it advisable that Bishops Sulati and Alesio, who at that moment are not mentioned and are not on the list of those invited to the assembly because there are no schools in their parishes, be included, so that in this way a decision shared by all Albanian bishops may be achieved. Vienna consults on this initiative with the representatives of both sides: Doki and the Archbishop of Shkoder. Having unambiguously expressed its concern and proposals, Vienna offers them its great, sincere support regarding the problem of the Albanian alphabet, as well as its tact and ability to launch a suitable initiative for its resolution.

Troski, on 17 January 1902, visits administrator Mutsam308 and lets him read the letter that Guerini sent him, as well as his reply to Guerini. In it he writes that he is very pleased that the assembly will be held and that he will personally attend it. As the most suitable place for the assembly he proposes Shkoder, and as for the date of its opening, he writes that it should be immediately after Easter.
However, to Guerini's proposal that the new alphabet be temporarily accepted in the schools until a definitive solution is decided upon, Troski replies that he would accept that only with the assembly's approval. This is an answer that does not augur well—neither for Vienna, nor for a single alphabet.
For his part, Kwiatkowski speaks with Bianchi309. The bishop, as Troski does with Mutsam, informs the Austro-Hungarian representative about the letter he received from Archbishop Guerini and about his reply, which is identical to Troski's reply: to convene the assembly as soon as possible. Although he says he seeks an agreement, for him it is essential that he cannot accept the new alphabet even temporarily.
Kwiatkowski, who is already navigating well the local games of the bishops, remains worried by Bianchi's answer, as well as by his choice of the delegate who will represent him at the assembly, who is an undisguised enemy of Monsignor Doki. The only thing Kwiatkowski can do in this situation—and not much is possible—is to try to influence Bianchi regarding the instructions he will give to his delegate.308309
308 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Prizren, Bericht Nr. 3, den 19. Janner 1902.
309 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Durazzo, Bericht Nr. 14/2, den 20. Janner 1902, Kwiatkowski an Goluchowski.

In the meantime, Ippen informs Archbishop Guerini of the contents of the Vienna decree of 4 January, that is, that Vienna considers it desirable to also invite the bishops of Pulati and Ljesh. Guerini invites them. The first replies that he will go if all the others go, which is hard to interpret as an expression of great enthusiasm. The second replies that he has asked Propaganda in Rome for its opinion and is still waiting for their authorization. Guerini himself is awaiting Propaganda's reply so that he can announce the date for holding the assembly. When he receives authorization from Rome, Guerini convenes the assembly of seven representatives of the dioceses in Albania for 27 April of the same year and asks the Imperial and Royal government to sponsor its expenses, which are estimated at 400 francs. Ippen forwards his request to the Ministry310311312 with the comment that Vienna cannot obtain any guarantees that the assembly will end with a good result and that it will not founder because of the not at all pleasant fights over trifles.
Vienna, however, accepts Guerini’s request and, through Marschall and Ippen, places the desired sum at his disposal. It also authorizes Marschall to draw up to 2,500 francs from the fund for Albania in case more requests arrive to subsidize the assembly.
Indeed, Troski also seeks financial assistance from Consul Para, on the pretext that he went into debt in order to travel to Scutari, where the assembly is to be held. The consul immediately informs Vienna of the Catholic bishop’s request,312 but adds that he is traveling with his intimate friend, which everywhere leaves a negative impression. Vienna’s decision is not to reply to his petition.
The assembly is held not from the 27th but from 30 April to 7 May. The outcome is negative. The participants reach no agreement on the matter of the two alphabets.

However, they prepare a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which they hand to Consul Ippen so that he may send it to the Ministry, as well as a copy of the same letter for him.313

310 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Scutari, Bericht Nr. 123/2, den 13. Marz 1902, Ippen an Goluchowski.

311 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Wien, Erlass Nr. 18008/6 vom 26. Marz 1902.

312 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Uskiib, Bericht n 64 vom 11. April 1902, Konsul Para an Goluchowski.

313 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Scutari, den 13. Mai 1902, Konsul Ippen an Goluchowski.

318

The document in question (Homagialschreiben) was signed by Pasquale Guerini, Archbishop of Scutari; Pasquale Troksi, Archbishop of Skopje; Primo Bianchi, Archbishop of Durres; Nicola Marconi, Bishop of Pulati; Lazaro Mjetija, Bishop of Sapa; Primo Doki, Abbot of Mirdita.

In addition, Guerini undertakes to prepare for Vienna a detailed report on the assembly, but he will need more time to produce it.

At the beginning of June, Ippen has more information about what happened at the assembly.314 Contrary to what he had promised Kwiatkowski, Bianchi behaves as the most obstinate of all participants. It is assumed that his behavior is due to the terror of the priest Nikola Kacona, whose influence the bishop cannot shake off. In any case, the bishops provide ample evidence that they are not capable of overcoming animosities and personal ambitions and agreeing on the use of one of these two alphabets in Albanian Catholic schools.

The heads of the dioceses of Prizren, Durres, Pulati, Lezha, and Sapa prefer Mjeda's alphabet. Guerini shares their view but does not dare openly to support them, since the greater part of the clergy of his diocese is for Doki's alphabet.

Realizing that the alphabet problem cannot be decided from Albania, Guerini proposes that foreign Albanologists, with Vienna's help, choose one of the two alphabets. He only asks that the principle be maintained that Albanian vowels, for which the Latin script has no corresponding letters, be marked with diacritics.

Ippen and his colleagues in the Vienna Ministry agree that this idea cannot be applied in practice. First, the Albanian bishops are not ready to accept the decision of the said experts. Second, Vienna has already attempted this path, but the results had no practical value. Success was limited to Faik-bey Konica publishing in the journal Albania the results of the survey and nothing more.315

314 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Scutari, Bericht Nr. 306/2, den 2. Juni 1902, Konsul Ippen an Goluchowski.

315 According to the Ippen report we cite, these results were published in the journal Albania in 1898, on pages 97, 98, 115–117, 162–163.

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For political reasons as well, Vienna cannot accept this idea.316 The members of the gathering of Albanian bishops, although under Austro-Hungarian protection, remain Ottoman subjects. It would attract extraordinary attention if the Austro-Hungarian government were to present Ottoman subjects before other foreigners—not all Albanologists are Austro-Hungarian subjects. The Ottoman authorities do not wish for

the development of the Albanian language, which compels Austria-Hungary to maintain a reserved stance on this problem in official and international fora, since open support for Albanian aspirations to create their own script would, instead of helping that aim, cause harm.

Despite everything, Vienna and its representatives in the country pay much attention to the effort not to hurt the vanity of the Albanian bishops, which, as has already become evident, is very delicate and sensitive. Therefore Vienna hastens to inform them that, if they wish, they may contact Albanologists abroad, but without the Ministry's direct involvement. It assures them that it will follow the development of this issue with great interest, and commits to helping the Albanian script both financially and morally once an agreement is reached.

Until the desired agreement is reached, Vienna, believing in it less and less, would rather maintain passive than active conduct, showing no inclination toward either of the two alphabets.

For his part, Ippen, in order to satisfy the Albanian high Catholic clergy, proposes to the Ministry that both alphabets be sent to certain Albanologists, with the authors' explanations attached as to why they chose some signs and not others. If this initiative acquires any practical value, the result can be delivered to the participants of the assembly.

At the same time, he considers that it would not be wrong to grant the request of the bishops of Prizren, Durres, Lezha, Sapa, and Pulati that in those dioceses textbooks be published in the Mjeda alphabet. He thinks it will be easy to transcribe the texts published in the Bashkimi script into the Mjeda script and republish them. These texts also include manuals—primers (when children learn to read), as well as those used for learning to count, for catechism, and stories.

316 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Vienna, Decree No. 39837/6 of 12 July 1902 to 1) Baron Bornemisza, Scutari, 2) Consul Para, Uskub, 3) Vice-Consul von Kwiatkowski, Durazzo, 4) Gerente Muthsam, Prizren.

320

Why does Consul Ippen propose this? Because both Doci and Mjeda are working on its development, although at this moment a struggle is under way between two tendencies in the Albanian script. If Vienna wishes to act solely from the standpoint of the development of the Albanian script, it must be objective and support both tendencies in the same way.

However, the Ministry does not have that much time and cannot allow itself to wait to see which of the two alphabets would prevail in practice and have a greater chance of being accepted by all Catholic Albanians, for a very important reason: neither of them is self-sufficient, nor can it present itself to the Albanian public with its own means, since both are completely dependent on financial assistance from abroad317.

According to Ippen, if they decide to wait, it would be the same as refusing support, and that would mean ending the aspirations for the development of the Albanian script. He compares the two alphabets to the experiments an inventor conducts when constructing a new device; he also needs money to validate his model, and if he is not allowed to carry out experiments, it will not be known what qualities his invention possesses.

Of course, according to Ippen, it is sad that in this case the experiments are conducted at the expense of Albanian pupils, but in the end that is an internal problem of the

Albanians, which they will have to resolve with their Catholic spiritual leaders. Unfortunately, they have not found another way to act, but have had to put the youth to the test, whom they should be caring for instead of experimenting on.
Ippen predicts that the struggle between the two alphabets will last some years and will lead to a split among Albanians of the Catholic faith. But this does not frighten him, because he thinks it is the only path that leads to unification. Indeed, at that very moment, the split already exists: they are divided into three groups—some support the old script, others Doci's, and still others Mjeda's. After debate and division, the Austrian expects them to understand which of them is best, so that Catholics among the Albanians will accept the Tosk alphabet, thereby ending the divisions.
However, he is mistaken in his predictions and hopes. The bishops—on the one hand supporters of Monsignor Mjeda, on the other supporters of Monsignor Doci—attack each other in the harshest way317

317 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F. 27, K. 35, Ippen, Report No. 306/2, already cited.

and with their conflict drag along the entire clergy318. Each current strives to gain adherents. Since one cannot expect the Imperial and Royal Government to decide to undertake a change of alphabet in the schools without taking into account the opinions of the Albanian bishops, a real offensive begins, aimed at securing a new majority among the bishops.
The position of the Bashkimi association experiences a significant strengthening after Monsignor Giacomo Sereggi, its current president, is appointed Bishop of Sapa, which unsettles the Mjeda faction, so that from that moment on, whenever a vacant episcopal see has to be filled, in making the decision it is no longer a matter of who is the most ideal candidate, but of his belonging to one or the other faction.
One of the heaviest blows that the Reverend Abbot thinks to deliver to the Agimi script—and by which, in the opinion of the new representative in Scutari, Kral, he simultaneously inflicts serious harm on Austrian interests—is the formalization of an agreement between him and the Italian Consul General in 1905. According to this agreement, the Italian consul agrees that in the Italian schools in Albania, Albanian textbooks printed in Italy, in the Bashkimi alphabet, be used, thereby becoming direct competitors to those subsidized and published by Vienna.
From that moment, the rift between the two systems in Scutari becomes even greater, and it is no surprise that, although this is essentially incorrect, one is labeled Italian and the other Austro-Hungarian.
Every individual Austro-Hungarian action or move from Scutari is examined with the greatest care in order to determine whether it actually represents, to some degree, the interest of one of the two sides.
In such circumstances it is practically impossible for Vienna to take a major step, not allowing itself to be confused by rumors and sticking only to what is best, since a different meaning is always attributed to its motivations. Then, automatically, one group or the other takes a position toward it, regardless of the specific issue at hand.
In the debates over the alphabet the most nonsensical things get mixed in. Thus, however paradoxical it may sound, according to Kral's report,

318 See HHStA, Adm. Reg., Fach 27, K 35, Scutari, Report No. 122, Secret, 9 November 1908, Kral to Alois Freiherr von Aehrenthal (at that time Minister of Foreign

Affairs).
322
debates about the replacement of Italian confraternities with Austrian ones, about subsidies to the clergy, about the question of the Catholic music chapel, about the elections of the Catholic community's committee, about the appointment of teachers, etc., get drawn into this topic.
Austro-Hungarian school policy in Albania is condemned to continue developing by itself. Vienna basically has nothing at its disposal except primitive textbooks in Albanian, as a result of which it has come into a compromising position relative to the Italian school system, which promises much and invests decisively in order to open paths for itself, relying meanwhile on a language of culture that possesses an abundance of varied means and didactic materials.
By contrast, in the Austro-Hungarian schools that have Albanian as the main language, it is impossible to make any visible progress because there are not enough textbooks in Albanian for gymnasium-level teaching and advancement. However, their production is hampered by debates over the alphabet question, which discourages many authors from publishing any new work and, on the other hand, additionally forces Vienna to print new texts irregularly, since people are never sure whether the alphabet of today will still be current tomorrow.
Of the two mentioned factions, the representatives of Bashkimi are in a position to develop more vigorous activity, because, thanks to the support received by Monsignor Doci, they have greater financial resources than the supporters of the Agimi alphabet, who, counting on no one but their own forces, concern themselves with nothing except the school texts prepared by Vienna. In turn, they receive with equal mistrust any attention directed to Doci's faction, whereby Vienna literally does nothing but increase the discord within its own ranks.
From this labyrinth of misunderstandings and compromises that hinder the Austro-Hungarian action, one can be rescued only by some broad agreement that, on the question of the alphabet, would manage to reconcile all parties.
With this task, in 1905 August Ritter von Kral arrives in Scutari, the person who contributes most to the harmonization of the Albanian alphabet. This achievement does not come by chance, but is conditioned by years of experience acquired during his career in the Balkans and a deep knowledge of the Albanians and their dialects. Given that this is one of the most significant results of the entire Austro-Hungarian action, and that it outlives the Monarchy itself, we consider it desirable briefly to present the professional path of this famous Viennese
323
official, to whom tribute should be paid not only for the establishment but also for the survival of the unified Albanian script. The information at our disposal comes from the report compiled about him by the Ministry itself and kept in the Imperial and Royal Archives319. We reproduce it here almost verbatim.
August Ritter von Kral was born on June 20, 1869. He first worked as an attaché and later as a vice-consul in the general Austro-Hungarian consulates in Constantinople320, Scutari321 and Beirut, in the period from 1894 to 1897. He was director of the consulate in Bitola322 from 1898 to 1904. From 1904 to 1905 he worked as a consul in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, where he dealt with matters related to Albania, and

from 1905 to 1909 in Scutari. From 1910 to 1913 he was a second-class general consul in Izmir and Salonika.
During his stay in Bitola he made great efforts to mediate between mutually opposed sides in the Bulgarian uprisings323, acquiring a deep knowledge of conditions in that area and focusing essentially on the cultural and literary aspect, with the Albanians, and above all with the movement of Albanians of the Orthodox and Muslim faiths from central and southern Albania, whose most important parts formed part of his district. During that period he learned Albanian very well.
After the earthquake in Scutari in 1905, he organized long-term activities to assist those in need, making no distinctions among confessions. At the same time he worked tirelessly to awaken solidarity and to encourage an understanding of common national interests among the adherents of all three confessions in Albania, who since time immemorial have fought one another, while supporting the necessary attainment of unity.
His activity in Scutari gave him an unexpected opportunity to become more closely acquainted with that region and the Albanians, also studying the situation of the Albanians of the Catholic and Muslim confessions from the north and their relations with other members of the tribes. In this way, in 1908 he had the opportunity to influence to a great extent the organization of the congress in Monastir for the unification of the Albanian alphabet, at which, by compromise, positive agreements were reached in that direction.
In 1904 he served, with the rank of first-class general consul, as the Austro-Hungarian commissioner on the International Control Commission for Albania, a job he performed in close cooperation with Mufti-bey Libohova and Bey Frasheri, aimed at establishing the independence of Albania.
319 HHStA, Archivbefehl XIX/84, NL Krai, K. 5.
320 That was then the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Today it is called Istanbul and is no longer the capital of Turkey.
321 A city in the Ottoman Empire, today in Albania.
322 A city in the Ottoman Empire, today in the Republic of Macedonia.
323 These were uprisings called by part of the Bulgarian population of this region, the first occurring after the public announcement of the decisions of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when this region was returned to the Ottoman Empire, and Muslims, humiliated by defeat in the last Russo-Turkish war, carried out a series of massacres and abuses against the local Bulgarian population. The second revolt was in 1902, with the aim of liberation from Ottoman rule and unification with their compatriots in Bulgaria. Both uprisings were brutally crushed by the regular Turkish army and fanatical Muslim masses, among them Albanians. Hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians were killed, hundreds of villages were burned, and the survivors emigrated to Bulgaria, whereby the ethnic picture of that region changed to the detriment of the earlier majority presence of Bulgarians.
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After temporary service as director in a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna in 1915, at the beginning of 1916 he traveled to Albania for the fourth time, this time as the Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within the highest civil and military administration. At his request, three general directorates were

created, akin to ministries—of finance, education, and justice—with high-ranking Albanian officials at their head, and a person holding the highest independent Muslim religious authority, the Grand Mufti, was also appointed. The Albanian Literary Commission and a Statistics Administration were also established, which, among other tasks, conducted the first demographic census, assigned surnames, etc.
The necessary departments were also naturally created, subordinate or, in various districts of the country, attached to the central departments, with appropriate staff exclusively of Albanian nationality.
Von Kral achieved the proclamation of Albanian as the exclusive and sole official language in the occupied part of Albania, thus creating an exceptional stimulus for learning the Albanian language written in the Monastir alphabet, with the aim of creating a unified written Albanian language. The Albanian Literary Commission was tasked with studying and reviewing all official Albanian civil regulations and all foreign military regulations, as well as all official publications, school textbooks, before their publication in the precise and uniform form of Albanian expression.
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Instruction in the Albanian language then reached an unprecedented rise: Albanian schools were opened in all regions, for which more or less suitable teachers had to be sought.
Through the dedicated cooperation of Albanian officials, who showed enthusiasm and understanding, a lively legislative and constructive activity began in all fields of Albanian civil administration, which in other regions was scarcely present during the wartime conflicts. That activity in Albania bore rich fruit. The Albanian officials selected at that time proved their worth and retained it under the subsequent governments. Many of them over the years advanced to the highest rungs of the national bureaucratic hierarchy. The administrative system formed at that time persisted and up to the interwar period constituted the basis and backbone of the Albanian national independent administration, with Kral considered its founder. At the beginning of 1917, Kral was appointed a member of the Austrian hereditary Order of Knighthood.
When his administrative activity in Albania after the war (1918) came to an end, in the Republic of Austria he first took the post of their Consul General in Hamburg (from 1919 to 1920), then the position of special Austrian envoy to the East and, as a minister with plenipotentiary powers, served in Bulgaria (from 1921 to 1923), in Turkey from 1924 to 1932, and simultaneously in Persia from 1928 to 1932.
As a consequence of this last assignment, upon retirement Kral published a series of books on the new Turkey, as well as the book The Land of Kemal Ataturk, The Creation of Modern Turkey from 1935, whose second, revised and greatly expanded edition was republished.
We return to the year 1905, when Kral arrived in Shkoder, and we try to recount what he achieved regarding the Albanian alphabet. During various journeys, extended stays over many years, and research in Albania in the 1880s, he had already become convinced that national unification and progress in the development of Albanian national feeling would not be possible without unifying the alphabet and creating a common literary language324. Three years later, in the form of a broad summary of his activities addressed to the Ministry, he confirmed that in recent years he had directed all his

efforts in Monastir toward maturing and promoting a solution to the question of the Albanian alphabet325.

324 HHStA, AB XIX/84, NL Krai (Herencia Krai), K. 4.

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Having arrived in Shkoder, he once again insisted that, after examining the details of the Albanian national movement and after observing his close relationship with representatives of various factions, he was convinced that the diversity of alphabets used in Albania was one of the main causes of the lack of unity and the emergence of mutually opposed groups, and that debates about the alphabet were largely to blame both for backwardness and for the slow development of the Albanian language and literature.

With sorrow and astonishment,326 he stated that the immense sacrifice made by Austria-Hungary to promote Albanian national aims in the Catholic northern part of the country, specifically in Shkoder, had remained completely unknown in the rest of Albania, due to the lack of means for mutual communication. Accordingly, the Austro-Hungarian action almost completely failed.

He observed that the literary projects in the north and those in the south were not connected in the least, and every printed book, whether printed at the expense of Austrian donations or thanks to other contributions, benefited only a small circle of interested parties, while it passed unnoticed by others.

The same occurred with the limited audience that followed various newspapers, whose printing Austria-Hungary very often subsidized. In most cases they appeared as nothing more than a party organ, serving particular interests or specific individuals, thereby losing the desired influence on public opinion in general.

In Kral's view, it is quite easy to understand why the cleavages in the literary sphere also carry over into the field of politics and why, as a consequence, the Albanian literary movement together with the Albanian press contributes more to the spread of these factions than to their rapprochement and the overcoming of mutual antagonisms.

The very existence of different dialects, especially Gheg and Tosk, constitutes an element of division, so it is completely impossible to set any common literary or political aspirations, insofar as the members of the different branches of the Albanian population could not agree even on common graphic signs.

325 HHStA, Adm. Reg., Fach 27, K. 35, Scutari, Bericht No. 122, 9 November 1908, Krai to Alois Freiherr von Aehrenthal, then Minister of Foreign Affairs.

326 HHStA, Ibid.

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Thus Kral encounters a situation in which the national movement from the south and the one from the north each go their own way, practically separate from one another.

In such circumstances, above all from the Viennese point of view, it becomes apparent that it is difficult to find a way to influence effectively the entirety of public opinion in Albania, with the aim of producing the necessary benefit for Austrian political action.

Kral is convinced that one of the basic pillars for achieving national understanding—the balance of religious oppositions—could not be attained as long as the existing alphabets, every single one of them, are placed in the service of a particular confession, i.e., as long as literacy is regarded as a religious question.

Given such a state of affairs, Kral reports, every attempt to encourage literary activity bears a stigma like the Mark of Cain, exacerbating discord, because it usually affects only the strengthening of some particular side, which then exploits it for itself, while the community does not benefit much from it.

According to Kral, no one suffered more from these mishaps than the Austro-Hungarian action in Albania, which is supported by an enormous amount of resources and which, despite having entirely different aims, is very often presented, both in Albania and abroad, as purely a partisan or religious policy. Thus there was no lack of those who attributed Machiavellian intentions to Vienna, namely the desire to revive discord and act in accordance with the motto divide et impera (divide and rule).

Besides that, the diversity of scripts, according to Kral, has a major drawback because it allows foreign groups to fight for influence in Albania, to meddle in national questions, by attracting the representative of this or that alphabet along with publishing organs, which has burdened Austrian policy and made its task extremely difficult.

For all these reasons, Kral claims he is personally convinced that it is mandatory and urgent, not only in the supposed interest of Albanian unity but specifically in the interest of Vienna's policy within the country, to contribute with all forces to resolving this delicate situation.

328

Leaving aside the Tosk circles, which set the norm and for the most part accept the Frashëri alphabet, it seems to him that Scutari is one of the places where Vienna ought to intervene with all available means, because writing and printing in Albanian have been done there since ancient times and several scripts that are still used today saw the light of day precisely in that city. There, in the consul's opinion, it would be simplest to reach an agreement which, as he envisages it, should begin to facilitate contacts between the representatives of the north and the south, who have the power to decide.

When in the spring of 1905 he got the opportunity to present his views to the authorities in the Ministry, Kral received approval and full authority to undertake, in secret, from his new post in Scutari, activities in the indicated direction, without thereby calling into question, as he claims, the principle of neutrality that the Ministry had defended up to that moment, nor that of non-interference in Albanian matters, such as the question of the alphabet.

In broad strokes, the essence of the Albanian alphabet question in 1905 is as follows327:

The Albanian scripts used in the region of Austro-Hungarian activity are:

1. The Frashëri script, also known as the popular or Constantinople script
2. The Greek script
3. The old Scutari script or the Jesuit script
4. The Bashkimi script, advocated by the party of Monsignor Primo Doci
5. The Agimi or Mjeda script

According to Kral's data, considerably more extensive than the information available in 1897 to Consul Rappaport (the first Vienna representative tasked with gathering information on the state of the Albanian alphabet), the Frashëri script is the most important and widespread, dominating the entire south and central Albania, and is therefore often called Tosk in the north. In the western half of Albania the area of its use

extends to the Sanjak of Durazzo, where it has its true bastion in Tirana; to the east, beyond Skopje, it reaches up to the Peć Sanjak.
327 The information is taken from Kral, or, more precisely, from his aforementioned report of 9 November 1908.
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It was created in 1880 by an assembly of well-known Albanian patriots, among whom, among others, the brothers Abdul, Naim, and Sami Bey Frashëri, and then Vasa Pasha and Jovan Vretua (Jani Vreto) stood out particularly. They gave it the name “popular” in order to distinguish it from the alphabet of Greek origin which until then had been used exclusively in southern Albania.
Its viability is owed to a great extent to the fact that many years earlier the English and Foreign Bible Society abandoned Greek letters for their Albanian texts in the Tosk dialect, which until then had been printed exclusively in that way, and had their books translated into Albanian reprinted using the new alphabet, thereby contributing very significantly to its spread.
It was based on the phonetic principle that each distinct sound is represented by a specific letter, and it strives to achieve that aim by using the Latin alphabet where possible, while making up for the phonetic signs it lacks by resorting to Greek letters and other letters of more recent origin.
There is no doubt that this script rests on very precise and modern scientific principles; however, it has the huge drawback that several of its letters, specifically the capital letters, are rather ornate and difficult to write and cannot be found in any other script, so there is not a single European printing house that has them, meaning they must be specially cast.
Despite this, there is no obstacle to its taking root in Albania, fostering the emergence of a national literature that has had an absolutely transcendent influence on the development of the Albanian language.
According to Kral, the Albanian association Diturija from Bucharest deserves credit for having been its noblest protector and promoter, both through various kinds of literary publications and in schools.
Despite the difficulties posed by procuring the types, more and more newspapers are appearing that use this system; in this connection, one should mention above all the newspaper Drita (Drita), published until recently in Sofia, which, with all its limitations, became the best of all Albanian newspapers.
Precisely because Albanians considered it the only “true,” “independent,” the Frashëri alphabet put down deep roots in Albania; and since renowned patriots stood as its sponsors,
330
in many circles it ultimately came to be regarded as a national heritage. To be unfaithful to it would be considered nothing but treason.
At present it is acknowledged that its main protectors were the beys of Korce (especially Orhan Bey), then Shahin Bey Kolonja, Kristo P. Luarasi, George Kyrias [Alb. Gjergj Qiriazi], brother of the first Albanian preacher and the founder of the school in Korce, Gerasimos Kyrias [Alb. Gjerasim Qiriazi], then Naum Naci, members of the Albanian Union from Bucharest, but above all and in the first place Midhat Bey Frashëri, with the

literary pseudonym Lumo Skendo [orig: Lumo Skendo], son of Abdyl Bey Frashëri of the Albanian League, very well known in this country.
The Greek alphabet carries weight in those regions of Albania that border Greece, although at other times it dominated those territories, not only among Albanians of the Greek Orthodox faith, but also among those living in the southern parts of the Janina Vilayet, i.e., among Muslims under Greek cultural influence. This alphabet was among the first to find a natural path of penetration through the schools and Greek churches; however, in the last twenty-five years, relative to the period we are discussing, it has strongly yielded to the Frashëri alphabet. As the national party rose, it lost ground and became one of the favorite targets of patriotic attacks.
The government in Athens, with great efforts, tried by all means to maintain its field of action as one of the most important and effective weapons of Greek propaganda, and to that end even encouraged the emergence of a modest Greco-Albanian literature. It subsidized Albanian newspaper enterprises created in Greece and guaranteed the publication of Albanian books, regardless of origin, but on one condition—that they use Greek letters. In this sense, in 1903 it achieved a great success by obtaining and later publishing the Albanian–Greek dictionary of Konstantin Kristoforidhi from Elbasan, thereby demonstrating to the Albanians of the south the Greek government's sympathy for the Albanian question.
At that moment, the Greek alphabet was also used by many Orthodox Tosks in whom national feeling had certainly already awakened, but who, despite everything, did not manage to free themselves entirely from the influence of Greek education.
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Advocates of this tendency are found in the orbit of Korce, in the Janina Vilayet, and within the colony of Orthodox Albanians in Egypt. Their leader is thought to be a doctor from Korce, Dr. Adamidis, who lives in Cairo.
Among the oldest Albanian scripts is the one used by the Jesuits in the printing of the "Immaculate Conception," developed on the basis of the old graphemes of the Albanian priest Blankus.
It is a mixture of Latin, Greek and foreign letters, combined without a principle that would give them unity and which, despite being difficult to learn, until only a few years ago represented a writing system adopted not only by Catholics but also by quite a few Muslims from northern Albania. The Jesuits used it in line with the aims of their works and religious publications, among which the best known of all should be noted: the Catholic periodical Elcija e zemers Jesu Krisctit ("Messenger of the Heart of Jesus"). Because of all this, it can be considered the Catholic alphabet par excellence.
With the creation of two modern alphabets—Bashkimi and Agimi—which appeared in Shkodra, the Jesuit script, which Vienna initially used for lack of something better to launch its action in Albanian schools, slowly lost its reason for existence, and even its representatives do not reject the idea that it is destined to disappear from current use.
Meanwhile, in the mid-1890s, after a long debate, the opinion began to impose itself in both the north and the south that the creation of the Albanian alphabet should resort to Latin letters, as is suggested by the Indo-European character of the language and the need for Albania to join the sphere of Western culture.
According to Kral, some members of the Albanian colony in Bucharest (such as N. Naço, among others) initially fought against this idea, and later Faik Bey Konica in his

journal Albania, published in Brussels, as did Monsignor Primo Doci, abbot of Mirdita, who headed the linguistic society Bashkimi ("Union"), founded in Shkodra. The alphabet he created is based on the use of combined letters for certain sounds not present in the Latin system.
The most prominent advantage of this script, which even Vienna had already been using for several years at that time, was that it could be printed anywhere without difficulty and used for transcribing telegrams.
332
After some hesitation, Faik-bey adapted his alphabet to Bashkimi, whereby his party gained a valuable publishing organ that enabled its propaganda activity.
As the method of combining letters in the Bashkimi system functioned in a similar way to English, according to Kral's observations, Doci's and Faik's influence is indisputable, since they were the only educated Albanians of that time who commanded this language.
Relying on the simplicity of its use, from that moment numerous Albanian publicists in various countries of Europe began to use this alphabet, such as Anselmo Lorekio in Nazione albanese, Sotir Petsi in Kombi, Nikola Ivanaj in Shpnesa e shcype-niis, Gaspar Jakova, G. Shiro, N. Asdreni, P. Gjergj Fishta, D. Ndoc Nikaj, etc.
Unlike in Shkodër, where the supporters of Monsignor Doci and, for a time, the schools subsidized by Austria-Hungary themselves contributed to the spread of the Bashkimi alphabet, in the rest of Albania the same operation, which would have limited the use of the entrenched Frashëri script to a minimum, could not be carried out.
Precisely what, according to the generally accepted rule, was considered its greatest achievement—the phonetic combination—its opponents regarded as the main defect, stressing that it conflicted with the essence of the language and confused pupils in class.
The position defended by its critics gained significant strength, even finding a kind of justification in the views of linguists and Albanologists, who stated that the phonetic principle—the same one on which the Frashëri system relies—was the most correct for reproducing Albanian sounds.
In Shkodër, seven years earlier, a split occurred among the members of the Bashkimi society, prompted above all by differences in expert opinion. This society set its creator, the parish priest Dr. Ndre Mjeda, at the head of a group that stood in defense of a new alphabet called "Agimi" ("Dawn"). That alphabet relied even more on Latin script than Frashëri itself, expressing the missing sounds with the help of diacritical marks above certain letters.
The management of the new linguistic society was soon thereafter taken over by Dr. Ndre's brother, the bishop of Sape, Monsignor Lazaro Mjeda, to whom all the other Catholic bishops
333
of the dioceses immediately joined, so that Vienna became forced once again to accept this new alphabet for publishing books for its Albanian schools, unanimously against Monsignor Doci.
Up to that moment, Albanian publishers had hardly paid attention to Mjeda's system, due to the fact that several of its letters did not appear in other alphabets, so they first

had to be cast for each individual print shop, which created significant costs. In all, there were three letters.
The Agimi script likewise did not have its own newspaper at its disposal until, a year before this report by Kral, Dashamiri (Dashamiri) from Trieste was founded, which immediately contributed to raising its reputation. In this case as well, as with the Bashkimi alphabet, the popularity of the new alphabet grew only in Shkodër, while the rest of Albania, by contrast, remained fairly distant from the debates over scripts that were being waged there.
It is practically impossible to classify as Albanian scripts (given that they are not in use in the country) the various scholarly alphabets, such as Gustav Meyer's, the alphabet of Johann Jarnik, Georg Pekmezi, etc., as well as the Turkish-Arabic script, which in recent times had been supported primarily by reactionary Muslims, Albanian-Muslim circles from Shkodër and Prizren, and the Young Turk Committee.
The introduction of the Turkish alphabet to transcribe texts in Albanian, like what happened in the case of the Greek alphabet, was not subordinated to linguistic considerations, but purely political ones, and represented the Turkish government's last attempt to set apart Muslim Albanians who were integrated into the linguistic-national movement for the emancipation of their Christian compatriots.
For reasons of a political nature, a solution to the alphabet problem seemed necessary to Kral from the very beginning, and after a brief stay in Shkodër he became firmer in his conviction and realized that it was absolutely necessary when one considers Vienna's vital interest in maintaining a protectorate over Roman Catholics in Albania.
Kral understands that the main causes of all the difficulties they face on the political-cultural field obviously lie in the debates concerning the alphabet and have a particularly divisive effect on Catholic circles. Some of these difficulties are the disunity of the clergy, the weakening of the Catholic party, the growing Italian influence on religious matters, and the standstill in the Austro-Hungarian initiative to create public

schools. According to him, a direct agreement between Mjeda and Doci, who stand firmly on their positions, does not fall within the realm of the possible; thus he focuses his attention primarily on persuading the two figures and their followers that it is necessary to reach an accord with the Tosks so that, by determining an alphabet that would be valid for all of Albania, the debates might cease on a broader scale.
To achieve lasting reconciliation, there must be neither losers nor winners, nor may any resentment remain in the hearts of those involved. Therefore Kral advocates the idea of adopting a compromise alphabet that would be composed on the basis of the three major existing systems.
According to his report, he launched his initiative in a strictly confidential and outwardly practically imperceptible form, through conversations with representatives of the Frashëri script whom he knew, as well as with influential Albanians who set the rules in Shkodër.
Of great help in achieving Kral's aims is the fact that he had earlier, in order to mediate among various figures and with the question of the alphabet always in view, established relations with the most important representatives of the publishing world and Albanian propaganda in Monastir, which he continues from Scutari to maintain in the most intensive way possible.

Kral judged it of capital importance to gain the trust of the leader of the Frasheri system, since the vice-consul, despite all the objections that, entirely unjustifiably, could be heard in Scutari regarding the alphabet, at no moment harbors doubts that the solution to this problem will never come from the Linguistic League of Scutari, but rather from the representatives of the Frasheri alphabet.

Among the latter one must count Shahin-bey Kolonja, who, through the newspaper Drita and the publishing house that issues Albanian books in Sofia, won over a considerable part of public opinion and enjoyed prestige among Albanian patriots. He also, incidentally, won over the heads of the Albanian colony in Romania, despite the fact that their literary influence in recent years had receded compared with the influence of Shahin and his colleagues.

Kral also writes that he has established contacts with Albanians from Egypt and that he maintains steady relations with circles of power from the Monastir vilayet.

In the first years, it seems almost impossible to persuade all of them, fierce defenders of the Frasheri alphabet, for whom this system is the only correct one,

that it represents an anachronism and that under no circumstances would it be accepted by the other factions. Among them, by pointing out the serious difficulties arising from the absence of a unified system, he finally manages to foster first some reflection and then, gradually, the opening of debates and the reaching of agreements, to which he also contributes through personal meetings with them. So that all, or at least practically all, Albanian newspapers might submit to a shared influence, Kral proposed to the minister that financial aid be granted to Albanian newspapers founded after Drita, thereby laying the foundations for closer ties with the director of Albania in Brussels, the director of the newspaper Shpnesa in Trieste, and the owner of the newspaper Kombi in Boston.

As for Faik-bey, the editor of Albania in London, who by that period had already for several years been close to Vienna and whom Kral knows personally, no effort is spared, although the consul writes that he would rather not entertain illusions because of his irreconcilable character.

It takes him an indescribable amount of effort to make the founders of the two alphabets from Scutari realize that neither has the possibility of imposing itself and that, in order to bring the matter to a close, one should count on the representatives of other factions, who would also have much to say.

While his work with the Tosks focuses above all on trying to persuade them to accept exclusively the Latin script, Kral also tries to convince the followers of the Agimi and Bashkimi scripts that it is necessary to make concessions to the Frasheri alphabet.

Only the need remains to begin direct contacts among the representatives of each system, at a moment when their positions have somewhat converged, so that personal negotiations could develop with some prospect of success.

Their efforts face not only more than serious objective difficulties, but also great mutual distrust and every kind of misunderstanding. No one fails to notice that the resolution of this conflict would deprive the various factions of an instrument for attacking and defeating the others.

Over two and a half years, according to Kral, the only person with whom it is completely impossible to establish a relationship is Monsignor Primo Doki, who perceives the consul's efforts to unify the alphabet
336
as personal hostility directed against him and his standing among the Albanians. According to Kral, Doki resorts to the "solution" usually applied in Albania in such cases—namely, he publicly or covertly, depending on the moment and place, conducts a veritable campaign against the consul, and, in concert with Monsignor Sereqi, does not desist from it even before the general consulate, placing all kinds of obstacles in his way in order to thwart his actions and prevent his diplomatic work. He proceeds from the assumption that, if he succeeds in removing him, he could count on the first opportunity to lead his party to victory.

However, Monsignor Doki is mistaken; Kral's efforts are on the verge of bearing fruit: under the influence of the press and statements by friendly voices, public opinion in Albania as a whole begins decisively to incline in favor of a single solution to all the disputes that have arisen around the unification of the alphabet. New articles continually appear that underline this necessity; in a word, the problem has become one of the most important points in the programs of Albanian patriots.

The abbot has, in several places, imposed the view that his alphabet has not only made its way into the Albanian press but also into the Muslim parts of Albania, such as Tirana, Elbasan, and similar places; yet the course of events, according to Kral, proves the baselessness of this claim.

Monsignor Mjeda, on whom Vienna can count to reach an agreement with the Tosks in a relatively short time, proves to be much more flexible than Doki. That flexibility is made possible by the identity of the basic principles that govern both alphabets—his and the Frasheri script (except for combinations of letters).

Already since the previous year it had become possible to carry out some merging of these two systems. However, Kral deliberately prevents this, blocking the decisive step that their representatives, in their haste, wish to take, since he does not abandon the idea that the script of the future should arise from a compromise or at least from an agreement among all the gathered factions, for which reason the exclusion of the Bashkimi script, even if it were voluntary, should be avoided by all means.
337
More precisely, Kral remains firmly of this view because, in accordance with his plan, the new alphabet should not arise from written, confidential agreements between authorized representatives; rather, these should serve only as preparation, so that it would later be approved at a general assembly and proclaimed as an independent national work.

Since at that time one could not even think of enjoying relative freedom for such aims within the Ottoman Empire, it seems to him that the most advisable place for holding such meetings would be Bucharest.

The positions of the supporters of compromise (Frashëri, Agimi) receive a great boost when, in the spring of 1908, the Jesuits openly join this current and declare that they are ready to cooperate in order to create an alphabet that would be valid throughout all of Albania and that, if that is the case, they will accept the script supported by the majority.

From the beginning of 1908, the rapprochement of the positions of the sides inclined to make a compromise led to such a change that Kral no longer saw any obstacle to initiating direct negotiations between them.
The exchange of views from the perspective of each of them and the weighing of possible concessions to be made develop even more calmly when Shahin-bey Kolonja, at Kral's request, makes an important turn by declaring that he is against the principle that until that moment he had defended in the name of his party. He states that he is even prepared to allow one or another compound letter to pass, provided that Bashkimi also takes part in the compromise.
In a hopeless situation, Monsignor Doki is isolated under pressure from his companions, who have likewise turned into supporters of the idea of compromise. The concern not to be left alone and to lose most of his followers is what moves him, in the summer of 1908, to publicly announce that his party too submits to the alphabet of the majority, although he does not formally abandon the essential points of his position nor explicitly accept active participation in the drafting of the compromise. This decision, which heralds the end of the disputes that had existed until then, is joyfully received in Shkodër.
The previous efforts at unifying the alphabet make enormous progress—practically unimaginable until that moment—with the introduction of constitutional guarantees in the Ottoman Empire, which

allow the exchange of views on all topics, and in particular with the convening of a general assembly in a city in Albania.
While the previous decisions are still echoing, already very widespread, the Albanian patriots from the Bitola Vilayet, who in the meantime have constituted an officially recognized union, take the opportunity to convene an assembly of the most trusted figures from Albanian circles, both from the country and from abroad, in order to agree on an alphabet that would be valid throughout Albania.
The speed and energy with which the first weeks of the newly proclaimed freedom are immediately used to open the question of the alphabet prove how deeply the need to find some solution has penetrated into people's consciousness and how great an importance is at last being ascribed to this aspect in relation to the subsequent development of the Albanian movement as a whole, both linguistically and politically.
The idea of a congress also meets with strong support in Shkodër. Regardless of how it will turn out, the sending of delegates from all factions so that a reconciliation assembly may be held must be considered a great success.
As representatives of the Bashkimi script, P. Gjergj Fishta (Gjergj Fishta) and Luigj Gurakuqi (Luigj Gurakuqi) set out for Bitola, and for the Agimi script, Dr. Ndre Mjeda and Matteo Logoreci.
However, the interest that began to be aroused among the broad masses of the population for this event is valued even more when it is known that at the same time the Catholic community of Shkodër decided to give full powers to Luigj Gurakuqi and Matteo Logoreci to represent it as delegates, paying the costs of their journey.
Kral also confirms that he has an envoy in Bitola, with the specific mission to, in a strict and exclusively confidential manner, smooth out disagreements that might arise between different persons, without for that reason appearing at meetings or in public.

It seems that the congress convened for the alphabet can count on all the important prerequisites to achieve success.
On the other hand, one should not overlook the danger that threatens it from the covertly hostile attitude of Turkish circles which, having perceived the efforts made to achieve unity, have stirred up great agitation, relying on the Turkish press as well as on broad circles of Muslim fanatics in order to encourage the adoption of the Turkish–Arabic alphabet.
339
Kral considers that it would be disastrous if Mid'hat-bey Frashëri, a member of the Young Turk party in the Salonika committee, who influences public opinion through the publication of the paper Lirija in Salonika, were to appear at the congress and express his disagreement with the compromise. From him and his supporters, it is expected that they will make every possible effort to prevent an agreement from being reached in Bitola, with the aim of preserving the division that prevails among the Albanians. However, judging by the firm resolve of the other Albanian patriots, there are well-founded hopes that a satisfactory agreement will be reached on this issue, which is so important for the country's future and which for decades has altered the people's mood, slowing its progress and development as a nation.
The invitations to this congress, which will be held in Monastir, were sent, on Kral's initiative and under his influence, by some Albanian patriots with whom he had already struck up a friendship. They formed a Committee to Invite to the Congress so that participants would not suspect Kral, as a foreigner, of meddling in the matter of the Albanian script.
The greatest difficulty is persuading the most bellicose factions from Scutari, which are the most hostile toward one another, to attend the congress. In the end, Kral asserts himself by exerting direct pressure on certain figures who oppose this idea. The greatest resistance is offered by the man who at that moment is the Catholic bishop of Scutari, Monsignor Giacomo Jeređi.
The congress takes place with the participation of representatives of all ideologies, but because of personal vanities it does not proceed in the expected unity, as had been promised.
Although all have representatives, the majority at the congress consists of adherents of two large groups, namely the supporters of the Frashëri alphabet and of another combined Latin script. The majority favors the latter alphabet; however, it turns out that the influence of certain prominent representatives from the leadership of the Frashëri alphabet is so great that their resistance cannot be broken. The person who fights most for this alphabet is Mid'hat Bey Frashëri, and his behavior is a mystery which, however, becomes entirely clear during the subsequent events: he had previously drawn close to the Young Turk movement and thus succeeds in preventing the achievement of unity.
328 HHStA, Adm. Reg., Fach 27, K. 35, Scutari, 20 September 1909, Krai to Aehrenthal.
340
Some members of the congress, such as Nuzhet Bey Vrioni and others, support this initiative, in the belief that those who want positions in government service act out of pure personal interest.

The events of July and all the developments connected with them that took place in Turkey significantly diminished the point of this congress, which had been envisaged as a completely independent meeting and was not supposed to depend on the views of some representatives of the Young Turk Party, to which many had rallied. This is harmful to Vienna, since, due to the declared boycott of everything Austrian, numerous adherents of the political line of the Habsburg Monarchy who were delegates at the congress do not dare to express their opinions openly. They did so for fear of being accused of having been bought by Vienna, as some incidents of that kind had already occurred. This indirectly contributes to strengthening the ranks of Austria's opponents. It is interesting to note that the Turkish alphabet, which shortly after the proclamation of the Constitution counted on the support of the Young Turks and was the subject of intensive propaganda that they conducted by all means throughout Albania, including in Scutari, had not a single supporter at the congress.

However, the Young Turk Party manages to deliver a surprising blow, above all because of the widespread suspicion that its leadership, which at that moment was touring Albania to propagate the Young Turk alphabet, would also come to the congress. These rumors influence the decision to accelerate the deliberations as much as possible. Although it later turns out that these fears were unfounded, they help bring about a rapid solution as the only way out of the difficulties that had arisen, namely, the proclamation of two alphabets. In Kral's view, this could have been avoided had the discussions been prolonged.

The Austro-Hungarian consul, of course, does not cease gathering information about that event, as well as the opinions of its participants. According to his sources, the position of the majority of the congress participants is that, had the Latin alphabet been chosen, within just a few years it would have become dominant over Frashëri. The consul thinks that his activity could have yielded better results—had he been able to establish personal relations with influential Albanians who counted not only on the Young Turks' moral support but also on material support—and that he should have made contact with those helping behind the scenes—for example with

the representatives of the weekly Lirija, which was turning into a powerful instrument of propaganda for the Frashëri alphabet due to the lack of other publications in the Albanian language.

Kral, however, considers it to have been of great importance to establish a single, unified Latin alphabet for northern Albania, which is Catholic, and especially for Scutari. That would have put an end to the old disputes among the many local factions defending the two alphabets and would have eliminated one of the most important reasons for animosity among the clergy, the bishops, and the consulate.

After more than a year—which allowed his opinion to become even more objective—Kral believed that, despite the unconvincing results, the congress nevertheless laid the foundation for a valuable national process. Such was also the immediate impression of the people dealing with this issue in his district.

He also reports an interesting metamorphosis in Monsignor Primo Doki and his stance. When the first news arrives from the congress, announcing that in addition to the Frashëri alphabet a Latin alphabet based on the principles of the supporters of the Bashkimi script was also adopted there, Doki shows joy and praises the work of the

congress, which he characterizes as magnificent, not for the solution achieved but because he feels himself the victor over Mjeda's party.
However, when he later learns that in the end a small element of compromise remained, he changes his views and opposes the decisions made in Bitola, to the point of repudiating his own delegates, refusing to recognize the Latin alphabet. He tries to persuade not only his like-minded supporters but Kral himself and Monsignor Mjeda. The latter, however, very happy that a solution has finally been found, replies firmly that the matter of the alphabet is, for him, finally closed and that they can now at last, with greater effort, devote themselves to more important topics.
Monsignor the archbishop remains "isolated" because of his intransigence, since even his closest followers make it clear to him that disregarding the agreement from the congress, which his delegates signed, would be tantamount to the loss of his national honor. Only then does Monsignor Doki abandon his opposition, and since the topic of the alphabet no longer requires his energy, he turns with all his might to continuing his various economic projects, which from then on occupy all his effort and time.

However, the majority approves the alphabet based on a compromise that Kral directly suggested. This represents a huge success, since it is accepted by the most important Albanian publishing houses and finally applied in practice. Over the following years it establishes itself as the sole alphabet, despite the shortcomings it contains and which cannot be avoided. The question of script, which over the years caused discord and brought the lack of agreement among the Albanian intelligentsia to the very brink of the abyss, is thus settled and corrected. In independent Albania, above all in official centers such as schools, from that moment no other alphabet is used.
But let us go back to briefly recount what happens after the congress in Bitola and before the Austrian occupation. It is 1909 and the Young Turks are in power, a political change that gives Albanian nationalists a freedom of action to pursue their efforts that they had not had before. We will concentrate above all on the District of Shkodra, from where Austro-Hungarian officials obtain the best information.
The delegates from the congress return home with the news of the establishment of two alphabets for writing the Albanian language, which was achieved at the congress. This solution does not fully satisfy the circles in Shkodra, who are very interested in this issue. However, it is ultimately accepted with satisfaction, as it serves to resolve a dispute that had dragged on for too many years. The difficulties that arose during the debates are attributed to the influence of the Young Turks.
Those who await the decision of the congress in Monastir with the greatest impatience in order to adapt to it immediately are the Jesuits of Shkodra. They at once publish their religious weekly Elcija, which they had been issuing for years, in the new script, thus burying for all time the old Bianchi alphabet, which had been used for centuries.
The assembly of bishops and the clergy decide to convert the old books printed in the Agimi script into the new script, although no one wishes to risk such labor until he receives a special assignment and compensation, so that a year later no decisive measure has yet been taken in that respect. For this reason it is not possible for Vienna to introduce the new Latin alphabet into its schools, and the old textbooks printed according to Mjeda's system continue to be valid, even after a year. Kral predicts that such a situation will last at least another year.

329 HHStA, Adm. Reg., F 27, K 35, Scutari, den 20. September 1909, Generalkonsul Krai an Aerenthal.
343
Soon after the conclusion of the congress, Monsignor Mjeda tries to draw conclusions from its decisions, seeking to form a unified and large linguistic society, to be made up of both clerics who are supporters of the Agimi script and those from Shkodra who support Bashkimi, and laymen could also join it. The society aims to publish newspapers and textbooks in the Albanian language, naturally printed in the new alphabet. It is envisaged that this association would commission a printing house abroad, with Monsignor Mjeda guaranteeing that he would take care of most of the expenses. In his view, this association is intended to become a kind of intellectual center of Catholic northern Albania, upon which the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have a particular influence.
However, Monsignor Mjeda has to move from Shkodra to Skopje, and for health reasons as well, which makes the effect of this action all the more evident, since Vienna considers him the only prelate in Shkodra who shows genuine interest in the evolution of the teaching of the Albanian language and literature, and he is also on the verge of drafting new teaching texts. Seeing that he is leaving, Kral warns Vienna that, if they do not want the teaching of the Albanian language to suffer a serious setback again, there is no other solution than for them themselves to energetically take care of the preparation of textbooks in Albanian.
Kral also reports on the behavior of Monsignor Doki, whose egotism and biased attitude bring about the final ruin of this project which, as might be expected, enjoys all of Vienna's sympathies. The abbot by no means wishes to approve the founding of such an association, because, in his words, there is a literary society, Bashkimi, in Shkodra and its members should not be allowed to join another association with similar tendencies. He does not openly say that he is against founding an association that would be of an expressly religious character and would devote itself solely to publishing pious writings, but subtly, by other means, shows that he is not in favor of merging the Bashkimi association with the new association.
During the various meetings that are held to discuss these issues, and during which, as everyone notes, Monsignor Mjeda behaves toward Monsignor Doki very
344
Well-intentioned, even proposing him as chairman of this cultural association, the overwhelming majority of those present express the view that what is needed is solely the support of the protecting power. To the great astonishment of those present, this view meets with aggressive opposition from Monsignor Doki, who argues that one can turn to the Italian government, which also shows great interest in the Albanian question in all its aspects. A truly heated debate begins on this point, and the meeting ends without achieving any result, due to the abbot's stance, who after only a few days manages to destroy the entire project.
Kral judges Monsignor Doki's opposition somewhat unwarranted, since he wanted to secure for himself a decisive influence in this new creation of the association, also bearing in mind that the Bashkimi association (which had long since failed to publish any literary work in Albanian) exists only on paper.

After this attempt by Monsignor Mjeda in Shkodër failed, there were no further attempts to achieve any progress in the linguistic and literary field, and a year later complete inactivity reigned there.

The issue of a common orthography and a common learned language still remained to be resolved, which became Kral's next task. He would accomplish it, but under quite different conditions, when the Ottoman Empire would no longer be an obstacle, since Austria-Hungary had occupied part of Albania.

During Austria's military administration in Albania, Kral was the country's civil commissar, and this position afforded him good opportunities to intervene in matters of orthography and the learned language through reforms and innovations. Thus he writes: "Respecting the Albanians' very pronounced national pride, which, as I well know, does not tolerate a foreigner's interference in its own affairs and suspects every foreign political intervention, even when prompted by the most evident friendly motives, I had a hard time, despite the influence that my position as organizer of the Albanian civil administration gives me, in encouraging and introducing in the field of language and orthography nothing other than what corresponded to the convictions and intentions of the most determined Albanian scholars. With this goal, I convened the Albanian Literary Commission, whose members included the most eminent men in the field of Albanian philology.

They were tasked with perfecting the language in accordance with contemporary needs, creating new words, making decisions regarding a common orthography, and gradually working on the creation of a unified written language, which could above all be used in schools—for the publication of new textbooks—and, in addition, in the activities of the official authorities. After debates, disputes, enmities, and numerous struggles that lasted many months, the Commission, which was always guided with understanding and unobtrusively by well-disposed men, decided to create a common orthography that would form the basis of new textbooks, laws, and regulations."

As for the question of a common learned language, besides in the Literary Commission, and according to the information Kral summarizes, a debate also opened in the Congress of Delegates, which was convened with the approval of the military administration and which on many points achieved a rapprochement between distant positions, thus preparing in a very effective way the future union.

It seems proper to conclude with Kral's own assessment of what Vienna achieved in the field of the Albanian language:

"The progress achieved in the field of language during the Imperial and Royal military administration in Albania can be considered one of the most important accomplishments, which will forever remain as a legacy of this wartime of great political agitations, but extraordinarily significant and fruitful for intellectual life and the foundation of the state."

CHAPTER IX:
SCHOOLS: A DIFFICULT BEGINNING

The strategic goal of Vienna, as already mentioned earlier, was to halt, in the long term and definitively, every kind of Slavic expansion on its southwestern border. It was concluded that it is precisely the Albanians who must become the key element that would shape the future Albanian state. According to the views of the Austro-Hungarian consuls charged with political activity in Albania, achieving this goal necessarily required an auxiliary means that played a very important role in the processes of forming all nations—that is, the creation of schools. Their conviction was that Austria-Hungary would never be able to influence the Albanians appropriately unless it energetically addressed the question of the school system, which is the most important of all topics.

What is the situation in the field of education at the present moment? According to information from the consuls from across-Vardar Macedonia (the Vardar River), which is governed alternately, the Greeks have 350 schools, followed by the Bulgarians who have 188, the Serbs with 101 schools, and even the few and very scattered Vlachs have 35 schools.

In northern Albania, where the majority of the population is Catholic, there are a total of 7 boys' schools and two girls' schools, financed by Austria-Hungary, but in all of them instruction is conducted in Italian! They are distributed as follows: in Shkodër there are 2 boys' schools and one for girls, in Durrës 1 for boys and 1 for girls, and in Shirokë, Prizren, and Peja one boys' school each. The consuls report that, despite the fact that these schools are subsidized by Austria-Hungary, one cannot expect too much gratitude from the Albanians. And even if among some persons who were educated in these schools a sense of gratitude had been pronounced, over time it weakened. The knowledge and ideas acquired in school remained; however, the former pupils ascribe all the credit for their education to Italy. Although it is precisely Austria-Hungary that financially supports many Albanian schools, their students speak and write in Italian; likewise, the teachers in these educational institutions know only Italy and always speak only about that country and its merits, while in the consciousness of the students Austria-Hungary remains quite distant, on the other side of Trieste.

If to this we add that, because of its geographical position, Albania gravitates more toward Italy than toward the Danubian Monarchy, the result in the educational system, in Ippen's opinion, can be perfectly explained by the notion of working for the enemy. Moreover, it seems impossible to deprive these schools of subsidies or to "turn them into Austrian" ones, that is, to form in the minds of their students Austria-Hungary as a friendly country. Difficulties are also encountered when attempting to replace teachers of Italian origin with others who come from Austria. The only way to correct this Franz Josephian [orig. franciscojosefiana – trans. note] state of affairs, in Ippen's view, would be to open schools in which instruction will be carried out in Albanian.

Northern Albania has about 100 parishes. Ippen estimates that it would be sufficient to start with 10 schools, which would represent an expense of at most 20,000 francs. To get a sense of the amount of money in question, we note that a single Italian school in Shkodër costs the Italian government 30,000 francs.

Where would the teaching staff come from? The consul assumes it will not be difficult to find 10 or 12 candidates, since the requirements are not high: teachers are expected to have gone through primary school, even some classes in a higher school, that is, to

possess some prior knowledge and to wish to devote themselves to the teaching profession. However, he points out that later it would also be necessary to establish and …
330 HHStA, PA I, K.473, Bericht Nr. 27, Consul Ippen an Grafen Goluchowski, Scutari, am 9. Juli 1897.
353
a preparatory institute for teachers, thus turning them, in accordance with Austrian criteria, into teachers in primary schools. The Austrian consul, however, is not able to devise a second level of education for the aforementioned future teachers. For institutes that correspond to that aim, institutes run by Catholic teaching associations are proposed, and since they are located in Salzburg the candidates could live in a monastic boarding school.
Another similar proposal concerns the education of Albanian Franciscan missionaries at the expense of the government in Vienna.
The costs that Vienna would have to bear in order to meet the religious needs of Albania, in Ippen's opinion, would be most properly and responsibly supplemented so as to be able to satisfy educational needs.
354
At the end of October 1897 the consul specifies his proposals for the successive opening of schools in the coming years, at the following locations331:
t Kalmeti 332 (Lješ)
t Nenshati in Podrimlje (Sapa)
t Dajchi in the territory of Bojana (Scutari)
t Kisha Kolaj in Maltrencit (Scutari)
f Kisha Shenkol in Bregmatia (Scutari)
t Bajsa in southern Kastrati (Scutari)
f Selce in Klementi (Scutari)
f Abati in Shhala (Pulati)
f Dshoani in Pulati (Pulati)
t Episcopal quarter in Nikaj (Pulati)
f Salca in Merturi (Pulati)
f Oroshi in Mirdita (Mirdita)
The consul foresees that in this first three-year founding period the costs would naturally be somewhat higher and estimates them at 15,000 francs.
As he envisages, during those 20 years the ordinary expense would increase by approximately 5,000 francs each year.
Summarizing the situation after 23 years, Consul Ippen gives the following snapshot:
Achieved investment 360,000 francs
Annual budget 144,000 francs
After the aforementioned investments and efforts, Vienna would have at its disposal approximately 70 schools for roughly 100,000 inhabitants.
However, for the opening of these schools, Ippen reminds, it is first necessary to approve investment funds, as well as to obtain permission from officials of the Turkish government.

Ippen is somewhat embittered by the injustice which, as he points out, lies in the fact that the Serbs, Bulgarians, Vlachs, and Greeks in Constantinople achieved much of what they asked for, while their “local protégés”333 (Albanians) did not.
331 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Bericht Nr. 51, Scutari, 29 October 1897, Consul Ippen to Count Goluchowski.
332 A cross indicates that this village is the seat of a parish.
333 This is the expression of Consul Ippen himself.

The consul is extremely angry and wants to correct the unfavorable situation with money from state funds. He attacks His Excellency Count Revertera, writing that the protectorate does not rest only on numbers, as the Count claims, but also on tireless insistence in Constantinople, at the Sublime Porte and in Yıldız. In order to win over Vienna, Ippen assures that just one imperial decree [firman] obtained in Constantinople for the construction of a church or a new school on the ground secures Vienna more reputation and more friends than 10,000 francs of financial aid.
The Jesuit General describes the situation in Scutari from a somewhat different perspective. He, at the request of the special ambassador of Austria-Hungary to the Holy See, Count Revertera, draws up a report, in which the Count expressed his desire to know his opinion on the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian government to emphasize public education in Albania by increasing the number of schools. In his letter the following stands334:
Based on the information that I have been able to gather through requests,
I will first allow myself to state that some persons in recent
years have criticized the behavior of the Imperial and Royal government with regard to instruction in Scutari. These are persons who have an inclination toward Aus-
tria and sincerely wish the best for this country; and we have no knowledge of
hidden motives behind these criticisms.
Indeed, during these last years, Austria has lost quite
a bit of prestige in Albania, especially because of the Italian schools in Scu-
tari, in which, to Austria’s detriment, the merits of Italy for
the development of education in Albania are emphasized, and this should not be underestimated.
When the first Italian schools were opened, everyone expected that
Austria would immediately employ all the moral means at its dis-
posal to prevent them from taking root and developing. At the same time it was overlooked that those schools have an anti-religious basis and that they would, at least as time passes, represent a great danger to the faith and piety of the
population (and this fact has indeed materialized).
Therefore the priests of the Association were those who strongly wished
and especially expected Austria to take effective measures against
the fact that to most parents the instructional system and the attitude of the teach-
ers in those schools seem extremely attractive to parents who send their
children to those schools. Namely, the priests believed that the advantages
which the Italians offer to the children could also be found elsewhere.

334 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Rome, 29 June 1897, Ludwig Martin, Jesuit General, to Count Revertera-Salandra.
356
I will try to be clearer. The main motive why the inhabitants
of Scutari earlier sent and still send their children to the Italian schools
is material interest. For those schools the parents did not have to pay before, nor do they now; everything that the children need for the instructional process is provided free of charge: books, paper, pens, and those who
need it most, being more materially disadvantaged—even
clothing is provided.
At the beginning the priests of the Association did everything that was
in their power to avoid the enrollment of children in these schools. For that
purpose they even neglected the general principle and, with the explicit and exceptional per-
mission of the Father General in their College of St. Francis Xavier 335, founded new primary schools. In them they accepted poor children, who
from that moment had been excluded from instruction in this College.
However, they lacked sufficiently large space in order to be able to…
to accept all those children whose parents wanted this. In the absence of the necessary funds to expand the schools, they were, against their will, forced to ask families—at least some among them—for a small monthly amount, and from everyone—the reimbursement of money for the costs of writing materials. This was an unfavorable circumstance, since these expenses, although in themselves very limited, were significant for some people, which is why it suited them better to send their children to the Italian schools, where everything was free.
The Father Rector of the College of St. Francis spoke with the representative of the Austrian government at the consulate in Shkodra about whether it was appropriate to submit to this esteemed Ministry a request for subsidies, for the purpose of enabling an expansion of the premises and freeing parents from any payments, bearing in mind also that the school needed repair of the ceiling, which threatened to collapse. The consul, however, replied that at that moment he did not consider it appropriate to address the Ministry with a request of such a nature.
Now I wish to move on to an important point.
With the aim of promoting the development of its schools, which at the beginning did not have many pupils, the Italian government established a children's day nursery in which boys and girls even received food for free. Naturally, the priests praised the Italian government for this measure at a time of great poverty in the city. Those same priests turned into followers of this so merciful government, and the children into followers of their educators.
335 The Commercial College.
357
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335 The Commercial College.

357

When the children finally left the nursery, it was most natural that they should go to the Italian schools, since they would consider it a sign of ingratitude if they had eaten Italian bread for years and then enrolled in other schools.

Because of this, the need to open another nursery was immediately considered, and the Father Rector of the College 336, for that purpose, forwarded through the consul a proposal and a petition to the Imperial and Royal government. However, up to this moment, nothing has been done on that matter. Had Austria opened a nursery under the management of the Sisters of Mercy or the Stigmatines immediately after what Italy did with lay male and female administrators, the town would most certainly have preferred to send its children to the Austrian religious shelter rather than to the secular Italian institution.

This is an opinion that refers to facts from the past. By this I do not wish to criticize the way the government proceeds, which in any case has its reasons for such behavior. I simply present the facts I have been able to ascertain.

If at this moment, more than before, there is a need to counteract the influence of the Italian schools and thus achieve the goal, the best and most appropriate way to do so is the one I have indicated above. The free Italian nursery should be neutralized by a free

Austrian one, and the free Italian schools by free Austrian schools. In this way, support is also given to the church authorities, who, for religious and moral reasons, have for some time been fighting against the educational institutions of the Italian government in Shkodra, applying even ecclesiastical penalties. In this way much has already been achieved against these schools, but almost nothing against the nursery, which for now will continue to be a seedbed of future Italian pupils, that is, the school that is the source for the schools [mi-
…of Minister Crispi. Accordingly, in order to draw some concrete conclusion regarding the schools of the city of Skadar, I note that my opinion coincides with that of the priests of that place, namely that the government of His Apostolic Majesty should take the following measures to correct the omissions made up to now and to restore the prestige that Austria, for the reasons cited earlier, has lost in Skadar:
336 Not the administrator, but Monsignor Guerini.
358

1. A children's kindergarten should be established as soon as possible, identical to the Italian model or, better yet, if possible, entrusted to the nuns. 337
2. The schools of the highly esteemed Franciscan friars, as well as those of the Stigmatine Sisters, which are truly flourishing, should be supported in an appropriate manner.
3. The School of St. Francis Xavier (which already receives an annual subsidy from Austria) should be subsidized by granting it an extraordinary subvention for urgent repairs and expansions.
4. The aforementioned Collegium should be allocated a sum of money sufficient for the elementary schools, with the aim of enabling free instruction and exempting pupils from payments; likewise, it would be advisable to ensure that the poor are exempted from the costs of writing materials, etc., so that they are no longer forced by necessity to go to Italian schools. The same should be achieved with regard to the Royal and commercial courses in the Collegium, mentioned earlier, against which Italy's supporters have already conceived the idea of setting up similar free courses.

The situation in the Skopje region likewise leaves little room for optimism. 338 To begin with, attendance at the schools subsidized by the Austro-Hungarian government is not at all satisfactory, for the following reasons:
First, foreign schools (Italian, Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian) in the largest towns, almost without exception, have better administration and are significantly better subsidized than the Austrian ones. Second, great poverty forces Catholic Albanians to employ their children at a very early age, instead of schooling them, so that they may earn a living (shepherds, market vendors) or do household work. Third, there are too few Austrian schools and the distances between them are great, so that people living in remote villages cannot send their children to school along roads that in these areas are impassable for months. Fourth, the number of pupils is insufficient because of the poor maintenance of the premises intended for schools.

More concretely, what is the situation?
337 Stigmatines
338 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Bericht Nr.163, Vertraulich, Uskub, 12 August 1897, Consul Pisko to Goluchowski.
359
In the consular district of Skopje at the present moment there are three schools, two of which have instruction in the Slavic language—at Janjevo and Letnica—while in one, in Skopje, instruction is conducted in Albanian and Italian.
In none of these schools is regular instruction for girls held, despite the fact that it seems more important to the Austrians to raise the level of education of the female Catholic population in Albania, since education, both of boys and girls, in their opinion up to the age of ten, is exclusively a task performed by women.
In Janjevo and Letnica some girls attend school, but they are present only at religious instruction, although the Catholic population of these districts has shown the consul a great desire that their daughters also receive regular schooling. According to the customs cultivated in that country, the teaching would have to be carried out by women. In the consul's view, it would be highly desirable for the monastic order of the Sisters of Mercy, which already has its seat in Prizren, to take measures to send two nuns to every place in which Austria-Hungary possesses Catholic schools or intends to found them. One of those two nuns would necessarily have to speak Albanian. Although at present this order still does not have a sufficient number of nuns who speak Albanian, that lack could be remedied if, among native Albanian women, those who wish to devote themselves to the profession of a nun are selected and prepared in the short term for the task ahead. The consul confirms that he knows for certain that in the vilayet there are several such girls. Naturally, the convent in Prizren would have to provide the young nuns for these purposes.
The clergy and one lay teacher organize instruction for children in Janjevo and Skopje. In Letnica the clergy alone deals with teaching. Consul Pisko explains that the priest of his parish, who is called every hour to visit some sick person at a distance of several hours' ride, and who moreover has to perform many other duties, can supervise the instruction and perhaps cover one to two teaching units. However, he should by no means be entrusted with exclusive supervision of the instruction, since because of all his obligations he lacks the necessary time and the calm required for it. Proof of this, among other things, are the poor results in the school in Djakovica, because of which the Catholics there have expressed the desire to receive a secular teacher.
360
This, in his opinion, necessary requirement to have secular teachers at the disposal of the schools subsidized by Austria-Hungary will at first encounter great difficulties, since Albanians do not have sufficient pedagogical training, and professors from the Monarchy are hindered in that work by their lack of knowledge of the language.
It would be necessary to examine whether some young Austrian elementary school teachers are willing to learn Albanian and whether they would respond to this call.
If Italian teachers from Ancona, Bologna, and other cities manage to learn the Albanian language within a year, Consul Pisko believes that Austrian teachers should likewise be able to achieve this result within the same period.
The consul is convinced that the appointment of Austrian teachers would introduce a

new atmosphere into the Albanian schools subsidized by Austria-Hungary. Thanks to this, they would be able to compete with foreign instruction, which is indeed under excellent management, whereas it is impossible to achieve the desired results under the patronage of foreign Albanian teachers within the prescribed time frame.
In the part concerning general education in the schools subsidized by Vienna, it would have to be thoroughly regulated in agreement with the Imperial and Royal consulates, in accordance with the usual curricula in primary schools in Austria-Hungary and, naturally, bearing in mind the special conditions prevailing in Albania.
In the consul's opinion, it is very important that teachers once and for all dispel the mystery regarding the origin of the benefits enjoyed by Albanians of the Catholic faith. While during final examinations in Italian schools the consul and school principals deliver fiery speeches about relations between Italy and Albania and the need for a close alliance between those countries, Albanian priests refuse even to mention the name of the Imperial and Royal Government in the schools subsidized by Austria-Hungary.
According to Pisko, for that purpose it would be desirable in the future to hold annual final examinations in the schools subsidized by Vienna with official ceremonies presided over by the Imperial and Royal consul of the respective place or his representative. As part of those ceremonies, the said Austrian official should also distribute various valuable prizes (preferably wristwatches, gold and silver medals, gifts in cash), since experience shows that this could significantly increase the number of attendees in schools in the East.
361
The consul reports on the situation in each of the existing schools, attaching his recommendations for improving their condition. In fact, there are only three schools.
He begins with the one in Janjevo. The parish priest of Janjevo, Father Fransisko Brkić, has been gravely ill for several years, so his associate, Mr. Nikola Glasnović, has to perform all parish duties and cannot regularly conduct the two upper classes for children (about 30 pupils). The lay teacher has to teach approximately 150 pupils, who differ in their level of educational progress, which is practically impossible for a single person.
His proposal is to appoint a second teacher—a layman, that is, an Albanian who knows the Slavic language—in order to introduce the Albanian language into the schools gradually (this proposal is based on ministerial decree no. 29,690/6 of July 23 of the current year). Two nuns should also be appointed to teach the girls. These two sisters would be housed in a building that the Catholic Church has at its disposal for that purpose, but which would first need to be adapted. Thirdly, the building in which the school is located, which received a subsidy of 1,000 francs (according to decree no. 29,690/6 of July 23 of the current year), must be expanded to accommodate a girls' school.
Next, Pisko examines the state of the school in Letnica. The parish of Crna Gora [in Skopska Crna Gora—translator's note], besides the village of Letnica, also includes several large villages, among them some whose inhabitants speak only Albanian (for example, the village of Stubla) and who for that very reason do not attend the Slavic school in Letnica.
His proposals for improving the situation in that area are similar to the previous ones:

a) A lay teacher should be appointed, that is, an Albanian who knows the Slavic language, in order to gradually introduce the new, Albanian language into the schools. If a suitable teacher cannot be found, a young secular Albanian priest should be sent to this parish, who should devote himself exclusively to teaching.
b) Two nuns should be appointed to conduct instruction for girls. This proposal was also put forward by the former parish priest of Letnica, Monsignor Fantelja, who also considered it necessary to separate the sexes in the Letnica school and to employ a female teacher, as he stated in his petition. According to what the parish priests of Letnica confirmed to Consul Pisko, accommodation for the two nuns could easily be found in the auxiliary buildings owned by the Catholic Church there. Their arrival in this place would be very well received by the entire population, and it can be expected that many more girls from the neighboring villages would attend those classes.
362
The third school Pisko has in mind is the one in Skopje. The Catholic school in Skopje, in the consul's opinion, exists only on paper. The premises, however, are in reality so neglected that the Catholics who live there do not send their children to that school during the winter, believing that they are not protected from the cold there. The teacher is a very young man, which is why not a single girl attends the school. The consul's proposals include appointing a capable teacher of Albanian nationality, while the current teacher could work as an assistant teacher in Janjevo. He also in this case proposes appointing two nuns for instruction for girls and, above all, the necessary subsidies. Besides that, in Skopje it would also be necessary to organize a secondary school for boys. In this regard, it is necessary, on the one hand, to secure new Albanian teachers, and on the other hand to train pupils who have already completed education in the five primary schools (Janjevo, Letnica, Skopje, Verisović, and Stubla), but who in most cases have only very scant knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic, so that they would be better prepared for their future profession. Since pupils usually choose a profession in the field of commerce, this school should organize subjects necessary for this discipline—primarily French, German, and Italian commercial correspondence, merchandise management, accounting, and other subjects in the field of trade. With this knowledge, some of these pupils could certainly find employment in the Monarchy, and in this way this secondary school would, without doubt, attract a greater number of Albanians. Naturally, this school would have to be a boarding school, since no Albanian of the Catholic faith from that vilayet would decide to provide his son with a secondary education while also paying for his studies.
As the director of this secondary school, who would at least formally have to be under the supervision of the parish priest, in order to maintain the principle of operation,
363
a capable Austrian teacher should be appointed. Along with him, an Albanian would be assigned (for that post the consul recommends a very useful teacher from Prizren, Mateo Logoreci). For the first year, 10 places could currently be offered, and in the following years, 20 places. The course could last 2 years.
The consul notes that to house this "Commercial and Teacher-Training School," as well as the primary schools he briefly outlined earlier, a larger school building would have to be built, with a separate section intended for lodging the two nuns who would be sent there.

What are the costs of such a fine project? Consul Pisko divides them into one-time costs (building adaptations, purchase of school materials, travel expenses for teachers, etc.) and costs that recur every year. For these purposes, he has prepared an approximate estimate:
a) One-time costs (expressed in gold francs)
Continuation of the adaptation of the school in Janjevo 1,500
Move-in of the nuns from Janjevo 1,500
Equipping the school in Janjevo 1,000
Move-in of the nuns from Letnica 1,000
Equipping the school in Letnica 500
Expansion of the parish house in Verisović and move-in of the nuns 3,000 339
Equipping the school in Verisović 500
Construction of the parish and school building, including the move-in of the nuns in Stubla 9,000 340
Equipping the school in Stubla 500 341
Construction of a larger school building and move-in of the nuns in Skopje 18,000
Equipping the primary school in Skopje 500
Equipping the Commercial and Teacher-Training School, as well as the boarding school in Skopje 8,000
339 This item will be reduced to 2,000 francs if we anticipate the appointment of the nuns.
340 The construction of this school could perhaps be dispensed with.
341 Omitted according to the note at the bottom of page no. 2.
364
Travel expenses and allowances for lodging for the nuns and several teachers 5,000 342
Total 50,000 343
b) Annual costs (expressed in gold francs)
Compensation for the head teacher from Janjevo 1,600
Assistant teacher from Janjevo 1,000
Two nuns from Janjevo 1,600
One teacher from Letnica 1,000
Two nuns from Letnica 1,600
Teacher for the primary school in Skopje 1,200
Two nuns from Skopje 1,800
Total carried forward 9,800
One teacher from Verisović 1,000
Two nuns from Verisović 1,600
One teacher from Stubla 1,000 344
Two nuns from Stubla 1,600
Director of the Commercial and Teacher-Training School in Skopje 3,000
Assistant post at this school in Skopje 1,800 345
School policeman in Skopje 720
Maintenance of 20 boarding students in Skopje 12,000 346
School supplies for all schools (paper, pens, ink, etc.) 880
School prizes 3,600

Total 37,000 347
342 Reduced to 4,000 francs because expenses for the nuns from Verisović and Stubla need not be included.
343 If Consul Pisko's additional requests, appended at the bottom of the pages, were accepted, the total amount of one-time costs would be reduced to 38,500 francs.
344 These three items were perhaps ultimately discarded.
345 In place of the assistant teacher in Skopje (1,800 francs), the consular staff interpreter Musani could be appointed; he would teach some subjects for a fee of 800 francs, which would represent a saving of 1,000 francs.
346 Instead of 20 pupils (in the boarding school in Skopje), one could first try with 16, that is, count on 8 of them in the first year.
347 This would mean that the following would be removed from the annual costs:
Nuns from Verisović 1,600 francs
Stubla (total) 2,600 francs
365
This sum does not include increases and personal allowances that will have to be granted to the other parish priests. Also not included are the increases that would have to be approved for them to compensate for school allowances, which they will forgo in the event that secular teachers are appointed. Those increases would amount in total to approximately 2,000 francs annually.
Vice-Consul Rapaport also sends from Prizren to Vienna his requests concerning the new subsidy for Catholic schools for the year 1898 348. They concern four schools, namely the following:
I. Catholic school for boys in Prizren. The Catholic archbishop of this place, Monsignor Pasquale Troksi, requests approval for new grants intended for the three Catholic boys' schools in Prizren, Djakovica, and Pec, within the district under the control of this Imperial and Royal Consulate. As for the subsidies for the first of the schools mentioned, the Ministry has set out the following items: Vice-Consul Rappaport writes to Vienna that the teaching staff is loyal and correct in every respect, and that the efforts to provide reinforcement in the form of Albanian teachers and to gradually introduce Albanian as the language of instruction meet the lofty intentions of the Ministry. He also notes a considerable willingness on the part of the teachers to accept the remarks he pointed out during his repeated inspections, especially with regard to a teaching method that is more oriented toward practical work. He also took into account the wishes of the parents regarding the school system. On this basis he states that he has no objections to the renewed request for payment of the amounts previously specified.
Only this needs to be added, as Rappaport notes, "a small additional groschen," which seems to have been desirable in the interest of the school and, in particular, in relation to the efforts to introduce the national language as the language of instruction. We also liked an interesting detail, on the basis of which we can vividly present unpredictable human relations, which can surprise us in any "field of action," and so we include it in this text. It is the following detail:
Having in view the demands of the local authorities and the needs of the population, Rappaport notes that in the aforementioned school for the past three
Assistant teacher from Skopje 800 francs
4 pupils in the boarding school 2,400 francs

Total 7,400 francs
All this would bring a total saving of 30,000 francs.
348 HHStA, PA I, K. 375, Rappaport, Prizren, Bericht Nr. 147 vom 18 October 1897.
366
years a Muslim efendi, Tahir, has been working as the professor of Turkish. The teachers also, on the recommendation of the local government, teach in all the Christian (both the Serbian and the Vlach [Romanian] Orthodox) schools in Prizren.
In this way the Turkish authorities pursue a dual aim: they maintain instruction in the official language and indirectly monitor tendencies in the Christian schools. Nevertheless, they leave it to the latter to take care of the teachers' honoraria, which proves feasible due to the fact that in Prizren in particular, knowledge of Turkish is a necessity for Christian merchants and craftsmen. Although the aforementioned efendi Tahir receives from the archbishop a sum considerably lower (not reaching 300 francs annually) than his colleagues from the Orthodox secondary schools, he has until then, either due to his personal view of instruction or out of sympathy for Albanian national aspirations, omitted to inform the Turkish authorities about various events at the school (about the introduction of Albanian as the language of instruction, about the distribution of teaching material in that language, about the procurement of that material, approved by His Gracious Holiness). Thanks to this, serious difficulties and inconveniences were avoided—both for this Imperial and Royal Consulate and for the school administration. On one occasion, because of this, the Turkish school inspector sharply rebuked Efendi Tahir, who, as he himself claims, replied to the criticism that he works as a language professor, but not as a spy.
Since such an attitude on the part of the Turkish teacher deserves a certain recognition, and since his continued service is highly desirable and in the interest of the future development of the school, the vice-consul ventures to submit to Vienna the translated petition of Efendi Tahir, who humbly asks for approval to increase his salary by between 200 and 240 francs.
II. Catholic school for boys in Djakovica. As for the Catholic school for boys in Djakovica, due to the situation in that place it was not possible to carry out an inspection. However, since the conduct of the teacher Pasquale Logoreci, insofar as the incomplete information testifies to it, appears entirely satisfactory, and also bearing in mind that this school accommodates Albanian aspirations, the vice-consul believes he may again request for the next year approval of the grant from the previous year, which amounted to 600 francs.
III. Catholic school for boys in Pec. In this school it is even more difficult to carry out an inspection than in the previous one. It is under the management
367
of a Franciscan monk—an observer educated in Bosnia whom Rappaport considers reliable. Bearing that in mind, as well as the sending of a third father to Pec, which indicates that the previously existing opposition to instruction with a religious orientation has ceased, the vice-consul considers that there are no obstacles to the school again participating in grants of 420 francs, which it had been receiving up to that moment.
IV. Schools of the Sisters of Mercy for girls in Prizren. To date, the school of the Sisters of Mercy for girls, located in Prizren, has only one teacher, whose maintenance is included in the annual grant of 1,800 francs approved in previous years. Thanks to the

increase in teaching staff that occurred with the assignment of Sister Cecilia Briski last year, the abbess, Sister Simeona Herman, was compelled to send a petition to the minister that, beginning on 1 January 1898, the previous annual grant be increased by 400 francs, so that it amounts to a total of 2,200 francs. In addition, the aforementioned sister requests reimbursement of the amount of 140 francs for the maintenance of a fourth sister from the end of August to the end of December of the previous year. Emphasizing that at any moment he can confirm the favorable assessment of the nuns and their school, expressed in his modest report no. 77 of 27 June of that year, and that the new teacher, Cecilia Briski, has met all expectations directed at her, especially with regard to learning the language of this country, Rapaport conveys to His Holiness for consideration the petition of Abbess Simeona Herman in full.

In the Imperial and Royal Archives in Vienna there are preserved, in the form of summaries and as annex no. 3 to Cvidinek's memorandum concerning schools in Albania, the Proposals of the General Consulate in Scutari, the Vice-Consulate of Durazzo, the Consulate of Skopje, and the Vice-Consulate of Prizren for the approval of new subsidies for schools, which we present here in full349:

A) General Consulate of Scutari

I. Permanent subsidies

1. Establishment of a kindergarten in Scutari, 3,600 francs annually. This proposal was also made by Archbishop Guerini and the Jesuit General.

349 HHStA, PA I, K. 473.

2. Establishment of an institution of the Sisters of Mercy from Agram in Kalmet for assistance to the sick and for the education of girls. The elders of the village sent Consul Ippen a petition to the same effect. The neighbors themselves would cooperate in building the house and in lodging the nuns. Consul Ippen strongly recommends granting this request. Initial outlay: Construction of the house, at most 6,000 francs. Annually: Financial aid of 400 francs for each of 2 to 4 sisters.
3. Establishment of a vocational school that would cooperate with the primary school of Scutari (Consul Ippen does not state the costs). The Franciscans have a similar school in Jerusalem; the English mission and the Israelite Alliance also have them in the same place. These schools are extremely attractive to the local population.
4. Establishment of schools that would use Albanian as the language of instruction over the next 3 years in: 1. Kalmet, 2. Nenshijati, both in Zadrima, 3. Daich on the Bojana, 4. Kisha Kolaj in Mal Rencit, 5. Kisha Senkoll in Bregmati, 6. Bajsa in Lower Kastrati, 7. Selce in Klementi, 8. Abat in Shala, 9. Dshoani in Pulti, 10. Kirshenvirtel in Nikaj, 11. Salc in Merturi, 12. Orosh in Mirdita. With the exception of Kisha Senkoll, all these places have Catholic parishes.

Initial investment:

12 scholarships for candidates for teaching positions in Austria 12,000 francs.

12 schools to be built at 4,000 francs each 48,000 francs.

Total 60,000 francs

After the construction of the first 12 schools, the following annual costs are required:
Salaries for 12 teachers at 1,200 to 1,800 francs each, between 14,400 and 21,600 francs.
Maintenance of schools (12 at 400 francs each) 4,800 francs.
Total between 19,200 and 26,400 francs

5. Establishment of schools over the next twenty years—three new schools annually. Accordingly, 3 scholarships for teachers and 3 buildings each year.

369
Initial outlay (and annually):
3 scholarships for candidates for teaching positions in Austria 3,000 francs.
3 school buildings 12,000 francs.
Total 15,000 francs

6. The budget increases each year by three teachers' salaries, each amounting to 1,200 to 1,800 francs; then by the costs for three schools—400 francs for each, i.e., between 4,800 and 6,600 francs—so that after 23 years it would reach an amount between 115,200 and 158,400 francs.

Details:

1. Annual costs for the first 12 schools as in the first year 19,200–26,400 francs.
2. Salaries for 3 teachers and costs for 3 schools totaling 4,800–6,600 francs, multiplied by 20 96,000–132,000 francs.

Total between 115,200 and 158,400 francs
The total cost of investments after 23 years reaches the sum of 360,000 francs. By then we would have 72 schools for approximately 100,000 inhabitants.
In the report of 9 July 1897, no. 5, Consul Ippen proposed that 10 schools be opened at the outset. (Northern Albania has about 100 parishes). Annual costs would amount to at most 20,000 francs. The Italian school in Scutari alone costs the Italian government 30,000 francs per year. For appointing the teaching staff, Ippen proposes 10–12 candidates from Scutari with primary schooling, perhaps with some civic classes, and they could readily be found for didactic teacher training in Austria. It would be best if they were trained in an institution maintained by a Catholic school association and, if possible, in a seminary, where they would be boarders. (According to Ippen, there is no such institution in Salzburg, but there is in Woering).
II. Exceptional expenses

7. Expansion of the classrooms of the Reformed Franciscans' primary school in Scutari. (As to the costs, which are certainly considerable, Ippen does not wish to comment until his request is accepted in principle). This was also proposed by the Jesuit General.

370
B. Vice-Consulate of Durazzo
Recurring expense

8. For the establishment of a Catholic parish school in Tirana, the capital of influential beys, with Albanian as the language of instruction and with one

position provided for an Albanian teacher (Asciuku from Scutari would be adequate). The influential men of Tirana would be extremely grateful to us for the establishment of schools in which Albanian would be the only language of instruction. There is no doubt that boys of the Muslim faith would also attend the school, which would contribute to the reestablishment of ties between Catholics and Muslims, who form the majority in the Sanjak of Durazzo. The Archbishop of Durazzo fully agrees with the establishment of this school, which could temporarily be set up in the parish house: 900 francs per year, and later that cost may rise slightly.

9. During a trial period of one year the teacher's salary should be set at 900 francs. Later it should be granted under a contract for several years and with higher honoraria.
10. Reactivation of the boys' school from Drac. Appropriate measures have already been taken and Josef Fekec, who previously did this in Pasman, Zara, has been appointed as the teacher, and an annual salary of 1,200 francs is recommended for him.

His salary may perhaps be increased later. He has been paid 100 francs for relocation expenses.

C. Consulate from Skopje

11. The school from Janjevo: The following are needed:
12. A second lay teacher (an Albanian who commands the Slavic language)
13. Two nuns to teach the girls
14. Work on the school building.

The parish priest of Janjevo, Brkic, is undergoing treatment. The collaborator Nik. Glasnovic is taking care of the parish and teaches together with the lay teacher.

1. One-time expenses:
2. Furnishing for the nuns 1,500 francs.
3. Works on the school 1,000 francs.
4. Creating conditions for work in the school 1,500 francs.
   Total 4,000 francs

2. Annual expenses:
   a) Salary of the first teacher 1,600 francs
   b) Salary of the second teacher 1,000 francs
   c) Salary of the two nuns 1,600 francs
   Total 4,200 francs
3. The school in Letnica. It is currently Slavic. A path could be opened for introducing Albanian as the language of instruction by employing an Albanian teacher who commands the Slavic language (perhaps some young cleric). In the

vicinity of Letnica there are some Albanian villages whose children would then attend this school. The following are needed: 1. One teacher, 2. Two nuns to give instruction to the girls.

4. One-time expenses:

5. Furnishing for the nuns 1,000 francs.

6. Works on the school 500 francs
   Total 1,500 francs

7. Annual expenses:

8. Support of the nuns 1,600 francs

9. Salary of the teacher 1,000 francs
   Total 2,600 francs

10. The school from Skopje. The premises are completely dilapidated, the teacher is a young man. Needed are: 1. Hiring a capable teacher. The current one could go to Janjevo as the second teacher; 2. Bringing in a second instructor; 3. Two nuns to teach the girls; 4. Construction of a larger school building.

11. One-time expenses:
    a) Construction of the school and housing for the nuns 18,000 francs
    b) Works on the elementary school 500 francs
    Total 18,500 francs

12. Annual expenses:
    a) Salary of the second teacher 1,200 francs
    b) Support for the two nuns 1,800 francs
    Total 3,000 francs

13. Opening a higher school for boys in Skopje, with the aim of providing education to the sons of Albanian teachers and enabling youths who have successfully completed elementary school to continue their education.

The classes would mainly be devoted to commercial subjects and languages (French, German, and Italian). The school should at the same time be a boarding school, and its director should be a capable Austrian teacher. Dragoman Musani as the second teacher (does not seem advisable to us). Duration of studies: 2 years. In the first year, 8 pupils would enroll. The institution could be housed in the building mentioned under point 11. Costs:

1. One-time expenses:
1. Equipment for the school and boarding house 8,000 francs
   Total 8,000 francs

2. Annual expenses:
   a) Director's salary 3,000 francs
   b) Salary of the second teacher 800 francs
   c) Salary of the assistant 1,200 francs
   d) Maintenance of 16 pupils 9,600 francs (*)
   Total 14,600 francs

(*) In the first year—half of that amount, since only 8 pupils are planned

14. Establishment of a school for boys and girls in Verisovic. Needed are: 1. Hiring an Albanian teacher or a collaborator only for lessons, 2. During the construction of a new parish, the needs of the school could be taken into account (for the first item, 4,000 francs were already approved in May).

15. One-time expenses:
   a) For the construction of a larger parish which would also house the school 2,000 francs
   b) Equipment for the school 500 francs
   Total 2,500 francs

16. Annual expenses:

5. Salary of the teaching staff 1,000 francs
   For travel and lodging expenses of the nuns and various staff with the aim of the proposed reforms Initial 4,000 francs
   For school supplies Annual 880 francs
   For school prizes Annual 3,600 francs
   Total annual expenses 4,480 francs
   The total annual expenses according to the requests of Consul Pisko reach the sum of 29,400 francs.* The one-time expenses amount in total to 38,500 francs.

373

(*) In addition, one should reckon with approximately an additional 2,000 francs in subsidies for the staff, as well as for the clergy, who are being deprived of the previous school subsidies as a consequence of their employment of a lay teacher.

D. Vice-Consular Agency in Prizren

Permanent subsidy

16. Tahir Efendi, teacher of Turkish at the boys' school in Prizren (3 years of teaching service) 200-240 francs

In addition to classes, just like his colleagues from the Vlach and Serbian schools in Prizren, he has also been tasked with indirect supervision of movements in the school. He receives 300 francs from Monsignor Troksi, less than the other Turkish teachers. However, he has always behaved properly and refrained from the complaint he could have lodged with the Turks over the reception of didactic material and the introduction of the Albanian language for teaching purposes. He has now requested a subsidy for himself personally.

17. The Vice-Consulate requests the allocation of small portraits of the Emperor and medals (50 pieces of each) for school prizes.

The model of the medal is in the report from Prizren, Exh. 52022/1897.

Consul Pisko expressed his opinion that in the future it will become necessary to open schools in the parishes of Pec and Zumbi.
The consuls, the bearers of pro-Austrian activity, are aware that in this part of the program, the schools and textbooks in Albanian will not have immediate success350. However, they agree in asserting that only schools can ensure the success of the Monarchy's political aims and activities351. Perhaps also due to the pressure created by their superiors' expectations, all express confidence that the money and effort invested will not go unnoticed and that, although the purely political part always carries the risk of not achieving precisely the desired results, the cultural part of the activity will not disappoint.
In order for something real to be achieved in this sense, Zwiedineck, on the basis of all the reports received, confirms his view that Vienna will have to improve conditions in the existing schools which already receive subsidies, in addition to founding new educational institutions.
350 See the aforementioned Bericht Nr. 27 (Report No. 27), Consul Ippen to Count Goluchowski, Scutari, July 9, 1897, HHStA, PA I, K. 473
351 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Zwiedineck, Vienna, January 1, 1898.

On the basis of the consuls' proposals, Vienna instructs its ambassador, Count Revertera, to contact the Jesuit General, Father Ludwig Martin (in May 1897), in order to discuss the Albanian Papal School, entrusted to his monastic order and intended for the education of the clergy, as well as to inform him of the innovations from Vienna that they intend to introduce in Albania. For his part, the said Jesuit General proposes that both sides sign an official agreement352.
At the beginning of 1898, Zwiedineck has to admit that "in the reports of the Austro-Hungarian consuls on the behavior of the Jesuits in Albania there is not a single word that would testify to any loyalty and gratitude on their part toward the Monarchy." However, the officials of the Ministry—who have an irresistible desire to behave like a great power—prefer to present problems as successes, and Zwiedineck confirms that he is not quite sure that the consuls' complaints are entirely well-founded. The consequence: the government decides to enter into negotiations on the proposal of the General of the Order with the aim of achieving "a reasonable and subtle change on the part of the Jesuits, as envisaged by the General of the Order, a change whose great benefit for the interests of Austria-Hungary can already be discerned."
What would be the bases of this agreement? First of all, what decisions for opening negotiations, on the initiatives of Father Martin himself, does the Ballplatz have?

1. To temporarily refrain from the incorporation of Albania as part of the Austro-Hungarian Jesuit province, although it is highly desirable. This is so as not to arouse any suspicion that could bring dangerous consequences for Austrian political aims.
2. Appoint an Austro-Hungarian Jesuit as rector of the Papal School.
3. Provide material support to the Order for all matters concerning its schools.

352 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Zwiedineck, Vienna, January 1, 1898. Parallel to this initiative Vienna is trying to have the Franciscan mission in Albania shaped as an autonomous province, which, as it sees things, would clear the way for the Jesuits so that they could then develop their activities much more freely and in close cooperation with the Austro-

Hungarian consulates. To continue along the very complex path that Vienna as a rule chooses for itself, given that at this moment, among many other things, despite the papal bull of October 4, 1897 ordering the union of all three branches of the Franciscans (Observants, Reformed, and Recollects), the division still persists, see HHStA, Liasse Tuerkei XXX.
375

4. The Jesuits must regularly inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna. The Ministry, for its part, undertakes to inform the Father, the General of the Order, of everything related to the actions undertaken by the diplomatic agents.
5. Provide instructions to the higher instances of the Order in Albania on how to inform Austrian consular officials about any matter worth consideration, so that the Imperial and Royal consuls work to establish a double control over the conduct of the Jesuits vis-a-vis the protecting power and thus obtain the right to remove from Albania any member of the Order who would be the subject of a protest by the Monarchy.
6. For its part, and in return for all this, Austria-Hungary undertakes to issue appropriate orders to its consuls to encourage, insofar as possible, the activities of the Jesuits, always on the condition that every Jesuit priest, should he need assistance in any case, address himself exclusively to Austro-Hungarian agents.

As regards point 3, Count Revertera's opinion is considered353 that cooperation with the Order in all matters concerning schools should be carried out in such a way that the administration of the new educational institutions be entrusted to the Jesuits, who, according to Vienna's expectations, will also be in charge of the already existing schools.

However, certainly not for the first time, approval of the Order on this issue is not obtained (contrary to Vienna's expectations), since the administration and supervision of the government schools in all the territories of the mission are solely and exclusively under the control of the archbishop of the dioceses.

In view of all this, the Jesuit Order offers to work for Austria-Hungary in the following three ways:

1. The creation of a pedagogical center at the Collegio commerciale—the Trade School in Scutari, where teachers will be trained when they arrive in Albania.
2. Communicating all remarks that Jesuit priests make about the professors and the schools during their missionary travels.
3. Discreet and effective control of the behavior of Jesuit priests.

Likewise, Zwiedineck confirms that the General of the Order has already informed Count Revertera that all that remains is for the Austrians to confirm their353

353 According to Zwiedineck's memorandum on schools, which we cited earlier and will discuss on the following pages, HHStA, PA I, K. 473.

376

They intend to carry out those proposals, which fully coincides with the way it was decided in Vienna to proceed.

During the negotiations on the agreement, the Austrians undertake to formulate each of the points of the proposal in a clear and unambiguous manner in order to avoid arbitrary interpretations in the future. Among all these points of the agreement, for Vienna the most important is the one that provides full guarantees that the post of director of the

Albanian Papal school will be entrusted to a Jesuit from Austria, and not to someone of Italian nationality.
According to the Cultus-Referat principle, the agreement does not envisage the possibility of an actual exchange of reports, since only from a single political point of view can one decide whether this directive is useful and harmless or not. However, as Zwiedinek claims: “An agreement of this kind—which provides for ceding control by Austrian representatives to the Jesuits on Albanian territory, as well as the immobility of the latter—can certainly be carried out in accordance with our already stated interests. It seems to us that the oversight of the clergy offered to us is of dubious value, given the traditional rivalry between the Jesuits and the Franciscans, and for that reason one cannot expect to receive from the Jesuits any very impartial assessment of the Franciscan clergy.”
The possibility is considered of creating a pedagogical center under Jesuit management at the Collegio commerciale. However, Consul Ippen, who approves the school reforms proposed by the Jesuits and judges them appropriate and timely, strongly opposes this, in light of the extremely bad experience the Monarchy has already had with the Papal school.
Both Consul Ippen and the one from Skopje express their agreement to appoint lay teachers, but for reasons different from those motivating the Jesuits; for them it is the best way to dispel the suspicions of the Turkish authorities.
Ippen supports the training of lay teachers of Albanian origin on condition that it take place in an Austrian pedagogical center.
In Vienna, however, they suspect that this proposal is not as practicable as it appears. This concern is based on the fact that, when the said teachers return to Albania, it will be difficult to ensure that the Turkish authorities do not regard them as Austrian agents, because of

which they will receive no support for their school activities. The Ballplatz undertakes to examine in detail the extent to which it is advisable to choose Austrian citizens for those new teaching posts, especially since the education of young Albanians is to be carried out in some pedagogical center, aside from the significant costs that entails. An additional unfavorable circumstance is that, at best, for only a few years will “material,” or staff, be available—and moreover without experience and guarantees.
All consular officials consider that introducing Albanian as the language of instruction in the new schools would be more than desirable, as would the application of the Austrian curriculum in them. To increase enrollment, they recommend that classrooms be pleasant and well maintained, with an optimal level of upkeep, since the population pays more attention to outward appearances than to the curriculum in the proper sense.
The consuls also recommend ceremonially holding final examinations with the awarding of prizes, as is done in the Italian schools, with the aim of making an impression on both parents and pupils.
They propose the establishment of kindergartens and vocational schools, confident that these will arouse general enthusiasm. A ceremonial opening of a kindergarten in Scutari is recommended.
They are also considering the opening of new schools for girls. The Jesuit General advises maintaining caution and prudence in the case of girls’ schools, although the

Turkish authorities are much less suspicious regarding instruction for girls than when it comes to instruction for boys.
In that sense, they know they can count on the nuns from Agram (Zagreb), with whom the previous year in Prizren they had a very positive experience.
All the Austro-Hungarian consuls from Albania agree that the proposals relating to the school initiative will be feasible if the Imperial and Royal government is ready to send the necessary money and is able to obtain from the Turkish government all the required permits. In Vienna they are not entirely sure what is the best way of proceeding to obtain that permission from the Ottoman authorities.
Another, third sine qua non condition—without which nothing can be done—is that events themselves will determine the timelines necessary for the realization of all these plans.

Austro-Hungarian diplomacy hopes that with its strategy it will reap benefits in no less than twenty years. For an issue such as this, after twenty-three years of activity, to reach its maturity and deliver the expected results, one must be sure that there will be no obstacles, whether permanent or merely temporary, that would prevent the normal development and full maturity of the project.
Plans and forecasts go together with analysis and remarks about some specific schools. The Catholic school for the children of the Reformed Franciscans, which exists in Scutari, for example, does not achieve satisfactory goals because, among other things, the Italian and Serbian Orthodox schools already there have better classrooms; moreover, the Italian school also has a kindergarten.
Consul Ippen insists that above all good classrooms must be provided and that at least part of the expenses be covered by the same religious communities from Vienna. Improvement is expected thanks to the introduction of the Austrian curriculum. Textbooks and other school materials should be the same as those used in Austrian schools.
At present it is not possible to obtain certification of the official equivalence of the boys' school in Skadar with Austrian primary schools. Likewise, despite Consul Ippen's proposal, it was not achieved that the inspection of Catholic boys' schools could be carried out by an inspector from South Tyrol, who is much better qualified.
Consul Ippen, by petition, asks the Austro-Hungarian government that the schools always have a loyal director who could ensure better control over the introduction of the Austrian educational program.
Ippen himself firmly supports Metropolitan Guerini's petition for the approval of an annual subsidy of 3,600 francs, which would serve to finance a kindergarten in Skadar. Both are convinced of the benefit that would be gained with the help of this kindergarten, which would be run by nuns who already have spacious houses and a large courtyard at their disposal. These nuns would, therefore, receive an annual subsidy of 3,600 francs.
Partial success has been achieved at the girls' school, where instruction in some subjects from the curriculum is held in Albanian.
At the beginning of December of this year, the elders of the village of Kalmeti handed a petition to Consul Ippen requesting that the Austrian government establish there a center for the treatment of the sick, as well as

379
for the education of girls under the supervision of nuns from Agram. The aforementioned village is located between the mountainous zone of Mirdita and the plains of Podrimlje, it is fairly advanced, it contains the bishop's residence, and the people there are good. It is estimated that construction costs would amount to at most 6,000 francs; the annual payments for the sisters will be between 200 and 400 francs for each of them. The land and materials for construction will be at the expense of the village. The Superior General of the monastic order agrees to send nuns there on the condition that this does not mean increased costs for the brotherhood. Consul Ippen speaks very favorably of this project. The report also notes the possibility of a decision being made by the beginning of March, so that construction of the center could immediately continue thereafter, to be solemnly opened in the spring of 1899.
Vice-Consul Winter requests the reopening of the Catholic boys' school in Drac and the creation of a parish school in Tirana.
For the vice-consul it turns out that Drac is a very suitable place for establishing a school with the Austrian curriculum, and he asks Vienna to appoint a teacher who would be in charge of it. The Ministry of Education then organizes a public competition and selects one who speaks Albanian and who will receive 1,200 francs per year.
In Drac there has been a Greek school for four years now, but the situation is far from good, since the teachers' salaries are irregular and moreover very low. Austrian diplomats believe this situation can be used to attract those Greek pupils. On the other hand, the Vlachs of Drac are trying, with the help of Romanian propaganda from Bitola, to open a school in which instruction would be conducted in the Romanian language. The said project seems feasible, since one of its propagandists, appointed as a teacher of the center, has already received his first monthly salary. However, the Vlach population, moreover with pro-Greek tendencies, is generally rather uninterested in this matter.
As for the new parish school in Tirana, Austrian diplomacy considers it best to appoint an Albanian teacher as cengar, and they already have a trusted candidate. The notable people of Tirana oppose the use of the Italian language in the schools subsidized by Vienna and expect the opening of new educational centers where Albanian would be introduced.
380
At Ballplatz they are studying the possibility that the pupils will be mostly Muslims, which presupposes a good opportunity to establish contact between Muslims and Catholics so as to reduce the gap that exists between them. The metropolitan from Drac gives his full approval to this project.
From Vienna it is calculated that the costs for the teachers will amount to about 900 francs per year, and this amount will be increased if, over time, its effectiveness is demonstrated. It is being considered to temporarily house the school in the same building as the parish.
The results obtained for the period 1896-1897 in the Catholic girls' school in Drac are absolutely not satisfactory for Vienna. The teachers have been replaced by others, more loyal, and a new teaching plan is being prepared according to which subject instruction will be held three days a week in Albanian, and on the other days in Italian. The number of pupils is ten.

In the region that includes Skopje, Janjevo, and Letnica, there are three schools subsidized by Austria-Hungary. Of all of them, only in one, the one in Skopje, is the curriculum carried out in the Albanian language; in the other two, instruction is conducted in the Slavic language. None of the schools has courses for girls; they go only to catechism classes. The Catholic population, however, wants education to include girls as well. It is recommended from Ballplatz that nuns be put in charge of this matter.

In Janjevo and Skopje, the teachers are both clerics and laymen. In Letnica there are only the former. According to Consul Pisko's assessment, instruction should not be entrusted exclusively to ecclesiastics, since they already have enough responsibilities related to the care of souls and therefore cannot devote enough time to teaching.

Consul Pisko himself is pleasantly surprised by the school in Janjevo. It is attended by about 200 children, 130 boys aged 6 to 14 and 70 girls aged 8 to 13. Classes for the two are held separately. The consul instructs them that instruction should be in Albanian. The school building comprises only three small rooms. The girls sit on the floor, which is not even tiled. For all these reasons, in June 1897 the consul requests eighty gold napoleons for renovating the school. He is granted fifty napoleons, which were sent to him in July. The school then receives extensive teaching materials. During

354 This is the zone of the Skopje consular district.

his last visit to Vienna, the consul asks that in 1898 the remaining thirty gold napoleons be paid.

Attention is drawn to the fact that, in the event of opening a school in Letnica, there may be an Albanization of many Catholic children, since in the immediate vicinity lies the village of Sasari, inhabited by Slavic Catholics who would attend it. The idea is encouraged that the care for this be entrusted to the nuns.

Consul Pisko has held discussions with Monsignor Troski regarding the reorganization and increase in the number of schools subsidized by Austria-Hungary. The Metropolitan believes that only priests for whom that vocation is fitting should be engaged in teaching, and that they should be freed from parish obligations. Monsignor Troski, however, does not have at his disposal priests qualified for that job and, besides that, lacks clergy in his parish.

In the Prizren consular district, the Austro-Hungarian agent does not submit any request for the creation of new educational centers there. His proposal includes the renewal of previous subsidies, as well as the approval of a very small annual allowance for Tahir Efendi, a Turkish teacher for the boys of Prizren, and, finally, that the subsidies received by the nuns from Zagreb be significantly increased, since their number has grown.

Vienna shows considerable satisfaction with the results obtained from the Prizren boys' school, although they maintain that success would be even greater, especially in view of the effort of the teacher, if the pupils attended classes in greater numbers. The blame for widespread absenteeism lies with the parents.

Vice-Consul Rapaport and Monsignor Troski have decided to reward every pupil who has not missed a single class. Rapaport proposes that in the future the most diligent children receive small portraits of His Majesty or medals with the Emperor's image. It is recommended for this purpose not to spare funds, so that the vice-consul has such portraits and medals, although, on the other hand, they remain reserved regarding the

final manner in which the latter will be arranged. Information has reached them that medals bearing the likeness of the Russian Tsar are circulating in the area, while in the Italian schools others with the Italian ruler are distributed.
The boys' school in Djakovica does not create problems since the teacher is very loyal to Austria-Hungary and, moreover, teaches in Albanian. This school is attended by 21 pupils. Vienna expresses the view that he should be given more assistance, since the building is not in good condition. This can be done without major difficulty if the already planned construction of the new village church is utilized.
A point of particular importance is the possible introduction of Albanian as the language of instruction in the Skopje archdiocese.
Monsignor Troski expresses to Vienna his intention, already in that school year, to introduce Albanian as the sole language of instruction for all Catholic schools of his archdiocese. Fearing that a similar decree would serve certain foreign newspapers as a pretext to attack Vienna, Vice-Consul Rapaport advises that Albanian be introduced as the language of instruction gradually, with the pretext of taking into account the needs of traders.
As a consequence of the Austro-Hungarian consul's request, in July 1897 a cyclostyle machine (for duplicating brochures in Albanian) was sent from Vienna for the schools in Prizren. The teachers from the boys' school, as well as the nuns, made various teaching aids themselves, such as alphabets and multiplication tables, and then sent some copies to the schools in Durres, Djakovica and Pec.
The activities that the nuns have developed in recent years in Prizren are a reason for great optimism in Vienna. The Superior General Dr. Jagatic not only fulfilled more than satisfactorily his promise to secure suitable conditions for the nuns he sends to Prizren, as well as to have all of them learn Albanian, but also influenced the sisters' behavior in such a way that potential complaints against them for attempting to spread Croatian propaganda have remained completely unfounded.
The nuns speak Croatian only among themselves. As a consequence of their cautious and very considerate attitude, the population's reserve toward them has disappeared, and they are beginning to please Monsignor Troski. There is one nun, a teacher, who, besides having learned Albanian perfectly, also composes magnificent readers in that language.
By August 1897 there were three nuns in Prizren. From 19 August there were already four, and the abbess considers it possible to open a kindergarten which children can also attend.
The planned increase relating to the staff also brings an increase in donations from 729 to 891 gold forints, which Vienna approves.
383
Up to that moment, the nuns had taught primarily "privately" without renewing the license for holding instruction. They had been present in Prizren at the request of the Austrian authorities since mid-1892, in order to replace the French Sisters of Charity. The Imperial and Royal ambassador in Constantinople secured them a residence permit, but is of the opinion that the request for a school license should be postponed, since at that moment negotiations were being conducted between the Sublime Porte and the French and American representations concerning the school system, due to the crushing conditions that the Porte was setting for the opening and management of

foreign schools.
In December 1892, Baron Calice also considers it would be good not to take measures regarding this, since he believes the circumstances cited in the previously quoted report have not changed at all, and that first those nuns should be settled in Prizren and win the sympathies of the local population, which Vienna fully approves.
In Skopje in 1893, Consul Schmucker hopes that with the goodwill of the mutasarrif and the governor from Prizren he will obtain a license for a school or at least a license to teach girls handicrafts. However, it turns out that his positive opinion of the Ottoman officials is wrong. On the contrary, they informed Constantinople that the Austrians now wish to settle in Albania. The attempt is more harmful than useful and arouses the mistrust of the Sublime Porte.
At the end of 1894, Baron Calice again expresses a negative opinion on the question of the school license. This leads the Ministry to order that the topic be set aside for now, bearing in mind also the relocation of the archiepiscopal see from Skopje to Prizren, which would cause the issue of constructing a building for the nuns to gain in importance.
Since then the question of the school license has been suspended, and it seems that Baron Calice does not even wish to raise it, but advises that the archbishop apply to the municipality in order to obtain for the sisters a permit for construction works. Submitting an application for the permit and for the school, by the embassy, would complicate the question of construction, on top of the question of unacceptable control of the schools, and would have negative effects on construction and the school.
The ever-greater needs for the Austro-Hungarian protectorate in Albania (in 1896 the annual expenses amount to 30,958 forints and 49 gold crowns and 12,090 forints and 90 gold crowns B. V., and now [1897] 54,426

forints and 04 gold crowns and 11,776 forints and 34 crowns B. V., which, however, does not include the exceptionally high donations, such as 11,000 gold forints for Monsignor Prima Dokija) raise the question of the need to find additional funds besides the state ones, in order to cover the ever-increasing projected expenses of the oriental protectorates.
To achieve that goal there is one means that promises success, consisting of collecting money in the churches of the Imperial and Royal Monarchy. The Prime Minister handed a petition to Cardinals Gruscha and Vaszary (Vaszdry) so that these patronage days could be held.
Both cardinals will in general respond affirmatively, but still without giving a definitive answer. Cardinal Vaszary ensures that a personal donation of 1,000 forints B. V. is delivered to the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs for use within the oriental protectorates.
Elsewhere, the Ministry turns its attention to the association “Leopoldine Foundation for Aid to Catholic Missions in North America,” founded in 1829 and under the administration of the competent archbishop in Vienna, whose revenues for a long time can no longer be sent to its original place of destination.
The Minister also asked Cardinal Gruscha to devote by all means the largest part of this association’s income to the oriental protectorates.

This step earned the archbishop's approval; however, his final decision on the matter is still awaited.
Second line of action: It is important to steer education in the schools that Austria-Hungary subsidizes in the desired direction by means of appropriate content in the school textbooks.
Among the first measures aimed at that is the introduction into those schools of the same curriculum used in Austrian public schools, with additional texts of nationalist content in the Albanian language355. Since this same plan, with the necessary adjustments for Muslim pupils, has already been successfully applied in the schools of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ministry wishes, after reaching agreement with the bishops, to introduce that plan into the schools in the Catholic dioceses in the Albanian vilayets.
355 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse N, Wien, Vertraulich, den 12. Marz 1898, Goluckow-ski an Kallay.
385
In order to implement this project, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asks the Minister of Finance to send it the plan and to assign a Franciscan who knows Albanian to translate the textbooks for the lower grades. In addition, it asks that the translation be finished as soon as possible and that, as soon as it is ready, it be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that from there the manuscripts can be handed over to the bishops for their approval. If this initiative yields good results, they will continue by translating the textbooks for the higher grades.
The Minister of Finance issues the appropriate orders and undertakes to send the translation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as soon as it is finished3563 57.
The priest Micacevic is entrusted with the translation. The court counselor, von Talosy, reviews the translated text and confirms that it is suitable for Vienna's pedagogical purposes357.
However, the question remains open as to which alphabet should be used when the time comes to print the textbook. The clergy uses Italian orthography, which until then had also been used for religious books. But numerous attempts at reform have created a chaotic situation, since, despite good intentions, they all share one basic flaw: they are not the result of an authentic cultural development generated by the people themselves, but are more or less practical proposals from outside, whose dissemination is hindered for two reasons. First, because a larger number of scripts are already in use, and second, because the clergy and literate Albanians maintain an openly hostile attitude toward so many changes, where each new alphabet eliminates the previous one.
Moreover, experience has clearly shown that a single book will not solve the problem by itself. For a solution it is necessary to create a series of books that Albanians themselves will write. There must also be a constant development of literary production.
The Court Councillor, von Taloshy, would therefore like to meet with Consul Ippen and hear his opinion. He, for his part, prefers the Italian orthography so as not to provoke the displeasure of the clergy, and with it he transcribed the translation by the priest Mičačević.
The next day, an offer arrived from the Court and University Printing House Holzhausen to print 1,000 copies of that textbook358.

356 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse N, Vienna, 15 April 1898, Kallay to Goluchowski.
357 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, 9 August 1898, Taloshy to Kallay.
358 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, 10 August 1898.

The costs will amount to 350 florins and the copies will be ready in three, at most four weeks. From the details, it appears this will be a very good edition.
From the Ministry, on 3 October, they send to Consul Ippen in Scutari the aforementioned translation with instructions to examine it thoroughly and to state his opinion on whether it should be introduced into Austrian schools359. Likewise, he must in confidence speak with the clerics about the aforementioned problem, mentioning other books as well so as not to attract too much attention. His goal must be to secure their approval for that textbook, so that later there will be no resistance to its final introduction into teaching. The alphabet to be used will be that employed by the Catholic clergy. If Ippen succeeds in ensuring that the clergy raise no objections, Vienna will immediately take upon itself the printing of 1,000 copies. However, he would prefer the printing to be done at the Catholic printing house in Scutari, because, among other things, they have at their disposal all the letters of that alphabet.
From a strictly confidential report that Fuks sends to the Minister of Finance Kallay360, it is clear that the archbishop of Scutari, Monsignor Guerini, approved the translation with small changes, and Fuks asks the minister to issue an order to the Vienna firm Holzhausen, whose offer has already been reviewed, for the printing of 1,000 copies.
The Minister of Finance, by note 1272 of 22 November, in that same month orders that 1,000 copies of the textbook translated into the Albanian language be printed immediately, with additional corrections361.
From the instructions to find a translator to the printing of the first translated textbook for Austrian schools, only six months pass.
However, one surprise awaited this so well-conducted undertaking. Monsignor Doki, together with the members of his literary society, began work on creating a new Albanian alphabet without informing the Austro-Hungarian consul in that region362. When the first part of the textbook translated into Albanian appeared in Italian transcription, and the continuation in the form of the second part was already in an advanced stage of preparation, Doki revealed his work to the Viennese representative. He must not hurt the pride of his collaborators, but he also does not want to anger the Franciscans and impose on them a new alphabet, whose practical value at that moment had not been confirmed, thereby risking the unity of the Albanian Catholic group. Vienna proposes to its representatives that, when considering the newly arisen case, they proceed with the greatest caution and tact. If it were established that this new script is more vital and practical and, above all, that it would not threaten a split among the Catholic alphabets, Vienna would be ready to reprint the first part of the book as well as the second.
At the beginning of June, they receive the opinion of the editor of the journal “Albania” about the new alphabet of Doki and his friends. He considers that acceptance of this script in the Scutari region would lead to significant literary development, because it would make it possible for Albanians from the central part and from the south to read much more363.

Faced with this competent opinion, Vienna forwards instructions to its representatives on the spot to meet with Archbishop Granini, the rector of the papal school, as well as with representatives of the Franciscan printing house, and on that occasion to ascertain by how much the costs for printing 1,000 copies would increase.
Vienna, somewhat hastily, considers this question settled and begins dealing with the technical details related to printing the second part of the textbook in the new script. However, it refuses to reprint the first part in the new alphabet, nor does it wish to do so with other books already published in Vienna. It would rather wait to see what reception it will meet with and to be convinced of the success of the new script, as well as to avoid the imputation of propaganda because of the alphabet chosen by the editor of the periodical "Albania," that is, because of Doki's alphabet364. It considers that in the course of introducing textbooks in Albanian one must be cautious due to the increasingly pronounced suspiciousness of the Turkish authorities, directed at the activities in the schools subsidized by Austria-Hungary, so as to avoid the Ottoman authorities imposing even stricter measures in the field of educa—
359 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, 3 October 1898, to Ippen, Scutari.
360 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, 22 November 1898, Streng vertraulich (strictly confidential report).
361 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Bericht No. 30, Streng vertraulich, Vienna, 30 November 1898, (strictly confidential report no. 30 from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
362 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, Decree No. 278, 24 May 1899, Fucks to Vice-Consul Ranzi, Scutari.

363 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, Decree No. 496, 7 June 1899, Fucks to Ranzi, Scutari.
364 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, 5 October 1899, to Consul Ippen, Scutari; and there also Fuks to Consul Ippen, Streng vertraulich, Vienna, 6 December 1898.

Therefore, Vienna decides to begin by introducing Albanian-language textbooks only in religious instruction and literature classes, and once their use becomes established, to introduce Albanian as well in grammar, arithmetic, and geography classes. Another concern of Vienna was persuading Monsignor Doci to proceed more cautiously. The decision on which alphabet the textbooks in grammar, arithmetic, and geography would be transcribed into was postponed for later.
A year later, Vienna accepts the alphabet of the Abbot of Mirdita for printing the second part of the previously mentioned textbook. It also decides to entrust Doci and his friends with translating the third part of the textbook into Albanian, sending Consul Ippen the originals as well—which are actually textbooks from Austrian schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina—so that he could verify the fidelity of the translation.
In March 1900, however, it becomes clear to Vienna that merging the two alphabets will not be easy, nor will it happen soon, and it will not pass without a war in the Albanian fashion. It turns out that patience, tact, and the best intentions have no effect, due to the lack of will of the Albanian Catholic clergy to maintain agreement, and the disunity of the supporters of different alphabets really manifests itself passionately and zealously. Thus Monsignor Doci presents four new school textbooks subsidized by Austria-Hungary

before he has even informed Vienna of his work on them. All Vienna can do is again call for caution, since Ottoman suspicion regarding activities in those schools is constantly growing, and it becomes clear to Vienna that they will undertake both passive and active measures to hinder all Austro-Hungarian initiatives.

These difficulties may manifest themselves either by refusing to issue permits to the schools or by humiliating supervision of the curriculum.

Those familiar with the Turkish system find it hardest to avoid humiliation by the local authorities with regard to oversight of the curriculum. The Turkish government has always rejected the idea of introducing the Albanian language into instruction, since it sees in it a means of strengthening the idea of an Albanian nation. There is the case of the governor from Janina, who in 1889 in Berat declared to prominent Albanians of the Muslim faith from that place that he could not allow school instruction in the Albanian language. The fact that, nevertheless, in most schools subsidized by Austria-Hungary, teaching proceeds in Albanian without any problems, primarily in the lower grades, is proof that those orders, as in Turkey always happens, are often issued, but their strict observance is not insisted upon. Otherwise it could not be, given that children of that age speak only Albanian.

Because of all this, the conclusion is confirmed that, on the one hand, the task of the imperial and royal consulates will be to remain on good terms with the local authorities, especially with the inspector of education, since in that way many humiliations can be avoided. On the other hand, it is not too difficult to retain the method applied until then, according to which the official language of instruction is listed as Italian or some Slavic language, while teachers communicate with their pupils in Albanian, as, for example, happens in Prizren.

However, the teachers themselves (the clergy, more than the Ottomans) are the first to impede Vienna's political action in the schools it subsidizes. They do this through constant quarrels and the stubborn rejection of the textbooks in Albanian that Austria-Hungary offers them, due to the acceptance of Doci's new script.

Paradoxically, the only Albanian schools, one for boys and the other for girls, are located in Korca and do not belong to the area under the religious protectorate of Austria-Hungary. They were founded in the 1890s with the support and financial assistance of those whom the Albanians themselves call "foreign well-intentioned friends."

The girls' school has two sections: the first, preparatory, functions as a kind of kindergarten and includes five grades; the second, with four grades, operates according to the current curriculum.

In addition to the subjects appropriate to each level, the pupils also learn the tailoring trade, embroidery, and other kinds of handwork, for which at the end of the fourth grade they receive an appropriate diploma.

The center also has a boarding house. The price of residence with full board reaches 8 Ltq (Stq) per year, of which the first half must be paid at the beginning of the school year and the second in the fourth month. Those who lack means may submit a request for a reduction of the tuition.

Girls from all parts of Albania are accepted. Parents need not worry about the health of their daughters because Korca is a beautiful and civilized town, with a healthy climate and good water.

The school opens at the beginning of September and closes in mid-June, which is why parents must take care of their daughters during the summer holidays.
People who want their daughter or sister to enter that school can write directly to the headmistress of the school, Miss Sevasti D. Kirijas in Korca (during the school holidays in Bitolj), who will be pleased to provide them with any additional information.
At the beginning of the 1900/01 school year, the boys' school has 65 pupils and the following teachers:

1. Naum Nachi
   (Education: Greek secondary school of Korca). Senior teacher for primary education and headmaster of the school
2. G. Atanasi
   (Education: Greek school of Korca)
   Assistant teacher for instruction at the beginner level and for lessons in the Greek language
3. Kristo Karagiozi.

365 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, 11 November 1899, to Consul Ippen, Scutari.
366 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, 29 December 1899, to Consul Ippen, Scutari.
367 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, 19 March 1900, private letter from Zwiedinek to Consul Ippen, Scutari.
368 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 4, Liasse II, Vienna, 11 April 1900, to Consul Ippen, Scutari.
389
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In addition to the subjects appropriate to each level, the pupils also learn the tailoring trade, embroidery, and other types of handwork, for which at the end of the fourth grade they receive an appropriate diploma.

The center also has a boarding house. The price of residence with full board per year reaches 8 Ltq (Stq), of which the first half must be paid at the beginning of the school year, and the second in the fourth month. Those who lack means may submit a request for a reduction of the tuition.

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3. Kristo Karagiozi.

369 HHStA, Liasse Albanien XVI/4, Monastir, 14 January 1902.

390

Auxiliary teacher for instruction on basic notions

4. Ali Efendi

(Teacher from the Turkish Rüşdi school) for holding classes in the Turkish language.

Since 1900, Vienna has been sending regular and very generous subsidies for both of these schools. 370. At times it competed for influence with the American Protestant Mission, but more often it cooperated with it. They helped each other in unfavorable moments, up to the final closure of both schools by the Turkish government. Albanians accept economic assistance from both sides, but have stronger sympathies toward

Austro-Hungary. So as not to wound their pride and sensitivity, and so as not to resemble other propaganda, Consul Kral above all loves to
370 HHStA, Liasse Albanien XVI/4, Vienna, Decree No. 52 of 14 February 1900: dispatch of 1,500 francs; Decree No. 70 of 5 February 1901: Vienna sends 1,600 francs. In the same manner on 14 March 1902, a remittance of 2,000 francs via the bank in Salonika; 3 April 1903, a remittance of 2,000 francs; 8 May 1904, a remittance of 2,000 francs.
391
distribute gifts, since, in his view, the local culture is more inclined and more susceptible to such gestures of friendship. 371.
The school was conceived and implemented as a propaganda institution with short-term and long-term goals. Among the former are the encouragement and spread of the Albanian language, the promotion of a unified alphabet, the development of Albanian writing. Among the secondary are turning the schools into centers for the creation of Albanian national feeling, preparing future supporters of the Albanian national movement, future professors and lecturers for the new Albanians. Activities in the schools are organized and carried out in such a way as to be attractive and to exalt the pride of the local population. The signs of attention shown by the patron are manifold, persistent, and unambiguous. Vienna follows every detail concerning the school: from the number of pupils, their origin, their disposition, to the ways of thinking of their parents and all the rumors and impressions that arise regarding the school. Detailed reports arrive in Vienna about each of the teachers, their biographies from before coming to Korça, the education and inspirations of each of them, friendships and needs. The presence of Austro-Hungarian representatives is very palpable, unlike the relative anonymity they display in the religious schools; they even have themselves photographed with pupils and teachers. This is, with each passing day, up to the final closure of both schools, considered a battle won for the fostering of Albanian national feelings. 371
371 HHStA, PA 1, Case 473, Monastir, Report No. 19, 6 April 1900.
H H S tA, PA XIV, Li II, K. 4.
H H S tA, PA XIV, Li II, K. 4.
H H S tA, PA XIV, Li II, K. 4. INDICIRT 14MRZ.1902
H H S tA, PA XIV, Li II, K. 4.
H H S tA, PA XIV, Li II, K. 4.
CHAPTER X:
THE PRESS, OR HOW VIENNA BEGINS TO WRITE IN ALBANIAN
The press represents a point of special significance within Vienna’s program for political action in Albania. 372. It must be a reliable, dynamic, and effective factor for shaping national feelings within the heterogeneous Albanian population. To achieve this goal, the Ministry sets itself the task of creating publications susceptible to Austro-Hungarian influence, which, through their content (supervised from Vienna), would awaken and form the national consciousness of Albanians from different tribes.
Ideas and the initial plan for implementing the Austrian–Albanian publication
The initial idea was to establish a publication in the Albanian language which, like a journal, would appear once a month373. It was to have the following features: vitality and staying power, which would distinguish it from other existing Albanian publications.

It was also expected that the journal would, in a short time, reach broad strata of the public, so that it could influence even wider circles374. The first issue would have to contain a summary of political events from the previous month, not political articles. The first task would be to inform, and then to set out opinions.
Aware of the difficulties such a publication entails, those who initiated this project began to work in an expressly German manner, thoroughly and systematically. In their plan it is stated that all consular offices in the Albanian regions, namely those in Scutari,
372 See Die Memoire iiber Albainen (Memorandum on Albania), Memorandum on Albania), which we commented on in Chapter II of this text, HHStA, PA I, K. 473.
373 See HHStA, PA XIV, K 18, Alb. XII / 2, 1 Theil, Bericht Nr. 16, Vertraulich, Scutari, den 18 Mai 1897, Consul Ippen.
374 See HHStA, PA XIV, K 18, Alb. XII / 2, 1 Theil, Erlass Nr. 781, Geheim, Wien, den 12. Juni 1897, an Ippen (Secret edict of 12 June 1897, no. 781, to Ippen).

Prizren, Durres, Valona and, finally, Skopje and Monastir, recruit contributors; they anticipate that at first these will primarily be clerics, as the most educated and closest to Vienna in terms of education, worldview, etc. However, the Ministry considers it desirable for this task to win over, a posteriori, also secular figures, especially Muslims. For the publication to be readable, the topics of the articles must include the history of different regions and the family traditions of the most prominent families. In addition, it should speak about ethnographic, folkloric, geographic and national-economic circumstances, and it would be good to collect and publish folk songs. Initially, it is necessary to publish articles without indicating the author; the texts will have to be "purged" of any attacks on the Turkish government, on Islam and on Muslims, and they must not have religious pretensions.
As for the place of publication, two options are considered. The first, which some consuls initially advocated, was that the journal's editing should be carried out in Vienna, where political and literary oversight would also be exercised. The editorial offices of all Albanian newspapers, as well as all publications in the Albanian language, would always have to inform the editorial office in Vienna of any literary movement, and to have new publications in their possession.
However, at that stage the project needed greater support, which is why it was necessary to win over officials of the Ministry of Finance. In that case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not rely exclusively on forces within its own sphere of influence, but this posed no obstacle, since officials of the Ministry of Imperial and Royal Finance had previously advised, as one of the initiators of this project emphasizes, that an Albanian program be drawn up and were ready to cooperate with their colleagues from Foreign Affairs375.
The second option, which in fact prevailed, is the one the Ministry itself proposed, emphasizing that it was better not to publish the journal in Vienna, because in that case from the outset they would run the risk of drawing attention to the planned Austrian activity in Albania376.
375 See Chapter II of this work, which deals with the development of political activity in Albania and presents the important role of the Minister of Finance himself at the secret conferences.
376 HHStA, PA XIV, K 18, Alb. XII / 2, 1 Theil, Weisung num. 781, Geheim, Wien, den

Aiming to be cautious about founding a new press organ, so as not to draw attention to Austro-Hungarian activity, the Ministry in Vienna decided to take over one of the already existing Albanian publications along with the subsidies belonging to it, and through it to defend its ideas and publish articles by Austrian authors377.
While seeking the most suitable publication for their political aims, instructions were sent from Vienna to Consul Ippen to continue collecting suitable materials for publication. The consul was preparing a book on the history of the Albanian people. Likewise, according to him, he was gathering five “intelligent” young men—members of the Albanian clergy—who formed a small local editorial board, and he believed that at this moment laymen could also join him, perhaps even collaborators of the Muslim confession. And Consul Rappaport devoted his time to collecting and preparing materials for the later Austrian–Albanian publication.
What other Albanian publications existed at that moment, i.e., in mid-1897, and what was their situation when Vienna made the decision to intervene with a publication fashioned for its own political objectives?
All the publications were issued in the diaspora379, and none had managed to survive, that is, to appear regularly over a longer period380.
In Italy there were three attempts—the publication of the newspapers “Fiamuri Arbrit” (The Albanian Flag), “Arbru i ru” (Young Albania) and “Oli i Arbresvet” (The Star of the Albanians)—but all were short-lived.
In Bucharest, a few years earlier, a Vlach–Albanian newspaper, “Skiperia” (Albania), had been published by the association “Dituria.”
From that moment an Albanian newspaper published in Brussels in French is also mentioned. Vienna, however, does not know who its editor is,
377 Ibidem: Decree No. 781, Vienna, 12 June 1897 to Ippen (Edict of 12 June, No. 781 of 1897 for Ippen).
378 HHStA, PA XIV, K 18, Alb. XII / 2, 1 Part, Report No. 24, Scutari, 29 June 1897, Ippen to Goluchowski
379 There really is only a single publication in the Ottoman Empire printed by the Jesuits, that is, a monastic order subject to a foreign legal system, a monthly, a very modest publication of an exclusively religious nature, called "Elcija i zemers L' Jezu Kristit" ("Herald of the Sacred Heart"); see the following note at the bottom of the page.
380 HHStA, PA XIV, K 18, Alb. XII / 2,1 Part, Report No. 24, Scutari, 29 June 1897, Consul Ippen to Goluchowski. The information on the publications comes from this report, and it was prepared by the consul on assignment received from Vienna on 12 June 1897.

Therefore Ippen turns to the consulate there. He receives the reply that the said journal, which appears once a month, cannot be found in bookshops, nor can it be determined who prints it. Also, according to information from the Austro-Hungarian consulate in Brussels, the Turkish embassy unsuccessfully tried to obtain that publication shortly before Consul Ippen took an interest in it.
At that moment, the only possibility proposed for infiltrating one of the existing Albanian publishing houses is the publication "Skiperia" from Bucharest.

However, after gathering additional information about that house, the Ministry in Vienna rejects this possibility, since the paper represents the organ of a pro-Hellenic party.
In any case, the most important questions that Vienna should address in order to achieve its propaganda goals are: which circle of readers the publication "Albania" should gather around itself among the Albanians of the Ottoman Empire, and to what extent the circulation of that paper can be increased.
The first information arrives from the Scutari area, where Vienna has at its disposal an energetic, active consular representative—talented and at the same time full of enthusiasm and ambition.
By his estimates, in the Scutari region Vienna can count on the Catholic clergy, scattered throughout this province, as well as the residents of the Catholic faith in the city itself, as the primary audience. However, among them the newspaper can be distributed only if it is given entirely free of charge381.
Likewise, bearing in mind the specificity of local customs, the content of the newspaper would be spread if among the Mirditas and the Malisors it were disseminated by word of mouth. It seems that the Albanians, like all Balkan peoples, are quite inclined to take an interest in political news. At the given moment, news is supplied to them by aghas and beys, and these are, logically, of a Turkish character, which means that they are often anti-Austrian and, from Ippen's point of view, distorted.
The clergy, for its part, since it receives no newspapers, cannot inform its parishioners. The consul expects that these shortcomings can be corrected precisely if they receive some newspapers with content inspired by Vienna.
381 HHStA, PA XIV, K 18, Alb. XII / 2,1 Part, Report No. 24, Scutari, 29 June 1897, Ippen to Goluchowski.

From reliable sources, in the villages of the plain and among the mountain tribes that descend to the plain in summer, there are only two or three people who know how to read. However, the Austro-Hungarian representative points out that within the village population an authentic circle of readers can be created only if schools are also built in the village.
Other methods of action, such as personal activity from one's position to create an environment for action, are regarded as hardly advisable, since the risk of failure is assessed as very high.
The situation is in fact not favorable for media propaganda. Even so, Vienna does not have much time at its disposal to encourage national feelings. One must act by methods that have proven effective in so many other cases. In this way, even if the newspaper achieves no other goals, the mere fact of the existence of an Albanian newspaper will be worth the expense, since for the Albanians it would represent a symbol of their vitality and national survival. That is already in itself a moral success for Vienna, and therefore it should not be underestimated, given that the intention is to make the Albanian question their goal382.
Nor are the costs, in the opinion of the Ministry's officials, so high; for example, to cover the Scutari region, they estimate that about 3,000 florins per year are needed.

Establishing Contact or the Beginning of a Long Friendship between Vienna and the Editor of the Magazine "Albania"

Vienna obtains more precise information about the editor of the magazine "Albania," which is published in Brussels, and comes into contact with him through Count Khevenhiller, the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic representative there.
As a consequence of that first contact, its editor, in a letter of 4 August 1897 addressed to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister382383, to which he also encloses an issue of the magazine, asks the minister to grant him a conversation with him in person, because he would like to discuss a very important question concerning
382 HHStA, PA XIV, K 18, Albanien XII / 2,1 Part, I. Faik bey Konitza (Trank Spiro Bey), Bruxelles, 4 August 1897, Fol. 27b.
383 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albanien XII / 2, 1 Part, Faik bey Konitza (Trank Spiro Bey), Bruxelles, 4 August, 1897, Fol. 36–37.

the attitude of the Albanians toward the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He writes that the nature of that conversation compels him to do this orally; however, if he must write, he does not wish to send this letter by post. He then expresses his readiness, if necessary, to go to Vienna, and asks in any case to be shown how it would be best to enter into contact with the Ministry.
Vienna's reply of August 17, 1897, in a private letter sent to the Austrian Embassy,384 so that it could forward it to the editor of the journal "Albania," is that he should address Count Khevenhiller, the Austro-Hungarian envoy in Brussels, who had been informed of his visit and was authorized to receive whatever information he might wish to communicate to him on Albanian questions.
The same letter from Vienna also contains instructions for Count Khevenhiller.385 They write to him that Trank Spiro-bey is the youngest representative of Albanian propaganda, whose activities Vienna characterizes as "energetic," though not sufficient. It is a movement connected with the future of the border regions adjoining Austria-Hungary, which deserve full attention, and it is therefore highly advisable, by learning the intentions of Trank Spiro-bey and his group, to supplement the information they had until then about Albanian matters. The instructions state that he should be received for a conversation, that everything he has to say should be listened to, and that Vienna should be immediately and thoroughly informed of impressions of him as a person and of the content of the information conveyed.
Trank Spiro-bey visits Count Khevenhiller on August 20, 1897.386 The visit lasts approximately two hours. It becomes clear that the real name of Trank Spiro-bey is in fact Faik-bey Konica, and that he is, in the words of the Austro-Hungarian representative, a "typical Albanian," a Muslim, who, however, atypically, studied at the universities of Toulouse and Lyon. His ideal is the independence of Albania, but he does not believe that, due to various geopolitical factors, it is possible; for that reason he seeks the support of one of the great European powers. With his journal he wishes to promote the idea of an independent Albania
384 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albanien XII / 2,1 Theil, Vienne, le 17 aout, 1897, Privat-brief an Trank Spiro Bey, directeur de l' „Albania" à Bruxelles, Fol. 38-38b.
385 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albanien XII / 2,1 Theil, Wien, 17-08-1897, Weisung Nr. 841 an Grafen Khevenhiiller in Brussel, Fol. 39-39b.
386 HHStA, PA XIV, K 18, Albanien XII / 2,1 Theil, Bericht Nr. 12, Vertraulich, Brüssel, den 20. August 1897, Khevenhueller an Goluchowski. And indeed, the correspondence

on behalf of Vienna is conducted by Count Cvidinek on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
404
under the protectorate of Austria-Hungary. He also proposes that a committee be convened to work on influencing the “brothers of the clan”387 with texts written for the same purpose. He believes that work should be done against Italian propaganda.
As for his newspaper, he informed him that an issue costs 300 francs, and that it is currently subsidized by people who share his ideas and are from Constantinople and Bucharest. However, if he changes the profile of the paper, he would lose that financial support and would need the backing of the Austro-Hungarian government. He is ready to travel to Vienna and present his ideas at the Ministry there.
Count Khevenhiller’s personal impression is that Faik-bey has fanatical convictions, but is sufficiently well-educated to understand that at that moment the complete independence of Albania is inconceivable, given its geographical position and the disunity of the Albanian clans.
According to the Austro-Hungarian diplomat, Faik-bey readily came to the idea that the policy Austria-Hungary pursues with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina would seek its extension to the south, and that the real reason he is addressing Austria-Hungary is the need to obtain subsidies, since he somewhat rashly embarked on the adventure of publishing a journal. The Austro-Hungarian representative thinks that this need will also force him to alter his convictions and will make him susceptible to advice.
He writes that during 20 years of service in the Balkans he has met numerous individuals who pursued grandiose plans with ridiculous financial means and that, as a rule, he does not trust too much the clients who come to his office.388
However, he is unable to foresee to what extent it will be possible for Faik-bey, through his propaganda, to influence the local population. Nor can he state the benefit that might be derived from supporting such aspirations. In fact, he believes that Turkey has much greater prospects of survival than the editor of the journal “Albania” thinks. But if Italian ambitions are more than a mere product of imagination, he considers it worth sacrificing some 1000 francs to fight them.
387 This is the expression of the diplomat Khevenhiller himself, from that same report.
388 He refers to the Informations Bureau, a special section devoted to the collection of confidential information abroad.
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Two weeks later, asked for his opinion on the path that should be chosen in order to establish an Albanian nationalist media organ that would be close and obedient to Vienna, Ippen sends his reply.389 To avoid the risk of failure, he advises the Ministry that instead of founding a new outlet, it should infiltrate an existing newspaper. Of those existing, he considers the journal “Albania” from Brussels the most suitable.
However, in Ippen’s view, the editor of this journal must carry out some changes that should not be underestimated. He would have to modify his program. Ippen calls his journal the organ of the autonomist-revolutionary party and believes that the editor of “Albania” should renounce the term “revolutionary” and cease criticizing Turkish sovereignty. In addition, in every issue of his journal he must leave room for articles drafted by Ministry officials and print them in the orthography that Vienna deems appropriate.

At the same time, following instructions from the capital, Ippen reports that he has already collected enough material for the future nationalist journal. The small circle of collaborators from the Catholic clergy, which he has organized, is already eager to see their contributions published.
During the second half of October of the same year he sent to the Ministry all the accumulated materials, with the note that the authors would prefer their names not to appear in the publication 390. The texts were inserted within sections devoted to history and law, though of doubtful scholarly value, despite the fact that the author of most of those articles was Ippen himself, whom we could, without much error, from this moment call the co-editor of the journal. Poems and proverbs were also enclosed.
Cvidinek had in his hands the material for the first Austrian–Albanian issue, and the collaborators from the interior of the area of operations were already impatient. Ippen did not know how to calm them and asked whether it would not be appropriate to explain to them that the entire undertaking to realize a nationalist publication was currently postponed. The project had already left the office where secret conferences were held, honneur oblige, and the baron summoned Faik Bey to Vienna.
389 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albanian XII/2, Bericht Nr. 41, Scutari, den 3. September 1897, Consul Ippen, Politischer Gegenstand, Uber Herausgabe einer albanesische Zeitung.
390 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Ippen, Bericht Nr. 49, Scutari, den 19. October 1897.
391 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Erlass Nr. 966, Vertraulich (Orden numero 966, confidencial), Wien, den 7. Dezember 1897, an Grafen Khevenhiiller, Bruselles.
406
In November Faik Bey appeared in Vienna, where he took part in confidential talks at the Ministry. The impressions he left (not only by explaining the aims of his publication, but also as a person) led the Ministry to take the position that it was worth the effort to try to use his journalistic activity, together with the connections he had in various parts of the country, to gain influence in Albania.
Cvidinek agreed to subsidize his journal under the following conditions: first, the publication must in no way serve to agitate against the Turkish government; second, the editor’s activity must be directed primarily toward awakening an understanding of common national interests, making no distinction by religion among his compatriots who belong to different clans; third, in order to be read both among the Ghegs and among the Tosks, he should publish articles in both dialects; fourth, the editor undertakes to publish those articles and news whose dissemination through the journal "Albania" Vienna deems desirable.
He was also informed that Vienna wished to keep away from any kind of political agitation in Albania not inspired by Vienna itself. The Ministry would support all efforts aimed at the autonomous development of the Albanians, provided those efforts remained within the bounds of established order and did not, through revolutionary tendencies, lead down the wrong path, since Vienna wished the Albanian people to strengthen themselves through their own work so that they could effectively defend their national individuality in relation to the expansionist aspirations of their Slavic neighbors.
Faik Bey expressed his satisfaction with the stance Vienna had taken and spoke disparagingly of the activities of the "pseudo-Albanian" 392 committee in southern Italy,

which pleased his interlocutor Cvidinek. He also explained more concretely that this committee did not strive to strengthen the interests of its people, but was devoted to propaganda for Albania to be annexed to Italy. The bey believed that his patriotic duty obliged him to work against these intrigues, dangerous to the future of his country 393.
392 This is Faik Bey's expression.
393 In the letter sent to Khevenhuller so that he would be informed about the talks with the Albanian editor, Cvidinek adds at the end that upon his return to Brussels, Faik Bey goes to the embassy and Khevenhuller is instructed to hand him 500 francs, requesting a written receipt; he also asks that it be confirmed whether the journal corresponds to Vienna's expectations, and Cvidinek adds that if it managed to be accepted in the widest circles in Albania, it could count on the Ministry's support in the future.

When an agreement was finally reached between the Ministry and the editor of the journal "Albania", the latter prepared in writing, in concise form and according to his own understanding, the content of the aforementioned agreement 394. Since this document actually represents the program of the journal for the next 10 years, we will comment on it in detail below.
The bey starts from the premise that the question under discussion must be studied from three perspectives: the goal to be pursued, the means for achieving it, and finally, the obstacles and how to overcome them.
From his conversations with Cvidinek, Faik Bey confirms that he understands the goals to be pursued, namely: 1) developing Albanian national feelings and helping the Albanians to become aware of their differences from the Turks, i.e., that they are different peoples; 2) gathering all forces around a single center so that common action, whatever it may be, is possible; 3) acting in such a way that the Albanians understand their distinctiveness while at the same time remaining within the bounds of legal behavior; 4) at the same time, they should respect the established authorities; toward them they must direct their aspirations, which are connected with economic and intellectual interests, in the event that unexpected events accelerate the resolution of the Eastern Question, that is, the partition of the Ottoman Empire and the distribution of its European territories among the Balkan peoples and the corresponding Great Powers.
The means to be used, according to Faik Bey, are, in the first place, his journal which, composed in the Toske and Geg dialects, as well as in French, will be devoted to publishing folk songs, historical chronicles, patriotic poems, economic questions; political notes will also be published, to be presented in the form of various events so as not to arouse the suspicion of the Ottoman government because of hostile comments and so that laudatory comments would not influence the favorable attitude of Albanians toward the said government; also, correspondence should be established among all parts of Albania, so that permanent regular links are set up among all Albanian towns. Letters from Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Bosnia will point to the necessary reforms; in each issue of the journal a favorable chronicle will be published about all the religions professed in the country, so as to destroy
394 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Fa'ik Beu i Konitzes, Vienna, 26 November 1897.

the prejudice which most Albanians have that their faith forbids them from engaging with their national language.
Second, as regards the media, one should emphasize small brochures to be published two or three times a year and printed in thousands of copies in both dialects, in which national feeling will be developed in simple form through questions and answers, and from which direct politics will be excluded.
Third, it is greatly useful to found an association whose statutes Cvidinek will have to approve, and whose general goal from that moment is already known: by oral means to do what the journal must achieve with the help of the written language.
The fourth envisaged means consist of letters exchanged with all Albanians who could exert any influence in the desired direction.
Fifth, the periodic dispatch of a capable correspondent to Serbia and everywhere there are Albanians, in order to organize branches of the aforementioned association, so that Albanians learn to read, brochures are distributed, and, if necessary, conferences are organized.
Sixth, also very important, are schools. They must be the subject of the liveliest interest, since there are none, and Albanians would like to have them, but they lack the initiative that such an undertaking requires, as well as teachers. In all places where it is necessary to establish a school, petitions should be prepared and sent to the Ottoman government. In addition to an Albanian course, the petitions should request a course in the Turkish language, in order to allay the suspicions of the government, as well as courses in French and German, which would arouse enthusiasm among all Albanians. The administration of these schools would be provided by the aforementioned association, whose task would be to protect them from every kind of influence that may be transmitted through teachers to pupils and through them to their families.
Seventh—it would be necessary to establish good relations with all religious leaders, and above all with the Bektashis, whose influence may be useful at that moment and later; at the same time, their religious aspirations, which incline toward autonomy, should be discreetly supported.
The most serious of all the obstacles to be overcome, the editor of the journal “Albania” considers to be the traditional and growing
395 The statutes are at our disposal, but since the said association does not come to life, the statutes remain a dead letter on paper and we think no more attention should be paid to them. They are yet another example of pedantic literary work that has no effect in the sphere of action.
409
distrust of the Turkish government. However, the Albanian bey knows the remedy for that: every criticism directed against the Ottoman government should be avoided, an almost friendly stance adopted, and it should be made, by adroit politics, to believe that this is a pacifist movement, purely intellectual in nature and without political aims.
Another important obstacle is the mutual hatred of the Albanians themselves, caused by religious differences. However, the optimistic view of this man of words is that Albanians will reconcile with one another, if friendship among their religious leaders is achieved.
The third obstacle consists of other propaganda. In Faik’s opinion, their effects are also easy to eliminate; one only needs to report their intrigues and show where they wish to lead the people.

The fourth obstacle is posed by the Albanian communities abroad themselves, for example in Italy or in Bucharest. It is important to morally discredit these communities, by reporting that they act at the behest of various governments. In this way, the favor of the Ottoman government would also be gained.
Part of the same problem is the fact that the European press is almost accustomed to seeing in those communities—the Orthodox and the Catholic—the only representatives of the Albanians, while the great majority of the people, who are Muslims, have no representatives.
By way of conclusion, it is emphasized that the whole activity should be dominated by two ideas: first, no party should be founded, but rather all Albanians gathered around the same goal; second, the journal, the association, and the propaganda together must act as a spontaneous movement, so that no conclusion can be drawn from it about anyone's patronage, sympathies, or friendship.
At the end of everything, Faik Bey repeats what he previously wrote in the summary of the conversation with Cvidinek, to whom this letter is addressed, confirming that he has carefully reflected on all the points, and promises that he will regularly inform the baron by post of all future activities.

Literary Collaboration and Monetary Compensation

After such cordial and profound understanding, the first honoraria arrive, as should be expected, which will turn the Albanian bey into one of the best-paid journalistic stars. On 14 December, Faik Bey goes to the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Brussels
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where Count Kevenhiller, executing order no. 966, hands him 500 francs, and the editor draws up a written receipt, which is sent to Vienna the next day.
On the other hand, the Ministry informs Consul Ippen in Scutari3 97 that the editor of "Albania" has offered to act through his journal in the direction Austria-Hungary desires for the development of the Albanian national movement. Therefore, they once again ask him for his opinion on the materials already received in Vienna, because, should they approve them again, they would be published in the journal in January.
In an encrypted telegram of 23 December, Ippen3 98 confirms that he approves the texts appearing in the next issue of the journal; however, he requests that the authors' names not be mentioned.
On 29 December, Vienna, by mail addressed to Count Khevenhiller, sends Faik-bey the prepared materials that Ippen has approved to appear in the next issue of the journal "Albania"399. In a personal letter to Faik-bey, which, as always, accompanies the one intended for the Count, they note that if he has any remarks on any of the texts, he should explain them in writing so that the authors may be acquainted with his comments.
From that moment, regular dispatches of material for the journal begin from Vienna. The editor also sends the Ministry a literal and complete translation into French of all materials that will be published in Albanian in the coming issues, as well as about twenty copies of the newly issued number. Vienna will later distribute the remaining copies that will be smuggled into the Ottoman Empire, for which Faik-bey is responsible.
The editor of the journal "Albania" follows Vienna's suggestions with the greatest care, and when he happens to overlook a detail that for some reason is not to Vienna's liking, he apologizes, shows enthusiasm to correct the mistake, asks their forgiveness, and

shows readiness to receive additional advice, and such an attitude greatly pleases the authorities in Vienna400.
396 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Brussels, on 15 December 1897, Count Khevenhiller to Goluchowski.
397 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Vienna, Confidential, 16 December 1897, Ippen.
398 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Consul Ippen, Scutari, Cipher Telegram No. 2816.
399 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Vienna, on 29 December 1897, private letter from Zwiedinek to 1) Frank Spiro Bey, dir. de “Albania”; 2) Count Khevenhiller, Brussels; for confirmation of the forwarding of the mail to Faik-bey, see: Report No. 1, Brussels, on 4 January 1898, Khevenhiller to Goluchowski.
411 HMje
As for the first articles sent, however, Faik-bey, always very attentive and satisfied with the materials he receives, allows himself only to propose that, for the success of the entire undertaking, the articles be shorter and more concise in content, because the journal does not have enough space for longer ones, but above all because of the specificity of its readers, who learned to read as adults, thus read slowly and aloud, tire quickly, and easily lose concentration401. Unfortunately, the Austro-Hungarian side, whose collaborators are members of the Catholic clergy from that region, educated in Rome, is accustomed to expressing far from simple ideas in sentences that could take up several pages. In that case, the readers would not remember even what they had read at the beginning, would get lost in the article, and thus its usefulness and effect would be diminished. Therefore, and also because of waiting until the next month (when the publication of the other parts of some previously mentioned articles is expected), the whole effort would become useless, since the Albanian reader would already have completely forgotten what the article is about. For that reason, Faik-bey suggests that it would be better for the journal to publish articles in the form of short news items402. Although reasonable and accepted in theory, the editor’s proposal is difficult to implement in practice because of the by no means negligible cultural differences between those carrying out this publishing undertaking and those receiving it. In search of a reasonable compromise, an original hybrid is achieved, with uneven parts, full of thematic and stylistic contrasts, but rich in content and in various forms. All in all, the organ becomes an unnatural mixture composed by Austrian authors, in which mythology and political science at a folkloric level are combined with Albanian legends, folk songs, legal provisions that nobody understands, mountain folk wisdom, etc.
If the differences in the degree of inclination toward reading between those who write and those who are expected to read are not negligible,
400 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Brussels, 1 January 1898, Faik-bey Konica to Zwiedinek.
401 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Brussels, 3 January 1898, Faik-bey Konica to Zwiedinek.
402 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Ibidem.
412
an even more serious problem is the very delivery of the journal to readers. Upon his return to Brussels, Faik-bey immediately gets in touch with a trusted man from

Constantinople, whose ideas are close to his, asking him how he sees the development of a media propaganda with the aim of quickly awakening national feeling among the Albanians and whether that undertaking has prospects of success.
His contact sends him a list of important and influential people who would be delighted to receive the journal regularly; however, the list is short, and the hope that “Albania” can be sent by the Turkish post, according to Faik’s own contact, is unfounded, even if its contents from beginning to end were praise of the Sultan. According to this friend of Faik’s, if the recipients were not too influential, they would be imprisoned and kept in jail until the journals were sent to Constantinople, translated, and assessed as harmless, which, knowing how the Turkish system works, would mean six months in prison. In that way, the movement being attempted would, in advance, be deprived of useful people. If the recipients were influential and had a good reputation, they would not go to prison, but the provincial governor would withhold the journals.
The problem the editor of the journal “Albania” must acknowledge to his new allies is that, to organize the journal’s entry, he needs a man who knows both the Tosk and the Gheg dialect, and who is skilled, sensible, and a patriot, and at that moment no such person is known to him.
While that problem is being solved, publication continues as the result of close cooperation between Faik and Vienna, and of course the subsidies continue to be paid. On 19 January 1898, Zwiedinek, through the Austro-Hungarian embassy, sends a further 500 francs in gold for the editor of the journal and a personal letter to him403. Zwiedinek confirms that he received 25 copies of the latest issue of the journal “Albania,” which is actually the eighth issue of the journal, together with a French translation of the text that appears in Albanian. This is a “transitional” issue, since it also publishes the new program of the journal drawn up according to Vienna’s recommendations. Zwiedinek is satisfied with the way Faik resolved the delicate situation and moved forward, and he believes that in future it would be sufficient for his friend to send him only a summary of the content of the texts that will appear in Albanian, without their literal translation, a task that will often be entrusted to the consuls from the interior of the country.
403 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Vienna, 19 January 1898, to 1) Count Khevenhüller, Brussels; 2) Trank Spiro, Director of “Albania,” Brussels.

He also conveys another pleasant piece of news: that he has sent him 500 francs for expenses and asks for a written confirmation from his cordial friend, the bey, that the said money has been received404.
Since Vienna pays great attention to ensuring that its ties to the journal “Albania” are not discovered, so as not to endanger its success with a large number of readers, Zwiedinek insists that the distribution of the journal in Turkey be arranged by its editor and only asks for a regular consignment of ten copies for the needs of the Austro-Hungarian consuls in Turkey. However, confronted with the bad news that regularly comes from Faik-bey, he is forced to consult the consuls on how the obstacles his friend described might be resolved.
He also sends the consuls a special, strictly confidential memorandum,405 informing them that, since the editor of the publication “Albania,” who writes under the pseudonym Trank Spiro-bey, has a politically correct program and does not oppose the Austro-

Hungarian positions on that issue, Vienna shows great interest in that literary publication in the Albanian language.
He encloses for them a “transitional” copy of the journal so they can study it and send him their comments or suggestions regarding the form and content of the paper. He points out that it is important to pay attention, also for subsequent consignments of the journal, to whether it easily reaches Albanian circles and to what extent other similar Albanian publications are well received among the population.
While the consuls strive to carry out the Ministry’s instructions, Zwiedinek turns his attention to “complicating the life” of his friend the editor, suggesting that he publish the articles in Albanian but transcribed in Turkish letters, so that the journal can be read in the north and east of the “area of activity.”
404 A receipt confirmed by Count Khevenhüller with: Bericht Nr. 2, Brussels, 27 January 1898 (Report no. 2 from Brussels, of 27 January 1898), to which is attached the editor of Albania’s acknowledgment in HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, I. Teil, May 1897 to the end of 1900.
405 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Vienna, 11 February 1898, Zwiedineck to 1) Consul Ippen, Scutari; 2) Consul Pisko, Usküb; 3) Consul Winter, Durazzo; 4) Consul Rappaport, Prizren; 5) Consul Petrovic, Valona.

It is not easy for Faik-bey to refuse such a suggestion, so he tries to fulfill the wish of the pro-Albanian baron406. Nevertheless, by way of complaint he notes that some Albanian consonants do not even have graphic equivalents in the alphabet used by the Turkish language, which would make following the content even harder for unskilled Albanian readers. He also remarks that perhaps, instead of whole articles, it would be better to try with short sentences.
Consul Ippen, the “co-editor” of the journal “Albania” in Scutari, continues to send materials for the journal originating from the interior of the country, and this time the author is the son of a translator from one of the general consulates407.
Zwiedinek does not hide his joy from his friend Faik, since he, despite certain difficulties, as the baron characterizes them, will be able little by little to begin publishing some articles using Turkish letters408. To make the complicated task easier for himself, he sends him Rappaport’s report, which we already know, on the different Albanian letters, describing it as a study of the Albanian alphabets prepared by a “distinguished connoisseur of the Albanian language.” He recommends that he direct his attention to the system of transcription into Turkish letters, which has already been used in several cases, in the hope that in this way he will dispel the editor’s doubts regarding the technical aspect in his writings.
Cvidinek’s insistence stems from his desire to win over, as readers of the journal 'Albania', the Muslims from the northeast, who, according to his information, receive with interest reading matter printed in this script. In order to determine the effects of this initiative, he informs Rapaport about the articles that may be expected in 'Albania' and instructs him to inform him about the practical results of these trials.409
Six days later, he sends to the editor of the journal 'Albania' the agreed monthly honorarium of 500 francs - for the month of February 1898 - and

asks Count Khevenhüller to have that sum paid to Faik, take a receipt, and send it to him later410.

Parallel to that, in accordance with Faik's recommendations, he informs Consul Ippen in Scutari411 to pay attention to the short and concise form of the articles on Albania, since his readers, being of advanced age, have learned to read, tire easily, and it is not advisable to publish long and complicated articles, given the literary level of his readership. Therefore he returns the materials sent, so that they may be corrected according to Faik-bey's recommendations, and adds that in future it would be better to choose articles that have direct significance for Vienna's planned actions and concrete aims. Finally, he asks that whenever he himself takes care to write an article for the publication "Albania," he should, when sending it, also include a short description of its contents so the Ministry can assess the tendency of that article. He also allows that authors of literary works of a more general nature may contact the editorial office of the journal "Albania" directly412.

Reception of the Austro-Albanian Publication among the Albanians of the Ottoman Empire or Disappointment Due to Culture Shock

Despite the dedication and good work of coordinator Zwiedinek and his collaborators—both Faik-bey himself and Consul Ippen and the Catholic clergy from his consular district—the reception of the publication remains far from the expectations and wishes of all those working on it.

To begin with—the rather naive expectations were not fulfilled that, due to the change in the political tendencies of the journal and with patience, the Ottoman authorities would change their opinion and allow the free entry of the journal into their territory. The import of the journal "Albania" into the Ottoman Empire, as could be expected, remains prohibited, which already at the outset reduces the number of readers to a minimum.

410 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Wien, den 21. Februar 1898, Vertraulich.

411 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Privatschreiben Seiner Excellenz baron Zwiedinecks an Consul Ippen, Scutari, Wien, 22. Februar, 1898.

412 The instructions which, in a special memorandum from Zwiedinek to Consul Ippen, are underlined with the greatest insistence from Scutari of March 5, 1898, to which he encloses copies of the journal "Albania" and adds that from that moment this publication will be sent to him in the desired number of copies, HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2.

Those who do change their opinion are the few readers of the publication who consider that it has been bought by Austria-Hungary, due to the sudden change in its orientation: from a wholly anti-Austro-Hungarian and pro-Italian journal, overnight it is transformed and becomes the exact opposite—a directly pro-Austro-Hungarian and anti-Italian journal413.

At the same time, another change that readers, this time from the Valona region, noticed was the stance of pronounced loyalty to the Turkish government, which caused satisfaction among Albanians. According to the Austro-Hungarian representative on the spot, who closely observes readers' reactions and has the opportunity to talk with them, this is a stance that should be followed in order to secure a future in the country and achieve that the authorities approve the import of the journal.

Also, to achieve this latter goal, which is of great importance, Austro-Hungarian consuls from the interior of the country recommend that the journal stop commenting so much on Austria-Hungary, primarily to calm the Turkish government, and then to dispel the belief formed among readers that it has been bought by Vienna and serves its interests. If this is not done, they fear it is very likely that the journal “Albania” will meet the same fate as the publication subsidized by Italy, “Nazione albanese,” which has become completely discredited and no one takes it seriously.
What the publication, on the other hand, should do is stand in defense of Albanian interests, opposing them to the interests of Greeks, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins. Nor should it allow itself to go to the other extreme and overly praise the Sultan, since if it did so, it would express sentiments that Albanians do not share.
As for the literary section, the recommendations from the “Albanian” consulates are to insist that contributors be Albanians from the interior of the country, and not those living abroad because, by all accounts, the latter do not enjoy either the prestige or the trust of the local population. Also, texts from the interior will increase and maintain interest in the publication among the local population, so that many people will feel support and gain strength for their new aspirations.
413 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Consul Petrovic, Valona, den 27. Februar, 1898.
417
The indisputable contribution of Faik-bey is acknowledged in that he writes in very beautiful Albanian.
From February to June the same routine continues. Zwiedinek coordinates each issue, in the process exercising “illustrated” censorship; Faik shows how diligent he is and how much attention he pays to his recommendations; Ippen is dedicated and methodical, as befits an Austro-Hungarian official, and his collaborators are ambitious and vain, as is also easy to predict for the local clergy, deprived of the protagonism that is spoken of in the Vatican.
As is usual for any publication that is carving out its path, there are minor changes414, such as the decision to appear twice a month instead of only once; also, the publication of short texts in Albanian written in Arabic script becomes established, and in terms of content, as can be assumed given that the Austrians are co-authors, the meticulous attention stands out with which literary and folkloric aspects are treated, which in themselves represent a veritable work of renaissance.
What persists is a high level of attention directed to the acceptance of the publication in the “region of activity,” and in the instructions for the consuls there is a constant insistence that they report on “everything that happens, what the reception of the magazine from Brussels is like among Albanian readers, and whether the news it encompasses is well received or provokes some kind of reaction.” 415
A cold shower for Vienna comes from Consul Rapaport in Prizren in a report of September 22, 1898 416, drawn up in response to the previously mentioned order of June 11, namely the one under which he reports in detail on the reception of the journal among Albanians. The consul begins by writing that the journal is completely unknown in his consular district, and the only person who knows that it exists—through Consul Pisko, with whom he is on friendly terms—is a schoolteacher in Prizren. A month ago that person sent a letter to the editorial office and asked to subscribe, but up to that

moment had not received a single copy, a fact which the consul explains as the possible retention of the issues by the Turkish authorities. However, the article that he sent was published, and Rapaport himself procured one copy of it.
414 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Strictly confidential, Vienna, June 11, 1898, Zwiedineck.
415 Ibidem.
416 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albainen XII/2, Prizren, September 22, 1898, to His Excellency the well-born Mr. Julius Baron Zwiedineck von Südenhorst, His I. & R. Ap. Majesty's Privy Councillor, Grand Cross, extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister, etc. etc. etc.
418
Indeed, not only "Albania," but all other publications in Albanian, are unknown in this area. The only exceptions are journals in Italian with clear anti-Austro-Hungarian tendencies, "Nazione Albanese" and "Nuova Albania," which arrive from Scutari only from time to time, only when articles against Austria-Hungary appear. They are distributed to the Catholic clergy of Prizren, who, in the consul's view, are connected with the Italo-Albanian Committee of Naples, established by Troksi himself, who is also said to be the author of several tendentious articles.
The Catholics of this area, who are not well represented, show little inclination for the genuine cultivation of Albanian literature. Quite the opposite, they prefer that Albanian language courses not be held in the schools and consider that the only useful and desirable thing is learning the language of commerce.
For their part, the Muslims show no desire to cultivate or develop the Albanian language, essentially for three reasons, namely: their own religious fanaticism, circumspection toward the populace, and the pride in the complicated Turco-Arabic formation which they have achieved with great effort.
Moreover, in this area, according to the consul's observations, the words "Arnaut" or "Shiptar" are not associated with any national idea; rather, by this word is meant any armed Muslim who hates legal order, taxes, military service, and the Slavic Orthodox neighbors on both sides of the border.
Only a handful of people know of the literary-national movement or take an interest in it, namely those born or educated abroad, relatives of the famous Frashëri brothers, or members of the Bektashi sect, who hold high administrative positions but fear the local population and do not express their opinion.
This state of affairs—the unawareness of the journal and the lack of interest in what it represents—prevents the consul from offering remarks about its reception or the impressions left by the texts written in Arabic letters. He was not able to assess or understand whether
419
the success of the propaganda messages would justify the risk represented by the distribution of the journal throughout Ottoman territory, because he could not foresee a wider circle of readers than that made up of the few higher officials—three of them, or at best five.
In any case, Rapaport considers that, for the development of the language and the habit of reading, it would be useful (perhaps also in other areas of the country) to replace the

primitive lithographic process with printing, which in itself already constitutes an obstacle to understanding texts between the two Albanian alphabets.
After 15 months in the area, Rapaport cannot be an optimist and thinks that Vienna, unfortunately, can do very little against the Arnauts' lack of interest in cultivating their own language. There is no basis for effective propaganda through newspapers, journals, etc., since what is necessary is lacking, namely a circle of readers. An increase in the number and improvement of Catholic schools with the establishment of instruction in Albanian does not appeal even to the Catholics themselves. Moreover, the consul fears that this measure would have the opposite effect on the Muslims and awaken their suspiciousness and prejudices turned against the Albanian language and the literary movement, in which they perceive something specifically Christian, i.e., anti-Muslim, and then of course would proceed to its persecution.
Despite this bleak situation, the consul believes it would be very advantageous to continue working to awaken national feelings among the Arnauts, since in the future this would give them firmer and more lasting foundations with which to gain predominance than they would achieve by arming and raw brutality, which are at this moment the pillars of their predominance. Most Albanians in this vilayet, according to the consul, will be assimilated as time goes by, either by the Slavic peoples or by the Turks, unless they renounce arms and devote themselves to commercial and cultural domination, which are decisive factors for interethnic relations in this area.
The Turkish authority has a remedy for this evil and could act by introducing Albanian into the schools and increasing their number, in order effectively to hinder the Slavicization of the vilayet.
Rapaport has also, for the past five years, been working on the development of Albanian culture and language, but in his current consular district he encounters very little interest in linguistic-literary aspects. He had previously prepared a collection of short articles

that could serve as a model for the magazine "Albania," but he does not send them because he believes it would be better for the magazine to publish articles sent from areas where it has readers, and not from those where it is unknown.
At the beginning of 1901, the magazine "Albania" had existed for a full four years. On that occasion, Zwiedinek proposed founding another journal, primarily literary in nature, which would complement the already existing press, above all of a political character. As most of the articles published were written by contributors from Shkodër, Zwiedinek proposed broadening the circle of authors, seeking them in other Albanian districts as well. He sent the agreed 1,700 francs of regular subsidy for Faik and invited him to come to Vienna to discuss the details of this project.
At the same time, Consul Ippen from Shkodër reported that among Albanians who already supported the national idea, stronger prejudices were beginning to take root against the magazine "Albania" and its editor Faik, regarding the notion that the magazine contributed to Italian propaganda. This development unsettled Vienna, and the Ministry wanted to learn more details about the opponents of the magazine.
For his part, the editor of "Albania" continued to work on expanding the magazine's influence and tried to win over the Bektashi dervishes of northern Albania to introduce Albanian into their religious books written in Turkish script.

At the beginning of April, through the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Brussels, Faik received a further 1,700 francs of assistance for his activities, and by decree no. 317 of July 1 he received another 1,700 francs.
417 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Zwiedineck an Khevenhiiller, Wien, 2. Janner, 1901.
418 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Consul Ippen, Scutari, 12. Dezember, 1901.
419 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Wien, an Graf Khevenhiiller, 10. April, 1901.
420 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Fa'ik Bey, Bruselas, an Zwiedineck, 24. März, 1901.
421 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Wien, an Graf Khevenhiiller, 10. April, 1901.
422 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Weisung 317, Geheim (secret), 1. Juli, 1901, Wien an Graf Khevenhiiller.
421
In mid-June, a distressed Faik Bey informed Zwiedinek that the Ottoman authorities had begun to expropriate his property in Turkey.
Vienna also tried its luck by attempting to influence the Albanians through the establishment of an Albanian cultural association in Borgo Erizzo, and recommended that Faik morally support his compatriots carrying out this initiative. Thus the bey came into possession of strictly confidential information that the position of Zadar was strategically important for Austrian interests, since the Albanians of Dalmatia would also get the opportunity to learn Albanian if this project were realized. Not long afterwards, however, Vienna became concerned that this same school—although it would provide the Albanians of Dalmatia with an institution where their children would learn Albanian—would enable them to come into contact with Italian revolutionary ideas, and advised Faik Bey to warn them of this danger.
Faced with these recommendations, Faik decided to travel to Borgo Erizzo and address the Albanians in person. He informed the Ministry of his intentions, but Vienna's answer was negative, since it thought the timing was not at all suitable. The situation in Turkey was becoming increasingly dangerous, and the debates in the Italian Chamber of Deputies ever more heated. They again invited him to come to Vienna, giving him this time precise dates for his visit: between October 20 and 31, 1901.
Vienna's concern about the situation in Turkey was confirmed by mass arrests of influential Albanians, which the Constantinople authorities undertook just a few days later.
Vienna, in the meantime, sent Faik another 2,200 francs, but remained worried about the poor reputation that the magazine "Albania" enjoyed among Albanians in Turkey.
423 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Brusel, den 15. Juni 1901, Fa'ik Bey an Zwiedineck.
424 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienne, le 8 mai, 1901, très confidentielle.
425 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienne, le 1 juillet, 1901.
426 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienne, le 25 juillet, 1901, Zwiedineck à Fa'ik Bey.

427 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienne, le 25 juillet, 1901; Bruxelles, le 31 juillet, 1901, Fa'ik Bey à Zwiedineck.
428 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Bericht Nr. 25 vom 9. October 1901, Brussel, is actually a confirmation that Faik Bey received 2,200 francs that were sent to him from Vienna, along with a private letter from him to Zwiedinek.

Faik's version of the causes of this situation, so unfavorable to his Austrian friends, is that almost all those Albanians who are devoted to advancing the magazine "Albania" are greedy and driven by self-interest, not at all recommendable people. The editor says that he had always suspected this, had occasionally had proof, but that earlier he could not be quite as certain of it as in recent times. As if these "commendations" were not enough, he points out that they can never be trusted and are ready for anything. Most of the people who represent the Albanian nation are good, but they are hard to reach. Those with whom it is easy to get in touch are actually the most corrupt among them. The latter abuse the good reputation of their people and the initial trust they gained, and as they are of bad stock, neither goodwill nor rationality can inspire positive feelings in them.
Although such delicate, objective, and above all, deeply rooted explanations did not lessen Vienna's concern. Nevertheless, the regular remittances to Faik Konica continued throughout 1902 430, since the situation could not be improved in any other way. There were also constant recommendations to be very cautious with distributing the journal in Turkey, because the Ottoman authorities, due to the Bulgarian uprising in Macedonia—ending with the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians and the emigration of many others—significantly increased the level of border control.
Here it should be added that Faik Bey, in order to continue receiving subsidies, collected various kinds of information that were very little or not at all connected with Albanian topics, and his aim was to convince Vienna how important and indispensable a source he was for it.
In this sense, the story is interesting of an armed uprising in the Ioannina region, which was provoked by specifically Albanian issues such as vendetta (blood feud, translator's note), and which then began to develop in another direction, as often happens in this area 431. It seems to us that this episode also says a great deal about the character
429 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Bruxelles, 16 December 1901, Fa'ik Bey Konitza to Zwiedinek.
430 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, See: Vienna, 7 January 1902, Secret, to Khevenhueller, this concerns a remittance of 1,700 francs for Faik Bey with a letter for him from Zwiedinek, and also: Vienna, 30 October 1902, to Khevenhueller, 2,200 francs for Faik Bey with a letter for him from Zwiedinek.
431 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Brussels, 13 January 1902, Very confidential, Fa'ik Bey Konitza to Zwiedinek.

of those involved in the "Albanian movement" and about the differing expectations and motivations of some of its protagonists, first and foremost Vienna and its proteges.
Faik writes to Zwiedinek with full conviction that an Albanian bey involved in local disturbances was in fact ready to gather several thousand men and, without bloodshed and unrest, attack by night and take Ioannina by surprise, and send the Sultan a letter

with his conditions: freedom of education and of the press in Albanian, as well as in other languages. According to the editor of the journal “Albania,” the said bey was indeed ready to undertake all this at Faik’s signal, but he lacked ammunition and for that reason alone refrained from action.

When he saw that his friend the bey was not taking Ioannina, Faik Bey made contact with the Marquis de Aladro, who promised to provide a ship with ammunition that would sail to the place indicated by the bey from the Ioannina region. They decided that it would be Brindisi. And at that moment, things became complicated: someone accused the marquis of a lack of discretion and of ambitions that led to the failure of such a brilliant operation:

“Under the seal of the utmost secrecy I conveyed the news to the Marquis de Aladro; he initiated into the secret three or four Albanians whom I recommended to him as worthy of interest, not as worthy of trust, which is quite different. In addition, he wanted nothing less than for Malik to proclaim that the Albanians want the Marquis de Aladro as ‘prince’! I spoke only of a serious plan by which the Sultan would be forced to allow certain freedoms.”

This letter from the editor of the journal “Albania,” as could be expected, became a nightmare for Baron Zwiedinek, who hastily replied 432 that in no way could he approve projects so out of keeping with the advice he himself had once given him in Vienna, and that the other Albanians, since the Albanian movement could count only on a modest number of patriots, were practically indifferent to them. He also commented that, despite their courage, Albanian patriots were not at all ready to risk their lives merely for certain cultural privileges.

Faik also dealt with compiling, editing, publishing, and distributing texts in Albanian, and this entire activity

432 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienna, 25 January 1902, Zwiedinek to Fa'ik Bey.

was, of course, directed by Vienna. In a letter addressed to Goluchowski, but actually handled by Zwiedinek 433, he wrote that the work on the history of Albania, specifically the History of Skanderbeg, was finished, and he asked Vienna to approve the manuscript so that a price could be set for it and it could be printed, if Vienna agreed and had no objections.

While these consultations were underway, Vienna compensated Faik for his dedication with a new 1,700 francs 434.

Zwiedinek replied 435 that the works on the History of Albania together with the Geographical Map were ready for publication and represented an honor for the Albanian publishing enterprise from Brussels. He asked that, upon publication, 10 copies of the book History be sent to him, and later he would request several copies of the work Carta geografica (Geographical Map).

In the same letter he returned to him another manuscript, received earlier, under the title “Histoire de la Turquie” (History of Turkey), which Faik wished to publish. Zwiedinek approved its content and agreed to bear the costs of its publication, about which Faik Bey would have to inform him after negotiating with the publisher. However, he recommended that the print use larger letters than those in the History of Albania so that Albanians who read poorly could do so with less difficulty and strain.

Vienna's intention was to prepare, in addition to the journal, a small library of works in the Albanian language. Therefore they also sent him a work by a Greek author, written in Greek letters, with the aim of publishing it in Albanian and hindering Greek influence among the Albanians.
From the Ministry on 28 June 1902 they sent 2,120 francs for Faik along with a letter in which Zwiedinek confirmed that he had received the 10 copies of the History of Albania he had previously requested, and asked for three more, as well as 10 copies of the Geographical Map 436.
He also draws his attention to the fact that lately the readers of the journal "Albania" are getting the impression that he is concerned exclusively
433 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Bruxelles, le 18 mars, 1902, Faik Bey to Goluchowski.
434 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Wien, Erlass Nr. 247 vom 10. April, 1902.
435 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Wien, 30. April, 1902, Zwiedinek an Faik
436 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Wien, den 30. April, 1902, Bericht Nr. 477; Wien, den 28. Juni, 1902.

with the problems of Albanians of the Catholic faith, and suggests that he devote equal attention to representatives of all confessions, since the religious factor has great significance for Albanians. This development of the journal is normal, since most of the articles published are prepared by Catholic clerics—friends of Vienna—who live in Shkodra.
During 1902, an important event takes place for the future relations between Vienna and the editor-in-chief of the journal "Albania": he moves to London, by his own account because in Brussels he feels insecurity and danger from Turkish intrigues. We know that between June 28 and August 25 Faik Bey relocates to the English capital and that in that period the journal "Albania" appears for the first time in London.
Faik continues his work as editor, and in the meantime he also published the previously mentioned book entitled Histoire de Turquie, and Vienna asks him to send 50 copies of that edition.
Vienna gives instructions to Count Mensdorff on how to deal with the newly arrived Faik, since contact with him will be maintained through the Austro-Hungarian embassy in London, and no longer through the one in Brussels. The order states that Faik Bey has an important role in the Albanian movement, that he is a Muslim with good connections, who knows all the influential Albanians of the Muslim faith from Constantinople inclined toward independence, and that his journal is loyal to the Sultan and the Turkish government.
He is informed that Vienna has granted 6,800 francs as an annual subsidy for the publication of Faik's journal and that from that moment the Austro-Hungarian embassy will have to ensure the continuation of the subsidies. For that reason Mensdorff should hand Faik 1,700 francs, which represent part of the aforementioned subsidy for the month of October. In the same way, in the strictest secrecy, the correspondence between Vienna and the editor of the journal "Albania" will proceed via the embassy, for which reason it would be best for the two of them to agree personally on the details.

437 It is possible that this is not the only reason for his relocation. Vienna, however, can do nothing and is forced to create the appearance of believing his version and to continue with financial assistance and commitments.
438 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/ 2, Wien, den 25. August, 1902.
439 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienne, le ler octobre, 1902, a Fa'ik Bey, Londres.
440 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Erlass Nr. 679, Wien am 20. Oktober 1902, an Grafen Mensdorff in London.
426
Count Mensdorff has a conversation with Faik Bey Konica and hands him the money. The editor of the journal "Albania" continues to justify his relocation: the anxiety caused by Turkish spies and the fact that he discovered interesting documents in the British Museum that he would like to research. He agrees with the count that Faik will come to the embassy each time to personally collect letters and the subsidy money.
In a letter of August 27 of the same year, the editor of the journal "Albania" explains in detail and rather unconvincingly what documents he found in the British Museum. The effect of his explanation of why he moved from Brussels to London did not go beyond the story about Turkish spies.
By a letter of December 24 from Vienna, with order no. 923, 1,900 francs (1,700 usual francs and 200 for his contribution to the publication of some poetry) are sent via Count Deym of the Austro-Hungarian embassy to Faik Bey Konica in London, as well as Zwiedinek’s letter to the Albanian editor.
In that letter Zwiedinek congratulates the editor on his work, since the journal is entering its seventh year of publication and there already exists a circle of people accustomed to reading it who can consider themselves readers of the journal "Albania."
However, the journal still has neither correspondents nor friends among the Muslims from the southern and central parts of the country. Since these are precisely the regions that have the greatest influence on the rest of the country, Zwiedinek suggests to Faik that he try to cover those areas as well. The contributors to the journal "Albania" mostly belong to the Catholic clergy from the north of the country, and although they are good writers, they are not in a position to give the journal the character of an edition that would, with equal impartial interest, encompass all regions and all confessions from the country.
Concerned about his new place of residence, from Vienna they take the opportunity to suggest that he change it. Zwiedinek emphasizes that the problems of the journal mentioned earlier may have arisen due to the remoteness of his new residence, which prevents
441 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 19, Albainen, Liasse XII/2, Bericht Nr. 33, Geheim, London, den 10. Oktober, 1902, Graf Mensdorff.
442 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII / 2, Fa'ik Bey, Londres, le 27 aout 1902.
443 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII / 2, Erlass Nr. 923, Geheim, Wien, am 24. Dezember 1902, an Deym, Londres.
427
simple and uninterrupted relations with the country or with Albanian centers abroad, which, on the other hand, are so necessary for a journal like his.

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the journal "Albania," Faik Bey Konica sends Zwiedinek a recapitulation of his work as editor-in-chief of the journal. He begins with what his work assignment was during those years:

"The program I set before myself as a goal was, in two words, the following: it was necessary to make of the Albanian language—whose culture had until then been considered useless and a mere pastime that pleased only a handful of eccentric people—a truly active organism that would take its place and exert a certain influence on the everyday life of the Albanian people."

Zwiedinek's response 445 is that Faik Bey rendered a great service to his people by perfecting the Albanian language to the point that it is no longer difficult to express, by means of it, the fruitful and exalted ideas found in the literatures of more developed nations.

He is informed that for now he should be satisfied with the task of preparing his people—informing and educating them—for a worthy assumption of a place among the other Balkan nations; that it is possible that, after the Macedonian question, the Albanian question may also become topical. In that case, it would be necessary to accelerate the Albanian national movement, and Faik Bey's journal could strongly contribute to that.

The Turkish government in 1903 undertook stricter measures against Albanians involved in the national movement. They closed the school in Korça and took the teachers to prison. (London, 12 March 1903, Faik to Zwiedinek.)

By Order No. 339 from Vienna, via Count Deym, 1,700 francs were sent to Faik Bey, which, along with Secret Report No. 18 of 9 April from London, confirms that he received and gave to the editor of the journal "Albania" 1,700 francs, and a written receipt from the recipient is enclosed.

However, at the end of that month Vienna already directly expressed its dissatisfaction with the content of the latest issue and reminded the editor that the only condition for receiving the subsidy he was getting was adherence to the program that he himself had summarized in writing in the memorandum of 26 November 1897.

This marked the beginning of an open crisis in relations between Vienna and the editor Faik, not foretelling a very good future for the Austrian–Albanian press.

Faik Bey showed no fear; he would rather break off his relations with Vienna than back down and change his point of view.

Since it did not achieve the desired effect—quite the opposite—the Ministry softened its threatening tone, explained its intentions more precisely, confirmed its desire to work so that the position of the Albanian people remained intact and that he might work on strengthening its national existence, and invited the bey to Vienna; but the editor, for private reasons which he did not explain, wrote that he must not be absent from London.

Vienna, as in so many earlier situations, did not wish to exert pressure, did not know how to proceed, and for the moment preferred to continue the subsidies so as not to lose contact entirely; thus on 18 June, via Count Deym, it sent 1,700 francs for the rebellious editor, which he, to the mutual satisfaction, accepted without trouble.

The same was repeated when they sent him a subsidy of 1,700 francs, which he collected at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in London at the beginning of October and in December; however, this time the editor was late in collecting the subsidy, which in

itself was a sufficiently alarming signal for Vienna. Nevertheless, the Vienna authorities pretended not to have noticed this gesture and continued with subsidies as in the past, until a change of strategy toward the editor was determined.
444 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Konitza to Zwiedinek, London, 17 January 1903.
445 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienna, 5 February 1902, Zwiedinek to Faik Bey Konitza.

446 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, London, Faik Bey Konitza to Zwiedinek, 3 May 1903.
447 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienna, 15 May 1903, Zwiedinek to Faik Bey Konitza.
448 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, London, Faik Bey Konitza to Zwiedinek, 21 May 1903.
449 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienna, Decree No. 646, 18 June 1903.
450 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Report No. 39, Secret, 17 July 1903, London: it is confirmed that Faik Bey received the money, and in the same dispatch the letter the editor wrote in accordance with what he received is sent.
451 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Vienna, Decree No. 868, 29 September 1903.
452 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Report No. 61, Secret, London, 9 October 1903; the letter also contains a receipt from Faik Bey dated 7 October of the same year.
453 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, Decree No. 1087, Vienna, Secret, to Count Mensdorff, London.
454 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albanien, Liasse XII/2, London, 12 January 1904; London, Report No. 2, Secret, 15 January 1904.

Recapitulation of Everything Achieved with the Help of the Journal “Albania,” or the Moment of Truth 457
Faced with Vienna’s criticisms, which were each time ever less lenient, as well as with constant recommendations—which are themselves a criticism—Faik Bey insisted that through his activity he had fulfilled two major goals of that publication, agreed upon in Vienna in 1897. These are: 1) the development of Albanian national consciousness through the language, and 2) the establishment of the conviction that Vienna and the Albanians have common interests, and thereby the awakening of a sense of gratitude toward the Danubian Monarchy.
However, Austrian diplomacy, which had the opportunity to follow the journal’s influence up close, remained reserved and assessed it differently. The questionnaire that as early as 1905 was sent to all consulates in Albania gave a negative answer, confirming that the journal had a small number of friends and that it managed to reach only a truly limited circulation.
In the opinion of Vienna’s representatives on the ground, its reach was limited only to the linguistic field: the development of the language in terms of vocabulary and the expression of more complex themes.

455 For the subsidies during the remainder of 1904, see HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albania, Liasse XII/2, the following decrees, with each of which 1,700 francs are sent to him, and the reports confirming that the embassy official charged with delivering it to him received the money, so that for the same recipient they are: Vienna, Decree No. 315, 26 March 1904, to Count Mensdorff in London: instructs him to hand over 1,700 francs to Faik. Report No. 23, Secret, London, 8 April 1904: acknowledgment of receipt; Vienna, Decree No. 683 of 11 July 1904 to Count Mensdorff in London: instruction to give Faik 1,700 against a receipt. Report No. 41, London, 29 July 1904: confirmation that Faik-bey received the subsidy. Vienna, Decree of 21 September 1904, acknowledgment of receipt with Report No. 53, Secret, London, 5 October 1904. Vienna, Decree No. 1221, 21 December 1904, receipt of 1,700 francs confirmed with Report No. 2, Secret, London, 13 January 1905, where the editor's acknowledgment of the 11th of the same month is attached.
456 Subsidies from Vienna continued regularly throughout 1905, and we have established that they were extended until 1908 and possibly thereafter, but we did not consult documents after 1908. The orders for the delivery of the monetary subsidy through the embassy and the reports with the recipient's acknowledgments can be viewed in HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albania, Liasse XII/2.
457 HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albania, Liasse XII/2, HHStA, PA XIV, K.19, Albania, Liasse XII/2, Scutari, January 1906, Consul Krai.
430 However, he failed to influence national feeling, because he could not maintain a continuous tone of forced argumentation with which he attacked anyone who did not share his opinion. He dealt with various topics, from those related to the alphabet to linguistic questions, with an indirect, personal approach instead of an objective and concrete one. The bey's personality is so accentuated that impartial expression is impossible for him, even on subjects that do not particularly concern him. When some other person has a different opinion from Faik, and he believes that person is wrong, he attacks them relentlessly and with irony, even if they have merely made a spelling mistake.
His attacks on Italy descend to the level of the grotesque and fail to achieve the effect of objective and calm criticism, since he is incapable of considering his opponent's point of view. His unapproachability characterizes him not only as a writer but also as a person, and therefore there is not a single person who could remain his friend for long. All educated Albanians abroad were once his friends, and all, without exception, ended their relations with him.
His endless verbal skirmishes with former friends drew him away from writing interesting articles on contemporary life and current political topics. Readers lost all sympathy for him and for the publication he represented, while his last, absolutely outrageous polemics exhausted even the most patient readers.
Consul Kral considers this quite understandable, since a publicist of such qualities was not suited to winning friends for his program and his ideas, and this is perhaps the reason why he was of such limited political use.
Since his compatriots view him with bitterness and distrust, he soon remains isolated. At one moment of bad mood, during this ostracism, he decides to move to London, where he has even fewer opportunities to maintain relations with his compatriots.

As a consequence of all these circumstances, the journal "Albania" failed to achieve a thorough influence on public opinion in the country, nor did it gain the necessary sympathies for its new political orientation.
However, despite all that, Faik-bey will continue in the following years to receive financial assistance from Vienna.
431 [illegible]
HHStA, PA XIV, Liasse XII/2, K. 19.
432 Albania XII/2
[illegible]
503
[illegible]
HHStA, PA XIV, Liasse XII/2, K. 19.
433 [illegible]
HHStA, PA XIV, Liasse XII/2, K. 19.
434 [illegible]
Albania XII/2
[illegible]
[Illegible/garbled text; unable to produce a reliable English translation.]
[illegible]
HHStA, PA XIV, LIX II/2, K. 19.
[illegible]
HHStA, PA XIV, LIX II/2, K. 19
440 Conclusions
In accordance with the archival sources we have studied, we can state that at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century the Albanian population still did not constitute a nation. In settled areas it lived in isolation, people barely knew one another, except when they fought among themselves; possibilities for communication and rapprochement were practically nonexistent, and death due to vendetta was frequent, even among people of the same clan.
There are two main dialects, but they differ so much that speakers of one and the other can hardly communicate with each other.
There is no single written language, but more than twenty transcriptions of dialects, which differ among themselves. The percentage of literate Albanians in this period did not even reach 2%.
They belong to different confessions: Islam, Orthodoxy, and the Catholic faith.
Among Albanians there is no national feeling; they do not perceive the existence of common interests, they are not in solidarity with one another, nor do they create any internal dynamic that could encourage the aforementioned national feeling.
Therefore, the Albanian nation at the beginning of the 20th century does not exist, and the so-called 'Albanian national movement', whose activity is quite insignificant, is nothing more than a small group that operates without a 'national context' and mostly does so from abroad or as collaborators of other European powers.
The documentary material we studied led us to the conclusion that the creation of the Albanian nation was a complex process that depended on various factors, and even more on the way they combined. There was, therefore, the possibility that the said

process of national consolidation would not reach its culmination. Besides favorable factors, a suitable combination of them was necessary.
In our view, that culmination was not based solely and necessarily on the very establishment of the nation, but on the fact that a point of no return had been reached, after which it was harder to go back than, despite obstacles, to continue toward the completion of this process.
441
We believe that Austria-Hungary had a very important role in the process of creating the Albanian nation and that its intervention was decisive in bringing the process, after 1908, closer to the already mentioned point of no return, in the context of favorable factors that it also knew how to create.
On the other hand, we recognize that Austria-Hungary, without the simultaneous coincidence of those conditions, would never have been able to develop the activity it carried out with regard to the culmination of that process, and it seems very important to take that issue into account.
It should also be remembered that there were other, unfavorable factors for the national construction of Albania, primarily encouraged by Austria-Hungary's rivals, but which, compared with the favorable factors, proved very weak, ineffective, and non-decisive.
What were those unfavorable factors?
We can, according to their nature, classify them as actual — those that had already occurred — and potential — those that could have occurred, although their intervention against pro-nationalist activities was never carried out in practice.
The former should be placed within realistic bounds, represented by the Ottoman government on the one hand and the influence of the two great religions—Islam and Orthodoxy—on the other. The Ottoman authority operates through its own administration but depends on the European powers, so it is unable to prevent the activity of foreign consuls, which is why its action ultimately proves weak, ineffective, and unsuccessful.
Another unfavorable factor for the creation of the Albanian nation is found in the existence of two majority religions within the Albanian population: Islam and Orthodox Christianity, and in their mutual relationship, as well as their relationship to the national idea. Both act in the opposite direction from the creation of the Albanian nation, with all that this implies in terms of their networks of influence. Such action is reflected in everything that concerns the practice of faith, mental conditioning, cultural milieu, traditions, rules of life, etc.
Potential factors that did not take shape, despite posing a threat to the process of nation-building in Albania, are found above all in the neighboring Balkan states and their
442
intention to annex to themselves the territories of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by their compatriots, who live alongside Albanian tribes and share the land with them. The said population shares the intentions of those Balkan states, but on both sides of the border the necessary means for carrying out these national initiatives are lacking. One should not forget the fact that this is a European colonial zone.
Russia could have become a decisive factor against the process of nation-building in Albania had it not remained isolated under threats and, therefore, been neutralized by the other powers, that is, left without the possibility to intervene during the said process.

Favorable Factors

In the territory of Albania there existed a set of conditions that favored the creation of the Albanian nation, reinforced by the presence of significant financial resources and structural funds. These factors supported one another and gave each other the necessary time, increasing the likelihood that action toward the realization of the goal would have a favorable outcome.

The first of these factors is Austria-Hungary, with its embassies and consulates and a network of various bodies that efficiently enable the creation and dissemination of texts of a national character written in the Albanian language. On the other side stands Italy, which has similar structures at its disposal. To this should be added the ability of both countries to influence the Albanian Catholic population through the right of religious protectorate. Under the umbrella of this protection are included the school and the attempt to achieve a single common language for all Albanians, a laborious task that is nevertheless being carried out.

Nor should it be forgotten that, despite being rivals, both Austrian and Italian propaganda work in the same direction, namely the awakening of national feelings among Albanians, which is why they undertake similar, and moreover parallel, initiatives. That rivalry has a negative effect only with regard to separate national-level campaigns, which led to their mutual cancellation. But the actions that both of these countries undertake to promote nationalism among Albanians remain intact, and will soon yield their results.

England maintains friendly neutrality and views these activities with approval; should insurmountable obstacles arise, this country offers its consular infrastructure in support of the process begun, so that it may continue on its course. American Protestant missions do the same.

Germany does not engage to the same extent, but is also well disposed toward these activities.

By the concerted action of all these powers, Russia is kept in isolation and without the possibility of acting against the Albanian national sentiments that are just awakening, or of working in favor of the neighboring Balkan countries.

This international “coverage” provides security and time for Austria-Hungary, so that it can develop its own activities that will result in success.

Seemingly, there are other groups that contribute to this national awakening. These are above all the Young Turk movement (in the period under study), then most of the Bektashi dervishes, who represent a significant part of Albanians of the Muslim faith, as well as a considerable part of the Catholic clergy.

In our view, another decisive factor that led the Albanian population to begin taking shape as a single whole is the irresistible attraction aroused by the very idea of the nation.

To begin with, it is the great powers that spread the idea by going out to meet the Albanians themselves, seeking them out in remote mountain villages where practically no one went, learning local dialects and speaking to the population in them; they instill in them the idea of the value they have as a people and offer proposals that are hard to resist. The Albanians have a conception of social relations that differs greatly from the

one touted by the Austrian consuls, so in the end they are won over and begin to believe them.

But what, all in all, is the message that the Austro-Hungarian consuls convey to these seasoned warriors from the mountains? Essentially, the message they send is that belonging to a nation—which, we believe, holds for any nationalist propaganda—gives the individual an additional and almost fantastic value; a person qualitatively ascends to some higher level compared to what he was before, because from that moment he becomes part of a whole that exists beyond the constraints of human nature. Moreover, one acquires this value very quickly, almost instantly. It is enough to believe in it.

444

In that way, the idea of the nation begins to gain the upper hand in its struggle with the great beliefs that prevail in these lands, that is, with the Orthodox and Muslim faiths. From a social and psychological point of view, these religions offer the individual the possibility of belonging to an international community within which everyone feels special, yet always contributes modestly within one great family; he retains his personal responsibilities and may even be subject to criticism—something the idea of the nation eliminates[458].

Within what the spread of the idea of the nation presupposes within the Albanian community, we should, in our view, underline another psychological factor of great importance: the promise that all their worries will be removed and that all their unresolved problems, for which no solutions are in sight, will be solved; in other words, the promise that they will be protected.

What worries the Albanians most—and this is something Vienna deliberately plays with—is the possibility of the Ottoman Empire's collapse, as well as the annexation of their land by neighboring nations. The consequence they fear is that they will find themselves in a position in which they are unable to face a future that is uncertain and full of threats on their own. In that case, the promise that accompanies the concept of the nation points to a solution to all these problems, as well as to the fact that they can secure for themselves a trusted protector who, of course, is none other than Austria-Hungary. To this should be added the hope that there will be administrative progress and, naturally, economic progress, since the Ottoman Empire is nothing but a colony of the great powers, and its economy is in a state of agony.

It should also be borne in mind that at that moment the entire Balkan Peninsula is under the sway of the same nationalist fever, and that its peoples are going through the same kind of experience, which creates fertile ground on which the idea of the nation can take strong root among the Albanians.

This idea is spread not only by consuls in those almost secret meetings, but also through part of the Catholic clergy and their schools, as well as through unofficial Albanian newspapers printed abroad and whose distribution in the Ottoman Empire is banned; the great powers also help, as do initiatives undertaken abroad with the intention of thrilling the Albanian people, mythologizing their origins, highlighting their heroism, developing the language, and warning of the danger they face.

458 We take into consideration the way a member of a nation intimately experiences his national belonging, not how it is perceived from the outside. Otherwise, he too would be subject to criticism, but not because of the shared qualities of the nation to which he

belongs, rather because of himself personally.
445
Instead of a conclusion, we can assert that Austro-Hungarian activity is very complicated, but also complete and successful, while at the same time—and perhaps above all—it is a paradoxical activity.
Challenging, first of all, is the fact that Austria-Hungary is trying to achieve the unification of scattered Albanian tribes among which there is no communication, despite the inaccessible geographical terrain, harsh climatic conditions, and non-existent infrastructure. Moreover, these are tribes in mutual conflict that often carry out blood feuds. Their unification has to be achieved under conditions of conspiracy, under the threat of harsh measures imposed by the official authorities. And on top of that, this is the first establishment of contacts during which complete trust must simultaneously be gained and success achieved in manipulating the concerns and hopes of local leaders—arousing them where they do not exist, keeping them under control, increasing or weakening them depending on what is considered desirable, but above all, directing and managing them.
Austro-Hungarian activity is complex because it encompasses many aspects: social, religious, psychological, political, and—very importantly—economic. For the political goals being pursued, Vienna develops an impressive literary, journalistic, educational, and publishing activity, thus “creating” a true renaissance which it “exports” to its southwestern Orthodox-Muslim frontier. It is complex also because unification means overcoming hatreds, religious prejudices, fear of the official authorities, as well as personal interests that must be replaced by other, different, and more global ones.
I do not think it would be wrong to conclude that the aforementioned activity was successful despite multiple difficulties. The existence of a unified written language is achieved, new occupations are awakened, the vision and perspective of the Albanians changes—who nevertheless remain different among themselves. An important turning point in their mentality occurs. Vienna becomes “historically responsible” for the Albanian awakening. Perhaps other European powers, although that would be difficult because of distance, would have devoted themselves to achieving the same results, albeit more slowly and in a different way. In that context, and despite the success of the entire endeavor, what draws attention
446
is the enthusiasm and energy with which Austria-Hungary rushes to pursue the set goals, even though they openly compromise it. Of course, the Monarchy is aware that in this kind of activity it is desirable to be discreet, all the more so since discretion is not incompatible with effectiveness.
It is also paradoxical that a simultaneously multinational and supranational empire, which lives off nationalisms while fearing them at the same time, promotes a new nationalism on its very border, showing no fear, not worrying even about the fact that its main representatives are of the Muslim faith. Moreover, by all accounts, Austria-Hungary was more inclined to the emergence of a new, predominantly Muslim nation-state than to the expansion of the familiar, small, weak, constrained, and manipulated Slavic Christian states. It may also seem surprising that, for the sake of a future, majority-Muslim state, Vienna, with such enthusiasm and energy, risks relations with its ally, Russia.

It is hard not to ask: why? I believe there are two basic reasons that should be emphasized. The first is the objective situation of the empire, which is going through a prolonged period of crisis. The second concerns the way the empire behaves under those conditions, which represents the personal choice of its highest official, Franz Joseph.

On the one hand, in the second half of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Habsburg Monarchy has the “international status” of a great power, recognized as one of the most powerful forces in the world. By its geographical position, territory, population, and army, the Austro-Hungarian Empire fulfills all the conditions to be a great power459, is able to influence effectively the fate of its neighbors, and plays an important role in the alliances of the most powerful states.

At the same time, however, its role as a great power slips from its grasp because of the characteristics of its economy, infrastructure, the configuration of global circumstances and, paradoxically, because of its very geographic position. The Habsburg state is rich in traditional sources of energy, such as water and wood, but fails to orient itself toward new sources, because it has neither the internal infrastructure at its disposal nor receives internal demand that would stimulate it, nor does it have the capacity for reform460. Its participation in world trade—one of the basic sources of wealth at that time—is insufficiently large. It lies far from the world’s trade routes, cannot reach them, nor can it control them in any way: it has no colonies nor prospects of acquiring them. It is an empire long-term condemned to cede its place as a true great power, although to contemporaries it still gives the impression that it is one.

It would not be wrong to claim that Austria-Hungary persists in the current concord of Europe not because of its own merits, but because the other powers allow it, especially due to its alliance with Russia and the approval of England. To this day there is no consensus as to which causes—among several possible, internal and external—were decisive in bringing about the disappearance of the empire. There is, however, agreement that Austria-Hungary survived as a great power thanks to its diplomacy and, more specifically, to its alliance with Russia and its good relations with England461. Without these two powers, the empire would have remained weakened and in extreme danger.

Without the Holy Roman Empire462, removed from the German question (die Deutsche Frage) in a radical and bloody way, the Habsburg Empire is confronted with a violent break in one of its lines of action, the one that had lasted the longest over time and was also the most traditional and most important in relation to how it conceived its historical mission. As if that were not enough, at that time there also comes the final loss of the Italian territories, as a result of which the Monarchy has to leave the Adriatic zone, one of its most traditional lines of action. The break is brutal, painful, and has negative effects on self-respect and its vision of itself, that is, of its historical and civilizing mission, which was of immeasurable importance for the Habsburg Empire.

On the other hand, the empire still lives as a great power, aware of its weakening and eager to react. With the arrival of Gyula Andrassy to the post of foreign minister, an anti-Russian orientation in foreign policy would prevail463. Despite his scant popularity among the highest strata of aristocrats and officers, to which Archduke Franz Ferdinand himself belonged464, and despite the mistaken perception that Russia would attack its ally465, Franz Joseph, having failed to secure an alliance with England, is unable to

resist the oratorical skills of his new foreign minister and decides to nullify the reliable alliance with Russia. At the same time, he compromises Russia where it is most sensitive and where it cannot react, believing that its historical mission in the Balkans is the defense of oppressed peoples who are often victims of genocidal massacres.
459 See Dicszegi, Istvan: Die Aussenpolitik der Osterreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchic 1871-1877, Wien, 1985.

460 See Gross, Nachum Th.: “Die Stellung der Habsburgermonarchie in der Weltwirtschaft” as well as: Matis, Herbert y Bachinger Kart: “Osterreichs industrielle Entwicklung” in: Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Band I, Wien, 1997.
461 See F.R. Bridge, “The Foreign Policy of the Monarchy 1908-1918”, in CORNWALL, Mark (Ed.): The Last Years of Austria-Hungary, Essays in Political and Military History 1908-1918, University of Exeter Press, 1990.
462 According to the famous words of a historian of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor an empire, and least of all Roman, and it disappears from the political map when Napoleon abolishes it.

Since the Habsburg Empire needed colonies, in keeping with the fashion of that era, and since it needed an outlet to the Adriatic Sea in order to be part of Mediterranean trade, the existence of a new Albanian state, albeit weak and dependent, was of great benefit to it. But what price would it have to pay to achieve that? It was far more important to maintain the friendship and support of its allies, above all Russia and England, without whom neither potential colonies nor access to the Mediterranean would have been of any use to it.
In such circumstances of objective decadence and considerable losses in a complex international situation, Franz Joseph’s great skill would have consisted in keeping calm and—despite his sympathies and personal prejudices—recognizing who the true allies were. He would have done better to heed those allies’ concerns instead of acting rashly and acting for action’s sake, provoking military conflicts without securing England’s support. But he did precisely the opposite: by embarking on an Oriental adventure, Franz Joseph acted more under the sway of his prejudices than his own interests, which rapidly led a sophisticated modern state machinery that existed in Europe at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century toward catastrophe. The Emperor did not know how to defend it adequately and began to act toward its ruin.
463 Lutz, Heinrich, “Politik und militärische Planung in Österreich-Ungarn zu Beginn der Ära Andrássy. Das Protokoll der Wiener Geheimkonferenzen vom 17. bis 19. Februar 1872” in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Festschrift für Karl R. Stadtler, Wien, 1974.
464 Jerabek, Rudolf: “The Eastern Front 1914-1918” in: The Last Years of Austria-Hungary, ed. Mark Cornwall, University of Exeter Press, 1990
465 Taylor, A.J.P.: The Struggle for Master in Europe 1848-1918, Oxford University Press, 1954.

Annex I:
Ippen’s Memorandum, April 1897 466
With a view to promoting unity and avoiding disintegration, and in order to give concrete form to the political action in Albania already approved and recognized as necessary by

the Imperial and Royal Government, the leading role is assigned to the General Consulate in Shkodër. I, as the designated head of this consulate, am required to issue a statement once I see the operations prepared for implementation in the context of this action. On that occasion I must set out my reservations, since I have been away from Albania for the past ten years and my knowledge of the situation in this country may be outdated; therefore it would be reasonable to refrain from making definite judgments. However, given that conditions in the Orient are so unchanging, operations take place primarily in remote places, and Albania over long periods undergoes only slight changes, it is very likely that my understanding, acquired on the ground ten years ago, has not lost its logical validity as a result of the evolution of the previous situation. And even so, in view of the current situation, I reserve the right to make appropriate modifications to everything that I now permit myself to state.

Obviously, my position can only pertain to the matters that concern the plan of operations by which it is intended to reach the described objective of action, as well as to certain specific points of its elements.

The program, which seeks to achieve the intellectual development and material well-being of the Albanians, strives to make them acquire an awareness of national sentiments, with the aim of creating a state union. This program is very complicated, very long, and of uncertain results. If it is true that various nations have attained their symbolic renaissance and then their national one, as well as their revival, it has always been a process lasting one to two generations, and its origin has been in the central part of the country and never on its periphery. The case that now concerns us is likewise based on this program of national revival of the Albanians; certainly, favorable conditions are offered for fulfilling the set goal, however, doubts remain as to whether the projected events will leave enough time for a mission of this type, whether there will be enough collaborators, and whether national elements will be found receptive to this Albania Rissorta.

466 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Memoire Ippens, April 1897.

450

The Eastern population, and especially that of the southeastern peninsula of Europe, is, for the most part, more sensitive to politics, its aims and propaganda, than to the ideas that carry the intellectual advancement of man, language, literature, and nationality. A political motto of that type is the “Albanian League, that Albanian national entity,” which existed between 1878 and 1882 and brought together all the uncoordinated elements of that kind. Accordingly, the program of political action in Albania, already approved and recognized as necessary by the Imperial and Royal Government, consists in reconstituting the old Albanian League, against external enemies—namely, against the Greeks and the Slavs—and against the internal ones, which implies protecting the palace and the government in Constantinople and keeping them safe. This brief program is likewise complicated and of uncertain prospects, as already stated; however, within a short period it will be possible to know whether it is being carried out successfully or is failing. The program of the old League defended the territorial integrity of Albania within Turkey against all its enemies, defended the old freedoms and anarchy, and fought for national autonomy vis-a-vis the Ottoman government. Although in Constantinople they would like, regarding the first point of the program, to support the organization of the league, in the end it would be rejected because of the

danger posed by the second point to the integrity of the realm. There is a fear that after the Albanians, the Arabs of Syria, and then the Kurds, would display federalist and separatist tendencies. Then the power of the Ottoman dynasty would be reduced to the Anatolian plateau, only as far as Konya and Ankara.

To reconstitute the league, besides efforts on the ground, strong diplomatic action in Constantinople is needed. Circles of people had to be formed at the Porte, capable of understanding that the league does not present a danger to the territorial integrity of Turkey, and that a possible autonomy for Albania would strengthen Turkey's position vis-à-vis Slavic and Greek territorial aspirations.

A valuable ally of these aims is Slavic propaganda. One person is responsible for it—Apostol Margarit, who constantly shuttles between Constantinople, Salonika, Bitola, and Ioannina. It is clear that he is in close touch with the government in Bucharest, although, on the other hand, he also understood that one should display ostensible loyalty to Constantinople. Apostol Margarit would be a good defender of the autonomous Albanian aspirations, because he could succeed in getting Turkish

politicians to approve them. Since Slavic propaganda possesses many contacts in the south and the central part of Albania—its organs include the association "Drita" from Bucharest—it could also support and encourage political action in Albania.

In Constantinople, discussions were probably held about the demands of Margarit and "Drita"—which probably belongs to the Romanian government—in Bucharest and, finally, with the delegates of Slavic propaganda in Albania.

The resulting program, with philhellenic nuances, corresponds to the first part of the work drawn up with the same intention by the abbot of Mirdita, Monsignor Primo Doci; precisely for that reason I criticize the second part of his work.

This distinguished prelate preaches great respect for the Mirdita and for Orthodoxy; thus he is an adversary of the Muslims and could turn into a political enemy. He plans a Catholic principality in northern Albania and an Orthodox principality in southern Albania; "the sluggish (ignorant) and lazy neighboring Turks could not resist the influence of those intelligent and energetic elements from the north and from the south." I resist the temptation to pursue a policy according to this recipe in order to create a unified Albania; yet everyone is being incited to implement it.

Monsignor Doci advances arguments with the following false premises: for his Catholic principality in northern Albania—what today corresponds to the Sanjak—he starts from a population consisting of 160,000 Catholics and 50,000 Muslims. The official census taken for that, and more reliable, estimates the population at 84,000 Muslims and 81,000 Catholics.

Furthermore, Monsignor Doci claims that all Catholic families be subordinated to the Mirdita and assimilated with them; and even that the Muslims be subordinated to the princes of Mirdita. Instead of thinking logically, I fear that Doci wishes to continue his youthful dream, which, instead of making him a Mazarin [mazarin, i.e., a gray eminence, after the eponymous cardinal who was regent of France while the future Louis XIV was a minor — trans. note] of the princely house of Prenk in northern Albania, led him into exile even to the Apostolic Vicariate in Bombay (Mumbai).

From my experience, every Albanian Mirdita lineage thinks the same of itself; they feel superior; moreover, the Muslim beys do not

452
forget that until 60 years ago the north of Albania was dominated by the Bushati [Bushatlis], who sprang from the center.
Here I wish to point to the Lebanese; each region was assigned a Maronite emir, then a Druze; later an attempt was made with a Maronite kaymakam and a Druze, who functioned together; this experiment led to the massacre of 1860/1861 between the Maronites and the Druze. After that there was a foreign governor, who was not from Lebanon; he was a functionary, not an emir. This organization lasted for 36 years.
Monsignor Doci proposes appointing the exiled Mirdita, Captain Prenk Pasha, as muavin (assistant) to the vali [muawin/adlatus — trans. note] in Shkodër, which would be a stage toward forming a Catholic principality in northern Albania.
I may, as a bold man, sin in speech against an institution which many competent persons highly esteem and which is the main point of all projects for reform of the Turkish administration—I speak of the Christian assistants to the general governor in the provinces; however, I have seen that all who have become acquainted with the Turkish provinces through long residence have the same opinion. Even assuming that more respectable Christian persons were appointed as assistants, every activity would be paralyzed by the governor himself or his clique.
However, it is usual that the Christian assistant is only a marionette, satisfied to have received some goods, or an accomplice of the governor in oppressing the Christian population; yet the same is endured even without an assistant, since every expression of discontent is countered by the reports of the assistant: the complaints are not justified and are merely expressions of a rebellious attitude. All in all, the position of the Christian assistants represents no solution for a devastated administration.
Along with the reflections against the valuable objective mission that Monsignor Doci envisages for Prenk Pasha, there are many doubts regarding the objective qualifications of this candidate for the throne.
Monsignor Doki himself claims he has not seen Captain Prenk since he was eighteen; for my part, I do not know Prenk, but from what I have heard about him, he does not seem a very intelligent, energetic, and reliable man. It appears that he has been affected by 15 years of residence in the center where he was imprisoned in Kastambol
453
(the capital of the Kastamoni vilayet, 16 hours inland from Inebolu on the Black Sea).
Moreover, it is a fact that the Mirdites remain faithful and loyal to their traditional captain. When Prenk Pasha is in Albania, he only creates unrest - I fear - which is not an advantage; an absent Prenk Pasha is also a cause of unrest, since he prevents the enthronement of the legitimate and universally recognized Captain of Mirdita from the house of Marka Gjoni.
If we base ourselves on the League's program, we observe a federal organization, with the various tribes, provinces, and cities as the members into which Albania is divided. Their representatives form a governing assembly which, naturally, places at the top the local representative, a general or a person of similar rank. I do not ignore the multiple advantages and dangers that a free organization of this type faces; but it is the only thing that can be implemented without introducing violence and that fits the character of the people, their history, and current customs.

There are questions about the set of circumstances in politics that are hard to answer, such as whether a strong and centralized organization could be allowed in every territory, or whether the Albanians will learn to live under the rule of a foreign prince, who is not chosen there by voting but by hereditary right.
To conclude, I wish to point out another danger that is very obvious, and which should be avoided during the planned course of action. In assessing the weight of the Albanian problem, the Catholic element is overestimated, and the Muslim one underestimated. The adversaries of our monarchy and of its policy on the southeastern peninsula have managed to arouse the same distrust among the masses whenever directives with Catholic or Italian tendencies are at issue. It would be desirable for Albania to return to the bosom of the Holy Church; however, the disclosure of such thinking would forever prevent its realization. Our action is not necessary; therefore it is premature to raise the Catholic question, nor should one desire to rely exclusively on it, but rather to find ways to integrate with the existing elements.
I should recall the discretion that the government in Bosnia and that in Herzegovina know and ought to maintain toward the Catholics there, as well as toward adherents of other confessions.
I do not wish to go further into details, since they will present themselves when action comes into force.
454
HHStA, PA I, K. 473.
455
Annex II:
Memorandum on the Albanian National Movement, Brussels, January 1899.467
(Fol. 359) [archival marks in the text are left as in the original - trans. note]
I have divided the memorandum into five parts. The first concerns the period up to 1877, the second from 1877 to 1884, the third from 1885 to 1895, the fourth from 1895 to 1899. The fifth and last is a list, arranged in alphabetical order, of all Albanians who, directly or indirectly, either for or against it, took part in the movement, with a few words about each of them.
First part (up to 1877)
I
Until 1877, a very small number of Albanians were aware of the fact that their language could and should be written. True, in northern Albania, especially in Scutari, a handful of merchants communicated with one another in writing in the Albanian language; (F.359b) and the Roman Propaganda published several books of religious content in Albanian. Nevertheless, those books reached only a few and did not touch on the idea of the nation. In southern Albania, a similar project had a much stronger echo. In 1827, on Corfu, "The Four Gospels" were published in the Albanian language and in Greek letters, and that book for some time was found in all Christian households. The first edition was printed in several thousand copies, and in 1858 a second edition was published in Athens.
II
At about the same time, the Albanian Naum Vekilharxhi, originally from Butukia, not far from Korcha (Fol. 360), published in Bucharest a book of Albanian script; upon returning

to Albania, he decided to put it into practice - he opened several schools and propagated national ideas in the field of language. However, when these activities became known in church circles, he was poisoned by order of the Patriarch of Constantinople, claims the majority of Albanians who lived in that period.
467 HHStA, PA XIV, K. 18, Albanien XII/2, Memorandum on the Albanian National Movement, Brussels, January 1899, Faik-beg Konica, Fol. 358. The memorandum, as is clear from the first paragraph, consists of five parts. However, we present here the first four and skip the fifth, because we consider that the information it contains does not make a significant contribution to the research we are conducting.
456
III
Another circumstance also worked in favor of the Albanian language. In the middle of the century, the Austrian consul in Janina, Mr. De Hahn, wishing to learn the Albanian language, engaged two professors for that purpose, the first named Apostoli, a physician by profession, and the second named Christoforidi. He then set out to tour the country and collected folk songs (Fol.360b) and tales. So much interest by a foreigner in their language led some Albanians to begin working on the preservation and development of the national language.
IV
In addition, Hahn's professor Christoforidi began to collect Albanian words in order to prepare a large dictionary. In 1871 he was engaged by a London Bible society, for which the following year he published an Albanian alphabet, a grammar, and an abridged edition of the Sacred History, etc.
The Patriarchate of Constantinople sought the right opportunity to separate Orthodox Albanians from the Albanian language once and for all; in this it succeeded. Every Sunday in all the churches during the Sunday services, the message was sent that (Fol.361) the Albanian language was that of Protestants, Catholics, Freemasons, and atheists (since for the Orthodox those terms were equivalent), and that therefore books in the Albanian language should be avoided. From that period dates the hatred toward Orthodox Albanians (who are certainly the most fanatical, the most stubborn, and the least intelligent faction in Albania) and the belief that they were working against the national language.
In that regard, Kristoforidhi’s books did harm. But, on the other hand, many Albanian Muslims gladly bought those books, and I saw them in many homes in the southern part of Albania.
Although it proved not to be the right opportunity, the Patriarchate (Fol.361b) sought and found another way.
V
An influence similar to Hahn’s was exercised by the French consul A. Dozon; what most amazed the Albanians with whom he was in contact was the existence of a foreigner who wrote in their language.
VI
Generally speaking, until 1877 the movement to preserve the Albanian language was only in its infancy and chiefly among notable people. Namely, and
457

despite the uprisings and revolts—especially the one of 1830 against the Tanzimat and those of 1854 and 1863 against compulsory military service—which aimed at a certain degree of autonomy, the question of the national language was not posed in a serious way. One had to wait until 1880.

Second Part (from 1877 to 1884)

I

At that time there lived an Albanian from Janina named Tahsin. He was an exceptionally learned man, who had long lived in Paris and associated with scholars and men of letters; he always wore a turban on his head. In 1877 he was in Janina, where he printed, in Turkish letters, an Albanian alphabet and distributed it throughout Albania. For a time these activities were permitted; then he was arrested and taken to Constantinople.

II

Tahsin's attempt was significant and in keeping with the sense of unrest that was spreading among the Albanians (Fol.362b). There was talk of ceding southern Albania to Greece, and that continual pressure reminded the Albanian intelligentsia of the time that it possessed a language and national interests that had to be protected.

In Constantinople a gathering of notable Albanians was held at which it was decided to send several envoys to Albania to prepare the people for a possible rebellion. One of those envoys, Abdul-bey, was aware that he would gain the support of the great majority of Albanians in the south if he won over the "Bektashi fathers," whose sect is dominant in Toskeria. It is important to know that these fathers, whom the Turkish government had in the past harshly persecuted and who still had limited freedom (Fol. 636), had always awaited an opportunity to expand the sphere of their influence. Abdul-bey therefore visited all their temples and (thanks to the support of the great father Alush of Frasheri, a kind of archbishop of that religious community) easily persuaded them to put pressure on all influential people to support the movement for autonomy.

III

However, things developed quickly. The Albanians gathered and held meetings in Constantinople. The Sultan, who was at first distrustful, supported the Albanians so long as this did not reflect badly on Turkey. Thus Abdul-bey traveled again to Albania,

this time in the name of the Sultan, in order to support (and thereby also, as some testify, to supervise) the nascent League, whose leaders were Prenk Bib Doda and Hodo-bey. (Fol.363b)

IV

I think there is no need to speak about those events, since they are known and have been treated in many books. Still, I will say a word concerning two or three unknown and important facts:

1/ The League of southern Albania, presided over by Abdul-bey and Mehmed Ali-bey Vrioni (just as in the north the leaders were Bib Doda and Hodo-bey), sent to all the leaders in the south an order to be under arms with their men and, at their signal, ready to move; if they refused, their houses would be burned, their property confiscated, and they and all members of their families would be put to death; they were also told that if they did not keep the order in strict secrecy, the League would learn of it from its men deployed throughout the whole land. - This fact is the plain truth. (Fol.364). I recall that

my father, then still alive, gathered a large number of Albanians from various places and was preparing to set out, which would take place when, on a given day, he carried out the order he had received, which stated that he was to arrest the Turkish vice-governor, seize and fortify the town of Konitsa, search all the houses of those who lived as sympathizers of Greece (Grecomans) and, if he found weapons, confiscate them, proclaim a new government; after that, the order says, he was to leave sufficient manpower behind for the functioning of the new authority, and himself, with his men, go to the location assigned to him—join the other beys who had carried out the same order in their own places. - Nevertheless, individuals without an official mandate could not issue orders to people entirely without consequences (Fol. 364b), most of whom did not understand or did not share their views. Therefore that mode of action by the League met with the dissatisfaction of the majority of Albanians.

2/ Abdul-bey's rule became more and more authoritarian by the day. From Malik Pasha he demanded 100,000 Turkish liras for the League, but since Malik Pasha promised him only 10,000, he threatened him and left, warning that when the revolution began he would return, kill him, and take his family's property. Therefore the Albanians, who are the most distrustful people in the world, began to wonder whether Abdul-bey planned to become king. That comical suspicion soon became a certainty for them: "Yes, he wants to become king!" Discontent spread.

"And who will become our king? A bey, and a 'pauper bey'468, Abdul Dume-Kerozi!"

Besides, the Albanian leaders jointly thwarted all of Abdul-bey's plans, and thus all the plans of the League also failed. It should be added that later, by all indications, it turned out that the suspicions about Abdul-bey were justified. In the meantime a new pretender to the imaginary throne appeared, Murad-bey Toptani. In order (so it is claimed) to avoid competition, he married off his niece to Murad. Thus a truce was concluded between all the rival houses.

(Fol.365b)

V

While events in Albania were taking their course, the Albanians of Constantinople, so as to lend importance and longevity to their gatherings, in 1879 founded an association which they called "Drita" (Light). They immediately published the organization's statute, in a brochure that was widely distributed, as well as a book in the script they had adopted.

All the publications were approved by the Turkish government. Anticipating the end of the League of Albania, the "Drita" association aimed to become its successor.

VI

At the same time as the "Drita" association in Constantinople, in Athens Kulurioti founded another association, (Fol.366) "The Voice of Albania." Kulurioti occupies one of the most important places in the Albanian movement. Born in Greece, an orphan from an early age, he was sent by the Greek Protestant mission to America, where he was an excellent student; then he began to engage in trade and in a few years amassed a great fortune. Upon returning to Greece, he first founded a committee, and then the Albanian-Greek newspaper "The Voice of Albania" (1879–80), hostile toward Greece. Then he was persecuted—in restaurants, cafes, shops did not want to sell him goods or serve him, he was the target of physical attacks, especially stoning when he went out into the street. In 1882, that Albanian patriot traveled to Albania to distribute several

books of national content that he had printed; (Fol.366b) but the Greek consul ordered that he be arrested in "Dirokastr," from where he was taken as a prisoner to Athens. And

468 Excuse this expression, but it is often used in Albania, especially in the south. The term "beys-odzak" (or house bey) refers to those who before the Tanzimat possessed timars (fiefs) or villages; on the other hand, "beys-pa-breke" (pauper beys) were those who became beys by their own say-so.

460

in addition he continued propaganda activities for a few more years, after which he died. It is believed that he was poisoned.

Kulurioti's influence was enormous. Besides having offered guiding ideas and awakened consciousness, he brought the first newspaper in the Albanian language.

VII

Fortunately, others followed his example. In 1884, "Drita" from Constantinople received from the Sultan permission to publish a newspaper in Albanian under the same name, "Drita," which soon saw the light of day and appeared until 1885 (12 issues). Then the Turkish government, having become aware that the paper was exceptionally well read, changed its stance and (Fol.367) began to obstruct its publication.

It was then planned to move the newspaper's editorial office and the association itself abroad. Bucharest was chosen, where Vreto was sent as an emissary on behalf of the Constantinople Albanians.

VIII

One circumstance contributed to the happy fate of that association. In Egypt there lived for 30 years an Albanian merchant who had become very rich: this was Nikola Naço. Naço had a 15-year-old nephew, whom during a brief absence he left in the care of his friend, the Greek consul in Alexandria named Krokidas. That Greek, by all indications, did not behave morally toward the boy, so Naço's nephew killed him (Fol.368) with pistol shots. Involved in the case as an accomplice, Naço was sent with his nephew to Greece for trial, because in Egypt he lived as a naturalized Greek. It is necessary to know that detail to understand the events that followed. In Athens Naço met Kulurioti, who drew him into the work of awakening Albanian national consciousness. When he was acquitted in court, Naço left for Bucharest, passing through Albania, where he left a trail of propaganda.

IX

In Bucharest, Naço found the "Drita" association in a state of disintegration. By then there were already factions within the association. One or two authors had sent book manuscripts (Fol.368) for publication: The Albanians of Bucharest, contrary to the association's rules, refused; they said that the manuscripts should be sent to Germany, where there are Albanologists who can assess whether they are worth publishing. In general

461

the mood was as follows: it is necessary to pretend to be working to preserve the association, because otherwise the patriots would make something serious of it; that the Orthodox, even those who speak the Albanian language, will never sincerely undertake anything contrary to the interests of Greece and Russia; that Albanians of the Muslim faith are false brothers who supposedly want national unity only in order to return all the

Orthodox to a servile position; (Fol.368b) and that, when taking a stand, Albanians should always act in favor of the faith and against the national movement. All this was stated repeatedly at private and public meetings. And in keeping with the general mood, it was unanimously decided to put up for auction the publishing and printing equipment that the association had purchased for printing various books.

X

Then there followed a multitude of everyday events which only proved (Fol.369) the hostility those Orthodox felt toward their nationality. In such an atmosphere, in 1885 a general assembly was held, convened by Naço's advisers. At that assembly the deputy Konstantin Eftimi, a wealthy and respected Albanian and the president of the association, delivered a fiery speech directed against the national movement and in favor of Russia, whereupon Naço fired a pistol at him.

Third part (from 1885 to 1895)

I

Until now we have not seen a single serious attempt (Fol. 369b) toward spreading national ideas in Albania; the only things we have seen were isolated, short-lived attempts without consequences; finally, we saw one important event—the founding of a broad association whose membership multiplied, published books, distributed them, and thus awakened the national spirit. Nevertheless, that nascent movement collapsed as soon as it appeared!

Nacho, whom the Romanian patriotic jury, hostile toward Russia, acquitted, continued his work. However, he encountered only opponents, with a small number of supporters of his ideas.

At that time (Fol. 370) a party of Slavic orientation was founded, reformed, and consolidated. The leader of that party was an Albanian

Herkul Duro, very wealthy and influential among them. Among the main parties there was also the Greek one, headed by another wealthy Albanian, Gavril Pema. Nevertheless, it should be noted, as will be seen later, that these are merely factions and that all the parties agree on the essential question: that Albania should be under Orthodox rule, whether in a large or a small state, and that all propaganda should be based on that.

Numerous meetings followed (Fol. 370b). The parties of Greek-Slavic orientation were bothered by Nacho's turn toward Turkey. On the Sultan's birthday, Nacho, with 200 Albanians, organized a rally of support in front of the Turkish embassy.

II

The association 'Drita', led by Nacho, began to print books in the Albanian language and to distribute them. A propaganda school was also established in which youths coming from Albania received instructions and then returned to Albania.

One fact harmed Nacho and worked to the benefit of the Greek-Slavic party: Nacho was, namely, very (Fol. 371) intelligent, experienced, he knew six languages, but he had learned everything in life from experience, without finishing even elementary school; he knew how to read and write more or less correctly. His opponents, otherwise as educated as he, used every opportunity to stress that fact; and nothing repels Albanians more than the prospect of being led by an uneducated man. Nevertheless, that fact did not prevent Nacho from publishing a newspaper in the Albanian language,

‘Shqipetari’, which appeared for more than a year and which, in the end, was merely a tool for attacking the Greeks and the Slavic lands.
At a closed session (Fol. 371b), the Greek-Slavic party decided to send a proclamation to the Russian Ambassador in Bucharest, in which, among other things, it is emphasized that the Albanians (that is, the Orthodox) do not stand in solidarity with Nacho, whom they consider an ignoramus and a wastrel; that they feel great respect toward Russia, from which they expect salvation; that they ask the Ambassador to convey their expression of loyalty to his government and to use it at his discretion. About thirty notable Albanians signed that declaration.
III
At about the same time, 1887, Sami Bey Frasheri (Fol. 372), the brother of Abdul Bey and at that time a member of the State Council, received permission to
463
open an Albanian school in Korca, which operated with the support of the ‘Drita’ association. The opening of the school was greeted with great enthusiasm. More than 150 pupils began to attend it, both Christians and Albanians of the Muslim faith. But that school did not last long. On the one hand, with the support of the Turkish governor, a few Albanians began to agitate against it, claiming that Muslims should not send their children to a godless school; on the other hand, the Greek archbishop threatened excommunication from the Church to all parents who sent their children to that school. For the same reasons, several other national-type schools that were opened somewhat later, in Pogradec, Starove and (Fol. 372b) Luaras, were closed after only a few months. Nevertheless, the school in Korca held up well, mostly thanks to the efforts of Orhan Bey; it had at that time about 80 pupils, mostly from Christian and poor families.
IV
The Albanians in Korca also founded an association. Since the authorities planned to ban its work, Alo Bey was elected president, and they gave up on the ban. It is interesting that, for a year or two, one Albanian association operated and held sessions in Turkey.
V
In 1892, Protestant activists opened a girls’ school in Korca. This institution was very successful. All prominent citizens, especially Albanians of the Muslim faith, sent their daughters there. In August 1898 the final examinations were attended by the governor, high officials, beys, and many others. An examination was organized for young Muslim women, attended as well by many Muslim women of high society. There were plans to open new similar schools. The aim of that propaganda was certainly not only religious; I think that, without any doubt, it was directed against the spread of Slavdom.
VI
As for the Albanians in Bucharest, they continued their mutual disagreements and propaganda, without serious organization, but with great efforts.
In 1890, an Albanian from Korca named Kočof (Fol. 373b) arrived in Bucharest from Saint Petersburg. His aim was to
464
organize a Slavic bloc among the Albanians. He proposed to the Albanians: 1) that the Russian government provide them annual support for their propaganda; 2) that the Albanian language be written in Russian letters; 3) that words which do not exist in the

Albanian language and those that have fallen out of use should not be taken from Latin nor should new ones be created, but that all of them should be taken from the Russian language; 4) that books be printed taking into account all of the above. In a word, he proposed that the Albanian language be turned into a semi-Slavic dialect.

His ideas were warmly received, but they were not realized. What should never be lost sight of when speaking of the Albanian parties is the fact that they have no structure; their members are uneducated (Fol. 374b) merchants who worked in shops as salesmen from the age of 15 to 25 or 30, and then opened their own shops and became wealthy, and that their politics consists mainly of meetings at which they speak of their wishes as if they were reality. In addition, it is very difficult to explain to them the necessity of propaganda. Their argument is that Russia and Greece do not need propaganda, and that, when the time comes, they will do what they want without obstacles. Such a mood was the most widespread. Thus even the representatives of the Russian government in Bucharest were very reserved toward these inexperienced activists. Kochof himself devised ideas that brought him no achievement of his goals. He contented himself with distributing copies of the Albanian revolutionary proclamation that he had (Fol. 374b) printed in Russia and left Bucharest.

VII

Yet, although all the parties lacked a genuine organization, this was not the case with propaganda and communication. Things worked mainly as follows:

Every week there were Albanian merchants, muleteers, and others returning to Albania. They were found by Greco-Slav activists: “You are going, have a safe journey! In your village there are such-and-such notable men: find them and tell them to oppose the planned opening of an Albanian school. You will tell them that this is a new instrument of repression of Albanians of the Muslim faith against us. Orthodoxy is in danger. And you, you will go to (375) another town. Safe journey! You will tell such-and-such notable man that we have learned that he has declared himself in favor of Albanian schools. He says he is not up to date? He does not know that all

the Orthodox have withdrawn from such things, because they realized it is a trap. And the rest of you, when you see so-and-so, tell him not to associate any more with those Muslims who pretend to be patriots, because he will end up in prison. All ‘Turkish’ Albanians are like that: they say they are patriots to draw you into talking with them, and then they pass it all to the authorities by a note, and you end up in prison.”

From several hundred examples I learned of such primitive, yet perfidious propaganda by these false patriots whom the newspapers celebrate as ardent nationalists.

In 1888, the Albanian multimillionaire Avramidi Leakche sent to his compatriots from Korcha an excerpt of his will (Fol. 375b), by which he left to Albanian schools several hundred thousand francs, close to half a million. The executors of the will were one Muslim, Orhan-bey, and several Christians. One of the executors, Dr. Manci, to whom a copy of the will had been addressed, called the other Christian executors and said to them: “Avramidi leaves us 20,000 Turkish liras for schools if we embrace Islam. For he equates us with Orhan-bey. Now I ask you: Will you remain Christians and poor, or change your faith and make your city richer?” “We will not become Albanians of the Muslim faith!” they all replied, and the will was returned to Avramidi with a message (Fol. 376) that the offer was refused.

Such a crude interpretation of a will that had nothing to do with religion is characteristic of that time. It testifies to the mood among Orthodox Albanians and proves how hard it is to expect anything from them. They are exceptionally stubborn, and great efforts and methodical means were necessary to drum anything into their heads, above all the national idea.

Fourth Part (from 1895 to 1899)

I

In 1895, while staying in Paris, I first learned of the existence of Albanian propaganda and the printing of Albanian books in Bucharest. Since 1890 I myself had been working on preserving this language and had collected (Fol. 376b) a small library in which were all the books printed by Albanians abroad! I began to write for a Paris newspaper articles about Albanian nationality. This proves that Albanian propaganda was nonexistent. For I was one of the few who

on their own initiative dealt with that question, and on several occasions I spent two or three months of vacation in Albania and spoke about national questions. Some received this coldly, others did not understand, and despite my interest in that question, neither I nor anyone I knew knew of the existence of an Albanian movement. The fact is (I noticed this long ago and there are a thousand proofs of it) that for the Albanians of Bucharest, and even for those of Constantinople, the national question does not exist; there is only one local question: for them the goal of all patriotic efforts is only the national goal of the city of Korcha.

II

In a letter to the association “Drita” I requested books and, as soon as I received them, I began corresponding with Naco. We exchanged views on the future of the country. A few months later, we decided to found an Albanian daily and agreed that I would travel to Bucharest. But since we did not raise the funds (Fol. 377b) (either because the Romanian government considered the costs too high, since, it seems to me, Naco had sent it an official request, or because of the construction of a large road on which Naco was working and from which he expected a large income), we postponed the realization of the daily project.

Nevertheless, I decided that in the meantime I would begin to publish a journal that would appear periodically and in which, according to my idea, there should be only stories, poems, and historical documents. In September 1896, I printed a prospectus-circular which I distributed to everyone. It made a strong impression and (Fol. 378) I discussed it with hundreds of people. Nevertheless, I already had reason to believe that the Albanians from the towns are more inclined to words than to deeds. Therefore I did not want to embark on such an undertaking unsure that it could lead to the expected outcome. I publicly expressed doubt about its success.

However, I soon received a letter from the president of “Drita,” Pandeli Evangeli, who undertook to secure 400 subscribers in Bucharest and another 300 from the rest of Romania; those from Constantinople promised me 200 subscribers; and those from Monastir financial aid of 20 Turkish liras per month. I had all those letters. If everything written in them were realized, I would soon be able to publish the journal as a weekly, and illustrated at that. And how could one not have faith (Fol. 387b), when it concerned

serious men, mostly leaders and patriots ready to compromise themselves by supporting such an undertaking.
467
But we shall see that this was enthusiasm without foundation. You will forgive me if I speak more about the history of the founding of “Albania,” since in that way I will, by examples, show the state of mind and the disposition of the Albanians.
III
In 1895 I received a letter from a group of Albanians from Bucharest in which they expressed satisfaction that I was dealing with the Albanian national question and told me that, although I was still sitting in Paris, I should not compromise myself by collaborating with Naco, “that ignorant vagabond”; that I should side with them, who were planning to found (Fol. 379) a new association, “Dituria”469. That association was, in fact, a branch of the Greek-Slav party. Pandeli Evangeli, the most capable and most active man in the party, was elected president of the association. It was he who somewhat later, as I have already mentioned, undertook 700 subscribers in Romania.
IV
Immediately after the publication of the first issue of the journal, the leaders of the Greek-Slav party gathered for a meeting. They were very dissatisfied because of the anti-Greek turn in the paper. Then they held a session at which they declared: 1. That this journal is an attempt at tyranny and repression, since the editor is a Muslim; 2. That it is necessary to put a stop to the assertions that the (380r) propaganda is the result of the initiative of “Turkish” Albanians; 3. That, at a moment when the Turco-Greek war was on the verge of breaking out, such a paper could only be contrary to Greek interests; 4. In the paper the Greeks and Slavs are attacked. These attacks cannot be justified by anything.
There were those who supported the fact that the Sultan financially assists a paper that attacks the Greeks. Others considered that it was not an Albanian paper but a paper of the Turkish youth, since the Sultan is attacked in it. Those same ardent supporters of the Sultan reproached me a few months later for not speaking ill of him. At the end of the meeting it was decided:

1. Not to accept subscribers from “Albania”; 2. To found an Albanian paper in Bucharest, even only for (Fol. 381) the expression of views opposed to mine and to show the world that the Orthodox, too, are doing something for themselves. The consequence of all this was that, instead of the promised 700, in Romania I found only 34 subscribers, and they were secured by members of the party who did not want to display hostility publicly. The report of that meeting was published in the Greek paper “Patris,” which appeared in Bucharest.

V
Albanians from Constantinople, as we saw at the beginning of the memorandum, are zealous patriots. They have done a lot, and still do, in propaganda work in Albania. Yet that propaganda is limited to a narrow category of people: Albanian officials from the Tosk-speaking area. Outside that circle, their propaganda did not exist.
Albanians from Constantinople (Fol. 318b) did not engage in politics. In that sense they are completely indifferent. Everything for them comes down to the question of script: in 1879 they adopted one whose creators were Sami and Naim-bey (impractical, since because of some special letters it cannot be printed); and the creators of the script

themselves were very satisfied with themselves; they considered good everything that was printed in their script, and bad everything that was printed in others—so that they themselves would gain in importance.

Thus they greeted with great enthusiasm the appearance of “Albania,” because I announced that later, when enough money was gathered for cutting new letters for the printing press (Fol. 381b), it would be printed in their script. Naim-bey, the head of the Ottoman censorship agency and of the Committee of Albanians in Constantinople, joined my collaborators, and it is precisely he who is the author of the verses published under the initials N.F. and N.H.F.

However, when they realized that the journal continued to be printed in the same script, they changed their stance and, without displaying open hostility, asked the party to withdraw support for the paper.

In 1897 there lived in Constantinople a shrewd student named Mehdi-bey, who carried out much propaganda work for the journal and remained its distributor. (1905: kaymakam in Ohrid). In that capacity he met with Ismail-bey Vlora and other officials of the Ottoman Empire who were in Constantinople, and he told them about that new instrument of Albanian national propaganda. He said that he had distributed copies of the journal to people who were traveling by steamers

469

469 “Drita” (Light) was the name of Naco’s association. Once printed books bore the word “dituria,” instruction. Therefore on some books printed before 1895 it says “Dituria.” But the proper association “Dituria” was founded only in 1895.

468

They traveled to Albania. But when he was appointed a diplomatic attaché, he left Constantinople. Propaganda was also carried out by Abdul Bey Frashëri’s son, Midhat. One day (in June 1897), upon leaving the Austrian post office, from which he was carrying a package with a large number of copies of “Albania,” he was arrested by secret agents of the security service. After three days behind bars in the Ministry of Police, he was released thanks to the persistent demands of his uncle Sami, a member of the Council of State. A few days later, he was appointed attaché at the Porte. From then on he devoted very little time to Albanian propaganda. (Fol. 383)

I cite these two facts in order to point out the weakest points of that propaganda: it is propaganda left to chance. Today, in some city, it is strong; tomorrow, in the same one, it will be weak or nonexistent when one or two patriots leave it. On the other hand, the Slavic activists are people whose only occupation is precisely propaganda. Today Albanian propaganda in Constantinople is in the hands of a few students and three or four Albanians from the territory annexed to Montenegro in 1879, a few from Shkodër, and two or three less significant officials.

VI

Thus, after the deception of Bucharest and the disappointment of Constantinople, I turned to the people from Bitola. (Fol. 383b) They kept their word. They established a kind of association to collect funds for propaganda. Meetings were held in the house of Lieutenant Colonel Halid Bey, a military pharmacist and great patriot. On several occasions they passed me the money that the association had collected. We sent copies of the journal to the British consul, who distributed them to those interested. I sent them openly, by post, and they reached their destination. The consul who is

currently in Angora understands the Albanian language and read the paper with interest. Unfortunately, due to the outbreak of violence against the Turks at that time, he stopped receiving and distributing the journal. Therefore the journal did not reach Bitola for a time. On the other hand, a few patriots left Bitola, among them a teacher at the Idadi school named Sherket, appointed director of a similar school in Skopje (Uskiib). Nevertheless, after some time, the Bible Society of Bitola took upon itself the distribution of several issues of the journal.

VII

These were the beginnings of the project. What happened to it later, and what is the current state of Albanian propaganda?

At first I was very hostile toward the paper “Shqiperia,” which was founded in Bucharest as a rival to “Albania.” However, after the change of director (and after the events about which I wrote in the ninth issue of “Albania,” A. 159), the paper remained in the hands of V. Dodani, an honest man and patriot who is not an extension of the Slavic, Greek, and Italian parties, although he falls into their traps. He often publishes articles that are given to him, whose meaning he does not understand.

VIII

Nevertheless, he gladly responded to a secret meeting attended by about a dozen notable men and the consul of Serbia in Bucharest. The meeting was held in May 1898. The Serbian consul proposed a budget of 40,000 francs for the first phase of propaganda to start an uprising in Albania, whose goal would be the creation of an independent government that would be politically united with Serbia. However, one of the participants in the meeting, Gavril Pema, a fervent adherent of the Greek option, objected that if it was only a matter of money, it would be more logical to ask it of Greece, and the next day he made public the details of that meeting.

IX

Besides the paper “Shqiperia,” a paper “YU' i Shkjiperise” (Star of Albania) recently appeared in Bucharest. I supported the appearance of that paper and believed it would go the right way. The person who was at the head of that undertaking seemed to me a patriotic intellectual. Unfortunately, other persons got involved in the work, above all a certain Georgos Mexis (about whom I spoke in Albania, A, 159), and that paper abruptly took on a pro-Slav orientation. From a letter I recently received from Bucharest, I learned that its editors are connected with the Russian legation.

X

The attacks of the paper “YU” (Fol. 385b) on the paper “Skqiperia” give hope that they will at least to some extent neutralize each other. In addition, the paper “Skqiperia,” which is already on fairly good terms with us, will draw even closer to us because of those attacks; at least that is what I can conclude from a letter sent to me by the director of that paper, V. Dodani.

XI

Despite everything, the propaganda of the Greco-Slav party against Austria will not cease any time soon. It is therefore interesting to pay attention to the way that propaganda is carried out. The Albanians from Bucharest, aware of the weakness of their Orthodox compatriots, have adopted as a tactic the spreading of the rumor that Austria’s aim (Fol. 386) is to convert everyone to Catholicism. That ridiculous claim is their only, yet powerful, weapon, enough to convince uneducated people. On the other

hand, they tell Muslim Albanians: “We, we are Christians; therefore we would have an interest in being on Austria’s side, which is a Christian power. But you, who are Muslims, under the rule of that Christian power you will become slaves. Therefore we set aside our own interests, we follow the general ones, and we tell you: be cautious, let us be cautious!”
Such was that perfidious and unrelenting propaganda, though not constant. It should be noted that among Muslims it had a negligible effect, for the members of the movement were in any case positively inclined toward Austria. But it made an exceptionally great impression on the Orthodox. (Fol. 386b)
XII
On the same subject I reached some conclusions during my last stay in Bucharest. They gave us a ceremonial welcome full of enthusiasm, as if we were saviors of the homeland. I am sure that the event would have taken on even greater proportions had I not “cooled” them—and somewhat irritated them—by sending, from the railway station in Vienna, a notice of our arrival not to the Greek-Slavic Committee, but to Nacho’s “Drita.”
When I arrived in Bucharest and sensed the great enthusiasm, I said to myself: “That surprises and astonishes me from those indifferent merchants. There must be something in it.” And I was not mistaken. A few days later, they proposed that I continue the work on “Albania” in Bucharest; the paper “Shqiperia” would cease publication and all readers would concentrate on my magazine, and the editorial board promised an annual budget of 10,000 francs. I was also offered to continue the work on the paper under the auspices of the Orthodox party. The trap was obvious. I asked for some time to think it over, and we did not speak of it again.
472
At one of our numerous meetings, Murad Toptani presented them with a plan for broad propaganda. They had reservations regarding the insurgent groups: they did indeed support the idea, but on the condition that these groups attack only Turkish officials and keep away from the Bulgarians and Greeks, as Murad proposed. Under that condition they would accept the proposal, and a budget was agreed, amounting to between 150 and 250 thousand francs. But when Murad Bey raised the question of where the headquarters of that propaganda would be, judging that the most suitable places were Dalmatia (Fol. 387b) or Bosnia, an icy silence ensued. It was broken by P. Evangeli, who said that, as far as they were concerned, they saw nothing objectionable in that, but that under those circumstances there was a problem with raising funds, “since the other Albanians from Bucharest are fanatics and will not accept the propaganda center being in a Catholic state.” I tried to be realistic, aware that it was all in vain and that the fund would never be formed. And I was not mistaken. For four months now they have been stringing along Murad Toptani with their promises, which will never be fulfilled. The only thing I managed to obtain was a signature on the telegram which I wrote and sent to the Sultan. (Fol. 388)
XIII
Naturally, with such an attitude and state of mind, it was easy to bring about an agreement between the Albanians from Bucharest and those who so identified themselves in Italy. Such an agreement would be further strengthened considering that the Italian Albanians are Catholics, but with Greek customs that allow priests to marry

(which brings them closer to the Orthodox), a tighter agreement, and because they are very likely supporters of Montenegro in Albania, at a moment when Italy is showing impotence. Toptani generally shares my view on that.
The Italians in the southern part of Albania spread propaganda with the help of the Albanians from Bucharest; and in the north through their consulates. Their Albanian school in San Demetrio Corone in Sicily, where, by the way, the pupils do not learn a single word of the Albanian language 470, is attended by a certain number of young men and in this way maintains in Albania a favorable attitude toward the Albanian-Italian camp. 470
470 In the school in Macchia (in Calabria) there is a course in the Albanian language taught by Mr. De Rada.
473
By the way, it should also be noted that: 1. Although it may not seem so to some, there is unity among all the Italian Albanians, as evidenced by the same script they use; 2. They do not know how to speak Albanian (among others, Murad Bey drew my attention to this).
XIV
To strengthen the agreement, the Italians and the Albanians from Bucharest sought the support of their compatriots from Egypt. (Fol. 389)
The Albanians from Egypt, who are numerous, are the richest Albanian merchants. They are in constant contact with their homeland and are interested in the national movement. They founded the association “Albanian Brotherhood” and plan to launch an Albanian paper. One of them, Eftim Mitko, published in 1878 the book “The Albanian Bee,” a collection of folk tales and songs, which is the best book published in Albanian so far. But, since they lived far from Orthodoxy and in daily contact with Westerners, they are not as narrow-minded as the other Albanian Orthodox; also, despite the efforts of a certain Adamidi, a Cairo physician and representative of the Greek-Slavic party in Egypt, no agreement was concluded between them and the Albanians from (Fol. 389b) Bucharest. On the other hand, “Albania” in Egypt has solid support.
XV
The Albanians from Bucharest had more luck with their compatriots from Sofia. It is true that the Albanians from Sofia, mostly workers, did not have time for more serious engagement in propaganda. There are two parties in Sofia. These are: 1. The association “Deshira” (Desire), headed by the Albanian priest Dimitri Spiro, who was exiled from Albania by the Greek archbishop, and who conducts services in the Albanian language; that association is pro-Slavic, its emblem bears a cross, and thus it is against any purely national union and regards the Albanian question as exclusively a religious one; it is connected with the association “Dituria” from Bucharest. (Fol. 390)

2. The association “Bashkimi” (Union), headed by Hristo P. Stefan, who every year publishes an annual in Constantinople characters. It is edited by Midhat, son of Abdyl Bey Frasheri. The “Union” association is patriotic and under the control of the Albanians from Constantinople. (Hristo P. Stefan is also one of our correspondents from Sofia.)

474

3. The Turkish paper “Ittifak,” edited by Yusuf Ali Bey; Yusuf Ali is from a place where both Albanian and Bulgarian are spoken. He speaks both languages and

has managed to gain the trust of both the Sultan and the Bulgarians. Besides the funds allocated to him, the Bulgarian government uses the police and pressures Bulgarian Muslims and forces them to subscribe to “Ittifak,” on the grounds that they need to be educated (Fol. 390b).

I learned of that unusual fact from letters I received from Bulgaria, as well as from a close friend, J. Ali, who stayed in Bucharest. “Ittifak” is quite popular in the northeast of Albania.

XVI

The history of the various types of propaganda has given us the opportunity to speak several times about the state of mind among the Albanians. Now a few words about the situation in Albania itself.

Generally speaking, the Albanian leaders in Albania are inspired by the best sentiments. Many of them know how to read and write in the Albanian language. In the districts of Korcha, Kolonja, Berat, almost all the beys cultivate their language. In Elbasan, (Fol. 391) Bitola and elsewhere, there are many of them as well. Here the school youth should be especially emphasized; they take great interest in the national question. Among the common people, and especially the “zaptiye,” above all in Bitola, almost all know how to read. In northern Albania, the national movement is considerably weaker. This applies above all to the Muslims. In this region almost no one knows that anyone has begun to write in their language. Nevertheless, among the Muslims of Debar, Mat, Tirana, and the coastal cities, the national movement is beginning to take faint shape. But almost everywhere, Albanian schools were welcomed. Among the towns where there is a strong desire for them, the following stand out: Elbasan, Kolonja, Valona, Permet, Tepelena, Verche, Debar, Ohrid, Tirana, Mat, and a large number of smaller places. Elsewhere, they would be received (Fol. 391b) with indifference, and that indifference would soon turn into sympathy.

XVII

Conclusion

All in all, there is a nascent idea in the minds of all Albanians, but it is neither sufficiently ingrained nor strong enough to spur

action. Why? Because at no moment has anyone concerned themselves with developing that germ. The attempts made so far prove that educated Albanians have good will, but what are those attempts in comparison with the persistent, powerful, and organized Slavs and Greeks?

The number of those who read, understand, and have some influence is quite small in Albania, and I can say that all of them are more or less familiar with the content of “Albania”; but (Fol. 392) when one reaches a certain point, it is hard to find readers, since there are no longer those who can fluently read a newspaper. Publishing articles in Turkish would increase the number of readers, especially in northern Albania.

The Albanian people are sufficiently conscious to understand, but it must be emphasized that nothing has been done to explain anything to them.

Between the Albanians of the north, who do not know how to read, and those of the south, who are distrustful and see traps in everything, a person engaged in propaganda can only be faced with a thousand difficulties.

What is especially lacking are collaborators. And the reason for this is the lack of schools. Where a school does exist, there is room for propaganda, and collaborators (Fol. 392b) appear and engage in spreading and distributing materials; in Korcha, some time ago, “Albania” was read in cafés, since, as soon as there is an Albanian school, the Turkish authorities cannot forbid the reading of materials in the Albanian language. One of the greatest obstacles to opening schools is finding capable teachers. The school in Korcha was long disparaged because for a time it had as a teacher a tailor who only knew how to read and write.

It is necessary to open schools in Zadar, Sarajevo, or in Albania itself, with a twofold aim—rapid training of future teachers of the Albanian language and—to them—following the model of the Albanian (Fol. 393) school in Italy—attracting youth from more or less influential families who would receive a complete education there.

Finally, it is a simple idea. But what I wish to emphasize is that Austria is gaining more and more sympathy day by day among educated Albanians, and that, if a way were found to solidify those sympathies, great strength could develop.

476

HHStA, PA XIV, Li XII/2, K. 19.

477

Annex III: The Political Action of the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Albania in 1897

The meetings of the council held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning Albania and the measures to be initiated in order to secure our interests there have led us to draw up a program of action, which we could summarize in four points:

1. Better political exploitation of the Austro-Hungarian protectorate over religious institutions in Albania and stronger exercise of influence over the administration of the seminaries and schools that we subsidize.
2. Initiation of closer relations between our consulates in Albania and the administrative elements from the local population, whose relations must awaken, stimulate, and set in motion common national interests.
3. Supporting and encouraging national aspirations in Albania insofar as they aim at the material and mental development of the Albanian population.
4. Constant vigilance, observation, and study of agitation and propaganda from foreign countries in Albania.

Religious Protectorate

As for the first point, the report of Councillor von Fuchs on the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the territory of the Catholic Protectorate during the year 1897 provides us with further clarification.

Activities of the consular posts

Recall that during the previous council a reorganization was envisaged, a new grouping by consular representations, and the need was also recognized to gather more information about the places chosen as points of support, footholds for our action, as well as to make a decision on opening new consular posts. (Fol. 569b) For the

administration in the existing consular representations in Albania, young men who speak the language of the region and are as familiar as possible with the local situation have been appointed and employed.
471 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Vienna, 11 January 1898, Die albanesische Aktion des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897, Fol. 569–578 b.
478
They were also entrusted with the Memorandum on Albania, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared for its own information, and, in addition, they were given written and oral instructions so that, from their posts, and also should any unobtrusive opportunity arise to travel within their consular districts, they might obtain the most accurate possible knowledge of the administrative and economic situation of their consular districts, and at the same time come into contact with influential persons from the local population, without making distinctions as to their religious convictions, and, in those relations, employ every means of gathering information about the main trends in the country and the aspirations of the leading circles. Their task or subsequent mission would be to inform the governing circles of the interests of the Imperial and Royal Government that Albania should have a progressive and sound development and thereby gain influence over the steering of national aspirations in the region. (There are still no national aspirations; their emergence is foreseen over time.) At the same time, while fulfilling these tasks, the language of our consuls must leave no room for doubt that the Imperial and Royal Government will, with great satisfaction, support those aspirations if they aim at the promotion of the national interests of the Albanians, but in the event that their aspirations are directed against the existing legal and state order, our Government will not assist them in this. In order, insofar as possible, to obtain accurate information on every occurrence that may appear politically interesting, the consuls must strive to acquire reliable informants, and for that reason the consuls will be given large sums of money at their disposal, of which a summary will be given at the end of the entire report.
Numerous reports by Consul Ippen from Scutari, Consul Pisk from Skopje, Vice-Consul Rapaport from Prizren, Vice-Consul Winter from Durres, and Vice-Consul Petrovic from Valona provide evidence of the zeal with which these officials of ours fulfill the tasks we have assigned them (Fol.570), while at the same time enabling us to ascertain the difficulties we must contend with in their missions.
First and foremost, there is the suspicion still rooted in the Turkish authorities that the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina represents only the first stage of an Austro-Hungarian concerted offensive on the Balkan Peninsula, and this caution influences the attitudes of Turkish officials in Albania vis-a-vis (toward) our consuls and compels the former to view with distrust every step our consuls take.
479
To this must be added the fever that has spread through the region on account of the Turco-Greek war, in which Albanian Muslims capable of bearing arms took part. Some beys, exploiting this agitation, are attempting to provoke an uprising against the Turkish authorities; therefore our consuls must act much more cautiously during contacts with the local population in order to avoid being accused of conspiring with elements disturbing public order.

For that reason, our consuls are compelled to remain in their offices and for now to abandon further travels through the surrounding districts. However, we have a report by Consul Ippen, who in August of last year managed to travel along the Turkish–Montenegrin border among the Malisor tribes of Kastrati, Hoti, Gruda, Klementi, and Shkreli. The journey gave him the opportunity to become acquainted with the dissatisfaction of these Catholic tribes with the Turkish administration, as well as with the intention of the Montenegrin government to exploit that dissatisfaction to the advantage of our interests. The following is a quotation from that report: "I will not say that the Malisori have concluded an agreement with Montenegro, but something of the sort is in preparation, and it would be ideal if we on our part did nothing that could improve their situation. Their desire is to retain the necessary guarantees against the oligarchy of the beys in the kaza of Scutari so that they can continue to live in peace and order." He continues: "The situation in northern Albania will develop as in Crete—an overbearing and arrogant Muslim minority (Fol.571), supported by Constantinople, through its fickleness and tyranny drives the Christian population, capable of defending itself, to revolt. Foreign influences stir the dissatisfaction and disrespect among the malcontents; projects for autonomy arrive too late; this country remains irretrievably lost."

In October 1897, Consul Ippen undertook a second journey into the interior of Albania, during which he came into contact with influential beys from Tirana and Elbasan. Through them he was informed about the activities of a very well-organized Albanian national party. Its ambitions are, through concern for their mother tongue and the founding of Albanian schools, to enable the cultural advancement of individuals of the same tribe, taking national feelings as the foundation.

The arrest of two prominent leaders of this party, Murad-bey and Dervish-bey, which the Turkish government ordered immediately after Consul Ippen’s visit to these towns, is explained in Albania by the fact that Ippen stayed in their houses. To avoid further compromising in the future, our consuls should move about more cautiously.

However, we cannot omit the efforts to collect more detailed information on the places—according to the Memorandum on Albania—selected for the possible opening of new consulates, namely Tirana, Elbasan, and Berat. Concerning them we can say the following:

These three places have political significance for us because there is a group of prominent Albanian families there of first-rate importance, very devoted to the national question. Since it will not be easy to obtain permission from the Turkish authorities to open new representations, posts, (consular) offices, it would be advisable temporarily to reconcile ourselves to the officials from the consulates in Durres and Vlora being in Tirana and Berat during the most difficult months under the pretext that they will spend the summer there. In this way, attention would not be drawn, and it would be a favorable opportunity for the consuls to establish their contacts with prominent Albanians. With regard to Elbasan, we have at our disposal an additional report by Consul Ippen (Fol.571), in which he explains the great commercial importance that Elbasan has acquired thanks to the construction of the railway lines between Monastir and Durres and how efforts should be made to secure the opening of an efficient office (or to secure the necessary conditions for that opening).

In addition, Vice-Consul Rapaiort underlines the need for an effective office in Pec.

Activity of Monsignor Primo Doqi:
Our consuls are forced to conduct themselves very carefully when contacting the population in Albania and to impose great constraints on themselves... Consequently, the circle of people who can be directly influenced remains very narrow. We must monitor those who, in word or deed, have shown interest in the national question. Moreover, among them we must single out those worthy of our trust. We must implement and carry out our plans with the aim of the union and strengthening of the Albanian tribes. In this connection, and on the basis of a report by Count Revertera of January 30, 1897, our attention is drawn first of all to Monsignor Primo Doqi, Archbishop of Mirdita.
This Albanian cleric, in 1877, while still the parish priest of Mirdita, was arrested on the order of the Turkish government and sent to Constantinople,
481
where he was accused of instigating individuals from his tribe to participate in the Italian-Albanian committee and the Montenegrin prince against the Turkish authorities. Thanks to the intervention of the Austrian ambassador and Monsignor Azarian, Primo Doqi was released. He went to Rome, won the favor of the Propaganda, and in 1888 (Fol.571b), on the recommendation of His Holiness the Pope, he was sent to the post of Archbishop of Mirdita with his seat in Orosh, and he was recognized by the Turkish authorities as well. From then on the Imperial and Royal government granted him an annual subsidy and also frequent cash contributions as capital funds that he has at his disposal for his personal expenses and for the expenses of his parish.
In April of the previous year, Monsignor Doqi appeared in Vienna with recommendations from Count Revertera and Baron Pasetti to request from the Imperial and Royal government the approval of significantly larger sums of money for the construction of the church in Orosh and to alleviate the pressure on the Mirdites, Catholics, as a consequence of the non-observance of their old privileges by the local Turkish authorities. On that occasion we informed Primo Doqi of the good intentions of the Government to, as soon as possible, promote the national development of the Albanians. He then, by a memorandum submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, set out in writing his program of action which set as its goal the union of all Albanian tribes in order to defend their national independence. This program was drawn up on the idea that it is possible to unite the mountain Catholic tribes under the leadership of Mirdita, and at the same time win over prominent and influential Muslims from Shkodra. According to Primo Doqi, once the country has been strengthened by the mountain Catholics, the Muslims from central and southern Albania will join so that all together they may defend their national rights.
In that sense, the abbot of Mirdita committed himself to lead ardent propaganda, insisting on strengthening the national idea among the Albanians and that in this they can count on the support of Austria-Hungary. But at the same time he explained that he would often need financial assistance. As a precondition he demanded the return of the exiled Prenk Bib Doda from Asia Minor, whose appearance among the Mirdites, in his opinion, would lead to the union of the Catholic tribes in a shorter period of time.
(Fol.572) We do not believe that all parts of Primo Doqi's plan are achievable. However, generally speaking, and bearing in mind the great prestige he enjoys among the tribes of Albanian Catholics, it seems

482
advisable to have him on our side, at least on a trial basis, and temporarily provide him with financial assistance for his activities on the Albanian question for one year.
As for the return of Prenk Doda, for which Consul Ippen also spoke out, we sought the opinion of Baron Kalice on the possibilities of some intervention before the Turkish authorities in that regard, but at the moment we have still not received an answer.
At the end of December of last year, Consul Ippen submitted a writing by Primo Doqi addressed to His Excellency Count Goluchowski, in which he explained how he would proceed with the intention of achieving, in line with the program communicated in Vienna, the creation of a union of the Albanians. But he only points to attempts and preparations and to the obstacles that the Turkish authorities are causing by arresting Murad-bey and Dervish-bey, and says nothing about the development of the action that should lead to the union of the mountain Catholic tribes, the cessation of blood feuds, the establishment of general peace in the entire region.
Establishing contacts with Albanians of the Muslim faith
When it comes to the defense of these territories, currently inhabited by Albanians, against the Slavic advance, equally important are both the Catholic tribes from the Scutari Vilayet and the Muslim Albanians from the border areas with Serbia and southern Bosnia. Our consuls in Skopje and Prizren have informed us of attempts to approach certain Albanian beys on the borders, who have confirmed the good reputation that the Austrian administration has acquired (Fol.572b) among the Muslim population in the occupied regions, as well as the attraction our administration is beginning to exert among the Muslims on the frontier. Thus, for example, Haxhi Zeka, very influential in the regions of Pec and Djakovica, has again offered to work for the annexation of Albania by Austria-Hungary, but at present it does not seem advisable for us to begin cooperating with him because of his excellent relations with the Turkish government and his character, which inspires little confidence.
Education, language, schools, textbooks
This is the third point of the program of action, namely support for the national aspirations in Albania insofar as they aim at the intellectual and material development of the entire Albanian people. (imposed terms, viewed through the final goal, not through the actual current circumstances)
483
In this regard, we are supplied with information not only by our consuls and the Catholic clergy from Albania, but also by the petitions of certain Albanian committees abroad. It is chiefly a request that we devote more effort to the Albanian language and introduce it into the schools there.
In Albania there is a single Muslim school in which classes in Albanian are held. It is located in Korca, it was opened by some Albanian patriots twelve years ago and, despite considerable difficulties, it has continued to exist, with about 80–100 pupils. There is no doubt that care for the Albanian language in the schools would be the best way to ensure a firm bond among all Albanians beyond religious differences and tribal affiliations. For that reason the government is making the greatest possible efforts to satisfy this aspiration of the nation in the Catholic schools under our Protectorate, by appointing teachers who know the language and by introducing textbooks in Albanian. (Fol. 573)

In the report of Court Councillor von Fuchs there is information on everything that has been done in this regard and on the measures that should be undertaken.
But in the Muslim parts of Albania there is also great interest in instruction in Albanian. As the Turkish government shows indifference toward these Albanian ambitions, they turn to the few books written by Albanian patriots abroad. These books were published in Bucharest on the initiative of the local committee, and various supporters of the national movement have lately asked our consuls in central Albania to procure a larger number of copies of these books, either by purchase or by preparing and arranging some new edition.
This request may perhaps have to be considered simultaneously with the question of introducing a new alphabet that would be usable for both Albanian dialects, and also together with the preparation of an Albanian translation of the manuals that circulate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For now only in Bucharest have they asked whether these books can be found in any bookshop, and the answer is negative.
The greatest contribution to the rise in importance of the Albanian question is owed to the Albanian committees of southern Italy, Constantinople, Bucharest, and Sofia, which, by petitions addressed to the authorities, attempt through regular publications to spread and defend the interests of their people in Albania.
Albanian publications
The most important among the Albanian publications is the one compiled in Italian, “Nazione Albanese,” not because of its content, but because of its connection with the Italo-Albanian committees, of which it may be considered the mouthpiece and which we shall discuss later.
484
It is also necessary to mention the periodical “Skipetar” (The Albanian), written in the Tosk dialect, published in Bucharest; the newspaper “Ittifak,” in Turkish, edited by an Albanian from Debar and published in Sofia; the monthly “Albania,” written in Albanian and French, published in Brussels, edited by Faik-bey, an Albanian from Konitza, under the pseudonym Trank Spiro-bey. (Fol.573b)
“Nazione Albanese” is definitely in the service of Italo-Albanian propaganda; “Skipetar” is devoted particularly to the interests of Albanians in Macedonia and speaks in favor of an understanding between the Albanians and the Romanians; “Ittifak” in Sofia is under the influence of the Albanian committee in Constantinople and, through some of its members, is in contact with the Sultan’s entourage. All these periodicals, to a greater or lesser extent, struggle against the influence of Austria-Hungary, accusing it of wishing to enlarge its territory at the expense of the Albanians. Only “Albania” from Brussels has from the outset refrained from hostility toward us.
These various publications are currently not widely distributed in Albania, partly because of the minimal number of Albanians who know how to read, and partly because of the difficulties that the Turkish authorities impose on the circulation of texts of this type in Turkey.
As early as December 1896, at a council devoted to the situation in Albania and held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was a discussion of the possibility that we compile an Albanian periodical or a monthly whose task and mission would be to explain to the Albanians what their national interests are and also to gain adherents to our program. In that sense, already last year we carried out preliminary preparatory studies, and we

have at our disposal (Fol.574) a proposal by Court Councillor von Thalloczy recommending the establishment of an Albanian periodical in Zadar that would be the organ of the Albanians living near that city.
Our affiliation with the journal “Albania”
At the same time we are considering the possibility of making use, for our aims, of one of the already existing Albanian-language publications that are not unknown.
An opportunity in that direction presents itself to us through the editor of the Albanian magazine "Albania," which is published in Brussels, and he has expressed his

He expressed the desire to present to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs his literary and political ambitions. That wish was accepted, and Trank Spiro-bey hastened to come to Vienna. After they carefully listened to and discussed his aims and the means that could serve them, it was concluded that there is a satisfactory congruence between his goals and ours. Therefore, we consider it correct to think that with Trank Spiro-bey we have found a good instrument for carrying out our program, and we intend to subsidize him regularly to the extent that his conduct warrants it. In this way, Trank places his journal at our disposal for the execution of our plan. In addition to literary-historical-economic content, the journal will also publish favorable political news that serves our interests. The journal will likewise be at our disposal, and Trank is obliged at any time to publish the materials we provide him. Moreover, he must take care of the distribution of the journal in Albania. But his activities will not be limited to that. He thinks that everything conceived proceeds from the idea of a national union of the Albanians, with the prospect of some eventual autonomy for Albania, and that its dependence on Austria-Hungary can be prepared, organized, and encouraged by the following means:
a) publication and distribution of popular texts with a national tendency, but without including even a crumb of politics. In this sense, Trank Spiro-bey promised not to defame or discredit the Sultan or the Turkish government, in order to avoid anything that could compromise the national movement as revolutionary (Fol. 574b).
b) the founding of a patriotic association
c) regular correspondence with influential Albanians
d) sending agents to Albanian centers abroad
e) constant propaganda through national schools
f) winning over Muslim religious leaders (Trank himself is a Muslim)
g) fighting against foreign propagandas that pursue a policy of enslaving and oppressing the Albanian nation and are supported by Albanians living abroad, by uncovering and objectively explaining their selfish, more or less hidden aims—for example, the Italo-Albanian movement, which Trank describes as entirely Italian.
486
What was put together for the December issue after our conversations with Trank contains a strategy that greatly serves our program with the Albanians: without regard to religious differences and setting aside all hostility between the tribes, it contains the idea of union and of fighting with all one's strength for national interests. It also argues very vigorously for the need to introduce classes in the Albanian language, for the laying out of streets, and for railways as a precondition for the nation's economic development. Our consuls in Albania must now inform us whether Faik-bey succeeds in distributing the journal among wider circles in Albania and what response it receives.
Popular "Stories about the Albanians"
At the council held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was decided to arouse the national consciousness of the Albanians with the help of easily understandable stories about the history of their ancestors. To implement that decision, we are beginning to publish some popular stories in Albanian, or more specifically, following the spoken Gheg dialect, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs covering the costs. The printing of these stories will be finished very soon, and we are considering providing the Albanians with serialized readings of these stories in a discreet manner through confidential agents. (Fol. 575)

The Foreign Italo-Albanian Propaganda

In the previous year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs devoted much attention to collecting the most accurate possible information about the ambitions of other foreign propagandas in Albania. In the first place, we dealt with Italian propaganda, since it most frequently and most sharply works against our influence. Its point of support is the Albanian colonies in Calabria and Sicily. The number of Albanians there ranges between 150,000–200,000. They have in broad outline preserved their mother tongue, but it is largely mixed with Italian and Greek words. It was Crispi who, at the end of the seventies, conceived the idea of organizing and energetically developing the relations of those Italo-Albanian people with their native land, and further, of maintaining commercial contacts on both sides of the Adriatic Sea. In this way, through those connections, it became possible to gain some influence over the political attitudes of the Albanians on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Also in the seventies, a supposedly

literary movement was launched, at the Albanian linguistic congress held in Lungro in Calabria in October 1895 and in February 1897.

At that congress the association “societa nazionale albanese” — “Albanian National Society” — was founded, whose current president is the lawyer Anselmo Lorecchio, considerably more energetic and radical than the earlier moderate presidents Professor De Rada and Monsignor Camodeca.

Along with that society, another Italo-Albanian committee was founded in Naples, with the director Marquis Auletta, who presents himself as a direct descendant of Skanderbeg and to whom the Italian government has recognized the right to bear the title and arms of this Albanian national hero.

From our ambassador in Rome we have been very thoroughly informed about (Fol.575b) the movement led by the “societa nazionale albanese,” which is being carefully watched by one of our informants. In accordance with the original statute, their activities were to be purely linguistic and scholarly, aimed at caring for the Albanian language and the spiritual and mental development of the Albanians on both sides of the Adriatic Sea, and thus any political aspiration was excluded. But at the second linguistic congress the conditions of the initial statutes were abandoned and the entirely scholarly program was replaced by an Albanian-national program, whose aim was the realization of an independent Albania under Italian leadership.

The current Italian ministry takes a reserved stance toward this disorder, which has not spread to Turkish Albania, although numerous Catholic priests and, specifically, the Albanian clergy, maintain relations with the “societa nazionale albanese,” and it has at times happened that they won over some Albanian beys from central Albania.

In the end, we must observe this propaganda much more carefully, because if it were to spread, and obstacles were not put in place, political unrest could once again occur in the Balkans, and it could serve as a dangerous instrument of the Italian side and also of the policy of the Italian government, securing for it a decisive, determining influence.

Italian schools in Albania;

secondary schools for Albanians in Italy

Crispi’s initiative from that period is also credited for the opening of the “regie scuole italiane” in Albania, through which effective attendance was achieved in the Catholic schools under

488
Austro-Hungarian protectorate, and certain sympathies toward Italy were also awakened among the Albanians. In addition, the Italian government in Skoder maintains three state schools and subsidizes six religious schools. Likewise, in November, one place at the San Adriano school in Cosenza was allotted to graduates from the Italian schools in Skoder.
This is a secondary school, founded primarily for Albanian colonies in Italy, financed by donations, linked with an affiliated Greek seminary. It seems that by creating this place the Italian government made the start of the second linguistic congress in Lungro contingent, which wanted to direct to St. Adriano the secondary education of all those who had studied in Italian primary schools abroad. To that end a special teaching council for Albanian was established and vacancies were sought.
It is thought that the attractiveness of Italian schools in Albania for Albanians will grow if the Italian government provides places in centers of higher education.
One must not forget that, although the Italian government still behaves correctly vis-a-vis Austria-Hungary, Italian consuls work against the Austrian protectorate just as do the directors of some Italian schools in Albania.
Other Albanian committees — there are also some in Sofia and in Bucharest
Information about them has been collected through diplomatic agents in Sofia and Bucharest; they are considered unimportant because of their membership and because of the means at their disposal; the Italo-Albanian committees tried to establish contact with them but without any success.
Summary and results, conclusions
All that has been mentioned so far presents the situation that Austro-Hungarian agents must face to carry out the program drawn up in December 1896 with the aim of creating national identity and nationalist feelings among the Albanians of the Ottoman Empire, and it has also discussed the means (Fol. 576b) at Austria-Hungary's disposal to increase its influence among them.
For the time being they have not been able to achieve more significant results. The terrain covered by the action is difficult and insufficiently studied. One must proceed cautiously
489 I
In the course of 1897, they managed to gain a good understanding of the conditions in which they are forced to act; they informed themselves well about the state of mind of people from different areas; they were able to examine foreign influences and, on the basis of that experience, adjust their tactics and choose the instruments and method of infiltrating in order to carry out their plan.
Reforms of those educational institutions have been prepared that will allow better political exploitation of the protectorate over the Catholic Church. If education in the districts of Catholic Albanians is improved in such a way that youth identifies with a nation and a nationalist spirit is formed, attendance at Italian schools and Italian influence in northern Albania will be neutralized.
It is much more difficult wherever one must influence Muslims. It has been shown that we are very limited in introducing and using the means that were planned according to the program approved in 1896. We have seen that the freedom of movement of our consuls is very limited due to the surveillance and close watch of the local Turkish

authorities. Our ambassador in Constantinople has on several successive occasions drawn our attention to the fact that, in the interest of our overall interests in the Ottoman Empire, our consuls must proceed very carefully (Fol. 577).
The Albanians feel more insecure because of the increase in the nationalist aspirations of neighboring peoples. But only a very small number of them, a few young men who are in contact with Albanians from abroad, see the need to encourage national identity. The people are very far from such thinking. There is an opportunity for this in central Albania; there are very few in the north or northeast.
Consul Ippen has informed us of fights between the Malisor tribes — in Pec and in Djakovica the supporters of Riza Bey are fighting against the supporters of Zuraij. These local wars absorb the people's entire energy and leave no room for understanding that they may have common interests of a national type. The notable Muslims of Skoder oppress the Catholic mountain tribes on the border with Montenegro and blame some of their own leaders for not resisting Prince Nikola.
From all sides complaints arrive about the inadequate Turkish administration. But internal consolidation of the discontented groups is lacking. For its part, the Turkish government does everything in its power to prolong the disunion and feeds conflicts between Catholics,

Orthodox and Muslims, between Ghegs and Tosks, since it is easier for them to rule if they are divided.
For the same reason the Turkish government refuses to grant the request of committees from abroad to open Albanian schools, improve thoroughfares (roads), and, insofar as resistance toward the Turkish government continues, to ease the Albanian national question; it also harms us (Fol. 577b) if we work in that regard outside the boundaries of the Protectorate.
We cannot count on any more effective action by our consuls, nor on increasing their number, unless we intervene directly before the Turkish government in favor of improving the situation of the Albanians. From the experience we have gained so far, the lever, the driving force for realizing our Albanian program must be in Constantinople. As a neighboring state, we can intervene before the Porte, advancing the argument that a divided and discontented Albania leaves the doors open to foreign intrigues and becomes a terrain for potentially dangerous uprisings, which at the same time will be the starting point of larger conflicts. By contrast, a united and culturally developed Albania would increase Turkey's power and serve as a provincial buffer against all Serbian and Montenegrin offensives, and thus serve to maintain the peaceful status quo in the Balkans, and we, like the Turks, wish that such a status last long. Perhaps a direct intervention would lessen the Turkish government's suspicion toward us and perhaps we could persuade it to heed us and to promote the Albanian question in the same way as it does for other peoples in the Empire.
But above all, such a direct intervention before the Porte would secure for us the valuable sympathies of the Albanians, increase the prestige of Austria-Hungary among them, and result in their seeking contact with us, since even the most ardent patriots who desire independence for their country realize that the people do not have the capacity to achieve such a political organization without help from outside. They desire that help and will be satisfied because we openly defend their interests. With this (Fol.

578) we will definitively put an end to any political propaganda of the other powers in Albania.
But as things now stand, it is not certain that we will achieve our aims, that is, lead the Albanians to defend their national independence together and united, despite the connection we have been able to
491
establish with Monsignor Doki, and despite our consuls in Scutari, Prizren, Valona and Durres seeking communication with influential persons there. Nor is it certain that in the future our financial sacrifices for those aims will be justified.
Monsignor Doki, in his report at the end of December addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, says that he must halt his activities so as not to arouse suspicions, which are already strong with the Turkish authorities as well as among the Albanians themselves. One cannot count on useful relations between our consuls and the Albanian beys inclined toward a national orientation until, in one way or another, the unfavorable impression left by Dervish-bey and Murad-bey, caused by Consul Ippen's journey into central Albania, is dispelled.
We cannot neglect the measures that must be taken in order for our program of December 1896 to be realized. We will better adjust those measures keeping in mind those already envisaged by the program and those proposed since then by our consuls. They are as follows:

- Intervention before the Porte in favor of the return of Prenk Bib Doda and in favor of establishing the necessary guarantees for the Catholic tribes from the mountainous regions of the border belt with Montenegro, so that they no longer suffer the repression of the Muslim beys of Scutari.
- Recommendation and support for a new division of the Turkish provinces that would favor the Albanian element. To that end, the proposal of 1880 presented by the international commission for reforms at that time, concerning (Fol.578b) the Albanian administrative districts, can perhaps be reconsidered.
- Founding schools that include courses in Albanian even in the Muslim parts of Albania.

d) Equipping those schools with manuals and textbooks in Albanian.
e) Opening Austro-Hungarian consular offices in Elbasan, Tirana, Berat and Pec.
It is also clear that all these interventions before the Porte will require us to explain openly our position with regard to the Albanian question.
To that end it will be necessary to mention again the following:

- The introduction of regular and frequent maritime transport between Scutari and the ports of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

492

- Establishing more direct commercial ties with Albania by issuing travel permits to Albanian merchants and more favorable types of commodity tariffs for them.
-

Influencing the administrative council of the Ottoman company for the operation of railway lines, so that the technical and medical posts on the section of the line between Mitrovica and Salonika attend much more to Austro-Hungarian citizens than they have up to now.

- The education of young Albanians in Austrian gymnasiums and commercial schools, as well as the establishment of representations appropriate to them.
- The establishment of a body to bring together teachers of the Albanian language, either at the Commercial Academy or at the State Academy for Oriental Languages in Vienna.

Moreover, with special attention the topic proposed by Court Councillor von Thalloczy and the Imperial and Royal civil government in Zadar should be studied: whether and how the Albanian colony in Borgo Erizzo could be of use to our political action in Albania and what consequences the intention to found an Albanian newspaper in Zadar may have.

Vienna, 11 January 1898.

Cvidinek

493

Annex IV: The State of the National Movement in Albania at the end of 1901 and the relationship of the Imperial and Royal Government with it 472

In the memorandum on the development of actions undertaken to guarantee the political interests of Austria-Hungary in Albania, which I presented to Your Excellency on 11 January 1898, I already had the opportunity to point out how strict were the limitations placed on the influence exerted by the Imperial and Royal Government upon the national movement that had emerged in Albania, in the sense that the Turkish government regards any possible strengthening of Albanian national sentiments as a threat to its own sovereignty and thus, by blocking them, calls into question all efforts directed toward the union of the various Albanian branches.

In this respect, the Sublime Porte (Turkey) in the years that have since elapsed has absolutely not changed its position. It is true that during that time assemblies of influential Albanians were held in Peć and Debar, with prior notification of the central authorities, and partly also on their own initiative, assemblies at which the common interests of the various Albanian branches were allegedly to be discussed. However, in doing so, the Turkish government had in mind only a league of Albanians of the Muslim faith, whose leaders it intended to win over to a militant, paramilitary organization for Albanian national defense; any alliance with the Christian mountain clans was to be prevented by fomenting religious fanaticism. By contrast, those who spoke at those assemblies, declaring themselves in favor of creating schools in which the language of instruction would be Albanian, as well as of greater consideration of the Albanian population in the local administration and of correcting territorial delimitations in accordance with the area of influence of the Albanian language, continued to be ignored from Constantinople.

It is true that the number of Turkish schools in the districts of Kosovo and Monastir has multiplied, but the Albanian language continues to be excluded from them. The

distribution of books with Albanian texts is prohibited, and the entry into Turkey of Albanian newspapers published abroad is prevented.
472 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, The state of the national movement in Albania at the close of the year 1901 and the relationship of the Imperial and Royal Government to the same, Zwiedineck, January 1902.
494
Under such circumstances, it was difficult to achieve an expansion of the sphere within which our request for respect for the national interests of the Albanians could have any effect.
However, our effort to achieve something in that direction continued to develop without interruption, and we can point to some progress in implementing the program of action as presented in 1896, despite all the difficulties that stood in our way owing to the mistrust of the Turkish authorities.
Apart from the assistance the Imperial and Royal Government devoted to improving the organization of the Catholic educational centers in Albania under its care, it has made a special effort to establish contact with the Muslim population in the country and to offer it proof of its good intentions.
Since it is very difficult to count on the approval of the Sublime Porte for the opening of Austro-Hungarian consulates in one or another central Albanian town, particularly those in which the Muslim population predominates, a solution was found in that, during the summer months, the holders of the Imperial and Royal consulates from Valona and Durazzo spent several weeks in Berat and Tirana, thereby obtaining the opportunity to acquaint themselves at first hand with the conditions of life in the districts somewhat farther from the coast. Quite naturally, at first they encountered a very cold and distrustful reception both on the part of the authorities and of the population, but it improved from summer to summer, since our consuls, by their correct conduct, avoiding any interference in the internal affairs of the administration, refuted the suspiciousness of the local authorities who believed they intended to influence the population unfavorably and against the survival of Turkish power. In so far as the relations of our consuls with the government organs began to take a course that was ever more satisfactory, it also became possible for unofficial circles to establish contact with them, without for that reason losing the favor of their own government.
The reports of the Imperial and Royal vice-consul Kral at Monastir, who quietly toured his extensive consular district, acquainting himself with the country and the people who inhabit it, taking the opportunity to establish contact with a few highly respected Albanian beys distinguished as loyal patriots, provided us with valuable guidance for assessing the Albanian question.
495
Relying on the data we obtained in that way, and on other information received from reliable sources, today we can have a somewhat more assured picture of the scope and the significance of the circles in which the idea of the evolution of Albania as a nation toward independence has taken root, and which, with appropriate encouragement, promises to continue to develop even more strongly than hitherto.
In that respect, there are great differences between the various parts of Albania, which either encourage or hinder the cultural development of their inhabitants, according to the natural inclinations of the nation and its past.

For several centuries the Albanian people, compelled in the safety afforded by their native mountains to seek protection from foreigners who wished to enslave their homeland, have remained divided into two great groups which, thus separated from one another, settled in the Albanian area resembling the Alpine mountain chains, from Montenegro to the peaks of the Pindus Mountains.

The northernmost branches of these groups, who settled on the steep mountains stretching along the northeastern reaches of the Lake Scutari basin and the inaccessible slopes of the Shar Mountains, had no choice but to temporarily acknowledge the superiority of the Serbian lands and later, after the Turks had conquered their country, to resignedly endure the rule of their sultans; only thanks to the protection afforded by the position of their mountain strongholds and their warrior courage did they succeed, even under a foreign boot, in preserving for themselves a measure of autonomy. In the Catholic mountain districts of the Scutari vilayet, as well as in most of the Muslim territories in Pec, Djakovica, and Prizren, the sultans were never able to fully assert their sovereignty. Among the Albanians of the Catholic faith from the Mirdita region and from the mountains of Upper Scutari, as well as among the previously mentioned Muslim branches, the position of state authority is occupied by the head of the clan branch, by the influence of ancient noble lineages, and, as in distant biblical times, the paterfamilias enjoys the same unimpeded and unlimited authority.

All these family branches find it acceptable to regard the sultan as their chieftain, insofar as it concerns protecting them from others' maltreatment; they are ready to serve him when he summons them to war; however, they want to know nothing of tax obligations or compulsory military service, and they resort to arms as soon as attempts are made to introduce forms of administration that run counter to the old patriarchal

institutions and their privileges. For them nothing is more important than the common interest of their own family branch, although they still lack a sense of national belonging that would unite the different branches for common defense and fruitful cultural work. This is observed with particular clarity in the skirmishes that so often recur among the various noble lineages in the struggle to gain control over each district, and, in order to triumph in the conflict, they often make use of the help that local authorities can offer them against enemies of their own nation. For its part, the Turkish authority likes to inflame these local quarrels, without concern for the harm to the country that may result, since in the disunity of the Albanians it sees a bastion of its own domination over them and counts on using this means to suppress any desires of the Christian leaders on the Serbo-Turkish frontier to raise uprisings. For the same reason, the Turkish government also never considered carrying out the disarmament of the northern Albanian branches, but rather pandered to and showed greater tolerance toward the rebellions and brutalities of their leaders who, like Haxhi Zeka, Ali Riza Bey, Bajram Djuraj, among others, wished to play at being the country's friends.

The conditions for the development of Albanian national feeling are more favorable in the part of Albania that lies between the rivers Mat and Vjosa, bounded in the south by the Pindus mountain range and the mountainous terrains of Zagori and Janina; in the east by the valley of the Black Drin and the basin of Lake Ohrid and the peaks of the Gramoz range. There the landscape is of an essentially different nature. From the steep summits, the ranges of the central Albanian massif branch downward. Rivers such as

the Shkumbin and the Seman flow from those heights and from the basin of Lake Ohrid toward the sea and enable communications between the coastal towns and those in the country's interior. The main commercial route in that part of central Albania starts from Durres and passes through Elbasan and Ohrid to Bitola and on to Thessaloniki, and thus, in broad outline, coincides with the course of the old Roman road known as the Via Egnatia. Another route leads from Vlora, passing through Berat and Korca to Kastoria in Macedonia. Along these roads goods and ideas from the more advanced civilized peoples of Western Europe have always reached Albania, although, on the other hand, they also opened the door to hostile incursions by Serbian, Bulgarian,

and, finally, Turkish conquerors. Thus it came to pass that the districts of central Albania, although the rulers who governed them had gloriously taken part in the heroic defense of the homeland under the leadership of Skanderbeg, nevertheless had to submit unconditionally to Turkish rule, under which the landowners of those territories could retain ownership of their estates only as fiefs, on condition that they convert to the faith of their conquerors. This condition seemed tolerable to them, all the more so as the sultans demanded only that they respond to calls for raising troops and, as for the rest, left the administration of the land to the local noble lineages. But when, under the reign of Sultan Mahmud and his successors, the form of administration changed and pashas were sent from the capital or from other Turkish provinces as governors to central Albania, a spirit of resistance awoke among the Albanian beys who had converted to Islam, and at the same time this was the beginning of efforts, through careful cultivation of their national language, to resist the loss of nationality planned for their people from Istanbul, and it was the beginning of a determination to fight for their national interests to the last breath.

It can be said that the central Albanian towns of Berat, Kruja, Tirana, Elbasan, and Korca are today the main hotbeds of the Albanian national idea, to the development and spread of which a whole array of prominent patriots are devoted, disseminating propaganda for it, orally and in writing.

Dervish Bey is one of the wealthiest notable Albanians in Elbasan; in Tirana there are members of the very ramified Toptani lineage, who have set themselves the task of educating their people on the national question; while the Vrioni family of Berat, and especially the Vlora family of Vlore, take the same stance, but, not wishing to jeopardize the favor they enjoy from the central government, express their national consciousness in a less open manner.

A fact worth mentioning is the establishment of one school for boys and one for girls in Korca, for which Albanians of Christian and Muslim faith, with equal goodwill, procured the necessary resources.

At the end of 1898, the girls' school had 45 pupils, 16 of whom were Muslims. However, a sultan's order forced the parents of the latter to withdraw their daughters from the school, so that only Christians are now present.

The ban imposed by the Turkish government on the distribution of any Albanian publications, and the various obstacles it places before the education of the people, caused some of the most prominent Albanian beys to turn to our consuls in Monastir and Durres, asking that they support their educational work by procuring Albanian-

language textbooks and the newspapers and other publications issued by the Albanian societies in Bucharest, Sofia, and Alexandria. Although, because of the negative stance of the Turkish authorities, this request could be considered only to a very limited extent, something had to be done to convince the Albanians of the interest that the Imperial and Royal Government takes in their cultural development and to gain their confidence that, should they need to defend their existence as a nation against attacks by foreign elements, Austria-Hungary would take their side.

The introduction of Albanian as the language of instruction in the rural schools we subsidize, both in Scutari and in Tirana, has made an excellent impression, as has the approval of a not insignificant subsidy to help maintain the schools in Korca. As for the rest, the Imperial and Royal consuls from Scutari, Bitola, and Durres, through suitable gifts and donations, have put themselves in a position to maintain friendly relations with the most influential people there.

It has turned out that, for the aims pursued by the Imperial and Royal Government in Albania, the relations we have begun with the director of the Albanian–French journal published in Brussels are very useful.

This monthly, which we subsidize and which counts among its contributors Albanians of both Christian and Muslim confession, has set itself the task, through instructive articles that provide evidence of collective cultural work, of enabling the Albanian people to know their historical past, pointing to the successes that other nations have had in that sphere, fighting against party and religious hatred, and advocating a union of all Albanian branches without dwelling overly on different confessions and local prejudices. In spite of the decrees that prohibit the distribution of this publication in Albania, its readership there expands from year to year, and since 1899, alongside the monthly, there has also appeared every fourteen days a small “Albania” (Albania e vogel), which brings into its own country news of particular political importance and brief notices of events worth knowing.

499

The efforts made in the field of linguistic unification by the director of the Albanian-language journal “Albania” are quite worthy of mention. The two main branches of the Albanian race, the Tosks, who occupy the southern part of the territory and most of the central, and the Ghegs, who are spread through the north and the northernmost part of central Albania, are separated by the bed of the Shkumbi River, which draws the linguistic boundary between them. The dialect difference between the languages spoken by these two branches is so great that Tosks and Ghegs do not understand each other at all, or only with considerable difficulty, unless they are acquainted with the other’s dialect. To this one may add that Ghegs and Tosks use different letters in their writing. While among the Ghegs the alphabet compiled in Scutari by Bishop Bogdan at the end of the seventeenth century for the publication of religious texts is still in use, the Tosks use a later alphabet that appeared in Constantinople. It so happened that in 1879 a large number of Albanians with a marked national consciousness found themselves at the same time in the Turkish capital, led by the Frasheri brothers: Abdul Bey, Naim Bey, and Sami Bey. They then created an alphabet which today extends through Albania from Janina to Tirana.

Faik Bey, the director of the journal “Albania,” himself a Tosk of the Muslim faith, considers the linguistic differences a fundamental obstacle to closer unity between the

northern and southern branches of the Albanian people. He has therefore undertaken the task of preparing the ground both for achieving linguistic unity by means of a new alphabet that would, as far as possible, standardize existing differences, and at the same time enrich the language's lexicon by recovering words that survive scattered in the villages and in old folk songs but have been forgotten by most speakers. Identical is the aim of the works of the linguistic association founded in Scutari in 1899 by the Abbot of Mirdita, Monsignor Primo Doci. It is true that the alphabet which this association uses in its publications still encounters the persistent opposition of some Albanian bishops, although this can be attributed above all to small rivalries, since not all the bishops were invited to collaborate in the work. The greatest simplicity of the alphabet of the Linguistic Society, the presence of appropriate letters for all the phonetic signs used in most Romance languages, together with the advantage that it will, without doubt, in time attain general acceptance and will in the end make even the current opponents of the new alphabet change their negative opinion. The journal "Albania" has adapted its alphabet to that of the Linguistic Society

from Scutari, so that the difference would be as small as possible, and an Albanian journal published in Egypt has adopted Doci's alphabet.

This represents a significant step forward toward attaining the much-desired linguistic unity, which, on the other hand, will show all its benefit only when the Tosks, who now adhere to the Frasheri alphabet out of respect for its creator, become acquainted with the new script.

In addition, in recent years, Faik Bey and the Linguistic Association of Scutari have been as active as possible in writing and publishing books intended to make up for the very noticeable lack of didactic materials and reading matter suitable for wider circles of readers.

After the first appearance of a history of Albania compiled by the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and published in Vienna, and after its distribution in the country by trusted persons, the Linguistic Association of Scutari prepared for publication the following books: 1) an Albanian primer; 2) a reader for the second grade of primary school; 3) an Albanian grammar; 4) a book of elementary arithmetic; 5) the first part of a catechism; and 6) a church history.

All the work was supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also financed its edition and distribution as didactic material in the schools belonging to the dioceses of Scutari, Sapa, and Mirdita.

The editor of the journal "Albania" in that same period published a Mountain Almanac for the year 1900, another for 1901, and, in addition, an Albanian-language primer intended for adults. The Jesuit press in Scutari published a short introduction to improving livestock breeding entitled: "The Importance of Livestock Breeding for the Prosperity of the Peasant."

In collaboration with the journal "Albania," Faik Bey also offered his readers several pamphlets containing stories inspired by the country's history.

The excellent reception given to all these publications brought out in the Albanian language points to a lively need for the education of a population that has become aware of its own intellectual backwardness in comparison with the cultural level of the other Balkan peoples.

The Turkish government is vainly attempting to halt this developmental process, paying no attention to the repeated pleas of the Albanians for

the establishment of schools where instruction would be in Albanian. In several towns of central Albania, associations have already arisen that, with their own funds, have hired teachers so that they might, in premises rented especially for that purpose or provided free of charge by certain patriots, give reading lessons in the native language to inhabitants eager to learn. A gratifying aspect is that in this joint activity prominent Christians and Muslims participate in equal measure, and differences of faith in no way hinder this cooperation.

The fact that the conflict between Islam and Christianity in central Albania is less sharp than in the northeastern parts of the country is due in good measure to the influence and tolerant mediation of the dervish Bektashi order, whose chief has his seat in the tekke (monastery) in the village of Derveni, near Kruja, and who commands so much respect among Muslims and, being himself an Albanian, expresses warm sympathies for the cultural and national aspirations of his compatriots.

In assessing the situation in the central Albanian regions, one cannot overlook the events that already in the last century led branches of the Albanian people from these districts to establish contact with the Albanians of the south.

Ali, Pasha of Tepelena, who wished to rule an Albania independent of the Sublime Porte, between 1780 and 1810, partly through battles from which he emerged victorious and partly through his own cunning, brought under his authority the entire territory between the Shkumbin and the Ambracian Gulf. The city where he established his court, Ioannina, became a place where all who wanted to obtain appointments and honors came to seek them. Under his protection, industry and commerce flourished. Although he did not know how to read, he knew how to value higher education. He encouraged the creation of Greek schools in Ioannina, in which Albanian youth were educated by Greek teachers alongside children of Hellenic origin, far more numerous than they. In the struggles that Ali waged against the Sublime Porte in defense of his own power, he assembled under his banner, in addition to the Albanian beys, the armatoles (band leaders). After his fall, the Christian tribes from the mountains of Souli and Himara took part in the Greek wars of liberation. With the founding of the young Greek kingdom, the border was moved toward the Ambracian Gulf, while the plain south of Ioannina remained under the domination of the Greek population which had settled there during the struggle for independence and had forced the Albanians to withdraw into the mountainous regions of the Vilayet of Ioannina. Greek then became the dominant language in Ioannina, and it cost the Albanian beys great effort to retain their previous position of dominance in relation to the Greek population in the country. If we consider the current distribution of the population in the Ioannina region, in the district (sanjak) of Berat we find no more than 1,272 Greeks, as against 136,000 Albanians; in Gjirokaster, 27,000 Greeks as against 110,000 Albanians; in Preveza the two nationalities are more or less in balance; whereas, in the district of Ioannina, there are only 47,500 Albanians to 100,000 Greeks. The inhabitants of central Albania see in this rise in the Greek element a danger to their hegemony. When at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 an extension of Greece to the Kalamas in Epirus and the Salambria in Thessaly was proposed, the beys of southern Albania, led by two members of the Vrioni family,

tried to draw all the Toski lineages into a league to repel any annexation of Albanian territories by Greece. And later, when Greece in 1881 took over the districts of Arta, Trikala, and Larissa, according to the boundaries set at the ambassadors' conference in Constantinople, the Albanians of central Albania considered that the least they could do was to keep national consciousness alive among their people by promoting the vernacular and a closer union with their brothers in the south and in the north, so that together with them they might prevent any further reduction of Albanian territory.
502
Voices which, at public gatherings, demanded of the Turkish government the protection of the national interests of the Albanian people, respect for their language in schools and in the courts, and the unification of various smaller administrative districts into one large, national, self-contained unit, became ever more numerous and gradually grew louder.
Had the Sublime Porte, after the end of the last Greco-Turkish War, in which Albanian contingents decisively supported the Sultan by repelling the Greek attack, approved the aforementioned wishes, it would have held the leadership of the national movement in Albania in its hands, thereby gaining the possibility to substantially strengthen its own authority in the country. Such a concession would not have placed Turkish rule in any danger, since the fact that the majority of the Albanian nation professes Islam contributed to making, despite everything, the continuation of union with the Ottoman Empire seem desirable to it. However, in Constantinople they were concerned that
503
the national movement from Albania might support foreign designs, and therefore it was not taken into account that this could produce significant discontent which would diminish the loyalty of a people extremely important for the defense of the Empire.
Faced with the impossibility, due to the authorities' negative stance, of developing in their own homeland activities that would benefit the nation, some of Albania's best sons went abroad, partly to escape suspicious surveillance, and partly to set about, more safely, the work of liberating their fatherland from the oppression that weighed upon it. We see associations arising in Constantinople, Bucharest, Sofia, and Cairo, which strive to spread propaganda in favor of greater respect for Albania's aspirations, to guarantee it the institutions necessary for the development of the nation, reminding Albanians who live abroad of the grievous condition of their brothers in the homeland and appealing for support. It is true that these efforts lack a unified direction, for too often they provoke debates and quarrels to see who has the majority, and they frequently affect the activities of their members. Despite this, they also help keep alive interest in their homeland's fate among Albanians living abroad. Their initiative is responsible for the appearance of a whole series of Albanian publications which, beginning from Bucharest, managed to reach Albania — with their support Shkiperia and the aforementioned paper Yll'i Shkjiperise (The Star of Albania) saw the light of day, publications which for a shorter period were successfully issued in Bucharest. There is no doubt that there are not sufficient means to secure lasting success for these newspaper undertakings. Through Faik Bey, who maintains close contact with all these associations, and through the Imperial and Royal delegates of our representation in Bucharest, Constantinople, Sofia, and Cairo, we are able to monitor their activities, and to this day they have not acquired any greater importance.

Of the actions of the aforementioned Albanian associations, what has thus far been much more vigorous is that of the Italo-Albanian propaganda. By its program it, too, turned to encouraging the national interest of the Albanian people, although its real aim was to promote Italian influence. This political ambition became evident in the high-flown publicity that, especially in recent years, has been raised in Italy in order to achieve closer relations with Albania. In place of the previous "Societa nacionale
504
albanese," an association which primarily dealt with strengthening the Albanian language in the numerous Albanian colonies of Calabria and Sicily, even though they had for the most part already been Italianized, there appeared in 1900 the "Lega nazionale albanese" — the National League of Albanians, a ramified league with committees in almost all places in southern Italy inhabited by Italo-Albanians. At the service of these associations are the press organs: "La nazione albanese," "Albania," "Nueva Albania," as well as "Gazetta albanese," published in Naples, which was founded by the committee "pro patria." In all these publications Austria-Hungary is presented as suspect, for it uses the protectorate it exercises over the Catholic institutions of Albania to prepare the way for a future occupation of the country. Likewise, at the congresses held by the "Lega" in Naples and Rome, voices were heard to that effect and memoranda were approved demanding that the Italian government take measures to combat foreign influence in Albania. These initiatives were not entirely neglected in cabinet; a series of measures by the Italian government, corresponding to the requests formulated at the congress, were implemented.

After there already existed in Scutari three Italian schools, namely, a primary school for boys, another for girls, and a nursery, there was also opened there in 1899 a third, Italian "scuola commerciale" — a commercial school; and, according to the reports we have, the ceremonial opening of corresponding Italian primary schools in Durazzo and Valona is in preparation.

After a reform, the San Adriano School in San Demetrio Corone (Italy) was placed on a par with state gymnasia, and its general inspection was transferred to the "ispettore generale delle scuole allestero" (an institution of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs — the High Inspector of Schools Abroad).

A chair for the Albanian language was attached to the Royal Oriental Institute in Naples; the Italian consulate in Ioannina was raised to the category of a general consulate; Italian vice-consulates were opened in Durazzo and Valona.

The government responded to the desire for better river and postal communication between ports and between Italian and Albanian commercial centers by introducing two sailings per week, instead of the previous sailings every fourteen days, along the Albanian coast, at the expense of the Italian Nautical Society of Apulia.
505
Besides that, together with the line from Brindisi, a local steam service began operating along the river Bojana between Medua and Oboti (a transfer point for goods from Scutari), and a regular postal service between Oboti and Scutari was established.

Through all these measures one can discern the intention of the Italian government to use intense competition to oust Austria-Hungary from its position, which until then had occupied a privileged place in Albania thanks to the schools and religious educational

institutions subsidized by the Imperial and Royal government, its postal services, and navigable shipping routes.
Nor can it be denied that this sudden Italian activity attracted much attention and, because of the Italian subjects and protégés living there, was received with particular joy in Scutari and the coastal towns of Albania. However, generally speaking, the Albanians themselves are not taken in by such actions. The fact that all the Italo-Albanian newspapers and other publications are written in Italian, and moreover that in the schools Italy maintains in Albania instruction in Albanian is not permitted, makes it possible to clearly perceive the political aims they serve and has the consequence that Italian acts of charity meet with great distrust, particularly among Muslim Albanians from central Albania.
That does not change the fact that the situation must be watched with the greatest care so that the schools subsidized by the Imperial and Royal government in Albania do not yield weaker results than the Italian ones, and that Italy does not overtake Austria-Hungary in the field of economics.
For that reason the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Austrian Imperial and Royal Ministry of Commerce and the Hungarian Royal Ministry to the need to support Austro-Hungarian trade in Albania by expanding something like a shipping connection between the ports of Trieste and Rijeka and places on the Albanian coast. This initiative was launched by the Hungarian side by introducing service every fourteen days between Rijeka and Oboti at the expense of the Hungarian-Croatian Maritime Company; and in Trieste negotiations are currently taking place between the local Imperial and Royal maritime authority and the Nautical Association of Dubrovnik, which, in exchange for the subsidy secured for its Trieste–Dubrovnik line, is prepared to introduce service every ten days between Dubrovnik and Oboti.
506
The improvements the Imperial and Royal government has achieved in the educational institutions in Albania under the administration of the Franciscans and Jesuits, by aligning instruction with the standard curricula in Austrian schools; the recent establishment of nurseries in Scutari and several elementary schools in the Catholic parishes of Albania; and finally, the sending of young Albanians to the Institute for Teacher Training in Klagenfurt, bear witness to the interest the Imperial and Royal government has in the progressive development of the Albanian schools under its protection.
On the other hand, in September of this year in Borgo Erizzo, on the outskirts of Zadar, a course in the Albanian language was solemnly introduced at the local Institute for Teacher Training and at the practice school attached to that institution, as the result of an agreement between the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Treasury in Zadar. This course offers the descendants of those Albanian families of the Kelmendi branch, who as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century left their homeland fleeing Turkish persecution and were received in Dalmatia by the then Venetian Republic, the opportunity to educate their children in their mother tongue.
There is also an intention that in the future candidates for professorships who studied at the Institute for Teacher Training in Borgo Erizzo and who command the Albanian language be given special consideration when being hired as teachers in schools in

Albania, thus ensuring a sufficient number of instructors who know the language of that country.
Father Bardi, a Franciscan of Albanian origin, who has been entrusted with Albanian language classes in Borgo Erizzo, currently has forty pupils in the practice school and fourteen at the Institute for Teacher Training.
After a few years, when Albanian, which until now has been preserved only as the language some families from Borgo Erizzo speak at home, again becomes the spoken language of the entire Albanian community, while most of them, moreover, also know how to write in Albanian, we can foresee that the re-establishment of the previous ties of this Albanian colony with the metropolis will be easier, and that will contribute to the revitalization of commercial traffic between Albania and the Austrian coast.
After centuries of Turkish rule under which the Albanian people preserved their feudal institutions and each lineage strove solely to defend its local autonomy, it is understandable that the idea of national unification of all branches penetrates there very slowly. However, there are more and more signs that this unification is being recognized in ever wider circles as the only means of guaranteeing their distinctiveness as a nation. In that sense, the Albanian people will seek support only from the power that shows willingness to encourage its cultural development and provide it with assistance in gathering its national strength.
This is the task that the Imperial and Royal government has taken upon itself, which, under the existing circumstances, can be satisfied only if in the future, as until now, close contact is maintained with the leaders of the national movement in Albania and support is given to them in everything that can contribute to raising the intellectual level and promoting the material well-being of the Albanian people.
508
Annex V: Memorandum from Albania (from late 1901 to early 1905) 473
The National Movement in Albania
Strengthening national consciousness. While the social and economic conditions in Albania in these last years have not undergone any improvement, and this cannot be expected in the near future either—as long as Turkish rule lasts—the strengthening of national consciousness is advancing slowly, though steadily.
At the same time, interest in the Albanian language is ever more intense, and the idea is taking hold that the official recognition of Albanian as a language which, in the Ottoman Empire, may be reproduced both in print and in writing is an indispensable precondition for the desired political unity of the various Albanian families.
Encouraging the mother tongue. For this reason, the main efforts of the patriots are directed toward encouraging the mother tongue, although unfortunately these efforts, due to the draconian countermeasures of the Turkish government, can develop only in a clandestine manner. Despite the surveillance by the police authorities to prevent the organization of the population of certain areas or even the reaching of agreements between more distant regions, secret societies have been successfully formed in various places, such as Tirana, Elbasan, Skadar, Debar, Valona, etc., which have set themselves the goal of strengthening the idea of belonging to one and the same people, spreading the need to understand the importance carried by a common language. The effectiveness of these associations, whose members pay lesser or greater contributions, includes the clandestine introduction and distribution of books,

newspapers, and other printed publications in Albanian, support for Albanian writers abroad, assistance to friends in difficult financial circumstances, etc.
Thanks to the courageous help of the patriots and the efforts they have made, knowledge of reading and writing in the mother tongue has spread in a way that draws attention, and that fact is worth noting; precisely for that reason, according to the most recent Turkish decisions, even the possession of a book in Albanian or the use of the Albanian language in correspondence constitutes a criminal offense. Above all, printing newspapers in Albanian abroad is considered a grave offense, for which reason foreigners need great courage to keep these newspapers or to let them circulate from hand to hand.
473 HHStA, PA I, K. 473, Vienna, April 1905, Memorandum on Albania (end of 1901 to beginning of 1905).
509
It is worthy of mention that love for the mother tongue, as opposed to that imposed by foreign propaganda organs or by the Turkish government, has penetrated equally among Albanians of the Muslim faith and among Christians (Orthodox and Catholics), and that among Albanian writers, above all among those who work abroad, the majority are adherents of the Muslim faith.
This fact may lead us to draw the conclusion, more than some others, that differences based on religious confession are beginning to have less significance in relation to the national factor.
Demand for Albanian schools. All those efforts mentioned earlier to preserve, recognize, and promote the development of the language culminate in an ever livelier and more spontaneous desire to have national schools at their disposal, still prohibited in Albania. The national movement exists and is making progress, but it remains an indisputable fact that it cannot advance nor survive without national schools. Thus the common and unanimous desire of the population is directed toward the goal of obtaining permission for the opening of public, private, and national schools, and only when that so well-founded desire is fulfilled will national life be secured and, therefore, the existence of the Albanian people.
Causes of Turkish opposition to this desire. The Sultan’s negative answer to the fulfillment of this petition, which the entire people submitted, is connected with the religious and state principles that prevail in his Empire, according to which Muslims are not allowed any schooling that is not Turkish or Arabic, without any consideration for their national origin. In this way, all persons are to be educated in the spirit of a single faith and in the state language, thereby practically creating an impenetrable wall between Christians and Muslims, who receive different treatment. The Sultan fears that, if he yields to the Albanians of the Muslim faith in the field of education, the religious ties between his person and the Muslim population will be weakened, among whom there is more than one family that still does not forget its Christian origin. The Padishah harbors doubts at the very moment when the wall that separates us should be torn down and wishes to preserve it so as to avoid unity between Albanians of the Muslim faith and their Christian compatriots, since he apparently fears the essential consequences for his rule that are already to be expected if national movements gain the upper hand among the Muslim inhabitants of his Empire, first of all those united by a common religion and the Turkish language.

510
Closure of the two Albanian schools in Korca. The extent to which such thinking prevails in Constantinople may be inferred from the fact that the government forbade pupils of the Muslim faith to attend the only two schools which in the 1890s were attended by both Muslim and Christian children, namely the Albanian boys' and girls' schools in Korca.

These two educational institutions, which were based precisely on that common instruction, did not manage for long to withstand the heavy blow; rather, as the last symbols of independent Albanian national institutions, after only a few years they were abolished. The boys' school was closed because of a false accusation against its teachers, who were arrested for belonging to a secret Albanian association (1902). The girls' school was closed because Albanian was excluded as the language of instruction (1904).

Political Efforts. Although the patriotic activities of leading national figures at various points in Albania, or even in small associations, lack a unified line of action, their very orientation and interest in the language have created a moral cohesion that will in the future turn into an important political factor.

Already now one notices more frequent efforts toward an active stance on questions concerning Albania, though people hold the view that the people must be roused to gain the necessary influence to decide jointly the fate of their homeland.

Echo of Events in Macedonia. Above all, it was the example of Macedonia that had a strengthening effect in that sense, and reasonable persons among the Albanian people cannot deny the Macedonian Bulgarians understanding and a certain acknowledgment for their brave conduct, despite the enmity with the Slavs.

Almost all of them long to achieve the same. One feels the need not to fall behind the other Balkan nations, although these reflections have not yet succeeded in overcoming the quarrels among the various clans and bringing the people to express themselves jointly,

511

since up to that date the integrity of Albanian territory had not been in serious danger. However, the main reason for this alleged delay should not be sought in a lack of national maturity, but in a sense of their own weakness and the conviction that the Albanians would not be able to fight for their national independence in the face of so many enemies surrounding them, especially if they did not receive help from abroad.

Hopes Placed in Austria-Hungary. It is indisputable that the vast majority of Albanian patriots, despite all contrary rumors, expect support above all from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to enforce their aspirations. To that end, they envisage the most favorable destiny for their fatherland through a more or less broad support from Austria-Hungary, as a matter of state right and in the view of every party.

From many statements and assertions it is clearly discernible that most Albanians of the Catholic faith are of the same mind as the Orthodox Albanians or the Muslim nationalists of the same political orientation. Among Albanians of the Muslim faith, perhaps certain families from the northeast should be excepted, who, because of their particular isolation, for ethnographic and political reasons, were more inclined to accept the Sultan's pan-Muslim religious influences.

The great impression made on people by the level that Bosnia and Herzegovina reached in relatively few years under Austro-Hungarian administration, the attitude in every sense full of respect toward the Muslim part of the population, and finally the spread of the idea that there exists an undeniable congruence of interests between these two sides—at a time of growing sympathies toward the Monarchy—were a more powerful main factor than the artificial instruments of propaganda.

This generally favorable feeling explains why, to fulfill their wishes and especially to foster a quicker realization of national development, our active help was abundantly sought, particularly by Muslims, and often help of greater scope than it was possible for us to provide. In that sense, there was no lack of voices, above all among the beys, who said we should not spare support for the Muslims. It seems that these words contain a slight reproach, given that we have always generously subsidized the Albanian clergy, who up to this day have done very little for the great cause of national unification.

512

The Impression Left by Italy's Promotional Measures. Despite the Albanian people's natural inclination toward Austria-Hungary, one cannot avoid the fact that lively Italian agitation, heated debates in the Chamber of Deputies, visits by delegations, Italian–Albanian committees, etc., have drawn Albania's attention and created the impression that the Italians seem to have a special interest in the Albanian nation. Not counting certain circles from Shkoder or the coastal towns, who enjoy material advantages—whether schools or certain appointments—only the parts of the Albanian coast closest to Italy, that is, the stretch from Valona southward, retain toward Italy an attitude marked by political reservations. Moreover, they hold the view that, if foreign intervention is necessary to achieve Albanian unity and independence, intervention by Austria-Hungary is desired first, as the most suitable for civilizing Albania while, of course, respecting the characteristics of the Albanian race. Taking into account the greater distance of the Monarchy from those regions and thinking that it, perhaps because of objections from certain powers or other obstacles, would not be in a position to appear simultaneously in the north and south of Albania, there are fears that Italy would, willingly or not, occupy the country, even if only temporarily and merely because of proximity.

Attitude toward Greece. Greece, which likewise loudly proclaims its claims, is rejected without discussion by the Tosk beys. They would accept foreign rule only as a condition preceding independence if it were exercised by a great power worthy of the name, and never by a country whose citizens, as they assert, not so long ago were their subjects. As for Italy, it is indisputable that, despite all the sympathies felt toward us, our influence in those regions would have to withstand severe tests if Italy's frenzied agitation continues.

Impression of the Austro-Hungarian–Russian Agreement and of the Reform in Macedonia. This is particularly applicable in view of the reform action in Albania which we carried out together with Russia for Macedonia. It may be assumed that because of our Agreement with Russia, the most hated European power and the one the Albanians traditionally fear most, we shall be met with the same cold

513

looks and even with distrust; it can also be confirmed that in the Kosovo Vilayet sympathies toward us have diminished.

With the rise of tensions, various phases of reform follow, Europe's interventions in Macedonia, and it is understood that these events are viewed predominantly from the perspective of one's own security and national demands.

Turkish expedition against the Albanians of Kosovo. The concern that the action of the Great Powers might aim at creating a Macedonia that would include Albanian areas from three vilayets was partly allayed when purely Albanian districts were excluded from the reform. However, for the Albanians the painful fact remained that precisely because of the pressure exerted by both Powers there came a large war expedition in the Kosovo Vilayet (1903), begun under the pretext of punishing the enemies of the new administrative measures ordered by the sultan, but ultimately resulting in the weakening of the Albanian element in those regions, which, naturally, the Serbian people wished to exploit. The Turkish government skillfully used its free hand against the opponents of reform in order to liquidate elements that, from its national point of view, seemed dangerous.

The consequences of this undertaking—namely, sending a portion of foreign administrators into exile, or introducing compulsory military service, which is more theoretical in nature, and Turkish judicial institutions in part of the insurgent area—have nothing to do with the enormous efforts and grievous wounds this inflicted on the Ottoman state treasury.

Demands for the implementation of reforms in Albania. The very widespread opinion that the Albanians are a savage and uncompromising people, who are horrified whenever confronted with any "reform," i.e., civilizing innovation, is a great mistake. Rather, it is a fact that they, and even some among their own circles, to a greater extent than other Balkan peoples, desire the introduction of certain conditions worthy of human beings, good customs and culture—in a word, "reforms" for their backward country. Naturally, they must be adapted to the national essence, the character of their people, and the needs of the country.

Recognizing the causes of their barbarism under Turkish rule lasting several centuries, they display an attitude that rejects measures imposed by Ottoman rule, with the intimate conviction that

their sole aim can only be the deprivation of nationality, the disunion and weakening of their race.

We cannot ignore that a people's low cultural level cannot be raised by violence and barbarism, but only by education and instruction, which cannot be provided to the Albanians by Turkish corrupt courts, the imposition of new taxes, and the national loss of the land they inherited from their ancestors, but exclusively by national schools.

In this regard, leaving aside the national aspect, the introduction of Albanian schools is a sine qua non and an unavoidable postulate of the greatest significance for any serious action aimed at improving the situation in Albania.

Italian propaganda

The history of Albania in recent years is marked by a disproportionately strong intensification of Italian agitation. It is therefore necessary to deal in detail with the developments connected to this.

Their aims. The peculiarity of this agitation is its uniformity, and no one can conceal its sole aim: to halt Austro-Hungarian influence and replace it with Italian. For Italian

propaganda it is therefore much less important to encourage Albanian national aspirations than to introduce the Italian language into institutions, and all their actions are seen solely as contributing to this end.
Claims regarding church policy. The most vigorous advance of the Italians occurred at the time of Minister Prinetti, who did not hesitate to attack even Austro-Hungarian rights in Albania, which rest on the oldest international agreements, such as the protection of the clergy and Catholic institutions, thus bringing political controversies even into the clergy.
Winning over the Albanian clergy with money, establishing religious orders and brotherhoods that are purely Italian and under Italian protection, placing priests of Italian nationality under the exclusive protection of Italian legations, and, finally, the aspiration to relocate the education of secular Albanian clerics to Italy, were the main targets pursued by all Italian efforts in the field of church policy.
515
Compensation for the clergy. Italy's promotional measures related to the clergy are understandable, bearing in mind that in the cities it represents far less of an authority. Since, usually for national reasons, the clergy on the whole are less inclined toward Italy, the effort made in that direction did not bring the swift success that was expected. However, the poverty, even the misery, of village priests was the starting point from which successful attacks could often be made, especially in cases in which poor clerics were offered not only subsidies of 20 to 25 gold Napoleons per year, but were also encouraged to accept that offer.
Don Gasparo Jakova. Among various clerics of lesser importance, the elderly Jesuit Don Gasparo Jakova (Gasper Jakova), who is, among other things, a man of particular talent, crossed over to the Italian camp and now, after a prolonged period filled with teaching activity in the Italian priestly seminary, carries out publishing work in Italy, issuing printed material in Albanian, including since the autumn of 1904 a newspaper ("L'Araldo d'Albania" – "The Herald of Albania").
The buying of souls carried out in Italy has led to great corruption of the clergy, the consequences of which we, despite all our efforts to mitigate them, cannot avoid. The subsidies given by the Italians forced us at the very least to match them with ours and thus we were even more than before compelled to support parishes financially with ordinary subsidies.
Attempts to establish Italian monastic orders under
with Italian protection. By establishing Italian monastic orders and using Italian consular protection for those orders and for clerics of Italian nationality without any exceptions, the government of Italy tried to make a breach in the old framework of our church protectorate, and to achieve its aims it used as an intermediary body the "Societa par le missioni Italiane ali' Estero" - "Society for Italian Missions Abroad," from Florence, an association it subsidizes. The secretary of this association, Commendatore Schiaparelli, with great effort during his repeated stays in Scutari tried to prompt the orders settled there to take a stance toward certain charitable organizations which were to be founded by Italy, or to leave to the Italians also the conduct of church policy, with
516
the sole condition that they accept Italian consular protection instead of Austro-Hungarian.

Since this was not accepted, they tried to bring purely Italian orders into Scutari, especially the Salesians of Don Bosco from Turin and the nuns from Ivrea, for the purpose of running an Italian orphanage and an Italian hospital. When the Ministry of Propaganda (in May 1903) announced that they could not accept novelties regarding the protectorate over church institutions in Albania (nil innovetur - introduce nothing new), the Italian government temporarily halted the ordination of those orders. However, the honorary dignitary Schiaparelli continued with costly purchases of extensive land in Scutari, apparently intended for large institutions, which shows that these plans are not being abandoned.

Negotiations with Italy concerning the religious protectorate. Since, due to the Italians' stance described earlier, there was an evident danger that some of the monasteries in Scutari, where the Italians are in the majority, would ultimately call upon Italian protection, the Imperial and Royal Government decided to make its point of view known to the Italian government on the question of protection in Albania, and in 1902 long preliminary discussions took place regarding this.

While the Italian government defended its position that it authorizes or even has the obligation to offer protection not only to every member of the clergy or every association of priests of Italian nationality, but also, upon request, to any member of the foreign clergy or monastery, we tried to reach an agreement on the basis of the following four points:

1. The protection of religious societies and institutes, as well as of members of monastic orders with an ecclesiastical character, belongs exclusively to the protecting power.
2. Austria-Hungary recognizes the competence of the Italians in purely personal matters of Italian clerics.
3. In the event of an attack on the honor, freedom, property, physical integrity, or life of a cleric of Italian nationality under Austro-Hungarian protection, we would be prepared to accept a simultaneous reaction.
4. The delivery of official documents to clerics of Italian nationality in institutions entrusted to our protection, etc., can only be carried out through the agency of our authorities.

Since the Italians did not come forward with any satisfactory declaration, with the sole exception that they accepted the fourth point, and since, on the other hand, the limitation of our right to protect certain categories of clergy and their institutions was completely unacceptable to us, as was the restriction of our spiritual sphere of influence in Albania, which Italy attempted, these negotiations were broken off because there was no prospect of success.

It appears that the Italian government likewise avoids directly violating our existing rights to church protection because of agreements that have long been recognized by all the Powers, partly explicitly and partly tacitly, and since then we have not recorded other attacks on our position in the field of church policy.

The San Adriano clergy seminary for Albanian pupils.

Italy is energetically promoting the realization of the project of educating lay clergy to be sent to Albania, which up to this moment has usually been carried out in the Collegium pontificium of Scutari or in the Collegium urbanum of the Ministry of Propaganda in

Rome, and for this purpose the Collegio di S. Adriano in San Demetrio Corone has been specially designated, whose opening will take place soon.
Efforts in the field of culture and colonization. In all other sectors the Italian government continues its policy, already begun at the end of the 1890s, of ever more permanently including Albania in its sphere of influence, and in this regard we must first have in mind the Italian school system.
School system. The colonial schools that already existed earlier now have an almost officially Italian character, after, by means of an imperial irade, they were converted into Italian state schools.
New Italian elementary schools for boys and girls have been opened in Durazzo, Valona, and Janina, one Scuola italiana di arti e mestieri [Italian School of Arts and Crafts] in Janina and Scutari and a convent for Albanian women in Scutari, in direct rivalry with a similar Austro-Hungarian institution.
Italy focuses its main efforts on education in Scutari, where the population is more advanced and receptive to ideas, in the hope that the countryside will follow this trend that the city has begun.
Since earlier the language of instruction in the religious schools subsidized by Austria-Hungary was exclusively Italian and

Bearing in mind that these schools did not possess a precise curriculum at the moment Italian propaganda began, the Italian schools found fertile ground among the inhabitants, all the more so given that religious education is valued but not considered necessary. For these reasons, the Italian schools, organized in the same manner as in the Kingdom, appear more civilized and modern, and moreover also provide further education for certain pupils by granting scholarships for continued studies in Italy.
In those cases in which school attendance did not meet expectations, they tried to achieve various aims with the help of various means, essentially quite agitational in nature, such as assistance with food and clothing for poor children.
However, the Italians realized that so long as the Catholic clergy did not depend on them, they could not, among Albanians of the Catholic faith, achieve the same influence in education as Austria-Hungary, despite all their efforts. Hence arose the idea to induce Turkey to suspend the ban on sending Muslim children to foreign schools, on condition that those Muslims give preference to secular Italian schools rather than the Austro-Hungarian religious ones. However, they did not count on the Sultan’s resistance, which on that question was rigid. This fact, however, at least shows that the intention of the Italians is not, through all their activities, to raise the national level of the Albanian people, but essentially to create colonizing institutions, in the hope of later securing positions, despite all the official assertions put forward.
Creation of colonies. The same dream was served by the decision to settle Italian emigrants in Albania, where there is rich land for cultivation. In that sense, the first attempt was made in a Scutari-area settlement, where Italian peasants rented large estates.
Charitable centers. As a preparatory measure before opening a hospital, a clinic was set up in Scutari, run by an Italian doctor, in which patients were treated free of charge and given therapy.

Italian undertakings do not face attacks from the Turkish government; on the contrary, these measures are secretly supported as a counterweight to our influence, always thinking that the rivalry between Italy and Austria-Hungary is useful to the Turks' own interests in Albania.

519

Scientific missions. A large number of travelers and missions in Italy aimed to study Albania more closely in the most varied sectors, including the military, and not as a last item. Here we wish to mention the most important:

Much attention was aroused by the journey of Marquis de Carlotti, at that time secretary of the Italian Embassy in Constantinople, now a counselor of their embassy in Vienna, who (1902) traveled from Bitola, passing through Elbasan and Scutari to Montenegro, and in a conspicuous way sought contact with distinguished foreigners.

The extensive excursions of the Albanologist Francesco Kinig and his various companions allegedly had ethnographic and linguistic aims. The same can be said of the journeys of Antonio Argondice, Aldo Masera, Hector Melis, and Count Francesco Trombi in the vilayets of Scutari and Janina, and finally of the journey of Marquis Guicciardini through the vilayets of Kosovo and Salonika.

Efforts of commercial policy. The Milan Commercial Society. The Chamber of Commerce of Vicenza in the autumn of 1902 sent a special commercial mission which, as a result of its investigations, recommended founding a large Italian commercial society, which was realized a year later under the name Societa italiana d'esportazione e d'importazione col Montenegro e col Albania — the Italian Import-Export Association for Montenegro and Albania, with headquarters in Milan.

Exhibition warehouse. Exhibition depots of Italian products in Gjirokastra and in Scutari had the aim of opening the country to trade and exploitation, and together with other efforts of Italy's commercial policy led to a noticeable activation of trade, which had previously been quite insignificant.

Concessions for Albanian merchants. The number of travelers visiting Albanian markets rose significantly; through the free sending of samples, price discounts, registering firms, and granting concessions to Albanian merchants traveling to Italy, everything possible was done to increase Italian sales.

Post offices. After opening consulates in Durrës and Valona, this was followed by the opening of Italian post offices in Scutari, Durrës, and Janina (1902).

Summer stays of consuls in the interior. Imitating the custom among us of sending vice-consuls from Durrës and Valona to Tirana or Berat for a summer stay lasting several months, so that they would be in a position to look after relations with the foreign community in the interior of the country, the Italian vice-consul from Durrës likewise, for the first time and with the same aim, spent several months in Tirana in 1904.

Visits of naval fleets. Visits of Italian fleets to Albanian ports, where they contributed to establishing many links, were repeated almost every year and would last for several weeks, which aroused much attention.

Maritime traffic. Italy worked with much effort and success on developing its maritime traffic with the Albanian coast, surpassing Austria-Hungary in that regard. As early as 1902 Italy offered the possibility of connections with all Albanian ports several times a week, via new lines, steamers of the company Puglia, which successfully connect all the way from Rome to Brindisi.

520
The “Puglia” Company. Studying maritime traffic under the Austro-Hungarian and Italian flags, we see that the “Puglia” company, heavily subsidized, surpasses all Austro-Hungarian maritime transport companies (Lloyd, Ragusea, Ungaro-Croata) connected with the Albanian coast, both in shorter and more convenient travel times, and in the frequency and performance of ships, as well as the low price of chartering voyages.
Navigation on the Bojana River. For this outlet in northern Albania, Italy owes, along with the higher frequency of trips, above all to the favorable exploitation of the fact that the line to Scutari via Medua (Shëngjin) is scarcely used for freight compared with that from the river Bojana via Oboti, now almost exclusively in use. A special service has been established for transporting goods arriving in Shëngjin without losing time in Oboti [orig. Obotti; the author also uses Oboti; Alb. Obot - trans. note], and even further, to the customs in Scutari. For this, “Puglia” provided a small steamer. It carries out its journeys regardless of weather conditions, undisturbed by the state of the water surface or the strength of the wind, which at the mouth of the Bojana is often unfavorable.
The Italian mail route. Thanks to an agreement with Montenegro, Italy conveys its mail to the Scutari Vilayet via Bar, and from there by land to Virpazar and then by a small steamer of the Montenegrin navy to Scutari. This excellent and rapid connection enabled it to attract almost all consignments for that area of Albania.
521
Italian–Albanian agitation in Italy. In dealing with Italian activity connected with Albania, one must not forget the intense agitation that took place in Italy itself, both verbally and in writing, in the press, at congresses, meetings, conferences, and in associations, with the aim of increasing interest in Albania not only among Italo-Albanians, but also among the broader Italian public. Although in many cases it is only high-flown words and a desire for immediate effects, it cannot be denied that all these events achieved one thing—to the detriment of our entire structure: they won public understanding for the importance of cultivating close relations with Albania and for vigorous and independent public support for an active policy with broad aims on that subject.
Lively debates on Albania in the Italian Chamber of Deputies directed the attention of all Europe to the claims presented there, and they also strongly resonated in Albania, leaving the impression that Italy was more determined than any other power to help the Albanian people.
Albanian congresses. The promotional statements from the Albanian Congress in Naples, repeated every year, had less effect, although the 1903 congress gained particular significance when greeting telegrams were exchanged with the king.
Although these events have brought no benefit to Albania to this day, they nevertheless provided the Italian government, as before, with many ideas on how to proceed. The creation of a chair for the Albanian language in Palermo, the approval of a large number of scholarships for Albanian students, more frequent support for arrested Albanian patriots, etc., served these initiatives.
Other points from the congress’s program, such as introducing Albanian as a compulsory subject for all primary schools in Albanian municipalities in Italy, have not yet been realized.
Politically, these congresses generally defended the independence of Albania without endangering the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but they reached no true agreement

regarding the person to be supported—at one time favoring a feudal lord, an Albanian, and at another a prince from the royal House of Savoy.
The merger of all Albanian committees, loudly proclaimed abroad, and the subordination of the entity thus formed to a central Italian committee, was illusory, which was already clear to all who knew the situation from the very beginning. However, the organization envisaged by the Albanians from Italy through the creation of numerous local committees seemed quite praiseworthy. It was considered that the local committees would be joined into a great "Lega tra gli Albanesi d'Italia" – "League of Albanians in Italy," turning this league into an important financial-political organism. However, this project achieved only partial, weak results in its implementation.
Consiglio albanese d'Italia. Then General Ricotti Garibaldi took the lead in stirring among Italo-Albanians the not-strong-enough will to act, relying on the reputation of his name and his irredentist slogans. With the support of leading men of the Italo-Albanian party he founded (in 1904) the "Consiglio albanese d'Italia" with the aim of uniting Albanians, both those from Italy and those from Albania, with all Albanian associations abroad and with all other political associations from the Balkans, into a great, unified coalition against Austria-Hungary. "Today, indisputably," he wrote to an Albanian patriot, "Austria is our worst enemy, even worse than the Turk himself, with whom one could come to an arrangement."
El Consiglio has its own press organ under the name "Gazzetta albanese," published by Manlio Beniki, and which, for its part, is characterized by the albanophile aspirations of its inspirers, uses exclusively the Italian language, and therefore is not at all widespread in Italy.
As for the Council's program, it may be subject to a certain evolution, insofar as it concerns the Albanians from Italy. In the already existing Albanian associations abroad, especially those in Sofia, Romania, Egypt, London, and Paris, there are, however, few possibilities, since the purely national tendencies of these associations do not allow closer rapprochement with the Italian committees, which follow specifically Italian interests.
Ismail Kemal Bey. In fact, only one of those three persons is undoubtedly of Albanian origin: the Muslim Ismail Kemal, from a truly exceptionally old house and the highly reputed beys of the family of Vlora

(Valona), who are counted among the richest feudal lords in all Albania. This line has produced a number of important men who served the Turkish state in important official functions. From that family, among others, are the current Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha and the state councillor Syrja Bey.
Ismail Kemal Bey himself was part of the Ottoman public administration and advanced in it to the rank of governor-general. He is a man of great culture, endowed with exceptional talents and abilities, without doubt one of the most prominent Albanians among the Muslim officials, which makes it very understandable that his sudden flight from Constantinople in 1900 caused great astonishment at the Palace.
Although Ismail Kemal never openly put forward his candidacy for the post of high governor of an autonomous Albania, there is no doubt that he decided to flee in such a surprising way from the conviction that in the future he would play an important political role in his homeland. He undoubtedly had many opportunities for this, since all his

compatriots trusted him and respected him as the most important representative of their ideas. Although at the beginning of his stay abroad it was not at all difficult for him to win over the majority of local Albanian associations to himself, the disappointment was all the greater when shortly thereafter he revealed himself as a defender of a Greek-Albanian brotherhood, and later even declared himself in favor of Italy. Although he tried to justify his stance with the argument that he believed in the necessary rapprochement of the Albanians with Greece or Italy in order to defend against the alleged desires of Austria-Hungary to annex them, it soon became clear that his change of side was abetted by money received from Athens, perhaps also from Italy, which allowed him to lead a refined life but on the other hand also undermined his popularity among Albanian patriots at home and abroad. Ismail Kemal spends most of his time in Paris or Brussels, only occasionally traveling to Italy.

Juan de Aladro Castriota. A wealthy nobleman appeared, a Catholic Spaniard, who invokes his descent from Albanian princes as the authentic pretender to the throne of an independent Albania. This is Juan de Aladro y Perez de Velasco, an old Spanish diplomat who claims through his mother's side to be descended from Vojsava, Skanderbeg's sister.

Under the name "Prince Gjin Aladro Castriota," in 1899 he presented himself to the Albanian people with an enthusiastic proclamation as a descendant of the great national hero and heir to his country, declaring that henceforth he would place himself at the head of the Albanian movement for the liberation of Albania from the Turkish yoke and wished to fight in order to win the throne of his ancestors.

Year after year he repeated his manifestos, at times bombastic, trying to create a certain cult of his personality through the press, through letters from his secretary, Viska Babatasi from Korcha, distributing portraits, proclamations, postcards, as well as lavish gifts. Naturally, with his generosity he wins adherents, but one cannot, of course, think of a party that can be taken seriously, nor even of any influence of his personality in Albania.

In recent years a strange rapprochement has taken place between Aladro and the albanophile circles in Italy, who apparently started from the view that any adequate attempt to weaken the predominant importance of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy is worthy of support. It may also have been expected that in this way this "pretender" would be better controlled, while also drawing benefits from his contacts and his activities for their own purposes. Because of his friendship with the Italians, Aladro in Albania relies mostly on Italian-leaning supporters.

The Italian press, and above all Nazione Albanese ("Albanian Nation") of Anselmo Lorecchio, accompanied the information about him with laudatory articles, and Ricciotti Garibaldi maintains a close friendship with him.

Aladro even tried to approach the Bulgarian committees under Sarafov's aegis in order to reach an agreement on old cooperation, and he invested significant funds in purchasing weapons in a manner similar to theirs.

This conspiracy of revolutionaries from Albania and Macedonia with the Garibaldists from Italy prompted the Turkish government, worried by this fact, to adopt even preventive military measures when, in 1902, there was persistent talk of an armed coup d'etat by Aladro in Valona, being prepared on Corfu.

From all this it seems that the Ottoman authorities, who show no mercy to the “prince’s” supporters in Albania, attach excessive importance to his posture, whereas up to that date the European state chanceries had not taken him very seriously.
Prince Albert Ghika. To the great horror and concern of this pretender, in the autumn of 1904 a rival appeared in the person of “Prince” Albert Ghika, a Romanian of the Orthodox faith, convinced that he has the right to lead all the liberal elements of Albania by virtue of his alleged origin from an old Albanian emigrant family. Ghika belongs to a Moldavian branch of the family of the same name, and thus has a number of prominent Romanians as relatives.
In one of his many articles in the press, he opposed Aladro’s claim to be called an Albanian or even a descendant of Skanderbeg, and did not hesitate to assume the rank of chieftain of the same after certain meetings, without any compromise, with various representatives of the Albanian Ministry of Propaganda. He tried to compensate for his lack of funds by attracting the interest of the Balkan Committee in London in order to carry out his plans, and he attempted to marry a wealthy Irishwoman, but because of a somewhat murky past, he could not inspire confidence in Albania.
Attention should be drawn to the fact that Djika strove to obtain support for his plans in Rome, where, despite his attempts to extract some benefit from this situation, two pretenders could not be advanced at the same time. As for the rest, Prince Albert Djika adhered literally to Ricciotti Garibaldi’s program.
Of the three persons mentioned, Djika is the one who deserves the least attention, and it is anticipated that his role will soon come to an end.
Vienna, April 1905

Annex VI: Austro-Hungarian Action 474
Promotion of the Albanian Language
With one noticeable difference from the Italian, the action of the Imperial and Royal Government in Albania focused above all on providing the greatest possible support to all initiatives aimed at promoting the Albanian language and schools, avoiding sensationalism and mere oratory, while reaping significant successes, particularly in this first direction.
With the growing interest in the language, the number of Albanian writers and journalists multiplied, and this gave grounds for our assistance to be extended ever more frequently to the most prominent among them.
Support for the national press. The journal “Albania”
The relationship we have maintained for six years continued, first in Brussels until 1904, and now in London, with Faik Bey, editor of the journal “Albania.” His paper continued to offer a series of articles that can serve as a true model and, thanks to the perfection of its style and the power of expression, contributed greatly to the development of the Albanian language. Faik Bey, like no other, commands his mother tongue, with all its subtleties and across different dialects, and should be considered one of the best Albanian publicists. Unfortunately, his personal opinions do not always align with his compatriots, which has cost him many friends and, moreover, has greatly harmed both the circulation and the significance of his newspaper for public opinion in Albania.
Faik Bey and his alphabet

Despite his strong efforts, he did not succeed in entrenching the alphabet he championed, which was used in the journal “Albania” and was intended to provide a basis for unifying the different alphabets in use among Albanians, so that the Frasheri, so named after its founders, remained, without question, dominant.

The Frasheri Alphabet

Except for the Catholic population of northern Albania, which until recently used an alphabet closely linked with Faik (and proclaimed by the Society for Language Unification “Bashkimi” under the patronage of Monsignor Primo Doci, Abbot of Mirdita), all the others, that is, the great majority of the people, both Orthodox and Muslim, have adopted the letters of Naim and Sami Bey Frasheri, whose sphere of importance thus extends from south to north, across Durres, Lower Debar, and the districts south of Prizren.

Since, among the population of the extensive Albanian territories, these publications can count on a good reception insofar as they use letters regarded as nation-wide, necessity and political prudence have compelled us not to take a negative stance toward that alphabet in principle, but likewise to extend our support to publications issued in it.

The journal “Drita.” Shahin Bey

Since 1902, the most important newspaper organ among all those published with the Frasheri alphabet, and the one enjoying the greatest prestige, has been the Albanian “Drita,” founded in Sofia by Shahin Bey of Kolonja and Kristo P. Luarasi, which in a short time won a fruitful circle of readers that spread throughout Albania. Besides the alphabet, its favorable reception is owed to its political content, which dealt with current questions about the Balkans, and to the authority of its first manager, Shahin Bey, known among his compatriots as the Ottoman kaymakam of various towns in Albania and Macedonia, who, as a result of both official and unofficial connections, had numerous supporters at his disposal.

With the weave of all these circumstances, soon after its appearance the journal “Drita” gained the opportunity to exert significant influence on public opinion in Albania and, with its purely national program, to respond to the aspirations for unification, reviving and fructifying them.

Therefore, it seemed indescribably important to establish lasting relations with this paper, which was achieved in 1903 by approving a regular subsidy for its editors.

Kristo P. Luarasi

Also, the second among them, Kristo P. Luarasi, an Orthodox from southern Albania, originally from Kolonja (Bitola region), who, in addition to his literary activity, has for some years been the head of a publishing house in Sofia, is already known in Albania’s literary circles, in addition to many merits, as the founder of an Albanian patriotic association in Sofia named “Deshira” (Desire).

In that sense, the relationship with “Drita” proved extremely profitable, since it incidentally gave us the opportunity, through its editors and without drawing attention to ourselves, to exert indirect influence on the aforementioned publishing house and the political organization of the local Albanian committee.

The newspaper “Toska”

It is true that the newspaper "Toska," which had been appearing in Egypt since 1901, had as its director Milo Duçi, a convinced defender of the national idea in Albania,

although, lacking adequate collaborators and appropriate means, it managed to survive only until 1903. As for the rest, in keeping with its diminished importance, it enjoyed our modest support.

The Newspaper "Besa"

As a result of the efforts of compatriots from Korça, Fokion Turtulli, who lived in Egypt, and a friend of Duçi named Toma Avrami, the newspaper "Toska" appears to be reborn as the newspaper "Besa," which has been appearing in Cairo since the end of 1904; a subsidy from the Imperial and Royal Government was indeed requested for it, but was taken into consideration only after long experience and after it had proven its sustainability.

The Newspaper "Albania"

Also in loose connection with the newspaper "Albania" of Dervish Hima, previously published in Geneva and now in Paris in the Albanian, French, and Turkish languages—which in fact turned out to be useful, given the information it provided on the overall scope of Albanian activities—we expressed sympathy for their effort, as well as recognition for so correct an attitude, together with material assistance at the government's discretion.

On the basis of the foregoing enumeration, it is evident that in recent years, with, let us be honest, relatively modest means, we have managed to establish relations with the principal representatives of the Albanian press abroad—a result which the Italian government has hitherto, despite considerable expenditures, vainly striven to attain. In the future it will also be important to keep in our hands all the threads we have tightened, since the path taken thus far contributes to the awakening and education of public opinion in Albania in a sense that coincides with our policy.

As for the rest, the benefit of this action will be seen only in a general sense, so long as the circulation of Albanian publications in Albania is not freed from prohibitions and restrictions.

Support for Albanian Literature

Apart from journalism, the Imperial and Royal Government also encouraged the publication of other specimens of Albanian letters, and in that sense, among other things, made possible the publication of the following works: a "History of Albania" (Historia e Shcypniis) in two volumes and a "History of Turkey" (Historia e Turkiis) by Dr. Ndoc Nikaj, a map of Albania by Trank Spiro-bey (Faik-bey), and a chrestomathy containing stories, dialogues, as well as the poetry of Georg Kirias (Gjergj Kiriazi).

Textbooks for the Catholic Churches

There was no interruption in the effort to expand the Albanian school bibliography that we had equipped in previous years; nevertheless, to the textbooks that had existed thus far, in recent years only one more in geography and the third part of a reader has been added.

Debates on the Alphabet Among the Catholic Clergy

The fact that this growth did not maintain the same pace, as would correspond to the intentions of the Imperial and Royal Government, has its causes in the controversies that flared up anew among the Catholic clergy regarding the question of the alphabet. In that respect, the secretary to the bishop of Sape, Dr. Ndre Mjeda [Ndre Mjeda, also known as Andrea Miedia], won over the greater part of the clergy to a new orthography

approved by the Congress of Orientalists in Hamburg, and condemned the previously mentioned Doci alphabet. After a year of struggle, the Albanian bishops as a whole decided in favor of Mjeda's thesis and applied to the Imperial and Royal Government to request the publication of new schoolbooks in this alphabet.

The Mjeda Alphabet

Despite the fact that it seemed entirely counterproductive to introduce a change after so relatively short a period of time, the Imperial and Royal Government saw it as necessary not to act in opposition to the declared unanimous desire of the episcopate. In this it was guided primarily by the view that, in a certain sense, Mjeda's orthography represents progress, since it opens the way to a rapprochement between Tosks and Ghegs in pronunciation, and renounces the Italianizing character inherent in the "Bashkimi" alphabet (Doci's alphabet).

Dr. Ndre Mjeda immediately received authorization to reform the orthography of existing school texts, and, one after another, they were prepared at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Imperial and Royal Textbook Publishing House, according to the prescribed standards for corrections.

To avoid misunderstandings, it is necessary to note that this new orthography is recognized only by Albanians of the Catholic faith, or more precisely, it is recognized only in those Catholic districts in which denominational schools operate, that is, on a relatively limited territory. To the rest of the Catholics, as well as to all Orthodox and Muslims, it will remain foreign; and unfortunately there is no prospect that the supporters of the Frashëri alphabet will decide to accept the "new" alphabet in practice.

Initiatives for the Unification of the Alphabet

The resolution of the alphabet question, of exceptional importance for the national and linguistic unification of all branches of the Albanian people, is left to the future. However, under the protection of the Imperial and Royal Government, important preliminary works and studies have also been begun which will contribute to the final decision.

Distribution of Books

The encouragement of the publication of Albanian works finds a valuable complement in the occasional facilitation granted for bringing copies into Albania, as well as in the free distribution of textbooks in the schools subsidized by the Imperial and Royal Government.

We could respond to the desire to increase the print runs of the successfully disseminated publications (both books and newspapers) only to a very limited extent, because of the police ban that in this case is in force in Turkey, and the aforementioned distribution had to be carried out with the utmost caution so that we might avoid finding ourselves in a compromising situation. From the requests for books, which are becoming ever more frequent, one can, however, conclude that in Albania the need for education is growing, which moreover offers a guarantee that the efforts which, with no small sacrifices, the Imperial and Royal Government has invested in Albania to revive literary activity have borne fruit.

531 I

Kristoforidis's Dictionary

In 1902 steps were begun so that the Albanian dictionary which the late Elbasan patriot Konstantin Kristoforidis had left behind as a posthumous manuscript, and which was regarded as a complete collection of the entire Albanian linguistic treasure, might see

the light of day as such an edition. Taking utterly unscrupulous advantage of the difficult material situation of the author's heir, the government in Athens in the meantime, with the help of an organ of Greek propaganda, managed to forestall us and obtain ownership of this work.

After more than two years of delays and only following strong pressure from Albanian patriots who feared that this work had been lost, it finally appeared in bookshops at the end of 1904. In keeping with the tendencies that inspired it, it was, naturally, printed in Greek characters and, as the preface openly admits, with the sole intention of proving to the Albanian people that if they wish to have any chance of success in preserving their mother tongue they must use exclusively the Greek alphabet and model themselves on the Greek language. The allusion was too clear and insolent to go misunderstood, and the Albanians perfectly well recognize the inauthentic value of this lamentable gift offered to them by the Danaans.

But besides that, the content of the dictionary, which had for some time already been outdated owing to the contemporary development of the Albanian language, did not meet the high expectations of Albanian linguists; its publication did not produce the expected impression, so that the Greek government cannot count on any advantage that might contribute to its policy of Hellenization in Albania.

Public Instruction,

Albanian language course in Vienna. Dr. Gjergj Pekmezi

A step for the promotion and preservation of the Albanian language that is worth mentioning, on the other hand, was the introduction of a course in Albanian held in 1903 at the Public Institute for Oriental Languages in Vienna, under the direction of an Albanian, originally from Estarova in central Albania, Doctor of Philology of the University of Vienna, Gjergj Pekmezi. This measure, an indication of the diligence with which the Imperial and Royal Government looks after the Albanian nation, was greeted with expressions of approval and full enthusiasm in all the printed media in Albania, and points to the path along which, in not too

long a time a Chair of Albanian Studies at the University of Vienna might see the light of day, which would be highly desirable. The results Dr. Pekmezi achieved during two years of courses are excellent, and one may expect that knowledge of the language in wider circles in the Monarchy will also revive interest in the country itself.

Language Courses in Borgo Erizzo

In addition, the elective course in Albanian held in 1901 in the Albanian colony of Borgo Erizzo [today the place Arbanasi], near Zadar, had great resonance, so that already the following year the number of classes was multiplied, and in 1903, alongside boys, they had to open courses for girls as well. Attendance in both oscillates between sixty and eighty pupils, and in this way the higher schools of the time for the training of teachers are preparing an excellent teaching staff for our schools in Albania, who are very diligent, well-trained and capable.

Preparing Teaching Material for the Albanian Language

Besides this form of training, which is more suitable for teachers from Albania, another, much more effective one for our aims was also chosen: the education of young talented Albanians by taking them from their native country and bringing them to the boarding high schools for teacher training in Austria-Hungary; for this purpose, up to now the

Klagenfurt schools, connected with boarding houses, and the Catholic school communities of Währing have been used. The first teachers who earned diplomas in these schools, three apiece, have already begun to perform their duties and to further develop their work in the schools in Prizren, Durrës and Scutari. At present, seven young Albanians are studying in Vienna and Klagenfurt, who are producing absolutely satisfactory academic results and promise the best.

Nationalization of the Catholic Schools

Thanks to the formation of an Albanian teaching corps, it became possible to promote vigorously the nationalization of the Catholic elementary schools in northern Albania. The language of instruction became Albanian—instead of Italian, which had previously prevailed almost exclusively in the school centers, causing us great harm.

Taking into account also the Albanian merchants, whose ties with foreign countries cannot function without the mediation of an international language, courses of instruction in German were likewise introduced in the larger schools

such as, for example, the Scuola Commerciale and the Franciscan school in Scutari, as well as the elementary school in Durrës, which has yielded excellent results.

Italian could not be completely eliminated, since commercial and maritime traffic with the Levant has always played a well-known role; nevertheless, from now on the Italianization which at other times, in a thoroughly deplorable way, was furthered with our own means in northern Albania has been stopped once and for all.

Reorganization of the Existing Schools

The flourishing of those centers that cultivated the mother tongue shows us that there is a genuine sensitivity among the people for good national schools, and this fact must be kept increasingly in mind each time. This was made possible thanks to a reorganization of our religious schools, especially the one in Scutari. Previously they lagged far behind modern Italian schools and no longer met the increasing demands that were arising.

Only in one center, in the Italian school, together with the so-called Commercial School of the Jesuit Fathers, were all attempts at reform rejected, with that rigid clerical sensitivity that resists any modernization, continuing to view the national language as something inferior and regarding the study of Italian as their most important task. Not reaching even the level of an elementary technical school, the Jesuit school, from the standpoint of modern pedagogy as well, does not meet the needs of our time. Instead of forming a systematic whole with the existing primary schools (the best of which are the Franciscan ones, since they are much more flexible), the Jesuits place obstacles before their graduates and reject many on the pretext that they are not strong enough in Italian.

Future Expansion of Public Education

In order to respond to the aspirations of the ambitious citizens of Scutari and to avoid Italian temptations, a project for the gradual construction of a secondary school, which will replace the Jesuit center or be joined to it, with at least six classes and with our curriculum in force, can no longer be postponed for long.

The reform should be carried out in cooperation with the Franciscan school and with the participation of a lay teaching staff. Alongside Albanian, German should also be cultivated and, to a lesser extent, Italian, so as to enable graduates to continue their studies more easily or advance in a commercial career.

For the sake of that natural development, which must necessarily be integrated into Albanian public education, the problem will arise of training a teaching staff of higher qualifications, and then the most agile way will have to be seriously considered to provide Albanian textbooks for technical schools and for secondary schools.

Scholarships for Studies in the Monarchy

Regardless of the appropriate preparatory steps for which, as is evident, more years will be needed, it could already now be useful, as an exception, to provide scholarships for the best graduates of our Albanian schools. In this way they would continue their education in the Monarchy, thereby avoiding being swept into Italian waters, and more energetically fostering common interests, both spiritual and material, between Austria-Hungary and Albania, in particular through the influence of the educated social strata.

Increase in the Number of Schools

The number of our educational centers in Scutari has increased with the ceremonial opening of several village schools and the so-called House of the Malisori; it is a boarding school in which the sons of the most influential Malisori tribal chiefs are housed and educated free of charge. (In the previous section we already mentioned the response given by the Italian government, which likewise founded a rival center.)

Charitable Institutions

The hospital of the Sisters that we maintain in Scutari has grown and has been expanded with suitable additional buildings, the construction of an outpatient clinic, and the appointment of a new physician, whose work, crowned with the best success, greatly contributes to establishing our prestige among the population.

Education of a New Generation of Catholic Clergy

Besides promoting public education, care for the education that a new generation of North Albanian clergy will receive—capable and animated by a sense of loyalty—constitutes a pivotal point of our program.

In this regard, it is above all a matter of those who will belong to the Franciscan monastic order, to which, for the most part, falls the administration and care of souls in the parishes and missions in northern Albania, as well as the education of the people.

535

While the question of reforming the course of studies for training Franciscan clerics, conducted in the centers in Scutari, is still unresolved, for several years now the theological studies from those centers have been transferred to monasteries in the Monarchy, more precisely, to those of the Franciscan Province of North Tyrol. Although the experience regarding the political usefulness of this measure has not yet been clearly formulated, it nevertheless represents a substantial advance over previous years, when Albanian theology students were mostly placed in Italian monasteries or seminaries and trained there in a spirit foreign to us.

With a view to making a similar decision for the new generation of clergy, whose education lies in the hands of the Jesuits, no agreement with Rome has yet been achieved.

The Situation with the Conversions from Elbasan

Great expectations were aroused by the movement of conversions prompted by national motives in Elbasan and Shpat (Monastir), where (between 1899 and 1900) fifty-five Albanian families, led by an archimandrite, passed from the Greek Orthodox

Church to the Greek Catholic, Uniate Church. Most of the remaining Christian families of the Greek Orthodox faith from that region (about 4,500 souls) were merely waiting for the construction of a Catholic school in order to follow their predecessors in changing faith.

The motive for such actions, which surprised everyone, was found in the hope that, through the Catholic clergy, they could avail themselves of the advantages of our ecclesiastical protectorate, and especially in the effect produced by the introduction of the Albanian language into church and school, as a result of the strengthening of national feeling and the acquisition of more effective personal protection. Unfortunately, the expectations of the converts from Elbasan were fulfilled only to a slight extent, since the Imperial and Royal Embassy—despite repeated efforts—had no opportunity to obtain the imperial firman that would have authorized the construction of a church.

Not only in Elbasan, which represents the center for nurturing the Albanian national idea, but also throughout central Albania, extremely marked importance is attached to the aforementioned movement of conversion. Both Christians and Muslims discern in it the beginnings of the national expansion of the Catholic Church from northern Albania toward the south and believe that this will surely, together with the national school, break the power of Hellenism among the Orthodox Albanians in Epirus and in the rest of southern Albania.

536

A sign of firmness of character, worthy of recognition, as well as of great confidence in our ultimate assistance and in our entire mission in Albania, is that, despite extremely dangerous pressures and persecutions, not a single converted person has been unfaithful to what he once swore. However, it would be most desirable that, after six years of existence, the Catholic community of Elbasan should soon be allowed to celebrate its faith in a house of God.

Support for Patriots in Distress

The Imperial and Royal Government, in supporting patriots in distress and those prominent figures from whom some benefit may be expected in the action of unification, sees an important means of strengthening the national factor.

Among Albanians of the Catholic faith, this group includes, among others, the well-known and respected Abbot of Mirdita, Monsignor Primo Doci, alongside the well-known patriarch Don Mark, upon whom, in the event of the death without heir of Prenk Bib Doda, the hereditary right to become the chieftain of Mirdita would be transferred.

If it is true that certain specific individuals among Albanians of the Orthodox and Muslim faiths were favored with occasional gifts, they were nowhere near as many as in the case of the Catholics. However, it would also be useful to increase our commitment to members of these two confessions from among the Albanian people, so that we do not contribute to creating the impression of us as biased and partial.

Intervention in Favor of Persecuted Patriots

Too often we see the need to mediate in a friendly manner before the Turkish government on behalf of Albanians who, because of their national consciousness, were subjected to pressure by the authorities. The more importance we attach in the future to this important branch of our action, the more the impression will be strengthened in Albania that we, without placing the greatest burden on the Catholics who depend on our ecclesiastical protectorate, cherish the same sympathies for the entire people,

promptly and effectively, and, when necessary, are ready to step forward in defense of the people with all the force at our disposal.

Struggle Against Montenegrin Agitation

It required vigilant attention to monitor the strong Montenegrin agitation among Catholic branches of families on the northern border, where

537

Prince Nikola strove to win over influential people with money and donations of arms, which turned entirely into corruption. Despite national enmity, taking advantage of the poverty that reigns among the highlanders, he managed to gain the favor of a good number of people, so that we found ourselves in a situation in which it was necessary for us also to strengthen our adherents with financial assistance, for resistance against Montenegrin pretensions. Proof of the deep dissatisfaction with the altered and uncertain relationship that currently prevails with the Turkish regime is that the majority of the Malisori Catholics, under threats from Montenegro on account of their faith and national consciousness, have in the end become receptive to attempts at rapprochement with their bitterest opponent, solely because he is also the ruler of a Christian state. Besides reinforcing the idea that they have support in us, it will be equally necessary to raise their national feelings and consciousness, which can only be achieved by establishing Albanian schools in their villages.

Trade and Navigation

In the field of trade and navigation our position in Albania has clearly encountered more energetic resistance from the Italians, and all oversight by our consular representations could not prevent the stronger inroads of imports of competing Italian goods and, unfortunately, their triumph in seafaring.

On our side, a commercial success can be mentioned: securing the first major trading houses from Korca (Monastir), the second largest city in southern Albania, for the exclusive import of Austrian and Hungarian goods. Thanks to the initiative of this house, which, covering the costs itself, established an emporium with samples of Austrian and Hungarian products, and thanks to its extensive contacts throughout the interior of the country, our trade with southern Albania has visibly increased in recent years. It would also be desirable to adopt similar measures in other important commercial centers in Albania, whereby, sacrificing relatively little—without attracting much attention—the promotion of Austro-Hungarian import goods can be achieved, while at the same time counting on the support of merchants from the country.

In order to restore the former prestige of our shipping on the Albanian coast, specifically the part closest to us, on the important route Durres–Medua–the mouth of the Bojana, and in order to remove from the horizon the competition of the company “Puglia,” the three companies concerned (Lloyd, Ragusea, Hungaro-Croata) should, by mutual agreement, alter their routes and reach some arrangement. Taking into account the importance of Shkoder, Medua (Shengjin) should be directly connected twice weekly with Trieste, Rijeka, and the most important Dalmatian ports, thereby establishing favorable conditions for a point of disembarkation of passengers and transshipment of goods originating from the Levant and from Italy (from Constantinople, Izmir, Salonika, Bari, Brindisi, etc.). Greater speed of travel to the Albanian coast is often demanded, and with that aim the Lloyd and Hungaro-Croata companies would have to abolish intermediate stops at smaller ports, which cost them time.

The line on the Bojana River, which is now more or less abandoned, requires special attention. It can be regarded as nothing but an anomaly that Rijeka and Dubrovnik are directly connected with Oboti, whereas Trieste no more often than once every fourteen days; thus, it would be in both the maritime and political interest of the Monarchy to establish a weekly service by the Ragusea company between Trieste and Oboti.
In order to compete systematically with the Italian navy, it should furthermore, at all costs, be ensured that a small river steamer be put into service which, similar to the Italian “Iolanda,” would have to handle the loading of large ships arriving at Medua or at Bar and sail upstream on the Bojana, transporting the cargo to the customs office in Scutari. This is not only a question concerning our commercial policy, but also our prestige, that the Austro-Hungarian merchant flag be seen even in the markets of Scutari, since the Italian one is already fluttering among them.
When we compare the Austro-Hungarian and Italian action in Albania, as well as the results achieved by both sides, no one questions that the Italian schemes for Albania and for the Albanian people possess nowhere near the usefulness and value of the Austro-Hungarian ones, and in no way justify the chauvinistic ambitions toward that country, so temperamentally formulated by the Monarchy.
However, the sudden industriousness with which Italy is acting, and thanks to which it achieves relatively rapid successes, cannot be doubted; it entails a strong desire for expansion, which in time could lead to genuine enmity with us.
However, since it is indisputably a matter of vital interest for us to draw Albania ever closer—on the one hand, to use it as a bastion against the Greater Serbia movement, which is as dangerous for them as it is for us, and on the other, to prevent Italy from consolidating its positions on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea—in the future we must neglect nothing, so that we can react in good time and successfully to any influence that penetrates into Albania and harms our policy, above all the Italian one. The best way to do this is through systematic and ever more resolute support for the national idea in Albania, which, in order to secure favorable results, should be extended equally to all parts of the country and be represented among members of all three confessions in the Albanian people.
[539]
[540]
Annex VII: Maps
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(Part of the administrative division of the Ottoman Empire which includes, among others, the vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir, Scutari, Ioannina, Salonika, etc.)
RELIGIONS MAP
SCHOOL MAP of the vilayets of Kosovo, Salonika, Scutari, Ioannina, and Monastir.
NATIONALITIES MAP
[546]
Annex VIII: Statistical tables of national and religious relations in the vilayets of Kosovo, Scutari, Monastir, Ioannina, and Salonika
Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Kosovo (1903), generalities
Sanjak

Population
Albanians Slavs Greeks Vlachs Ottoman Turks Emigrants from Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria Circassians Roma Jews Total
Of the Muslim faith Catholics Exarchists (Bulgarians) Patriarchists (Serbs) Muslims Catholics (Serbo-Croats)
Skopje 36,282 360 178,711 19,334 20,076 123 3,162 83,223 1,500 210 6,713 1,298 350,992
Prizren 126,420 1,340 17,232 22,550 1,932 680 16,170 4,500 3,780 194,604
Pristina 145.508 565 87.701 17.264 3.011 60 1.650 8.933 170 264.862
Sjenica 3.000 2 3 3 9 0 28.610 410 20 55.430
Pec 130.690 11.695 16.460 2.000 1.500 981 2.780 166.106
Plevlja 2 4 3 7 2 22.719 141 47.232
Total 441.900 13.960 195.943 193.807 9 2 6 0 1 3.011 123 3 902 102.543 6.981 210 22.757 1.488 1.079.226
Note of which 70,593 Serbs
of which 22,008 Bulgarians (Pomaks)
474 HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai), K. 2. Statistical Table of the National and Religious Relations in the Vilayet of Kosovo (1903).
Annex VIII:
Statistical tables of national and religious
relations in the vilayets of Kosovo, Scutari, Monastir, 547
Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Kosovo (1903), Part 1
475
Sanjak Town
Number of inhabitants
Albanians Slavs
Greeks Vlachs Ottoman
Turks
Emigrants from Bosnia,
Serbia and Bulgaria
Circassians Roma Jews Total
Muslims Catholics Exarchists
(Bulgarians)
Patriarchists
(Serbs) Muslims
Catholics
(Serbo-
Croat)
Skopje
Skopje 21.387 360 25.921 4.406 5.600
(Pomaks) 102 360 9.949 1.500 2404 800 72.789
Orchanje
(Kadanik) 7800 400 52 8.252
Cuprili (Veles) 1 500 29 394 4.130 5.242
(Pomaks) 15 900 12512 664 54.357

Stiplje 19.472 27.764 378 480 46.094
Radoviste 7 622 10.464 390 18 476
Malesh (Osmanje) 16.536 288 9 2 3 4
(Pomaks) 425 485 26.968
Kocane 16.534 690 1.680 11.600 660 31.154
Kratovo 17.391 954 6 102 3.815 336 22 604
Palanka 22.141 108 1.929 336 24.514
Kumanovo 23.710 8.358 102 6.765 210 1.008 18 45 784
Total 36.282 360 178.711 19.334 20 076 123 3.162 83.223 1.500 210 6.713 1.298 350 992
Prizren
Tetovo 37.602 17 232 8.922 1.932
(Pomaks) 30 16 170 780 82.668
Prizren 71.118 1 340 13.628 650 4,500 3.000 94 236
Luma 17.700 17.700
Total 126.420 1 340 17 232 22 550 1.932 630 16.170 4.500 3.780 194 604
'1'5 HHStA. AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2. Statistical Table of the National and Religious Relations in the Vilayet of Kosovo (1903). Part 1. 548 Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Kosovo (1903), Part 2 476
Pristina
Pristina 58.784 100 12.765 1.633 3.949 77.231
Gnjilane 30 69? 415 18 206 1 378 4 0 0 0 54.694
Presevo 15.158 25.944 1.650 600 43.352
Vucitrn 26 550 5.300 150 32.000
Mitrovica 11 321 50 10.785 500 60 84 22.800
Novi Pazar 3.000 14.701 16.764 150 170 34.785
Total 145 508 565 87 701 17.264 3 011 60 1 650 8 933 170 264.862
Sjenica
Sjenica 3.000 7.925 10.803 200 20 21.948
Nova
Varos 7.226 1 740 8.966
Bijelo Polje 5 969 12.000 60 18 029
Kolasin 2 270 4 0 6 7 150 6.487
Total 3 000 23 300 28.610 410 20 55.430
Pec
Pec 59.390 3.100 7.500 1.500 1 500 200 2.000 75 190
Djakovica 54 000 8.595 300 781 780 64.456
Trgoviste 8.800 1 760 10.560
Berane 2.000 6.400 8.400
Gusinje 6.500 500 500 7.500
Total 130 690 11 695 16.460 2000 1 500 981 2.780 166.106
Plevlje
Taslidza
(Plevlja) 14.600 15.908 141 30.649
Prijepolje 9.772 6.311 16.583

Total 24 373 22.719 141 47.232
Total 441.900 13.960 1 9 5 9 3 193.807 92.601 3.011 123 3.902 102.5 6.981 210 22.757 1.488 1.079.226
Note of which 70,593 Serbs; of which 22,008 Bulgarians (Pomaks)
476 HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai), K. 2. Statistical Table of the National and Religious Relations in the Vilayet of Kosovo (1903). Part 2. 549
Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Salonika (1903), Part 1 477
Number of inhabitants
Sanjak Town Slavs
Jews Total Note
Exarchists
(Bulgarians) Patriarchists Catholics
(Bulgarians)
Muslims
(Pomaks)
Greeks Vlachs Ottoman
Turks
Salonika 7 700 9 .1 0 0 900 34 800 80 53.000 50 000 155 580 1 000 Serbs
of which 8,400 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Langadas 2 000 16 800 29 700 48.500
Katerini 17.600 1.300 4 200 23.100
Karaferia 2 030 1.600 18.900 5.400 5 500 33,430 2 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Vodjen 9.200 13.200 5 200 300 11.500 39.400 400 Serbs
of which 12,800 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Janica 9.000 15.600 700 9 100 600 13.900 48.900 500 Serbs
of which 15,100 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Salonika Gevgelija 12 800 5 700 600 1 500 6.700 18.900 46.200 700 Serbs
of which 5,000 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Tikves 23.300 1 000 14.400 50 6.600 45.350 2 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Strumica 9.900 8 200 17.450 35.550 1,200 Serbs
of which 8,000 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Dojran 5.150 2 000 600 1 000 22.300 31.050 300 Serbs
of which 1,700 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Avret-hisar 16 850 1 800 1400 26.000 46.050 2 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Kasandra 37 000 4 300 41 300
Total 97 930 58.200 4 200 29.700 126 650 14 380 213.350 50 000 594 410 of which 3,100 Serbs
of which 55,100 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
477 HHStA. AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2. Statistical Table of the National and Religious Relations in the Vilayet of Salonika (1903). Part 1. 550 Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Salonika (1903), Part 2 478

Serres
Serres 15.700 10.000 300 34.900 240 36 200 97.340 5 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Zihna 3 900 22.700 75 6.000 32.675
Demir Hisar 7.450 7.000 1 100 2.600 5 800 14 300 38.150 5 Bulgarians who are inclined toward the Greeks
Petrich 19.000 900 100 9.300 29.300
Blagoevgrad 20.300 2.000 350 250 6.000 28.900
Melmk 14,300 700s 700 1,500 1,100 8,500 26,800 • Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece
RazJog 20,400 450
(Protestants) 11,000 700 32,550
Nevrokop 27,000 2,000s 30,000 1,900 450 16,600 77,950 with Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece
Total 128,050 19,700s 450 45,900 64,050 7,915 97,600 • 363,665 • Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece
Drama
Drama 3,600 600s 11,000 8,200 800 33,100 57,300 with Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece
Pravište 20 600 7,000 30 12,100 19,750
Kavala 3,000 1,300 50 13,200 17,550
Rupdschuz 30 19,700 19,730
San-Jaban 250 35 20,300 20,585
Total 3,650 600s 34,300 16,750 915 78,700 134,915 • Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece
Total 229,630 78,500 109,900 207,450 232,210 389,650 50,000 1,092,990

- of which 75,400 Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece
- of which 4,200 Bulgarians of the Catholic faith

478 HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2. Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitäts- und Religions-Verhältnisse im Vilajet Salonich (1903). 2. Theil. Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Salonika (1903), generalities479
Number of inhabitants
Sanjak Slavs
Greeks Jews Total Note
Exarchists
(Bulgarians) Patriarchists Catholics
(Bulgarians)
Muslims
(Pomaks)
Salonika 97,930 58,200 4,200 29,700 126,650 14,380 213,350 50,000 594,410
of which 3,100 Serbs; of which 55,100 Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece
Serres 128,050 19,700 450 45,900 64,050 7,915 97,600 363,665 • Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece

Drama 3,650 600s 34,300 16,750 915 78,700 134,915 • Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece
Total 229,630 78,500 4,650s 109,900 207,450 23,210 389,650 50,000 1,092,990
of which 3,100 Serbs; of which 75,400 Bulgarians who are favorably disposed toward Greece; of which 4,200 Bulgarian Catholics; of which 450 Bulgarian Protestants
479 HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2. Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitäts- und Religions-Verhältnisse im Vilajet Salonich (1903). 552 Statistical table of national and religious/confessional relations in the Vilayet of Janina (1903), generalities480
Sanjak
Number of inhabitants
Albanians Greeks Vlachs Roma Jews Total
Muslims Orthodox Orthodox Muslims
Janina 29,650 19,800 106,150 6,000 15,100 4,050 3,600 184,350
Preveza 16,330 15,480 20,240 3,220 460 580 414 56,724
Berat 122,000 23,700 1,135 13,580 1,740 85 162,240
Gjirokastër 69,500 38,850 33,200 3,400 3,700 40 148,690
Total 237,480 97,830 160,725 9,220 32,540 10,070 4,139 552,004
Note 1 by a large majority they harbor sympathies toward Greece
2 mostly harbor sympathies toward Greece
480 HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai), K. 2. Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitäts- und Religions-Verhältnisse im Vilajet Janina (1903). 553
Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Janina (1903), Part 1481
Sanjak Town
Number of inhabitants
Albanians Greeks Vlachs Roma Jews Total
Muslims Orthodox Orthodox Muslims
Janina
Janina 450 800 77,700 6,000 6,400 1,000 3,600 95,950
Ljeskovik 11,000 5,000 4,000 1,000 21,000
Konica 1,200 12,600 4,000 200 18,000
Filat 12,000 9,000 6,000 1,000 28,000
Ajdonat 5,000 5,000 5,000 800 15,800
Metsovo 850 4,700 50 5,600
Total 29,650 19,800 106,150 6,000 15,100 4,050 3,600 184,350
Preveza
Preveza 3,100 7,590 1,400 180 20 300 12,590
Luroš 5,280 12,450 1,820 250 60 50 19,910
Margariti 16,330 7,100 200 30 500 64 24,224
Total 16,330 15,480 20,240 3,220 460 580 414 56,724
481 HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2. Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitäts- und Religions-Verhältnisse im Vilajet Janina (1903). 1. Theil. 554
Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Janina (1903), Part 2482
Berat

Berat 62,000 10,000 25 4,000 1,170 25 77,220
Ljušnje 14,000 11,000 10 8,000 300 33,310
Skrapari 20,000 700 80 70 20,850
Valona 26,000 2,000 1,100 1,500 200 60 30,860
Total 122,000 23,700 1,135 13,580 1,740 85 162,240
Gjirokastër
Gjirokastër
(Erem) 11,000 13,000 7,000 800 20 31,820
Delvina 6,000 7,000 7,000 100 200 20 20,320
Himara
(Kurvelesch) 12,000 2,350 3,200 17,550
Tepelena
(Pepedelen) 20,500 4,500 1,000 26,000
Permet 19,000 10,000 800 1,300 31,100
Pogon 1,000 2,000 16,000 2,500 400 21,900
Total 69,500 38,850 33,200 3,400 3,700 40 148,690
Total 237,480 97,830 160,725 9,220 32,540 10,070 4,139 552,004
Note 1 by a large majority they harbor sympathies toward Greece
2 mostly harbor sympathies toward Greece

555
Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Skadar (1903), generalities 483
Sanjak
Number of inhabitants
Albanians Slavs Greeks Vlachs Roma Total
Muslims Catholics Orthodox Patriarchists Muslims
Skadar 41.630 84.203 20 1.810 3.600 20 300 131.583
Drac 82.684 11.719 3.119' 4.270 2.7802 1.530 106.102
Total 124.314 95.922 3.139 1.810 7.870 20 3.080 1.530 237.685
Note
1 of which 450 are inclined toward Greece
7
of which 350 are inclined toward Greece In total 800 are inclined toward Greece
483 HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2. Statistische Tabelle der Nationalities.-und Religions-Verhdltnisse im Vilajel Scutari (1903). 556 Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Skadar (1903) 484
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sl
City
Number of inhabitants
Albanians Slavs
Greeks Vlachs Roma Total Note
Muslims Catholics Orthodox Patriarchists Muslims
Skadar
Skadar 33.450 41.622 2 0 1.300 3.000 2 0 300 79.712
Ljes 1.500 10.875 12.375
Tuzi 1.310 3.920 510 600 6.340
Puka
(Dukadin) 5.370 10.902 16.272
Mirdita 16.884 16.884
Total 41.630 84.203 20 1.810 3.600 20 300 • 131.583
Drac
Drac 4.110 653 1.079' 990 260= 730 7.822 1 of which 300 are inclined toward Greece 3 of which 200 are inclined toward Greece
Kavaja 18.040 1.520' 450 1.3402 800 22.150 ’of which 150 are inclined toward Greece 5 of which 150 are inclined toward Greece
Shijak 13.740 510 520 2.800 300 17.870
Tirana 33.000 30 30 880 33.940
Kruja 13.794 10.526 24.320
Total 82.684 11.719 3.119' 4.270 2.7802 1.530 106.102 1 of which 450 are inclined toward Greece
3 of which 350 are inclined toward Greece
Total 124.314 95.922 3.139 1.810 7.870 20 3.080 1.530 237.685

484 HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2. Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitats.-und Religions-Verhaltnisse im Vilajet Scutari (1903), 1. und 2. Theil. 557
Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Monastir (March 1903), Part 1 485
Number of inhabitants
City Albanians Slavs Greeks
Ottoman
Turks
Muslims Catholics Orthodox Exarchists (Bulgarian) Patriarchists Muslims Orthodox Muslims
Vlachs Circassians Roma Jews Total Note
Monastir 32 000 2 2 0 0 47.000 24.000' 100 23 0001 12.000 200 2.500 5.000 148.000 ' of which 3.000 are inclined toward Serbia : of which 18.000 are inclined toward Greece
Prilep 12000 39.000 7.000' 1 800 500* 3.500 800 64 600 1 of which 48.000 are inclined toward Serbia 3 of which 100 are inclined toward Greece
Ohrid 22.000 300 27.500 2 5 0 0 ' 20 2.500* 80 500 55.400 ' of which 1.500 are inclined toward Serbia - 1.700 sympathizers of Greece
Kicevo 11 500 16 000 6 5 0 0 ' 6.500 60 80 40.640 ' all are inclined toward Serbia
Florina 6.500 ■ 2600 17000 16 000 4 0001 12.000 2.000 20 60.420 2 of which 2.000 are inclined toward Greece
Total 84.000 5 100 146 500 56.000' 8 300 120 30 060= 27 580 5.880 5 020 369.060 1 of which 15.800 are inclined toward Serbia • 21.800 sympathizers of Greece
Upper Debar 44 000 400 9.800 1300' 3 000 2.000 200 60 700 ' all are inclined toward Serbia
Rekalar 10 000 3.600 9 200 1.500' 3.000 27 300 • all are inclined toward Serbia
Lower Debar 20.000 20.000
Mai 2S.800 26.031
Total 99 800 4 0 0 0 19 000 2.800' 6.000 2 0 0 0 200 134.031 ' all are inclined toward Serbia
HHStA. AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2. Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitats- und Religions-Verhaltnisse im Vilajet Monastir (Marz 1903). 558 Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Monastir (March 1903), Part 2 486
Elbasan 30.000 6 5 0 0 1 000 1.200 38.700
Grami 11.100 11.100
Pekin 14.800 800 15.600
Total 55.900 6 5 0 0 1.000 2.000 65.400
Korcha 40.000 20.800 6.000 3.300» 50 300 30 70 480 - of which 2.100 are sympathizers of Greece
Kolonia 13.000 6.100 100 100» 100 19.400 ; sympathizers of Greece
Starovo 22.400 3.000 1.000» 26.400 - of which 670 are sympathizers of Greece
Castona 11.000 3 0 0 0 10.400 20.600 3 000 9.600 200 7 000» 5.000 500 1.000 71.300 : of which 4.000 are sympathizers of Greece
Total 86 400 32 900 1 0 4 0 0 26 600 3.000 9.700 200 11 400» 5.050 900 1 0 3 0 187.580 : of which 6.870 are sympathizers of Greece
Servia 900 15.500 800 400» 2.500 • 19 300 : sympathizers of Greece

Naseliz 1.800 2.500 23 500 5100 1.500» 1.500 350 36.250 » of which 1.300 are sympathizers of Greece
Kozaru 340 8 700 2200 500» 15.600 200 20 27.560 sympathizers of Greece
Servia
Kajalar 1.900 6 400 2.200 1.350 1.800» 28 0 0 0 41.650 • of which 1.300 are sympathizers of Greece
Greben 800 18.000 4500 14.000» 700 200 37.400 - of which 7.000 are sympathizers of Greece
Elasona 200 19.000 1000 6000» 2.400 25 28.425 - of which 4.000 are sympathizers of Greece
Total 3.700 2 240 8 9 0 0 2 2 0 0 86.050 13600 24.200» 50.700 750 45 192 385 ^ of which 14.500 are sympathizers of Greece
Total 329.800 231 48.500 178.140 9 4 3 0 0 ' 19.500 95.870 13800 66.660» 85.330 500 9.730 6.095 948.456
1 18.600 Slavs who are inclined toward Serbia
: 43.170 Vlachs who are inclined toward Greece
486 HHStA. AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai), K. 2, Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitats.-und Religions-Verhaltnisse im Vilajet Monastir (Marz 1903). 559
Statistical table of national and religious relations in the Vilayet of Monastir (March 1903), generalities 487
Sanjak
Number of inhabitants
Albanians Slavs Greeks
Vlachs
Ottoman
Turks Circassians Roma Jews Total Note
Muslims Catholics Orthodox Exarchists
(Bulgarian) Patriarchists Muslims Orthodox Muslims
Monastir 84.000 5.100 146.500 56.000 8.300 120 30.0602 27.580 500 5.880 5.020 369.060
of which 15.800 are inclined toward Serbia and of which 21.800 are inclined toward Greece
Debar 99.800 231 4.000 19.000 2.800 6.000 2.000 200 134.031 All are inclined toward Serbia
Elbasan 55.900 6.500 1.000 2.000 65.400
Korea 86.400 32.900 10.400 26.600 3.000 9.700 200 11.4002 5.050 900 1.030 187.580 of which 6.870 are inclined toward Greece
Servija 3.700 2.240 8.900 2.200 86.050 13.600 24.2002 50.700 750 45 192.385 of which 14.500 are inclined toward Greece
Total 329.800 48.500 178.140 94.300 19.500 95.870 13.800 66.6602 85.330 500 9.730 6.095 948.456
18.600 Slavs who are inclined toward Serbia; 43.170 Vlachs who are inclined toward Greece
HHStA. AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2, Statistical Table of Nationality and Religious Relations in the Vilayet of Monastir (March 1903). 560 Statistical table of national and

religious relations in the vilayets of Skadar, Janjina, Kosovo, Monastir and Solun (1903), part 1 488
Vilayet
Number of inhabitants
Albanians Slavs Greeks
Muslims Catholics Orthodox Exarchists
(Bulgarians)
Patriarchists
(Serbs) Muslims Catholics Orthodox Muslims
Skadar 124 J 14 95.922 3.139 1.810 7.870 20
Janjina 237.480 97.830 160.725 9.220
Kosovo 441.900 13.960 195.943 193.807 92.601 123
(Serbo-Croats)
Monastir 329.800 231 48.500 178.140 94.300 19.500
95.870 13.800
Solun 229.630 78.500 109.900 4.6S05
(Bulgarians) 207.450
Total 1.133.494 110.113 149.460 603.713 368.417 229.871 7.661 464.188 23.020
4RR HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K 2, Statistical Table of Nationality and Religious Relations in the Vilayets of Skadar, Janjina, Kosovo, Monastir and Salonich (1903).
Statistical table of national and religious relations in the vilayets of Skadar, Janjina, Kosovo, Monastir and Solun (1903), part 2 489
Vilayet
Number of inhabitants
Vlachs Ottoman
Turks
Emigrants from Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria
Circassians Roma Jews Total Remark
Skadar 3.080= 237.685 of which 450 are inclined toward Greece; of which 350 are inclined toward Greece
Janjina 3Z540= - 4.139 552.004 the great majority are sympathizers of Greece
for the most part are sympathizers of Greece
Kosovo 3.902 102.543 6.981 6.981 210 1.488 1.079.226 of which 70.593 are Serbs
of which 22.008 are Bulgarians (Pomaks)
Monastir 66.660= 85.330 500 6.095 948.456 of which only 18.600 are inclined toward Serbia; all the others toward Greece; 43.170 Vlachs who are inclined toward Greece
Solun 23.210 389.650 50.000 1.092.990
of which 3.100 are Serbs
of which 75.400 Bulgarians are inclined toward Greece
of which 450 are Protestant Bulgarians, and Pomaks
Total 129392 577.523 6.981 6.981 710 61.722 3.910361
HHStA, AB XIX / 84 (NL Krai). K. 2. Statistical Table of Nationality and Religious Relations in the Vilayets of Scutari, Janina, Kosovo, Monastir and Salonich (1903).
ARCHIVAL SOURCES and
ABBREVIATIONS USED
Consulted libraries:

Austrian National Library (ONB), Vienna
Library of the HHStA, Vienna
Bibliotheque Nationale de France, Paris
Library of INALCO, Paris
Bulgarian National Library, Sofia
Library of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia
Consulted archives:
Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, (Vienna), Vienna
Kriegsarchiv (War Archive), Vienna
Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris
Bulgarian National Archive, Sofia
Archival sources:
Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Political Archive (PA)
I. (General), Boxes: 375, 473.
XII. (Turkey), Boxes: 263, 270, 271, 301, 312.
XIV. (Albania 1894-1916), Boxes: 4, 7, 8, 9, 18, 19, 24.
Nachlass (NL) Scepary, Box: 3
Finding aid XIX/84, Boxes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
Administrative Registry (AR):
Section 4 (Personalia), Boxes 339, 340.
Section 27 (Catholic Church in the Levant), Boxes: 1, 2, 35.

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About the Author

Teodora Toleva (1968–2011) studied history and theology at Sofia University, received education in Paris and Barcelona, and in 2008 at the University of Barcelona defended her doctoral dissertation, presented in this book. Her research interests were directed particularly toward the process of nation formation among Macedonians, Armenians, and Albanians, toward the Habsburg Monarchy, and the phenomenon of emigration.
574

CONTENTS

Forewords 5
Introduction, or How the Subject of the Research Was Determined and Defined 23
Chapter I: Organization of the Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary 33
Chapter II: A Plan for Albania, or Viennese Rationality and Irrationality 59
Chapter III: Approval of the Plan — Diplomatic Risks and Long-Term Forecasts 111
Chapter IV: A Rebellious People Between Two Empires 155
Chapter V: The Travels of Austro-Hungarian Consuls into the Heart of the Albanian-Muslim Community, or the Beginning of a Romantic Conspiracy 185
Chapter VI: Religious Protectorate — Between Tradition and the Future 231
Chapter VII: Monsignor Primo Doci: Idealist, Hero, or the Power of Gold? 267
Chapter VIII: Language — The Great Work of Synthesis 307
Chapter IX: Schools — A Difficult Beginning 353
Chapter X: The Press, or How Vienna Begins to Write in Albanian 399
Conclusions 441
Appendix I: Ippen's Memorandum, April 1897 450
Appendix II: Memorandum on the Albanian National Movement, Brussels, January 1899 454
Appendix III: Political Activity of the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Albania in 1897 478
Appendix IV: The Situation of the National Movement in Albania at the End of 1901 and the Attitude of the Imperial and Royal Government Toward It 494
Appendix V: Memorandum from Albania (from the end of 1901 to the beginning of 1905) 509

Appendix VI: Austro-Hungarian Action 527
Appendix VII: Maps 541
Appendix VIII: Statistical Tables of National and Religious Relations in the Vilayets of Kosovo, Scutari, Monastir, Janina, and Salonika .....
546
Archival Sources and Abbreviations Used 562
Bibliography 563
575
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“The Influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the Creation of the Albanian Nation” is the pioneering work of the prematurely deceased Bulgarian historian Teodora Toleva (1968–2010). Starting from documents accidentally found in the Viennese Court Archives, the author is the first to reveal the existence of a department of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, in the period 1896–1908, thoroughly financed the entire mechanism of operation of its consular representations on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, with the aim of assisting the development of authentic Albanian literacy.
Incidentally, that department also works intensively on creating a national

consciousness among the Albanians. With the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vienna gets a new "tribe" for a neighbor. The Albanians are geographically, tribally, and especially religiously divided, so the assessment is that they lack a unified national consciousness. Vienna carefully pursues a policy of not provoking Turkey, presenting itself as a friend of the peoples on the eastern shore of the Strait of Otranto, since the competitor from the Apennines is already greatly exploiting the Vatican’s influence over Catholic Albanians.

From 1875, as the Serbs pressed against the Turks, Austro-Hungarian planners determined (as Dr. Aleksandar Rakovic emphasized in the afterword) that the northern Albanians — Roman Catholics and Muslims — having no common ethnic consciousness, are “united” by hatred toward their neighboring Slavs.

During the intensive implementation of this campaign, Austria-Hungary would recognize the full difficulty of gaining the trust of the divided Albanian tribes, having also realized the unreliability of the Albanians themselves. With the Young Turk Revolution (1908) this campaign was effectively halted, and Austria-Hungary would not remember it as a success.

"The Influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the Creation of the Albanian Nation," the work of the prematurely deceased Bulgarian historian Teodora Toleva (1968–2010) is a pioneering work. Starting from documents accidentally discovered in the Vienna Court Archive, the author is the first to expose the existence of a department within the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, in the period from 1896 to 1908, thoroughly financed the entire operational mechanism of its consular missions within the territory of the Ottoman Empire, with the goal of aiding the development of authentic Albanian literacy.

Concurrently, this department worked intensively on the creation of an Albanian national consciousness. With the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vienna gained a new "tribe" as a neighbor. Albanians were geographically, tribally, and especially religiously divided, so the assessment was that they lacked a unified national consciousness. Vienna carefully pursued a policy of not provoking Turkey, presenting itself as a friend to the people on the eastern shores of the Strait of Otranto, since its competitor from the Apennines was already heavily utilizing the Vatican's influence over Catholic Albanians.

Since 1875, the Serbs had also been advancing against the Turks. Austro-Hungarian planners determined (as highlighted in the afterword by Dr. Aleksandar Raković) that Roman Catholic Albanians and Muslim Albanians in the north – lacking any shared ethical consciousness – were united by a "hatred" toward neighboring Slavs.

During the intensive implementation of this operation, Austria-Hungary would come to see the sheer difficulty of gaining the trust of the divided Albanian tribes, realizing also the unreliability of the Albanians themselves. With the Young Turk Revolution (1908), this operation was practically suspended, and Austria-Hungary would not remember it as a success.

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